VDL Belgium A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
12/03/2026
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for VDL Belgium in 2026.
No incidents recorded for VDL Belgium in 2026.
No incidents recorded for VDL Belgium in 2026.
Changan Automobile is among Top 4 Chinese automobile groups , with a history of 157 years, Changan Automobile has 35 years’ experience in auto-making. Changan has 16 production bases and 35 vehicle and engine plants globally. In 2014, total production and sales of Changan-branded vehicles exceeded 10 million. Changan’s production and sales volume in 2016 hit 3,000,000 units. By July of 2018, Changan-branded vehicle users have exceeded 17 million. Changan Automobile is committed to building world-class R&D capability. For 5 sessions in the past 10 years, Changan has been NO.1 in R&D capability in China’s automotive industry. Changan has over 12,000 R&D personnel from 18 countries, nearly 600 are senior experts, sitting at the forefront of China’s auto industry. We have built a globally collaborative R&D network with various priorities, connecting the R&D centers in Chongqing, Shanghai and Beijing of China, Turin of Italy, Yokohama of Japan, Nottingham of UK ,Detroit of USA and Munich of Germany. To ensure all products meet customers’ demand of driving for 10 years and 260,000 kilometers, Changan has established product development system and test validation system. In April 2018, Changan unveiled The Third Breakthrough-Innovation and Business Venture Program, with an aim to build a global leading automobile company. With this blueprint, Changan is committed to transforming itself into a leading technology company offering smart mobility solutions and services. The program expects to drive growth by innovation, enhance efficiency as the core competitiveness in organization, transform the company in four key areas and boost innovation in three fields. Changan Automobile has launched a series of classic products including CS series, EADO series, RAETON series and ect. With “hi-tech and trendy, efficient and clean, safe and smart” guiding product design, Changan has been vigorously developing new energy vehicles and intelligent vehicles.
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German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will arrive Friday in Brussels in a bid to convince Belgium's leadership to back a €165 billion reparations...
Zephyr's HTTP server (subsys/net/lib/http) provides a static-filesystem resource type (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS, available when CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM is enabled) that serves files from a configured root directory. Before this fix, both the HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 front-ends placed the raw, attacker-controlled request path into client-url_buffer (assembled in on_url() for HTTP/1 and copied verbatim from the :path pseudo-header for HTTP/2) without resolving ./.. segments. The static-FS handler then built the on-disk filename by directly concatenating the configured root with that raw URL (snprintk(fname, ..., "%s%s", static_fs_detail-fs_path, client-url_buffer) at http_server_http1.c:603 and http_server_http2.c:490) and opened it with fs_open(fname, FS_O_READ). Because the handler is reached via wildcard/leading-dir (fnmatch FNM_LEADING_DIR) or fallback resource matching, a request such as GET /<prefix/../../<file is dispatched to the handler and, after the underlying filesystem (e.g. LittleFS/FAT) resolves the .. segments, escapes the configured web root, letting an unauthenticated remote client read arbitrary readable files on the mounted volume (information disclosure). The HTTP server requires no TLS or authentication to reach this path. The fix adds http_server_remove_dot_segments(), which canonicalizes the path portion of the URL before resource lookup in both protocol handlers, neutralizing the traversal. Affects releases v4.0.0 through v4.4.0 for deployments that register a static-filesystem resource.
The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery handlers in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c (handle_ra_input, handle_ns_input, handle_na_input) used an incorrect boolean expression that combined the RFC 4861 validity checks with the ICMPv6 code check using the wrong operator precedence: the form was '((length/hop/source/target checks) && (icmp_hdr-code != 0))'. Because every legitimate ND message carries ICMPv6 code 0, an attacker setting code == 0 (the normal value) caused the entire predicate to evaluate false, so the packet was never dropped and all of the other checks were silently skipped. The bypassed checks include the mandatory Hop Limit == 255 verification (which proves an ND packet originated on-link and was not forwarded) and, for Router Advertisements, the requirement that the source be a link-local address, as well as multicast-target sanity checks. As a result, an adjacent on-link attacker — and, because the Hop-Limit-255 guard is bypassed, potentially a remote/off-link attacker whose packets would otherwise be rejected — can have forged Router Advertisement, Neighbor Solicitation, and Neighbor Advertisement messages accepted. A forged RA lets the attacker reconfigure the victim's default router, on-link prefixes (SLAAC), MTU, reachable/retransmit timers, and (with CONFIG_NET_IPV6_RA_RDNSS) DNS servers, while forged NS/NA enable neighbor-cache poisoning, enabling man-in-the-middle, traffic redirection, and denial of service. The flaw is an input-validation/authentication weakness rather than a memory-safety issue: the underlying packet-parsing primitives (net_pkt_get_data, net_pkt_read, net_pkt_skip) are independently bounds-safe and the validated 'length' is the true buffer length, so skipping the length check causes no out-of-bounds access. The defect has existed since the logic was introduced in 2018 and shipped in all releases through v4.4.0; it is fixed by splitting the condition so any failing check drops the packet.
A heap buffer overflow in the HighPriorityASDUQueue_hasUnconfirmedIMessages function of lib60870 v2.3.3 to v2.3.6 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted payload.
A heap buffer overflow in the TS7Worker::PerformFunctionWrite() function (/core/s7_server.cpp) of snap7 v1.4.3 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted packet.
mcumgr_serial_process_frag() in subsys/mgmt/mcumgr/transport/src/serial_util.c calls net_buf_reset() on the result of smp_packet_alloc() before checking it for NULL. smp_packet_alloc() uses net_buf_alloc(K_NO_WAIT) against the shared MCUmgr packet pool (CONFIG_MCUMGR_TRANSPORT_NETBUF_COUNT, default 4), which returns NULL when the pool is exhausted. In default builds the __ASSERT_NO_MSG in net_buf_reset is a no-op, so net_buf_simple_reset writes through the NULL pointer (buf->len = 0; buf->data = buf->__buf), causing a fault/crash. The fragment data reaches this code from attacker-controlled bytes on the MCUmgr serial/UART/shell-console transports (smp_uart.c, smp_raw_uart.c, smp_shell.c), and a fresh buffer is allocated at the start of essentially every new packet. An attacker on the serial/console link can flood the transport to drive the 4-entry buffer pool to exhaustion and induce the NULL dereference, crashing the device (denial of service). The defect was introduced after the original MCUmgr rework and shipped in Zephyr v4.4.0. The fix moves the NULL check ahead of net_buf_reset.
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