DCMS
Company Details
Linkedin ID:
dcmsgovuk
Employees number:
1,508
Number of followers:
122,999
NAICS:
92
Industry Type:
Homepage:
civil-service-careers.gov.uk
IP Addresses:
0
Company ID:
DEP_7893314
Scan Status:
In-progress
Department for Culture, Media and Sport Company CyberSecurity Posture
civil-service-careers.gov.uk
The Department for Culture, Media and Sport will focus on supporting culture, arts, media, sport, tourism and civil society across every part of England — recognising the UK’s world-leading position in these areas and the importance of these sectors in contributing so much to our economy, way of life and our reputation around the world. The department champions sport for all at every level, support our world-leading cultural and creative industries and enhance the cohesiveness of our communities. DCMS is a ministerial department, supported by 42 agencies and public bodies.
Department for Culture, Media and Sport A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
DCMS Risk Score (AI oriented)Between 650 and 699
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DCMS Company CyberSecurity News & History
Past Incidents
21
Attack Types
4
Department for Culture, Media and Sport: UK Ransomware Payment Ban to Come with Exemptions
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: There will be “national security exemptions” to the ransomware payment ban proposed by the UK government, according to British Security Minister Dan Jarvis. The ban, which was subject to public consultation from January to April 2025 and received support from three-quarters of respondents, was confirmed in July and described in more details by the UK government in a policy paper published on September 2. If adopted, the new legislative proposal would ban ransomware payments for public sector and critical national infrastructure (CNI) organizations as well as require other businesses to notify the government of any intent to pay a ransom to attackers. Speaking at the Financial Times’ Cyber Resilience Summit: Europe, held in London on December 3, the minister said the proposition was his “personal priority.” He also said that the current arrangements for each organization to choose whether to pay cybercriminals a ransom is “not sustainable” as it doesn’t offer organisations any meaningful guarantee they will get their data back. Security Minister Pushes Ban Across Government and CNI Organizations Asked about the next steps for the proposal, Jarvis said it will be adopted “when parliamentary time allows.” He continued by explaining he is currently “seeking agreement across government” and consulting with CNI organizations and the private sector to “ensure that our proposals are going to work in the most effective way.” Jarvis said that the government has acknowledged war
Department for Culture, Media and Sport: Making cybercrime illegal won’t stop it; making cybersec research legal may
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack without any consequences
Description: **Portugal and UK Move to Legalize Ethical Hacking for Security Researchers** Portugal and the UK are taking steps to protect cybersecurity researchers from legal repercussions for ethical hacking. Last week, Portugal’s parliament passed legislation exempting researchers from prosecution when probing systems to uncover vulnerabilities, while the UK signaled plans to follow suit. In a speech, UK Security Minister Dan Jarvis criticized the country’s outdated 1990 Computer Misuse Act, arguing it stifles security experts who play a critical role in strengthening digital defenses. Jarvis emphasized that researchers help identify unknown vulnerabilities, making systems more resilient—work that should be encouraged rather than penalized. The moves reflect a growing recognition that legal barriers can hinder efforts to improve cybersecurity, leaving critical infrastructure exposed. Both countries aim to strike a balance between deterring malicious hacking and enabling legitimate research to bolster national security.
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) website in the U.K. fell victim to a redirect attack in which the cybercriminals used an open redirect to send visitors to fake OnlyFans pages. Threat actors exploited an open redirect that appeared to be a valid UK government URL but instead routed visitors to the bogus OnlyFans dating site. The website widely used services that offer users access to adult content for a subscription so they could steal users’ personal information.
Government Legal Department
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: The Government Legal Department launched an investigation after it suffereda data leak in which the names of civil servants claiming expenses was published online. Documents showing officials' names were published on GOV.UK accidentally. It also contained the credit-card spend at the department of more than £500 between November 2021 and May 2022.
HMRC
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack limited on finance or reputation: Loss of bank statements, self-assessment details, and other people's National Insurance numbers
Description: Organized crime has extracted £47 million from the UK government in a phishing operation. The operation involved mimicking taxpayer credentials and claiming payments from HMRC. No data from taxpayers was taken, but the incident has affected 100,000 Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) accounts. Authorities have begun a criminal investigation, and arrests have been made. The £47 million was taken through three separate payments, and HMRC was able to protect £1.9 million that was sought by the entities behind the operation.
National Crime Agency (NCA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of a geographical region
Description: The website of the National Crime Agency was targeted by the Lizard Squad hackers which left the site inaccessible for some time. The websites or servers are flooded with requests for data and were attacked with a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The attack disturbed the normal functioning of NCA.
U.K. Education Sector (Schools and Colleges)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: The U.K.’s education sector faced a surge in cyber incidents driven by student hackers, with 215 insider threat breaches reported between January 2022 and August 2024. In one case, three Year 11 students exploited downloaded tools to hack their school’s information management system, citing curiosity and skill-testing as motives. Another incident involved a student using a staff login to access, modify, or delete personal data of over 9,000 individuals—including staff, students, and applicants—before the breach was reported to police. The attacks were primarily motivated by dares, notoriety, or revenge, with only 5% involving sophisticated techniques. Poor data protection practices, such as unattended devices and unauthorized student access to staff systems, exacerbated vulnerabilities. While most breaches stemmed from reckless behavior rather than malicious intent, the incidents exposed sensitive personal information, risking reputational damage and potential long-term harm to affected individuals. The ICO emphasized the need for parental guidance and redirection of tech-savvy youth toward legal cybersecurity careers to mitigate future risks.
UK Government (Public Sector)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The UK government is facing severe criticism for its repeated failures in safeguarding sensitive data, with a history of major breaches exposing highly confidential information. Recent incidents include the **Afghan data leak**, where 19,000 Afghans (including British military allies) and over 100 UK officials had their personal details exposed, endangering lives. Another breach involved **200 abuse survivors in the Church of England**, whose private records were leaked through a compensation scheme. Additionally, the **Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) breach** compromised nearly 10,000 officers' data, risking their safety and that of their families. The **Legal Aid Agency breach** further exposed names, addresses, National Insurance numbers, and criminal histories dating back to 2010.The proposed **mandatory digital ID system** would centralize biometric and identity data for the entire UK population, creating a high-value target for cyberattacks. Experts warn this could lead to **mass surveillance risks**, **foreign adversary exploitation**, and **large-scale identity theft**, with 63% of Britons already distrusting the government’s data security. The cumulative impact of these breaches—combined with the potential for a centralized digital ID—poses existential threats to **national security, civil liberties, and individual safety**, turning the UK into a high-risk surveillance state.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: A Ministry of Defence (MoD) official accidentally exposed confidential government data by leaving their laptop unattended on a train. The breach involved sensitive information related to Afghan refugees fleeing the Taliban, alongside multiple other incidents within the same unit, including emails sent to incorrect recipients, insecure system access, and unauthorized employee data access. The case was criticized in Parliament as an institutional failure, highlighting systemic vulnerabilities in handling classified information. The incident underscores broader risks tied to remote work, such as unsecured environments (e.g., public Wi-Fi, public spaces) and inadequate monitoring of compliance. Experts emphasized the need for stricter policies, employee training, and secure handling protocols to prevent recurring breaches, particularly in high-stakes sectors like defense. The breach further erodes public trust in government data practices and raises concerns about operational security in hybrid work models.
UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The **Afghan data breach** involved the unauthorized exposure of sensitive personal data belonging to Afghan nationals, including **QP1 and another claimant (QP2)**, who had worked with or were associated with UK forces during the Afghanistan conflict. The breach led to the **leak of identities, roles, religious affiliations (e.g., Shia/Hazara), and perceived associations (e.g., falsely labeled as a 'spy')**, placing individuals at severe risk of **Taliban retaliation, persecution, or targeted violence**. The UK government’s **Defence Secretary refused relocation assistance** in April 2024, arguing the claimants did not meet the 'highest risk' threshold, despite their vulnerable status.The **judicial review challenge** (dismissed in June 2025) highlighted systemic failures in risk assessment, where **misclassification of high-profile status** and **underestimation of ethnic/religious threats** (e.g., Hazara Shia minority) were central. The breach’s fallout included **legal battles over accountability**, with closed proceedings (e.g., 'Afghan superinjunction') obscuring full transparency. The incident underscores **gaps in post-conflict data protection**, where leaked information directly endangers lives, particularly in regions under hostile regime control. The case reflects broader **governmental negligence in safeguarding at-risk collaborators**, with long-term reputational and humanitarian consequences.
Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The Ministry of Defence (MoD) experienced a significant data breach where the names and details of more than 19,000 people were leaked. This breach occurred when an unnamed official emailed a spreadsheet outside the government team processing Afghan relocation applications, leading to the data entering the public domain. The leak was discovered in August 2023 when names of individuals who applied to move to the UK appeared on Facebook. Many Afghans now fear retribution from the Taliban, and the MoD has stated it will not provide compensation or proactively give payouts to those affected. The breach has led to significant distress and worries for the affected families, who are seeking relocation to safer countries.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) experienced **49 separate data breaches** over four years within its **Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)** unit, which handles relocation applications for Afghans at risk due to their work with British forces. The most severe incident involved a **spreadsheet leak in 2022**, where a soldier unknowingly shared hidden data containing **personal details of nearly 19,000 Afghans**, including names, contact information, and family associations. This breach, suppressed by a gagging order until 2024, risked exposing vulnerable individuals to Taliban reprisals. Other breaches included **email misconfigurations** (e.g., 265 Afghans’ email addresses exposed in 2021) and repeated failures in data handling protocols despite remedial measures like the 'two pairs of eyes' review rule. The breaches prompted fines (e.g., £350,000 for the 2021 email incident), legal scrutiny, and criticism over **lax security culture**, with lawyers and data protection experts questioning the MoD’s ability to safeguard highly sensitive information. The ICO acknowledged ongoing engagement but took no further action on the largest breach, citing resource constraints. Political blame shifted between Conservative and Labour administrations, with the latter claiming improved measures post-2024.
Ministry of Defence (MOD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: In 2022, the UK’s **Ministry of Defence (MOD)** suffered a severe **data breach** involving the accidental leak of personal details of **~19,000 Afghan citizens** seeking refuge in the UK post-Taliban takeover. The breach occurred due to **insecure handling of Excel spreadsheets on a SharePoint site**, exposing sensitive information that led to **49 confirmed deaths** (linked to Taliban reprisals) and placed thousands more at risk. The incident, concealed under a superinjunction until 2024, has incurred an estimated **£850 million in costs** (excluding legal/compensation claims, which could push totals into **billions**). The **Public Accounts Committee (PAC)** criticized the MOD for **systemic failures**, including outdated IT infrastructure, lack of cybersecurity specialists, and repeated breaches (e.g., a 2023 leak of military personnel data). The breach’s fallout includes **operational disruptions**, reputational damage, and potential long-term geopolitical consequences, as compromised Afghans included interpreters and allies critical to UK missions. The PAC demanded urgent reforms, including **modernized systems** and **enhanced recruitment of digital security experts** to prevent future incidents.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: A catastrophic data breach at the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) exposed the personal details of **33,000 Afghans**—individuals at risk from the Taliban due to their ties to British forces. The leak occurred when a highly classified **Excel spreadsheet** containing sensitive data was **emailed to an unauthorized external recipient**. The breach triggered a covert evacuation program but was concealed from the public and MPs for nearly two years under a **superinjunction**, only revealed after a prolonged legal battle by media outlets, including *The Independent*. The UK’s data regulator, the **Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)**, opted **not to launch a formal investigation**, citing reliance on the MoD’s 'honesty' and claiming resource constraints. No contemporaneous notes were taken due to the **classified nature of the information**, raising concerns over institutional failures. MPs criticized the ICO’s handling, describing it as **‘a few unrecorded meetings and a handshake’**, while the MoD’s data practices were condemned as **‘top-secret information bandied about like confetti’**. The breach risked **life-threatening consequences** for exposed Afghans, with no accountability or systemic reforms enforced until public scrutiny forced limited action in 2024.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: A catastrophic **data breach** at the **UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)** exposed the personal details of thousands of Afghan interpreters and former special forces members who had worked alongside British troops. The leaked information—including identities, locations, and eligibility for UK relocation—was accessed by hostile actors, leading to direct threats from the Taliban. As a result, at least two families (including a former patrol interpreter and a special forces commando) had their **UK relocation offers revoked** despite prior approval. Pakistani police detained them, moving them to deportation camps with imminent risk of forced return to Afghanistan, where execution by the Taliban is highly probable. The breach has left vulnerable individuals—many of whom had waited **years** in limbo—without visas, financial support, or safe shelter. Children and wives of affected personnel now face severe psychological trauma (e.g., PTSD) and potential violence. Legal challenges have been filed, but the UK government cites **failed security checks** (conducted only after the breach) as justification for reversals. The incident underscores systemic failures in protecting at-risk allies, with critics condemning the move as **‘morally bankrupt’**, given the life-or-death stakes for those abandoned. The reputational damage to the MoD and UK government is severe, compounded by accusations of betrayal toward those who served British forces.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) suffered a **mass data breach** exposing highly sensitive personal details of thousands of Afghans who had supported British forces, including interpreters, staff, and their families. The breach led to a **top-secret airlift operation** to relocate at-risk individuals to Britain, costing £7 billion, while the MoD imposed a **draconian super-injunction** to suppress details for nearly two years. The exposed data placed Afghan allies in grave danger of retaliation from the Taliban, with the MoD failing to allocate funds for compensation or resettlement. Despite the court order being lifted in July 2024, the MoD continues to evade transparency, ignoring journalist inquiries and parliamentary scrutiny. The incident revealed systemic failures in data protection, financial accountability, and ethical governance, with MPs condemning the cover-up as a betrayal of those who served alongside UK forces. The breach’s fallout extends beyond financial mismanagement to **life-threatening consequences** for vulnerable individuals, eroding public trust in institutional accountability.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed **49 data breaches** tied to its **Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)** and related schemes for Afghan nationals who aided UK forces. The most severe incident—a **February 2022 spreadsheet error**—exposed **18,700 Afghans’ personal data**, including those seeking UK resettlement after the Taliban’s return. The breach, concealed under a super-injunction until July 2025, incurred **£850M+ in mitigation costs** and risked endangering lives by revealing identities to hostile actors. Other breaches included: - **Blind carbon copy (BCC) failures** (3 incidents, £350K ICO fine), exposing email recipients’ identities. - **WhatsApp messages** with insecure personal data. - **Misdirected emails** (e.g., sent to the *Civil Service Sports Club* or with incorrect classification levels). - **Physical exposure**: An **MODNET laptop screen** displaying sensitive data on public transport. - **Microsoft Forms incident** (October 2021), further compromising data. Only **5 of 49 incidents** were reported to the ICO, though the watchdog accepted the MoD’s risk assessments. The breaches stemmed from **operational negligence** during high-stakes relocation efforts, heightening risks for vulnerable Afghan allies. The **Defence Select Committee** is investigating the 2022 breach under a broader inquiry.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The **Afghan data breach** involved the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive personal information belonging to Afghan nationals who had collaborated with British forces prior to the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021. The leak exposed names and other identifying details, placing these individuals—and potentially their families—at severe risk of retaliation, persecution, or fatal harm under Taliban rule. Despite the gravity of the breach, the **UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)** opted **not to launch a formal investigation** into the MoD, nor did it impose any enforceable penalties. Critics argue this reflects a broader **systemic failure in enforcement**, where the ICO’s ‘public sector approach’—relying on non-binding reprimands rather than legal action—undermines deterrence and accountability. The breach is deemed one of the **most serious in UK history**, with life-threatening consequences for affected individuals, yet regulatory inaction has left victims without recourse. The incident has also eroded trust in the ICO’s ability to uphold data protection laws, particularly in high-stakes government failures.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK Government
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could bring to a war
Description: In a catastrophic data breach, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) inadvertently leaked the personal details of **18,700 applicants** to the Afghan resettlement schemes, exposing highly sensitive information that placed thousands of vulnerable individuals—including Afghan interpreters, allies, and their families—at severe risk of retaliation, persecution, or harm. The breach was concealed under an **unprecedented 18-month superinjunction**, blocking public and parliamentary scrutiny while the government failed to address the fallout effectively. Despite the legal gag being lifted in July 2023, **4,200 eligible applicants and their families remain stranded**, awaiting relocation under the scheme. The incident revealed systemic failures in data protection, transparency, and accountability, with MPs and journalists highlighting a **culture of secrecy** within the MoD. The breach not only endangered lives but also undermined trust in the UK’s resettlement programs and its commitment to protecting at-risk Afghans who had assisted British forces.
UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed **49 data breaches** tied to its Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) and related schemes, exposing sensitive personal data of Afghan nationals who worked with the UK government. The most severe incident—a **February 2022 spreadsheet error**—compromised **18,700 individuals**, with mitigation costs estimated at **£850 million**. Other breaches included **blind carbon copy (BCC) email failures** (fined £350,000 by the ICO), **WhatsApp messages with insecure personal data**, **emails sent to wrong recipients** (including non-relevant entities like a sports club), **misclassified emails**, and **a laptop screen displaying sensitive data in public**. Only **5 of 49 incidents** were reported to the ICO, though the watchdog deemed the MoD’s reporting judgment satisfactory. The breaches risked endangering Afghan allies by exposing their identities to potential Taliban retaliation, while also damaging the MoD’s reputation and operational trust.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: Russian hackers (Lynx group) breached the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) by exploiting a third-party contractor (Dodd Group), gaining access to **hundreds of classified military documents**—including files marked *‘Controlled’* or *‘Official Sensitive’*—from **eight RAF and Royal Navy bases**. The leaked data (4TB total) includes **names, emails, and mobile numbers of MoD personnel and contractors**, **car registrations**, **visitor logs for high-security sites (e.g., RAF Lakenheath, home to US F-35 stealth jets and nuclear bombs)**, and **internal security instructions**, aiding future phishing attacks. Two of four planned data dumps have been released on the dark web, with hackers threatening further leaks. The breach, described as *‘catastrophic’* by experts, compromises **national security**, **embarrasses key allies (e.g., the US)**, and exposes critical vulnerabilities in the MoD’s supply chain and IT infrastructure. The attack leveraged a *‘gateway’* via a maintenance contractor, bypassing the MoD’s primary cyber defenses.
DCMS Company Scoring based on AI Models
Cyber Incidents Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
A.I Risk Score Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
Underwriter Stats for DCMS
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Average (This Year)
Department for Culture, Media and Sport has 146.91% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs All-Companies Average (This Year)
Department for Culture, Media and Sport has 159.74% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident Types DCMS vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
Department for Culture, Media and Sport reported 2 incidents this year: 0 cyber attacks, 1 ransomware, 1 vulnerabilities, 0 data breaches, compared to industry peers with at least 1 incident.
Incident History — DCMS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DCMS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
DCMS Company Subsidiaries
The Department for Culture, Media and Sport will focus on supporting culture, arts, media, sport, tourism and civil society across every part of England — recognising the UK’s world-leading position in these areas and the importance of these sectors in contributing so much to our economy, way of life and our reputation around the world. The department champions sport for all at every level, support our world-leading cultural and creative industries and enhance the cohesiveness of our communities. DCMS is a ministerial department, supported by 42 agencies and public bodies.
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DCMS CyberSecurity News
September 30, 2025 07:00 AM
Permanent Secretary Urges Early Cybersecurity Education in Schools
Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Ambassador Dr. Rocky Meade, has called for the integration of cybersecurity...
August 27, 2025 07:06 PM
Cybersecurity for K-12 Education
There is nothing more important than ensuring the safety and security of our schools from physical and cybersecurity threats alike.
March 14, 2025 07:00 AM
Industry groups ‘alarmed’ Education Department cuts may weaken school cybersecurity
Industry groups 'alarmed' Education Department cuts may weaken school cybersecurity. Several groups and school districts this week said...
November 25, 2024 08:00 AM
Fortinet partners with South Australia for cybersecurity programme
Fortinet has announced a partnership with the Department for Education in South Australia to provide a comprehensive Security Awareness and Training programme.
November 16, 2024 08:00 AM
Florida Department of Education announces winners of 2nd Annual Cybersecurity Competition
On Friday, the Florida Department of Education announced the winners of its 2nd Annual Cybersecurity Competition, an event held in partnership...
October 08, 2024 07:00 AM
Cybersecurity Pathway Design Lab Nov. 20
EnvisionEdPlus, in partnership with the Ohio Department of Education and Workforce, invites Ohio high schools to a no-cost Cybersecurity Pathway...
October 08, 2024 07:00 AM
Cyber crime and harm
Advanced technology has increased the breadth, scale and sophistication of cyber crime. How can cyber security evolve to counter it?
September 19, 2024 02:30 AM
School Safety and Security
ED has a number of school safety resources for schools. These include guides on substance abuse and online safety, data and resources related to college campus...
April 28, 2023 07:00 AM
Royal Holloway is building the cybersecurity experts of tomorrow
According to research from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, almost 700,000 businesses in the UK have a basic skills gap...
Frequently Asked Questions
Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
DCMS CyberSecurity History Information
Official Website of Department for Culture, Media and Sport
The official website of Department for Culture, Media and Sport is https://www.civil-service-careers.gov.uk/working-for-dcms-hub/.
Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s AI-Generated Cybersecurity Score
According to Rankiteo, Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 650, reflecting their Weak security posture.
How many security badges does Department for Culture, Media and Sport’ have ?
According to Rankiteo, Department for Culture, Media and Sport currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
Does Department for Culture, Media and Sport have SOC 2 Type 1 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, Department for Culture, Media and Sport is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
Does Department for Culture, Media and Sport have SOC 2 Type 2 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, Department for Culture, Media and Sport does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
Does Department for Culture, Media and Sport comply with GDPR ?
According to Rankiteo, Department for Culture, Media and Sport is not listed as GDPR compliant.
Does Department for Culture, Media and Sport have PCI DSS certification ?
According to Rankiteo, Department for Culture, Media and Sport does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
Does Department for Culture, Media and Sport comply with HIPAA ?
According to Rankiteo, Department for Culture, Media and Sport is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
Does Department for Culture, Media and Sport have ISO 27001 certification ?
According to Rankiteo,Department for Culture, Media and Sport is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Industry Classification of Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Department for Culture, Media and Sport operates primarily in the Government Administration industry.
Number of Employees at Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Department for Culture, Media and Sport employs approximately 1,508 people worldwide.
Subsidiaries Owned by Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Department for Culture, Media and Sport presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s LinkedIn Followers
Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 122,999 followers.
NAICS Classification of Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Department for Culture, Media and Sport is classified under the NAICS code 92, which corresponds to Public Administration.
Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s Presence on Crunchbase
No, Department for Culture, Media and Sport does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s Presence on LinkedIn
Yes, Department for Culture, Media and Sport maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/dcmsgovuk.
Cybersecurity Incidents Involving Department for Culture, Media and Sport
As of December 12, 2025, Rankiteo reports that Department for Culture, Media and Sport has experienced 21 cybersecurity incidents.
Number of Peer and Competitor Companies
Department for Culture, Media and Sport has an estimated 11,525 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
What types of cybersecurity incidents have occurred at Department for Culture, Media and Sport ?
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack, Vulnerability, Ransomware and Breach.
What was the total financial impact of these incidents on Department for Culture, Media and Sport ?
Total Financial Loss: The total financial loss from these incidents is estimated to be $851.75 billion.
How does Department for Culture, Media and Sport detect and respond to cybersecurity incidents ?
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an containment measures with shut down fake accounts, containment measures with removed false information, and communication strategy with contacting affected customers, and third party assistance with legal representation by leigh day law firm, and recovery measures with high court applications to halt deportations, recovery measures with special immigration appeals commission reviews, and communication strategy with statements by mod spokesperson defending security checks, communication strategy with media coverage highlighting humanitarian crisis, and third party assistance with national crime agency (nca), third party assistance with cyber choices program, and and remediation measures with parental awareness campaigns, remediation measures with student education on legal cybersecurity careers, and communication strategy with ico advisory to parents and schools, communication strategy with public warnings about teen hacking risks, and incident response plan activated with partial (varies by breach), incident response plan activated with legal gagging orders (afghan leak), and law enforcement notified with likely (for psni breach), law enforcement notified with unclear for other incidents, and containment measures with data removal requests (psni), containment measures with legal suppression (afghan leak), and remediation measures with review of 11 breaches by cabinet office, remediation measures with unclear if all recommendations implemented, and communication strategy with delayed/supppressed (afghan leak), communication strategy with public disclosures for psni/church of england breaches, and incident response plan activated with yes (post-2021 breaches), and third party assistance with information commissioner's office (ico) engagement, third party assistance with legal counsel (high court gagging order, 2023–2025), third party assistance with data protection specialists (e.g., mishcon de reya, barings law), and containment measures with high court gagging order (2023–2025, lifted july 2025), containment measures with internal reviews of breaches, containment measures with limited public disclosure (only 4 of 49 breaches initially public), and remediation measures with new data handling procedures (november 2021), remediation measures with mandatory training for staff, remediation measures with 'two pairs of eyes' rule for external emails (post-november 2021), remediation measures with new software (introduced by labour government, post-july 2024), and recovery measures with closure of arap scheme (july 2025), recovery measures with public apology by defence secretary, recovery measures with parliamentary scrutiny (post-july 2024 disclosures), and communication strategy with delayed disclosure (gagging orders, legal restrictions), communication strategy with selective transparency (bbc foia request, 2025), communication strategy with apologies via political statements, and enhanced monitoring with yes (post-2021, details undisclosed), and remediation measures with judicial review process, remediation measures with policy rationalization (as per cx1 and mp1 v sshd [2024] ewhc 892), and communication strategy with superinjunction initially imposed (lifted july 2024), communication strategy with open judgment published in 2025, and and and containment measures with investigation ongoing, containment measures with no public details on containment, and communication strategy with mod statement: 'actively investigating', communication strategy with no public disclosure of remediation steps, and incident response plan activated with yes (partial; ico satisfied with escalation judgments), and containment measures with super-injunction (lifted in july 2025), containment measures with ico reporting for 5/49 incidents, containment measures with internal reviews, and remediation measures with mitigation spending (£850m for spreadsheet error), remediation measures with policy/process reviews (ongoing), and communication strategy with letter to mps (7 october 2023), communication strategy with public accounts committee (pac) disclosures, communication strategy with defence select committee inquiry, and incident response plan activated with secret evacuation program, incident response plan activated with mod internal review, and containment measures with limited to mod's internal actions (per ico), and remediation measures with mod claimed to address 'bad data practices', remediation measures with no formal ico oversight, and communication strategy with concealment via superinjunction (for ~2 years), communication strategy with public disclosure after legal battle, and incident response plan activated with yes (internal investigations; reporting to ico for 5 incidents), and containment measures with super-injunction for spreadsheet error (lifted in 2023-07), containment measures with ico reporting for selected incidents, containment measures with internal reviews by mod, and remediation measures with £850m allocated for mitigation of spreadsheet error, remediation measures with policy/process reviews (implied by parliamentary inquiries), and communication strategy with letter to mps (2023-10-07, published 2023-11), communication strategy with public accounts committee evidence session (2023-09), communication strategy with defence select committee inquiry (ongoing), and remediation measures with review of internal processes (implied), remediation measures with potential policy updates for remote work, and communication strategy with no public comment (mod declined to comment), and incident response plan activated with superinjunction imposed (later lifted), incident response plan activated with internal review (details undisclosed), and containment measures with superinjunction to suppress public disclosure (controversial), and remediation measures with defence select committee inquiry, remediation measures with intelligence and security committee investigation, remediation measures with potential policy reforms (pending inquiry outcomes), and recovery measures with limited evacuations resumed post-superinjunction, recovery measures with ongoing parliamentary scrutiny, and communication strategy with initial suppression via superinjunction, communication strategy with post-disclosure: parliamentary hearings and media engagement, and containment measures with super-injunction (later lifted), containment measures with limited public communication, and remediation measures with secret airlift of exposed afghans, remediation measures with parliamentary inquiry, remediation measures with media investigations, and recovery measures with lifting of super-injunction (july 2023), recovery measures with ongoing parliamentary scrutiny, and communication strategy with initial suppression via super-injunction, communication strategy with selective disclosure to journalists, communication strategy with parliamentary testimony, and incident response plan activated with yes (though criticized as inadequate by pac), and containment measures with superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted), containment measures with internal review triggered by pac, and remediation measures with pac-mandated six-monthly updates on resettlement/costs, remediation measures with calls for system modernization and digital specialist recruitment, and recovery measures with ongoing; no specific technical details disclosed, and communication strategy with delayed public disclosure (2023), communication strategy with pac report and media interviews, communication strategy with letter to mod permanent secretary expressing disappointment, and communication strategy with public statements by ico, communication strategy with letter from civil liberties groups to parliamentary committee, and communication strategy with policy announcement and public consultation..
Incident Details
Can you provide details on each incident ?
Title: DDoS Attack on National Crime Agency Website
Description: The website of the National Crime Agency was targeted by the Lizard Squad hackers which left the site inaccessible for some time. The websites or servers were flooded with requests for data and were attacked with a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The attack disturbed the normal functioning of NCA.
Type: DDoS Attack
Attack Vector: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Threat Actor: Lizard Squad
Title: Data Leak at Government Legal Department
Description: The Government Legal Department suffered a data leak in which the names of civil servants claiming expenses was published online. Documents showing officials' names and credit-card spend at the department of more than £500 between November 2021 and May 2022 were published on GOV.UK accidentally.
Type: Data Leak
Attack Vector: Accidental Publication
Title: DEFRA Website Redirect Attack
Description: The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) website in the U.K. fell victim to a redirect attack in which the cybercriminals used an open redirect to send visitors to fake OnlyFans pages.
Type: Redirect Attack
Attack Vector: Open Redirect
Vulnerability Exploited: Open Redirect
Motivation: Theft of personal information
Title: UK Government Phishing Operation
Description: Organized crime extracted £47 million from the UK government in a phishing operation by mimicking taxpayer credentials and claiming payments from HMRC.
Date Detected: 2024
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025
Type: Phishing Operation
Attack Vector: Phishing
Threat Actor: Organized Crime
Motivation: Financial Gain
Title: Data Breach of Afghan Personal Details by UK Ministry of Defence
Description: The names and details of more than 19,000 people were leaked, with many Afghans now saying they fear retribution from the Taliban.
Date Detected: 2023-08
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-08
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Email
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper email handling
Threat Actor: Unnamed official
Motivation: Unknown
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Data Breach Exposing Afghan Interpreters' Details
Description: A catastrophic data breach at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) exposed the personal details of thousands of Afghans, including former interpreters and special forces members who had applied for relocation to the UK due to risks from the Taliban. The breach led to the revocation of relocation offers for some individuals, including a former Afghan interpreter and his family, who were detained by Pakistani police and faced deportation to Afghanistan. The exposed data included sensitive information that placed these individuals and their families at severe risk of Taliban retaliation. Legal challenges have been filed to contest the sudden visa refusals and deportation threats.
Type: Data Breach
Title: Increasing Cyberattacks and Data Breaches in U.K. Schools by Student Hackers
Description: The U.K.’s Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) warned that student hackers, often motivated by dares, notoriety, financial gain, revenge, or rivalries, are driving a rising number of cyberattacks and data breaches in schools. Between January 2022 and August 2024, 215 insider threat breach reports were identified in the education sector, with 57% attributed to students. Poor data protection practices, such as unattended devices or unauthorized access by students, also contributed to breaches. The ICO and National Crime Agency (NCA) emphasized the need to divert young hackers toward legal cybersecurity careers, noting that some incidents involved students using downloaded hacking tools or exploiting staff logins to access or alter sensitive data.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-09-05
Type: Insider Threat
Attack Vector: Insider Threat (Students)Exploitation of Weak Security PracticesUse of Downloaded Hacking ToolsMisuse of Staff Credentials
Vulnerability Exploited: Poor Data Protection PracticesUnattended DevicesLack of Access ControlsStudent Access to Staff Devices
Threat Actor: Student Hackers (Aged 10–16)Teenage Cybercriminals
Motivation: DaresNotorietyFinancial GainRevengeRivalriesTesting Skills/Knowledge
Title: Series of Major UK Public Sector Data Breaches and Concerns Over Proposed Mandatory Digital ID System
Description: A review by the UK Cabinet Office revealed eleven major data breaches in recent years, exposing systemic failures in safeguarding sensitive public sector data. High-profile incidents include the 'Afghan data leak' (19,000 Afghans and 100+ British officials exposed), the PSNI breach (10,000 police officers' details published online), a Church of England abuse survivors' data leak (200 victims), and the Legal Aid Agency breach (sensitive data dating back to 2010 accessed by unauthorized parties). These breaches highlight risks associated with the UK government's proposed mandatory digital ID system, which critics argue would create a centralized 'honeypot' for hackers, enabling mass surveillance and threatening civil liberties. Public trust in the government's data security is low (63% distrust), per YouGov polling commissioned by Big Brother Watch.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human ErrorInsecure Data HandlingImproper Access ControlsAccidental Publication
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Data EncryptionPoor Access ManagementInadequate RedactionFailure to Implement Security Recommendations
Threat Actor: Insider Threat (Accidental)Unauthorized Third PartiesPotential State-Sponsored Actors (for future digital ID risks)
Motivation: NegligenceOperational FailuresPotential Espionage (for Afghan/PSNI breaches)Financial Gain (for dark web sales of leaked data)
Title: Dozens of UK Afghan Data Breaches Uncovered at Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Description: The Ministry of Defence (MoD) admitted to 49 separate data breaches over four years within the unit handling relocation applications for Afghans seeking safety in the UK. The breaches include the 2022 leak of a spreadsheet containing details of nearly 19,000 individuals fleeing the Taliban, which was concealed under a gagging order until July 2025. Other incidents involved inadvertent disclosure of email addresses and personal details of applicants to third parties. Concerns have been raised about systemic lax security, inadequate remedial measures, and insufficient oversight by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). The Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) scheme, now closed, was marred by repeated failures, risking the lives of Afghans who collaborated with British forces.
Date Detected: 2021-04-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2021-09-012022-02-012023-08-012025-07-012025-08-21
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (Email Misconfiguration)Improper Data Handling (Spreadsheet Hidden Data)Insufficient Access ControlsLack of Oversight/Review Processes
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of 'Two Pairs of Eyes' Review (Pre-November 2021)Inadequate Data Redaction in SpreadsheetsPoor Training on Data Protection ProtocolsAbsence of Automated Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Tools
Motivation: Unintentional (Negligence/Lack of Compliance)
Title: Afghan Data Breach and Relocation Assistance Dispute
Description: A judicial review case involving a data breach of Afghan individuals' information, where the UK Defence Secretary refused relocation assistance to claimants (QP1 and another) on 29 April 2024, deeming them not high-risk. The decision was challenged on grounds of irrationality in risk assessment, but the court dismissed the claims in June 2025 (R (QP1 & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2025] EWHC 2504). The breach exposed sensitive personal data, including religious/ethnic identities (e.g., Shia/Hazara), leading to perceived risks like misidentification as a 'spy.' The case was initially under a superinjunction, lifted in July 2024.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-07-26
Type: Data Breach
Motivation: EspionageTargeted HarassmentPolitical
Title: Major Breach: Russian Hackers Steal Hundreds of Ministry of Defence Files and Leak Them to Dark Web
Description: Russian cybercriminals (group 'Lynx') stole hundreds of military documents from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and leaked them on the dark web. The breach compromised eight RAF and Royal Navy bases, including sensitive data such as personnel names, emails, contractor details, and operational documents. The attack was executed via a third-party contractor (Dodd Group), bypassing the MoD’s cyber defenses. Approximately 4TB of data, including 'Controlled' and 'Official Sensitive' files, were exfiltrated. The hackers have released two of four planned data dumps, with threats of further leaks if unresolved.
Date Detected: 2023-09-23
Type: data breach
Attack Vector: third-party compromise (Dodd Group)gateway attackphishing (likely)dark web data exfiltration
Vulnerability Exploited: weak supply chain securityinadequate third-party access controlsoutdated IT infrastructure
Threat Actor: Name: LynxAffiliation: Russian-speaking cybercriminal groupLocation: Russia (suspected)Type: ['hacktivist', 'cybercriminal', 'state-aligned (possible)']
Motivation: financial gain (ransom threats)espionagegeopolitical disruptionreputation damage
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Data Breaches Related to Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed 49 data breaches related to its handling of efforts to help Afghan nationals who worked for the UK government. These breaches include a major incident involving a spreadsheet error exposing ~18,700 Afghans' data (costing £850m to mitigate), BCC email errors, WhatsApp messages with insecure personal data, misdirected emails, and a laptop screen displaying sensitive data in public. Only five incidents were reported to the ICO, with fines of £350,000 imposed for three 'blind carbon copy' breaches in 2021.
Date Detected: August 2023 (spreadsheet error from February 2022)2021 (BCC incidents)2021 (Microsoft Forms incident on 8 October)
Date Publicly Disclosed: July 2025 (super-injunction lifted for spreadsheet error)7 October 2023 (letter to MPs published by PAC)
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (Spreadsheet Mismanagement)Misconfigured Email (BCC Errors)Insecure Communication (WhatsApp)Physical Exposure (Laptop Screen in Public)Incorrect Data Classification (Emails)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Data Handling TrainingInadequate Email Security ProtocolsPoor Access Controls for Sensitive DataImproper Use of Collaboration Tools (WhatsApp, Microsoft Forms)
Motivation: Unintentional (Human Error)
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Data Breach
Description: A catastrophic breach exposed the personal details of thousands of Afghans linked to UK forces, endangering their lives under Taliban rule. The leak occurred when a 33,000-line spreadsheet was emailed to an unauthorized recipient outside the government. The incident triggered a secret evacuation program but was concealed from the public and MPs for nearly two years. The UK's Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) did not launch a formal investigation, relying instead on informal meetings and assurances from the MoD.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-06-00
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human ErrorImproper Data HandlingEmail Misdirection
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Data EncryptionInadequate Access ControlsPoor Data Governance
Title: Multiple Data Breaches in UK Ministry of Defence's Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed 49 data breaches related to its handling of efforts to relocate Afghan nationals who worked for the UK government. These breaches included wrongful disclosure or inadequate security of personal information, with incidents ranging from spreadsheet errors to insecure WhatsApp messages and misclassified emails. The most severe incident, a February 2022 spreadsheet error affecting ~18,700 Afghans, was initially under a super-injunction and had estimated mitigation costs of £850 million. Only five incidents were reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), including three 'blind carbon copy' (BCC) breaches that resulted in a £350,000 fine.
Date Detected: 2021-10-08 (Microsoft Forms incident)2022-02 (spreadsheet error, discovered in 2023-08)2021 (multiple BCC incidents)Various dates for 44 other unreported incidents
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-07 (spreadsheet error super-injunction lifted)2023-10-07 (letter to MPs published by PAC on 2023-11)
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (BCC misconfiguration)Improper Data Storage (spreadsheet error)Insecure Communication (WhatsApp messages)Misclassified EmailsPhysical Exposure (laptop screen visibility)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of BCC usage in group emailsInadequate access controls for sensitive spreadsheetsUnsecured communication channels (WhatsApp)Improper data classification proceduresLack of physical security for sensitive data display
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Data Exposure on Public Train
Description: A Ministry of Defence (MoD) official inadvertently exposed confidential government information after leaving their laptop open on a train. The MoD unit responsible for handling applications of Afghans fleeing the Taliban was also involved in several other data breaches, including emails sent to wrong recipients, insecure systems, and unauthorized employee access to sensitive information. The incident highlights institutional failures in data handling practices, particularly in remote working environments.
Type: Data Leak
Attack Vector: Physical ExposureNegligenceInsecure Work Practices
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Physical SecurityInadequate Remote Work PoliciesPoor Employee Training
Threat Actor: Internal (Accidental)
Motivation: None (Unintentional)
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Resettlement Scheme Data Breach
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) inadvertently breached the personal details of 18,700 applicants to the UK resettlement schemes, primarily affecting Afghans eligible for relocation under the ARAP (Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy) program. The breach was concealed under a superinjunction for nearly two years, raising concerns about government transparency and the safety of affected individuals. The data leak exposed applicants to potential risks, including identity theft and targeted threats, while the MoD's handling of the incident—including the use of legal gag orders and lack of parliamentary disclosure—sparked a high-profile inquiry by the Defence Select Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-07
Type: Data Breach
Vulnerability Exploited: Human ErrorImproper Data HandlingLack of Oversight
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Data Breach Exposing Afghan Relocation Details
Description: A mass data breach at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) exposed sensitive information about thousands of Afghans who had worked with British forces, leading to a top-secret airlift operation. The breach was initially covered up under a super-injunction for nearly two years, delaying public disclosure. Journalists from the Daily Mail, including David Williams and Sam Greenhill, played a key role in exposing the incident and its impact on Afghan interpreters, support staff, and their families. The breach raised concerns about transparency, operational security, and the UK government's handling of resettlement efforts for at-risk Afghans. The MoD was later criticized for failing to allocate funds for compensation and resettlement costs tied to the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) and the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR).
Date Detected: 2021-08-17
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-07
Type: Data Breach
Motivation: Espionage (potential)Accidental ExposureGovernment Oversight Failure
Title: MOD Afghan Citizens Data Breach (2022)
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) accidentally leaked the personal details of ~19,000 Afghan citizens seeking refuge in the UK after the Taliban takeover. The breach occurred due to improper use of Excel spreadsheets on a SharePoint site and was publicly disclosed in 2023 after a superinjunction was lifted. The incident has been linked to the deaths of 49 Afghans and exposed thousands to Taliban reprisals. The estimated financial impact is ~£850 million (excluding legal/compensation costs), with potential to escalate to billions. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) criticized the MOD for systemic failures, lack of digital expertise, and inadequate post-breach remediation.
Date Detected: 2022
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human ErrorImproper Data HandlingInsecure Storage (SharePoint/Excel)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Access ControlsPoor Data GovernanceInadequate TrainingLegacy System Risks
Motivation: Accidental (No malicious intent; attributed to procedural failures)
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Data Breach and ICO Enforcement Concerns
Description: A serious data breach involving the leak of personal information of Afghan individuals who worked with British forces before the Taliban takeover in August 2021. The breach exposed these individuals to life-threatening risks. The UK's Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) faced criticism for its 'collapse in enforcement activity,' including its decision not to formally investigate the MoD despite the severity of the breach. Civil liberties groups, legal professionals, and data protection experts have called for an inquiry into the ICO’s handling of the incident, citing broader structural failures in enforcement across both public and private sectors.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2021-08
Type: Data Breach
Vulnerability Exploited: Poor Data ManagementLack of Compliance Oversight
Motivation: NegligenceSystemic Enforcement Failure
Title: UK Government Proposes Ransomware Payment Ban with National Security Exemptions
Description: The UK government has proposed a ban on ransomware payments for public sector and critical national infrastructure (CNI) organizations, with national security exemptions. The proposal requires other businesses to notify the government of any intent to pay a ransom. The ban was confirmed in July 2025 and detailed in a policy paper published on September 2, 2025. The proposal received support from three-quarters of respondents in a public consultation held from January to April 2025.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-09-02
Type: Policy Announcement
Title: Portugal and UK Consider Legal Exemptions for Cybersecurity Researchers
Description: Portugal has introduced an exemption for cybersecurity researchers from hacking laws, and the UK is considering a similar move. The UK's security minister highlighted the importance of researchers in improving system resilience and criticized the outdated Computer Misuse Act of 1990 for constraining their work.
Type: Policy Change
What are the most common types of attacks the company has faced ?
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Breach.
How does the company identify the attack vectors used in incidents ?
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Open Redirect, Email, Student Access to Staff DevicesExploitation of Weak Credentials, Human error (e.g., accidental publication)Insecure data storage and Dodd Group (third-party contractor).
Impact of the Incidents
What was the impact of each incident ?
Incident : DDoS Attack NAT233920422
Systems Affected: NCA Website
Downtime: ['Some time']
Operational Impact: Disturbed normal functioning
Incident : Data Leak GOV1527121122
Data Compromised: Names of civil servants, Credit-card spend details
Incident : Redirect Attack DEP225811123
Data Compromised: Personal information
Systems Affected: DEFRA Website
Incident : Phishing Operation HMR745060625
Financial Loss: £47 million
Systems Affected: Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) accounts
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Data Compromised: Personal details of 19,000+ people
Brand Reputation Impact: Significant
Legal Liabilities: Potential lawsuits
Identity Theft Risk: High
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Data Compromised: Personal details of afghan interpreters and special forces members, Relocation application statuses, Family member information
Operational Impact: Revocations of relocation offersLegal challenges and High Court applicationsDeportation threats to affected families
Brand Reputation Impact: Criticism of UK government's handling of Afghan alliesAccusations of moral bankruptcyPublic outcry over humanitarian failures
Legal Liabilities: Urgent High Court applications to challenge visa refusalsPotential legal actions for endangering livesSpecial Immigration Appeals Commission reviews
Identity Theft Risk: ['High risk for exposed Afghans due to Taliban threats']
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Data Compromised: Personal information of staff, students, and applicants
Systems Affected: School Information Management SystemsCollege Administrative Systems
Operational Impact: Disruption to School/College OperationsUnauthorized Data Modification/Deletion
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential Damage to Trust in Educational Institutions
Legal Liabilities: Potential Legal Actions for Data Protection Violations
Identity Theft Risk: ['Risk to Personal Data of 9,000+ Individuals (in One Case)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Biometric data (potential future risk with digital id), National insurance numbers, Criminal history records, Addresses, Names, Sensitive role identifiers (e.g., mi6, special forces), Abuse survivor details, Legal aid client data
Systems Affected: Defence Ministry Systems (Afghan leak)Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) DatabasesChurch of England Compensation SchemeLegal Aid Agency Systems
Operational Impact: Endangerment of Afghans who assisted British forcesRisk to lives of PSNI officers and familiesRe-traumatization of abuse survivorsLegal and reputational damage to UK governmentErosion of public trust in digital systems
Customer Complaints: ['High (public outcry, 95,000+ petition signatories)']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to UK government credibilityIncreased skepticism toward digital ID proposals
Legal Liabilities: Potential lawsuits from affected individualsViolations of GDPR/UK Data Protection ActLegal gagging orders (e.g., Afghan leak suppression)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for exposed PII)', 'Extreme (potential future risk with digital ID)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Financial Loss: £350,000 (Fine for 2021 Email Breaches)
Data Compromised: Email addresses (265 in 2021), Personal details (names, contact information, family/associate data for ~19,000 in 2022), Spreadsheet metadata (hidden data)
Systems Affected: ARAP (Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy) DatabaseMoD Email SystemsInternal Spreadsheet Storage/Sharing Tools
Operational Impact: Closure of ARAP Scheme (July 2025)Legal Scrutiny and High Court InterventionsReputational Damage to MoD and UK GovernmentIncreased Workload for Remediation and Compliance
Customer Complaints: ['Hundreds of Affected Afghans Represented by Barings Law', 'Public Outcry and Calls for Transparency']
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Trust in MoD Data HandlingCriticism from Lawyers, Data Protection Experts, and Opposition PartiesMedia Scrutiny (BBC, High Court Rulings)
Legal Liabilities: £350,000 Fine (2021 Breaches)Potential Further Fines or Legal Actions Pending ICO ReviewHigh Court Gagging Order (Lifted July 2025)
Identity Theft Risk: High (Exposed PII Could Be Exploited by Threat Actors)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Religious/ethnic identity (shia/hazara), Perceived affiliation (e.g., 'spy' misclassification)
Brand Reputation Impact: High (due to government involvement and national security implications)
Legal Liabilities: Judicial review challenges (dismissed in 2025)Potential future litigation from affected individuals
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (due to exposed PII and sensitive attributes)']
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Data Compromised: Military documents (raf/royal navy bases), Mod personnel names/emails, Contractor names/car registrations/mobile numbers, Internal email guidance/security instructions, Visitor logs (raf portreath, rnas culdrose), Construction details (kier’s work at raf lakenheath), 4tb of data (including secured repositories)
Systems Affected: Dodd Group (third-party contractor)MoD email systemssecured document repositoriesRAF Lakenheath (F-35 stealth jets/nuclear bomb data)RAF Portreath (radar base)RAF Predannack (National Drone Hub)RNAS Culdrose (Royal Navy air station)
Operational Impact: compromised security protocols (phishing aid)embarrassment to UK/US alliespotential disruption to military operationsloss of trust in MoD supply chain
Brand Reputation Impact: severe damage to MoD credibilityeroded trust in UK national securityinternational embarrassment (especially with US allies)
Legal Liabilities: potential GDPR violations (personal data)contractual breaches with third parties
Identity Theft Risk: ['high (personnel/contractor PII exposed)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Financial Loss: £850m (mitigation costs for spreadsheet error)£350,000 (ICO fines for BCC incidents)
Data Compromised: Personal data of ~18,700 afghans (spreadsheet error), Email recipients' identities (bcc errors), Sensitive personal data (whatsapp, misdirected emails, laptop screen)
Operational Impact: Reputation Damage to MoDLoss of Trust Among Afghan NationalsRegulatory Scrutiny (ICO, PAC, Defence Select Committee)
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe (Public and Parliamentary Scrutiny)Erosion of Trust in Government Data Handling
Legal Liabilities: ICO Fines (£350,000)Potential Further Legal Actions (Defence Select Committee Inquiry)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (Exposed Afghans at Risk of Taliban Retaliation)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii) of afghans, Sensitive military-associated data
Operational Impact: Secret Evacuation Program TriggeredPublic Trust ErosionRegulatory Scrutiny
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe Damage to MoD and UK Government CredibilityCriticism of ICO's Handling
Legal Liabilities: Potential Violations of Data Protection LawsCourt Battle Over Superinjunction
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for Affected Afghans)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Financial Loss: £850 million (estimated mitigation cost for spreadsheet error) + £350,000 (ICO fine for BCC incidents)
Data Compromised: Personal information of afghan nationals (including ~18,700 in spreadsheet error), Sensitive relocation/assistance data, Contact details (visible in bcc incidents)
Operational Impact: Ongoing parliamentary inquiries (Public Accounts Committee, Defence Select Committee); reputational damage to MoD and UK government
Brand Reputation Impact: High (public disclosure of failures in protecting vulnerable Afghan allies; scrutiny from MPs and media)
Legal Liabilities: £350,000 ICO fine for BCC incidentsPotential further fines/legal actions from ongoing inquiries
Identity Theft Risk: High (exposed personal data of at-risk Afghan nationals)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Data Compromised: Confidential government information, Afghan refugee application data, Employee records
Operational Impact: Potential disruption to Afghan refugee processing; erosion of trust in MoD data handling
Brand Reputation Impact: Significant (criticized in House of Commons; institutional failure acknowledged)
Identity Theft Risk: Possible (if exposed data included PII)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Data Compromised: Personal details of 18,700 applicants (e.g., names, contact information, resettlement eligibility status)
Operational Impact: Legal battles spanning 18 monthsParliamentary and public distrust in MoD transparencyOngoing delays in resettlement processing
Customer Complaints: ['Reports from affected Afghans and advocacy groups regarding safety risks and relocation delays']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to MoD's reputation due to secrecy and mishandlingErosion of public trust in governmental data protection practices
Legal Liabilities: Superinjunction imposed for ~2 years (later lifted)Defence Select Committee inquiryIntelligence and Security Committee investigationPotential legal actions from affected individuals
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (exposed personal data of vulnerable applicants)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghans, Relocation/resettlement details, Sensitive operational data
Operational Impact: Compromised safety of Afghan alliesDelayed resettlement effortsErosion of trust in UK governmentLegal and diplomatic repercussions
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to MoD's credibilityPublic and parliamentary distrustCriticism from auditors and watchdogs
Legal Liabilities: Potential compensation claims from affected AfghansViolation of data protection lawsSuper-injunction controversies
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for exposed Afghans)', 'Risk of retaliation by Taliban or hostile actors']
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Financial Loss: £850 million (estimated; excludes legal/compensation costs; potential to reach billions)
Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii) of afghan refugees, Contact details, Application statuses
Systems Affected: SharePoint platformExcel spreadsheets
Operational Impact: Compromised resettlement operationsLoss of trust in MOD data handlingIncreased scrutiny from regulatory bodies
Customer Complaints: ['Reports of Taliban reprisals against exposed individuals', 'Public outcry and media criticism']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to MOD's credibilityErosion of public trust in government data securityCriticism from Parliamentary committees
Legal Liabilities: Potential compensation claims from affected AfghansOngoing legal investigations
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (exposed PII could be exploited by malicious actors)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghan nationals, Names of individuals who collaborated with british forces
Operational Impact: Risk to lives of exposed individualsErosion of trust in UK government data handling
Customer Complaints: ['Public outcry', 'Calls for inquiry by civil liberties groups']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to UK MoD and ICO credibilityPerceived failure in data protection enforcement
Legal Liabilities: Potential legal actions by affected individualsScrutiny by parliamentary committees
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (life-threatening due to Taliban exposure)']
What is the average financial loss per incident ?
Average Financial Loss: The average financial loss per incident is $40.56 billion.
What types of data are most commonly compromised in incidents ?
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Personal Information, Financial Information, , Personal Information, Personal details, Personal Identifiable Information (Pii) Of Afghan Interpreters And Special Forces, Relocation Eligibility Statuses, Family Details, , Personal Information (Staff, Students, Applicants), , Pii (Names, Addresses), Sensitive Role Identifiers (Mi6, Special Forces), National Insurance Numbers, Criminal History, Abuse Survivor Details, Biometric Data (Potential Future Risk), , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Email Addresses, Family/Associate Details, Application Status For Relocation, , Pii, Religious/Ethnic Data, Perceived Intelligence Affiliations, , Military Operational Documents, Personnel Pii (Names, Emails, Mobile Numbers), Contractor Data (Car Registrations, Contact Details), Visitor Logs, Construction Project Details, Internal Security Guidance, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii) Of Afghan Nationals, Email Addresses (Bcc Errors), Official Sensitive Personal Data (Laptop Screen), , Pii (Names, Locations, Associations With Uk Forces), Sensitive Military-Related Data, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii) Of Afghan Nationals, Relocation/Assistance Application Details, Contact Information (Emails, Phone Numbers), Official Sensitive Data (Displayed On Laptop), , Government Confidential Information, Refugee Application Data, Employee Records, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Resettlement Application Details, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Relocation/Resettlement Records, Military Operational Data, , Pii (Names, Contact Details, Application Data), Sensitive Refugee Status Information, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Names Of Afghan Collaborators and .
Which entities were affected by each incident ?
Incident : DDoS Attack NAT233920422
Entity Name: National Crime Agency
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Incident : Data Leak GOV1527121122
Entity Name: Government Legal Department
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Legal
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Redirect Attack DEP225811123
Entity Name: Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Government
Location: U.K.
Incident : Phishing Operation HMR745060625
Entity Name: HMRC
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Sector
Location: UK
Customers Affected: 100,000
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Defence
Location: UK
Customers Affected: 19,000+ Afghans
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Entity Name: Former Afghan interpreters and their families
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: PakistanAfghanistan
Size: Thousands (exact number unspecified)
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Entity Name: Former Afghan special forces members and their families
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: PakistanAfghanistan
Size: At least 13 members in one family (exact total unspecified)
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Entity Name: Multiple U.K. Schools and Colleges
Entity Type: Primary Schools, Secondary Schools, Colleges
Industry: Education
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 9,000+ (in one reported case)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defence
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 19,000 Afghans + 100+ British officials
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Entity Name: Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
Entity Type: Law Enforcement
Industry: Public Safety
Location: Northern Ireland, UK
Customers Affected: 10,000 officers and staff
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Entity Name: Church of England
Entity Type: Religious Institution
Industry: Non-Profit/Religious
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 200 abuse survivors
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Entity Name: Legal Aid Agency
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Legal Services
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Unknown (records dating to 2010)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Entity Name: UK Cabinet Office
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: Public Administration
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Population-wide (potential future risk with digital ID)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Entity Name: Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Size: Large (10,000+ Employees)
Customers Affected: ~19,000 Afghans (2022 Breach) + 265 (2021 Email Breaches) + Undisclosed Others
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals/Refugees
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Customers Affected: 49 Breaches Affecting Thousands (Exact Numbers Undisclosed for Most Incidents)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MOD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/National Security
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Afghan nationals (including QP1 and others; exact number undisclosed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Entity Name: UK Home Office
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Immigration/Resettlement
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: government/military
Industry: defense
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: Dodd Group
Entity Type: private contractor
Industry: construction/maintenance
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: MoD personnel, contractors, visitors to RAF/Royal Navy bases
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: RAF Lakenheath
Entity Type: military base
Industry: defense/aviation
Location: Suffolk, UK
Customers Affected: US Armed Forces (F-35 stealth jets), MoD personnel
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: RAF Portreath
Entity Type: military base (radar)
Industry: defense
Location: Cornwall, UK
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: RAF Predannack (National Drone Hub)
Entity Type: military base
Industry: defense/UAV
Location: Cornwall, UK
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: RNAS Culdrose
Entity Type: Royal Navy air station
Industry: defense/aviation
Location: Cornwall, UK
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: Kier Group
Entity Type: private contractor
Industry: construction
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: Defence and National Security
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: ~18,700 Afghan Nationals (and others in smaller breaches)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Beneficiaries
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Customers Affected: ~18,700 (spreadsheet error) + others in 48 additional incidents
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Entity Name: Afghanistan Locally Employed Staff Ex-Gratia Scheme Beneficiaries
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 33,000+ Afghans (and potentially their families)
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Entity Name: Afghan Nationals Linked to UK Forces
Entity Type: Individuals at Risk
Location: Afghanistan
Customers Affected: 33,000+ records exposed
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Ministry
Industry: Defence/Public Sector
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Afghan nationals under ARAP and Afghanistan Locally Employed Staff Ex-Gratia Scheme (~18,700 in spreadsheet error; total across 49 incidents unspecified)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Customers Affected: ~18,700 (spreadsheet error) + unknown additional in other incidents
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Entity Name: Afghanistan Locally Employed Staff Ex-Gratia Scheme Participants
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense & National Security
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Afghan Refugees, MoD Employees, Potentially Other Government Stakeholders
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defence/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 18,700 applicants (primarily Afghans under resettlement schemes)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Entity Name: Afghan Resettlement Scheme Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: AfghanistanUnited Kingdom (pending relocation)
Customers Affected: 18,700 (including 4,200 still awaiting relocation as of October 2023)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Thousands of Afghans (interpreters, support staff, and families)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Beneficiaries
Entity Type: Individuals/Refugees
Location: AfghanistanUnited Kingdom (relocated)
Customers Affected: Thousands
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MOD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: ~19,000 Afghan citizens (primary) + unspecified number of military personnel (secondary breach mentioned)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Afghan nationals who worked with British forces (exact number undisclosed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Entity Name: Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
Entity Type: Regulatory Body
Industry: Data Protection
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Entity Name: UK Public Sector Organizations
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Entity Name: UK Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Organizations
Entity Type: Critical Infrastructure
Industry: Various
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Policy Change DCM1765433387
Entity Name: United Kingdom Government
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Policy Change DCM1765433387
Entity Name: Portuguese Parliament
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Sector
Location: Portugal
Response to the Incidents
What measures were taken in response to each incident ?
Incident : Phishing Operation HMR745060625
Containment Measures: Shut down fake accountsRemoved false information
Communication Strategy: Contacting affected customers
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Third Party Assistance: Legal Representation By Leigh Day Law Firm.
Recovery Measures: High Court applications to halt deportationsSpecial Immigration Appeals Commission reviews
Communication Strategy: Statements by MoD spokesperson defending security checksMedia coverage highlighting humanitarian crisis
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Third Party Assistance: National Crime Agency (Nca), Cyber Choices Program.
Remediation Measures: Parental Awareness CampaignsStudent Education on Legal Cybersecurity Careers
Communication Strategy: ICO Advisory to Parents and SchoolsPublic Warnings About Teen Hacking Risks
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Partial (varies by breach)', 'Legal gagging orders (Afghan leak)']
Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (for PSNI breach), Unclear for other incidents,
Containment Measures: Data removal requests (PSNI)Legal suppression (Afghan leak)
Remediation Measures: Review of 11 breaches by Cabinet OfficeUnclear if all recommendations implemented
Communication Strategy: Delayed/Supppressed (Afghan leak)Public disclosures for PSNI/Church of England breaches
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (Post-2021 Breaches)
Third Party Assistance: Information Commissioner'S Office (Ico) Engagement, Legal Counsel (High Court Gagging Order, 2023–2025), Data Protection Specialists (E.G., Mishcon De Reya, Barings Law).
Containment Measures: High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025, Lifted July 2025)Internal Reviews of BreachesLimited Public Disclosure (Only 4 of 49 Breaches Initially Public)
Remediation Measures: New Data Handling Procedures (November 2021)Mandatory Training for Staff'Two Pairs of Eyes' Rule for External Emails (Post-November 2021)New Software (Introduced by Labour Government, Post-July 2024)
Recovery Measures: Closure of ARAP Scheme (July 2025)Public Apology by Defence SecretaryParliamentary Scrutiny (Post-July 2024 Disclosures)
Communication Strategy: Delayed Disclosure (Gagging Orders, Legal Restrictions)Selective Transparency (BBC FOIA Request, 2025)Apologies via Political Statements
Enhanced Monitoring: Yes (Post-2021, Details Undisclosed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Remediation Measures: Judicial review processPolicy rationalization (as per CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892)
Communication Strategy: Superinjunction initially imposed (lifted July 2024)Open judgment published in 2025
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: investigation ongoingno public details on containment
Communication Strategy: MoD statement: 'actively investigating'no public disclosure of remediation steps
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (Partial; ICO satisfied with escalation judgments)
Containment Measures: Super-Injunction (Lifted in July 2025)ICO Reporting for 5/49 IncidentsInternal Reviews
Remediation Measures: Mitigation Spending (£850m for spreadsheet error)Policy/Process Reviews (Ongoing)
Communication Strategy: Letter to MPs (7 October 2023)Public Accounts Committee (PAC) DisclosuresDefence Select Committee Inquiry
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Secret Evacuation Program', 'MoD Internal Review']
Containment Measures: Limited to MoD's Internal Actions (per ICO)
Remediation Measures: MoD Claimed to Address 'Bad Data Practices'No Formal ICO Oversight
Communication Strategy: Concealment via Superinjunction (for ~2 years)Public Disclosure After Legal Battle
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (internal investigations; reporting to ICO for 5 incidents)
Containment Measures: Super-injunction for spreadsheet error (lifted in 2023-07)ICO reporting for selected incidentsInternal reviews by MoD
Remediation Measures: £850m allocated for mitigation of spreadsheet errorPolicy/process reviews (implied by parliamentary inquiries)
Communication Strategy: Letter to MPs (2023-10-07, published 2023-11)Public Accounts Committee evidence session (2023-09)Defence Select Committee inquiry (ongoing)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Remediation Measures: Review of internal processes (implied)Potential policy updates for remote work
Communication Strategy: No public comment (MoD declined to comment)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Superinjunction imposed (later lifted)', 'Internal review (details undisclosed)']
Containment Measures: Superinjunction to suppress public disclosure (controversial)
Remediation Measures: Defence Select Committee inquiryIntelligence and Security Committee investigationPotential policy reforms (pending inquiry outcomes)
Recovery Measures: Limited evacuations resumed post-superinjunctionOngoing parliamentary scrutiny
Communication Strategy: Initial suppression via superinjunctionPost-disclosure: Parliamentary hearings and media engagement
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Containment Measures: Super-injunction (later lifted)Limited public communication
Remediation Measures: Secret airlift of exposed AfghansParliamentary inquiryMedia investigations
Recovery Measures: Lifting of super-injunction (July 2023)Ongoing parliamentary scrutiny
Communication Strategy: Initial suppression via super-injunctionSelective disclosure to journalistsParliamentary testimony
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (though criticized as inadequate by PAC)
Containment Measures: Superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted)Internal review triggered by PAC
Remediation Measures: PAC-mandated six-monthly updates on resettlement/costsCalls for system modernization and digital specialist recruitment
Recovery Measures: Ongoing; no specific technical details disclosed
Communication Strategy: Delayed public disclosure (2023)PAC report and media interviewsLetter to MOD Permanent Secretary expressing disappointment
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Communication Strategy: Public statements by ICOLetter from civil liberties groups to parliamentary committee
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Communication Strategy: Policy announcement and public consultation
What is the company's incident response plan?
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Partial (varies by breach), Legal gagging orders (Afghan leak), , Yes (Post-2021 Breaches), , Yes (Partial; ICO satisfied with escalation judgments), Secret Evacuation Program, MoD Internal Review, , Yes (internal investigations; reporting to ICO for 5 incidents), Superinjunction imposed (later lifted), Internal review (details undisclosed), , Yes (though criticized as inadequate by PAC).
How does the company involve third-party assistance in incident response ?
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through Legal representation by Leigh Day law firm, , National Crime Agency (NCA), Cyber Choices Program, , Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) Engagement, Legal Counsel (High Court Gagging Order, 2023–2025), Data Protection Specialists (e.g., Mishcon de Reya, Barings Law), .
Data Breach Information
What type of data was compromised in each breach ?
Incident : Data Leak GOV1527121122
Type of Data Compromised: Personal information, Financial information
Sensitivity of Data: Medium
Personally Identifiable Information: Names of civil servants
Incident : Redirect Attack DEP225811123
Type of Data Compromised: Personal Information
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Type of Data Compromised: Personal details
Number of Records Exposed: 19,000+
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghan interpreters and special forces, Relocation eligibility statuses, Family details
Number of Records Exposed: Thousands (exact number unspecified)
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risks due to Taliban retaliation)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (details leaked and accessed by unauthorized parties)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesRelocation application detailsFamily member informationPotentially addresses or contact details
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Type of Data Compromised: Personal information (staff, students, applicants)
Number of Records Exposed: 9,000+ (in one case)
Sensitivity of Data: High (Personal Identifiable Information)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Type of Data Compromised: Pii (names, addresses), Sensitive role identifiers (mi6, special forces), National insurance numbers, Criminal history, Abuse survivor details, Biometric data (potential future risk)
Number of Records Exposed: 19,000 (Afghan leak), 10,000 (PSNI), 200 (Church of England), Unknown (Legal Aid Agency, records since 2010)
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (life-endangering in some cases)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (published online for PSNI)Likely (Afghan leak)Unclear for others
Data Encryption: ['Likely Unencrypted (based on breach severity)']
File Types Exposed: DatabasesSpreadsheetsCompensation Scheme Records
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesAddressesNational Insurance NumbersRoles/Associations (e.g., interpreters, police)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Email addresses, Family/associate details, Application status for relocation
Number of Records Exposed: 265 (2021 Email Breaches), ~19,000 (2022 Spreadsheet Leak), Undisclosed (45 Other Breaches)
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (Life-Threatening Risk to Afghans)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (Unintentional, via Email/Spreadsheet Sharing)
File Types Exposed: Spreadsheets (Excel)Emails (Outlook/Internal Systems)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact Details (Email, Phone)Family Member InformationAssociate Networks
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Type of Data Compromised: Pii, Religious/ethnic data, Perceived intelligence affiliations
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risk to individuals if exposed in Afghanistan)
Data Exfiltration: Likely (implied by risk assessments)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesReligious/Ethnic Background (Shia/Hazara)Potential Role Classifications (e.g., 'spy')
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Type of Data Compromised: Military operational documents, Personnel pii (names, emails, mobile numbers), Contractor data (car registrations, contact details), Visitor logs, Construction project details, Internal security guidance
Number of Records Exposed: hundreds of files (4TB total)
Sensitivity of Data: ControlledOfficial Sensitivepotentially Secret (e.g., F-35/nuclear bomb references)
Data Exfiltration: dark web leaks (2/4 dumps released)planned staged releases
File Types Exposed: PDFsemailsspreadsheetsvisitor formsconstruction documents
Personally Identifiable Information: namesemail addressesmobile numberscar registrations
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghan nationals, Email addresses (bcc errors), Official sensitive personal data (laptop screen)
Number of Records Exposed: ~18,700 (spreadsheet error), Hundreds (BCC errors), None
Sensitivity of Data: High (Life-Threatening Risk for Afghans)
Data Exfiltration: No (Unintentional Disclosure)
File Types Exposed: Spreadsheet (February 2022)Emails (BCC Errors)WhatsApp MessagesMicrosoft Forms Data
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact DetailsRelocation StatusEmployment History with UK Government
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Type of Data Compromised: Pii (names, locations, associations with uk forces), Sensitive military-related data
Number of Records Exposed: 33,000+
Sensitivity of Data: Top SecretLife-Endangering for Affected Individuals
Data Exfiltration: Yes (via Unauthorized Email)
Data Encryption: ['No (Spreadsheet Sent in Cleartext)']
File Types Exposed: Excel Spreadsheet
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact DetailsAssociations with UK Forces
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghan nationals, Relocation/assistance application details, Contact information (emails, phone numbers), Official sensitive data (displayed on laptop)
Number of Records Exposed: ~18,700 (spreadsheet error) + unknown in other incidents
Sensitivity of Data: High (personal data of at-risk individuals; potential life-threatening consequences if exposed to Taliban)
File Types Exposed: Spreadsheets (e.g., February 2022 incident)Emails (BCC incidents)WhatsApp messagesMicrosoft Forms submissions
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes (names, contact details, relocation status)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Type of Data Compromised: Government confidential information, Refugee application data, Employee records
Sensitivity of Data: High (government/military; refugee personal data)
Data Exfiltration: No (exposure via physical access)
Personally Identifiable Information: Likely (refugee applications may include PII)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Resettlement application details
Number of Records Exposed: 18,700
Sensitivity of Data: High (included identities of at-risk Afghans)
Data Exfiltration: Unintentional (via human error/misconfiguration)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact InformationResettlement Eligibility Status
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Relocation/resettlement records, Military operational data
Number of Records Exposed: Thousands
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risk to exposed individuals)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesRoles (e.g., interpreters)Family detailsResettlement status
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Type of Data Compromised: Pii (names, contact details, application data), Sensitive refugee status information
Number of Records Exposed: ~19,000
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risk to exposed individuals)
Data Exfiltration: No (accidental exposure via shared Excel/SharePoint)
Data Encryption: No (data stored in unsecured spreadsheets)
File Types Exposed: Excel (.xlsx)SharePoint documents
Personally Identifiable Information: Full namesContact informationRefugee application details
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Names of afghan collaborators
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (life-threatening if exposed)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (leaked to unauthorized parties)
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
What measures does the company take to prevent data exfiltration ?
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Parental Awareness Campaigns, Student Education on Legal Cybersecurity Careers, , Review of 11 breaches by Cabinet Office, Unclear if all recommendations implemented, , New Data Handling Procedures (November 2021), Mandatory Training for Staff, 'Two Pairs of Eyes' Rule for External Emails (Post-November 2021), New Software (Introduced by Labour Government, Post-July 2024), , Judicial review process, Policy rationalization (as per CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892), , Mitigation Spending (£850m for spreadsheet error), Policy/Process Reviews (Ongoing), , MoD Claimed to Address 'Bad Data Practices', No Formal ICO Oversight, , £850m allocated for mitigation of spreadsheet error, Policy/process reviews (implied by parliamentary inquiries), , Review of internal processes (implied), Potential policy updates for remote work, , Defence Select Committee inquiry, Intelligence and Security Committee investigation, Potential policy reforms (pending inquiry outcomes), , Secret airlift of exposed Afghans, Parliamentary inquiry, Media investigations, , PAC-mandated six-monthly updates on resettlement/costs, Calls for system modernization and digital specialist recruitment, .
How does the company handle incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) ?
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by shut down fake accounts, removed false information, , data removal requests (psni), legal suppression (afghan leak), , high court gagging order (2023–2025, lifted july 2025), internal reviews of breaches, limited public disclosure (only 4 of 49 breaches initially public), , investigation ongoing, no public details on containment, , super-injunction (lifted in july 2025), ico reporting for 5/49 incidents, internal reviews, , limited to mod's internal actions (per ico), , super-injunction for spreadsheet error (lifted in 2023-07), ico reporting for selected incidents, internal reviews by mod, , superinjunction to suppress public disclosure (controversial), , super-injunction (later lifted), limited public communication, , superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted), internal review triggered by pac and .
Ransomware Information
Was ransomware involved in any of the incidents ?
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Ransom Demanded: ["implied ('resolve this matter before consequences unfold')"]
Data Exfiltration: True
How does the company recover data encrypted by ransomware ?
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through High Court applications to halt deportations, Special Immigration Appeals Commission reviews, , Closure of ARAP Scheme (July 2025), Public Apology by Defence Secretary, Parliamentary Scrutiny (Post-July 2024 Disclosures), , Limited evacuations resumed post-superinjunction, Ongoing parliamentary scrutiny, , Lifting of super-injunction (July 2023), Ongoing parliamentary scrutiny, , Ongoing; no specific technical details disclosed, .
Regulatory Compliance
Were there any regulatory violations and fines imposed for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Legal Actions: Potential lawsuits
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Regulations Violated: Potential violations of UK data protection laws (e.g., GDPR), Human rights obligations toward Afghan allies,
Legal Actions: High Court applications to challenge visa refusals, Potential lawsuits for endangering lives,
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Regulations Violated: Potential Violations of U.K. Data Protection Laws (e.g., GDPR),
Legal Actions: Police Reports Filed in Some Cases,
Regulatory Notifications: ICO Breach Reports (215 Incidents)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR, Data Protection Act 2018, Potential Human Rights Act violations (for surveillance risks),
Legal Actions: Potential lawsuits from affected parties, Parliamentary scrutiny,
Regulatory Notifications: Cabinet Office reviewLikely ICO notifications (unconfirmed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR, Data Protection Act 2018, ICO Reporting Requirements,
Fines Imposed: £350,000 (2021 Breaches)
Legal Actions: High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025), Ongoing ICO Engagement, Potential Further Investigations (Per Jon Baines, Mishcon de Reya),
Regulatory Notifications: 7 of 49 Breaches Reported to ICOICO Declined Further Action on 2022 Spreadsheet Breach
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018 (potential), GDPR (potential, if EU citizens affected),
Legal Actions: Judicial review (R (QP1 & Anor) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 2504), Dismissed on grounds of rational policy application,
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Regulations Violated: potential GDPR (personal data), UK Official Secrets Act (military data),
Regulatory Notifications: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) involved
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), Data Protection Act 2018,
Fines Imposed: £350,000 (for BCC incidents)
Legal Actions: Defence Select Committee Inquiry (Ongoing), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Scrutiny,
Regulatory Notifications: 5/49 Incidents Reported to ICOICO Confirmed Satisfaction with MoD's Judgment
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Regulations Violated: Potential GDPR/UK Data Protection Act Violations,
Fines Imposed: ['None (ICO Chose Not to Investigate)']
Legal Actions: Court Battle Over Superinjunction by Media Outlets (e.g., The Independent),
Regulatory Notifications: ICO Informed but No Formal Action Taken
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), Data Protection Act 2018,
Fines Imposed: £350,000 (for BCC incidents)
Legal Actions: Public Accounts Committee inquiry (2023-09), Defence Select Committee inquiry (ongoing, launched 2023-11), Potential further actions pending inquiry outcomes,
Regulatory Notifications: 5 incidents reported to ICO (including 3 BCC incidents and February 2022 spreadsheet error)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR (potential), Data Protection Act 2018 (potential),
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018 (GDPR), Parliamentary Transparency Obligations,
Legal Actions: Superinjunction (later lifted), Defence Select Committee inquiry, Intelligence and Security Committee investigation,
Regulatory Notifications: Delayed (due to superinjunction)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act (potential), Freedom of Information laws (via super-injunction),
Legal Actions: Parliamentary inquiry, Auditor General critique, Potential compensation lawsuits,
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018 (likely), GDPR (potential non-compliance),
Legal Actions: PAC investigation ongoing, Potential compensation lawsuits,
Regulatory Notifications: Delayed; disclosed only after superinjunction lifted
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018, GDPR (potential non-compliance),
Fines Imposed: None (ICO issued reprimands but no formal penalties)
Legal Actions: Calls for parliamentary inquiry, Potential lawsuits by affected individuals,
Regulatory Notifications: ICO notified but no formal investigation launched
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Regulatory Notifications: Proposed requirement for businesses to notify government of ransom payment intent
How does the company ensure compliance with regulatory requirements ?
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Potential lawsuits, High Court applications to challenge visa refusals, Potential lawsuits for endangering lives, , Police Reports Filed in Some Cases, , Potential lawsuits from affected parties, Parliamentary scrutiny, , High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025), Ongoing ICO Engagement, Potential Further Investigations (Per Jon Baines, Mishcon de Reya), , Judicial review (R (QP1 & Anor) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 2504), Dismissed on grounds of rational policy application, , Defence Select Committee Inquiry (Ongoing), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Scrutiny, , Court Battle Over Superinjunction by Media Outlets (e.g., The Independent), , Public Accounts Committee inquiry (2023-09), Defence Select Committee inquiry (ongoing, launched 2023-11), Potential further actions pending inquiry outcomes, , Superinjunction (later lifted), Defence Select Committee inquiry, Intelligence and Security Committee investigation, , Parliamentary inquiry, Auditor General critique, Potential compensation lawsuits, , PAC investigation ongoing, Potential compensation lawsuits, , Calls for parliamentary inquiry, Potential lawsuits by affected individuals, .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What lessons were learned from each incident ?
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Lessons Learned: Need for Better Access Controls in Educational Institutions, Importance of Monitoring Student Access to Staff Devices, Early Intervention to Redirect Teen Hackers Toward Legal Cybersecurity Careers, Parental Role in Educating Children About Online Ethics
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Lessons Learned: Centralized databases create high-value targets for attackers., Public sector data handling practices are consistently inadequate., Legal suppression of breaches (e.g., gagging orders) undermines transparency., Mandatory digital ID systems could exacerbate risks to privacy and civil liberties., Public trust in government data security is critically low (63% distrust).
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Lessons Learned: Systemic Failures in Data Handling Require Cultural Change, Not Just Procedural Fixes, Gagging Orders Undermine Public Trust and Accountability, High-Risk Data (e.g., Refugee/Asylum Information) Demands Specialized Protections, ICO Oversight May Be Insufficient for Government Agencies Handling Sensitive Data
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Lessons Learned: High-risk categorization policies must balance individual circumstances with scalable criteria., Superinjunctions can delay transparency but may be necessary for national security cases., Data breaches in conflict zones have severe human rights implications beyond typical cyber risks.
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Lessons Learned: Supply chain vulnerabilities are critical attack vectors for nation-state/advanced threats., Third-party contractors with MoD access require stricter cybersecurity oversight., Outdated IT infrastructure and rigid processes exacerbate breach risks., Dark web monitoring is essential for early detection of leaked sensitive data., Lack of accountability in repeated MoD breaches undermines public trust.
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Lessons Learned: Need for Stricter Data Handling Protocols, Mandatory Training on Email/BCC Usage, Secure Communication Channels for Sensitive Data, Proactive Monitoring of Physical Data Exposure Risks
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Lessons Learned: Inadequate ICO Oversight for High-Severity Breaches, Failure of MoD Data Governance and Classification Controls, Lack of Transparency in Government Data Breaches, Over-Reliance on Informal Assurances Without Documentation
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Lessons Learned: Institutional failure in data protection practices, not just individual negligence, Remote work policies must explicitly address physical security of devices, Need for regular training on handling sensitive data in public/remote settings, HR plays a critical role in enforcing confidentiality obligations
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Lessons Learned: Transparency failures in governmental data breaches can exacerbate harm to vulnerable populations., Legal gag orders (e.g., superinjunctions) may undermine public trust and accountability., Ongoing delays in resettlement schemes highlight systemic issues in crisis response.
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Lessons Learned: Lack of transparency in government data breaches can exacerbate harm., Super-injunctions may delay accountability and remediation., Financial provisions must be pre-allocated for high-risk resettlement programs., Journalistic persistence is critical in exposing government failures.
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Lessons Learned: Critical need for modernized data systems (beyond Excel/SharePoint), Urgent recruitment of digital/security specialists at senior levels, Importance of timely breach disclosure and transparency, Mandatory access controls and data governance frameworks, Consequences of underinvestment in cybersecurity for high-risk operations
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Lessons Learned: ICO's public sector enforcement approach lacks deterrence and fails to drive compliance., Systemic failures in data protection oversight require structural reforms., Parliamentary oversight may be necessary to restore trust in regulatory enforcement.
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Lessons Learned: Current arrangements for organizations to choose whether to pay ransoms are not sustainable and do not guarantee data recovery.
Incident : Policy Change DCM1765433387
Lessons Learned: Cybersecurity researchers play a critical role in identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities, and outdated laws may hinder their ability to improve system resilience.
What recommendations were made to prevent future incidents ?
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Recommendations: Implement Stricter Access Controls for School Systems, Educate Students on Legal and Ethical Hacking (e.g., Cyber Choices Program), Regular Audits of Data Protection Practices in Schools, Parental Guidance on Responsible Online Behavior, Collaboration with Law Enforcement to Address Teen CybercrimeImplement Stricter Access Controls for School Systems, Educate Students on Legal and Ethical Hacking (e.g., Cyber Choices Program), Regular Audits of Data Protection Practices in Schools, Parental Guidance on Responsible Online Behavior, Collaboration with Law Enforcement to Address Teen CybercrimeImplement Stricter Access Controls for School Systems, Educate Students on Legal and Ethical Hacking (e.g., Cyber Choices Program), Regular Audits of Data Protection Practices in Schools, Parental Guidance on Responsible Online Behavior, Collaboration with Law Enforcement to Address Teen CybercrimeImplement Stricter Access Controls for School Systems, Educate Students on Legal and Ethical Hacking (e.g., Cyber Choices Program), Regular Audits of Data Protection Practices in Schools, Parental Guidance on Responsible Online Behavior, Collaboration with Law Enforcement to Address Teen CybercrimeImplement Stricter Access Controls for School Systems, Educate Students on Legal and Ethical Hacking (e.g., Cyber Choices Program), Regular Audits of Data Protection Practices in Schools, Parental Guidance on Responsible Online Behavior, Collaboration with Law Enforcement to Address Teen Cybercrime
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Recommendations: Reject mandatory digital ID proposals to prevent mass surveillance risks., Implement all Cabinet Office review recommendations for existing systems., Enhance transparency in breach disclosures (avoid gagging orders)., Adopt decentralized, privacy-preserving identity solutions if digital ID is pursued., Strengthen legal protections for whistleblowers reporting data mishandling., Conduct independent audits of public sector data security practices.Reject mandatory digital ID proposals to prevent mass surveillance risks., Implement all Cabinet Office review recommendations for existing systems., Enhance transparency in breach disclosures (avoid gagging orders)., Adopt decentralized, privacy-preserving identity solutions if digital ID is pursued., Strengthen legal protections for whistleblowers reporting data mishandling., Conduct independent audits of public sector data security practices.Reject mandatory digital ID proposals to prevent mass surveillance risks., Implement all Cabinet Office review recommendations for existing systems., Enhance transparency in breach disclosures (avoid gagging orders)., Adopt decentralized, privacy-preserving identity solutions if digital ID is pursued., Strengthen legal protections for whistleblowers reporting data mishandling., Conduct independent audits of public sector data security practices.Reject mandatory digital ID proposals to prevent mass surveillance risks., Implement all Cabinet Office review recommendations for existing systems., Enhance transparency in breach disclosures (avoid gagging orders)., Adopt decentralized, privacy-preserving identity solutions if digital ID is pursued., Strengthen legal protections for whistleblowers reporting data mishandling., Conduct independent audits of public sector data security practices.Reject mandatory digital ID proposals to prevent mass surveillance risks., Implement all Cabinet Office review recommendations for existing systems., Enhance transparency in breach disclosures (avoid gagging orders)., Adopt decentralized, privacy-preserving identity solutions if digital ID is pursued., Strengthen legal protections for whistleblowers reporting data mishandling., Conduct independent audits of public sector data security practices.Reject mandatory digital ID proposals to prevent mass surveillance risks., Implement all Cabinet Office review recommendations for existing systems., Enhance transparency in breach disclosures (avoid gagging orders)., Adopt decentralized, privacy-preserving identity solutions if digital ID is pursued., Strengthen legal protections for whistleblowers reporting data mishandling., Conduct independent audits of public sector data security practices.
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Recommendations: Independent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting Risks
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Recommendations: Review risk assessment frameworks for Afghan resettlement programs to include nuanced threats (e.g., religious/ethnic targeting)., Enhance data protection measures for sensitive government databases involving vulnerable populations., Establish clearer communication protocols for breaches with national security dimensions.Review risk assessment frameworks for Afghan resettlement programs to include nuanced threats (e.g., religious/ethnic targeting)., Enhance data protection measures for sensitive government databases involving vulnerable populations., Establish clearer communication protocols for breaches with national security dimensions.Review risk assessment frameworks for Afghan resettlement programs to include nuanced threats (e.g., religious/ethnic targeting)., Enhance data protection measures for sensitive government databases involving vulnerable populations., Establish clearer communication protocols for breaches with national security dimensions.
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Recommendations: Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Recommendations: Implement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan DataImplement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan DataImplement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan DataImplement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan Data
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Recommendations: Formal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable PopulationsFormal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable PopulationsFormal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable PopulationsFormal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable PopulationsFormal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable Populations
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Recommendations: Implement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reporting
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Recommendations: Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices.
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Recommendations: Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest.Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest.Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest.Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest.
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Recommendations: Immediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reporting
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Recommendations: Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors.Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors.Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors.Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors.
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Recommendations: Consultation with CNI organizations and the private sector to refine the proposal for effectiveness.
Incident : Policy Change DCM1765433387
Recommendations: Governments should consider updating cybersecurity laws to provide exemptions for ethical hacking and security research to foster collaboration and improve national cybersecurity posture.
What are the key lessons learned from past incidents ?
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Need for Better Access Controls in Educational Institutions,Importance of Monitoring Student Access to Staff Devices,Early Intervention to Redirect Teen Hackers Toward Legal Cybersecurity Careers,Parental Role in Educating Children About Online EthicsCentralized databases create high-value targets for attackers.,Public sector data handling practices are consistently inadequate.,Legal suppression of breaches (e.g., gagging orders) undermines transparency.,Mandatory digital ID systems could exacerbate risks to privacy and civil liberties.,Public trust in government data security is critically low (63% distrust).Systemic Failures in Data Handling Require Cultural Change, Not Just Procedural Fixes,Gagging Orders Undermine Public Trust and Accountability,High-Risk Data (e.g., Refugee/Asylum Information) Demands Specialized Protections,ICO Oversight May Be Insufficient for Government Agencies Handling Sensitive DataHigh-risk categorization policies must balance individual circumstances with scalable criteria.,Superinjunctions can delay transparency but may be necessary for national security cases.,Data breaches in conflict zones have severe human rights implications beyond typical cyber risks.Supply chain vulnerabilities are critical attack vectors for nation-state/advanced threats.,Third-party contractors with MoD access require stricter cybersecurity oversight.,Outdated IT infrastructure and rigid processes exacerbate breach risks.,Dark web monitoring is essential for early detection of leaked sensitive data.,Lack of accountability in repeated MoD breaches undermines public trust.Need for Stricter Data Handling Protocols,Mandatory Training on Email/BCC Usage,Secure Communication Channels for Sensitive Data,Proactive Monitoring of Physical Data Exposure RisksInadequate ICO Oversight for High-Severity Breaches,Failure of MoD Data Governance and Classification Controls,Lack of Transparency in Government Data Breaches,Over-Reliance on Informal Assurances Without DocumentationInstitutional failure in data protection practices, not just individual negligence,Remote work policies must explicitly address physical security of devices,Need for regular training on handling sensitive data in public/remote settings,HR plays a critical role in enforcing confidentiality obligationsTransparency failures in governmental data breaches can exacerbate harm to vulnerable populations.,Legal gag orders (e.g., superinjunctions) may undermine public trust and accountability.,Ongoing delays in resettlement schemes highlight systemic issues in crisis response.Lack of transparency in government data breaches can exacerbate harm.,Super-injunctions may delay accountability and remediation.,Financial provisions must be pre-allocated for high-risk resettlement programs.,Journalistic persistence is critical in exposing government failures.Critical need for modernized data systems (beyond Excel/SharePoint),Urgent recruitment of digital/security specialists at senior levels,Importance of timely breach disclosure and transparency,Mandatory access controls and data governance frameworks,Consequences of underinvestment in cybersecurity for high-risk operationsICO's public sector enforcement approach lacks deterrence and fails to drive compliance.,Systemic failures in data protection oversight require structural reforms.,Parliamentary oversight may be necessary to restore trust in regulatory enforcement.Current arrangements for organizations to choose whether to pay ransoms are not sustainable and do not guarantee data recovery.Cybersecurity researchers play a critical role in identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities, and outdated laws may hinder their ability to improve system resilience.
What recommendations has the company implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Consultation with CNI organizations and the private sector to refine the proposal for effectiveness., Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Governments should consider updating cybersecurity laws to provide exemptions for ethical hacking and security research to foster collaboration and improve national cybersecurity posture., Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Independent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices and Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting Risks.
References
Where can I find more information about each incident ?
Incident : Data Leak GOV1527121122
Source: Government Legal Department
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Source: BBC
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Source: Leigh Day Law Firm (statement by Erin Alcock)
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Source: AFP via Getty (images)
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Source: U.K. Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)
Date Accessed: 2024-09-05
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Source: National Crime Agency (NCA)
Date Accessed: 2024-09-05
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Source: Big Brother Watch Report: 'Checkpoint Britain: the dangers of digital ID and why privacy must be protected'
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Source: YouGov Polling (commissioned by Big Brother Watch)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Source: UK Cabinet Office Review of 11 Major Data Breaches
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Source: Big Brother Watch Petition Against Digital ID
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: BBC Politics Investigations
URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics
Date Accessed: 2025-08-21
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)
URL: https://ico.org.uk
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: High Court Ruling (Gagging Order Lift, July 2025)
Date Accessed: 2025-07-01
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: Barings Law (Representing Affected Afghans)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: Mishcon de Reya (Jon Baines, Data Protection Specialist)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Source: Judgment: R (QP1 & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2025] EWHC 2504 (Admin)
Date Accessed: 2025-06-00
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Source: CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892 (Admin)
Date Accessed: 2024-00-00
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Source: The Mail on Sunday
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Source: The Sun
URL: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/24312344/russian-hackers-steal-mod-files-dark-web/
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Source: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) report
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Source: Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Evidence Session
Date Accessed: September 2023
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Source: David Williams' Letter to MPs (Published by PAC)
Date Accessed: October 2023
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Source: Defence Select Committee Inquiry Announcement
Date Accessed: October 2023
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Source: The Record - 'UK MoD discloses dozens of data breaches in Afghan relocation blunders' (Jim Dunton)
URL: https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/16/uk_mod_afghan_data_breaches/
Date Accessed: 2023-10-16
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Source: The Independent
URL: https://www.independent.co.uk
Date Accessed: 2024-07-00
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Source: UK Parliament (Science, Innovation and Technology Committee)
URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/465/science-innovation-and-technology-committee/
Date Accessed: 2024-07-00
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Source: The Register
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Source: UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Source: UK Ministry of Defence Letter to MPs (2023-10-07)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Source: The Independent
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Source: House of Commons session (Dame Chi Onwurah)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Source: CIPD Factsheet on Data Protection and GDPR
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Source: Parliament TV (Defence Select Committee Hearing)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Source: Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Source: The Times (Larisa Brown)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Source: UK Parliament Defence Select Committee
URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/77/defence-committee/
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Source: National Audit Office (NAO) Annual Report on MoD
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Source: BFBS Forces News
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Source: UK Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Source: Academic research linking breach to 49 Afghan deaths
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Source: Open Rights Group (coordinated letter)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Source: The Guardian (coverage of Afghan data breach)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Source: UK Parliament Science, Innovation and Technology Committee
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Source: UK Government Policy Paper
Date Accessed: 2025-09-02
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Source: Financial Times’ Cyber Resilience Summit: Europe
Date Accessed: 2025-12-03
Incident : Policy Change DCM1765433387
Source: Speech by British Security Minister Dan Jarvis
Incident : Policy Change DCM1765433387
Source: Portuguese Parliament Act
Where can stakeholders find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: Government Legal Department, and Source: Bloomberg L.P.Date Accessed: 2025, and Source: BBC, and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.uk, and Source: Leigh Day Law Firm (statement by Erin Alcock), and Source: AFP via Getty (images), and Source: U.K. Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)Date Accessed: 2024-09-05, and Source: National Crime Agency (NCA)Date Accessed: 2024-09-05, and Source: Big Brother Watch Report: 'Checkpoint Britain: the dangers of digital ID and why privacy must be protected', and Source: YouGov Polling (commissioned by Big Brother Watch), and Source: UK Cabinet Office Review of 11 Major Data Breaches, and Source: Big Brother Watch Petition Against Digital ID, and Source: BBC Politics InvestigationsUrl: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politicsDate Accessed: 2025-08-21, and Source: UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)Url: https://ico.org.uk, and Source: High Court Ruling (Gagging Order Lift, July 2025)Date Accessed: 2025-07-01, and Source: Barings Law (Representing Affected Afghans)Url: https://www.baringslaw.com, and Source: Mishcon de Reya (Jon Baines, Data Protection Specialist)Url: https://www.mishcon.com, and Source: Judgment: R (QP1 & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2025] EWHC 2504 (Admin)Date Accessed: 2025-06-00, and Source: CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892 (Admin)Date Accessed: 2024-00-00, and Source: The Mail on Sunday, and Source: The SunUrl: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/24312344/russian-hackers-steal-mod-files-dark-web/, and Source: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) report, and Source: Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Evidence SessionDate Accessed: September 2023, and Source: David Williams' Letter to MPs (Published by PAC)Date Accessed: October 2023, and Source: Defence Select Committee Inquiry AnnouncementDate Accessed: October 2023, and Source: The Record - 'UK MoD discloses dozens of data breaches in Afghan relocation blunders' (Jim Dunton)Url: https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/16/uk_mod_afghan_data_breaches/Date Accessed: 2023-10-16, and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.ukDate Accessed: 2024-07-00, and Source: UK Parliament (Science, Innovation and Technology Committee)Url: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/465/science-innovation-and-technology-committee/Date Accessed: 2024-07-00, and Source: The Register, and Source: UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee, and Source: UK Ministry of Defence Letter to MPs (2023-10-07), and Source: The Independent, and Source: House of Commons session (Dame Chi Onwurah), and Source: CIPD Factsheet on Data Protection and GDPRUrl: https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/factsheet, and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.uk, and Source: Parliament TV (Defence Select Committee Hearing)Url: https://parliamentlive.tv, and Source: Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill)Url: https://www.dailymail.co.uk, and Source: The Times (Larisa Brown)Url: https://www.thetimes.co.uk, and Source: Daily MailUrl: https://www.dailymail.co.uk, and Source: UK Parliament Defence Select CommitteeUrl: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/77/defence-committee/, and Source: National Audit Office (NAO) Annual Report on MoDUrl: https://www.nao.org.uk, and Source: BFBS Forces News, and Source: UK Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report, and Source: Academic research linking breach to 49 Afghan deaths, and Source: Open Rights Group (coordinated letter), and Source: The Guardian (coverage of Afghan data breach), and Source: UK Parliament Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, and Source: UK Government Policy PaperDate Accessed: 2025-09-02, and Source: Financial Times’ Cyber Resilience Summit: EuropeDate Accessed: 2025-12-03, and Source: Speech by British Security Minister Dan Jarvis, and Source: Portuguese Parliament Act.
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the investigation for each incident ?
Incident : Data Leak GOV1527121122
Investigation Status: Ongoing
Incident : Phishing Operation HMR745060625
Investigation Status: Ongoing
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Investigation Status: Ongoing
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Investigation Status: Ongoing (legal challenges and High Court reviews in progress)
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Investigation Status: Ongoing (ICO and NCA Involvement)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Investigation Status: ['Ongoing (for some breaches)', 'Cabinet Office review completed but recommendations not fully implemented']
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Investigation Status: Ongoing (ICO Engagement, Potential Further Reviews)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Investigation Status: Closed (judicial review dismissed in 2025)
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Investigation Status: active (MoD-led, NCSC involved)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Investigation Status: ['Ongoing (Defence Select Committee Inquiry)', 'PAC Review Completed (Letter Published)', 'ICO Investigation Closed (For Reported Incidents)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Investigation Status: ['Closed Without Formal Investigation (ICO)', 'MoD Internal Review (Undisclosed Details)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Investigation Status: Ongoing (Defence Select Committee inquiry; PAC follow-up)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Investigation Status: Acknowledged in House of Commons; MoD declined to comment (status unclear)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Investigation Status: ['Ongoing (Defence Select Committee inquiry)', 'Ongoing (Intelligence and Security Committee investigation)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (parliamentary inquiry, media investigations)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (PAC oversight; MOD internal review)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Investigation Status: No formal investigation by ICO; under scrutiny by parliamentary committee
How does the company communicate the status of incident investigations to stakeholders ?
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Contacting Affected Customers, Statements By Mod Spokesperson Defending Security Checks, Media Coverage Highlighting Humanitarian Crisis, Ico Advisory To Parents And Schools, Public Warnings About Teen Hacking Risks, Delayed/Supppressed (Afghan Leak), Public Disclosures For Psni/Church Of England Breaches, Delayed Disclosure (Gagging Orders, Legal Restrictions), Selective Transparency (Bbc Foia Request, 2025), Apologies Via Political Statements, Superinjunction Initially Imposed (Lifted July 2024), Open Judgment Published In 2025, Mod Statement: 'Actively Investigating', No Public Disclosure Of Remediation Steps, Letter To Mps (7 October 2023), Public Accounts Committee (Pac) Disclosures, Defence Select Committee Inquiry, Concealment Via Superinjunction (For ~2 Years), Public Disclosure After Legal Battle, Letter To Mps (2023-10-07, Published 2023-11), Public Accounts Committee Evidence Session (2023-09), Defence Select Committee Inquiry (Ongoing), No public comment (MoD declined to comment), Initial Suppression Via Superinjunction, Post-Disclosure: Parliamentary Hearings And Media Engagement, Initial Suppression Via Super-Injunction, Selective Disclosure To Journalists, Parliamentary Testimony, Delayed Public Disclosure (2023), Pac Report And Media Interviews, Letter To Mod Permanent Secretary Expressing Disappointment, Public Statements By Ico, Letter From Civil Liberties Groups To Parliamentary Committee and Policy announcement and public consultation.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
Were there any advisories issued to stakeholders or customers for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Stakeholder Advisories: Mod Spokesperson Statements, Legal Advisories From Leigh Day.
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Stakeholder Advisories: Ico Warning To Parents And Schools, Nca Cyber Choices Program.
Customer Advisories: Parents Advised to Monitor Children’s Online Activities
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Stakeholder Advisories: Big Brother Watch Warns Of Orwellian Surveillance Risks With Digital Id., Public Opposition Via 95,000+ Petition Signatories., Mps Criticize Government For Failing To Act On Breach Review Recommendations..
Customer Advisories: Affected individuals in Afghan/PSNI breaches likely received risk notifications.Church of England abuse survivors offered support (unclear if adequate).General public advised to oppose mandatory digital ID proposals.
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Stakeholder Advisories: Afghans Affected By Arap Breaches (Via Legal Representatives), Uk Parliament (Post-July 2024 Disclosures), Media Outlets (Bbc, Others).
Customer Advisories: Limited Direct Communication (Due to Security Risks for Afghans)Public Apologies via Political Channels
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Stakeholder Advisories: Uk Government (Mod/Home Office), Afghan Resettlement Programs, Legal Representatives Of Claimants.
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Stakeholder Advisories: Us Armed Forces (F-35/Nuclear Asset Exposure), Uk Royal Navy/Raf (Operational Security Risks), Dodd Group/Kier (Contractor Accountability), Uk Parliament (Oversight Of Mod Cybersecurity Failures).
Customer Advisories: MoD personnel: monitor for phishing/social engineering attacks using leaked PII.Contractors: reset credentials and enable MFA for all MoD-linked systems.Affiliated organizations: audit third-party access to sensitive networks.
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Stakeholder Advisories: Mps (Via David Williams' Letter), Public Accounts Committee (Pac), Defence Select Committee.
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Stakeholder Advisories: Letter From Mod Permanent Secretary David Williams To Mps (2023-10-07), Public Accounts Committee Evidence Session (2023-09), Defence Select Committee Call For Evidence (Closed 2023-11).
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Stakeholder Advisories: Defence Select Committee Hearings, Media Disclosures Post-Superinjunction Lift.
Customer Advisories: Limited communication to affected Afghans (details undisclosed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Stakeholder Advisories: Defence Select Committee Hearings, Auditor General Reports.
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Stakeholder Advisories: Pac Report To Parliament, Media Statements By Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, Letter To Mod Permanent Secretary.
Customer Advisories: No direct advisories to affected Afghans documented; resettlement updates mandated
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Stakeholder Advisories: Letter From 73 Academics, Lawyers, And Organizations To Chi Onwurah (Committee Chair), Public Statements By Ico Defending Its Regulatory Approach.
Incident : Policy Announcement DCM1764770468
Stakeholder Advisories: Consultation with CNI organizations and private sector to ensure proposal effectiveness.
What advisories does the company provide to stakeholders and customers following an incident ?
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Mod Spokesperson Statements, Legal Advisories From Leigh Day, Ico Warning To Parents And Schools, Nca Cyber Choices Program, Parents Advised To Monitor Children’S Online Activities, , Big Brother Watch Warns Of Orwellian Surveillance Risks With Digital Id., Public Opposition Via 95,000+ Petition Signatories., Mps Criticize Government For Failing To Act On Breach Review Recommendations., Affected Individuals In Afghan/Psni Breaches Likely Received Risk Notifications., Church Of England Abuse Survivors Offered Support (Unclear If Adequate)., General Public Advised To Oppose Mandatory Digital Id Proposals., , Afghans Affected By Arap Breaches (Via Legal Representatives), Uk Parliament (Post-July 2024 Disclosures), Media Outlets (Bbc, Others), Limited Direct Communication (Due To Security Risks For Afghans), Public Apologies Via Political Channels, , Uk Government (Mod/Home Office), Afghan Resettlement Programs, Legal Representatives Of Claimants, Us Armed Forces (F-35/Nuclear Asset Exposure), Uk Royal Navy/Raf (Operational Security Risks), Dodd Group/Kier (Contractor Accountability), Uk Parliament (Oversight Of Mod Cybersecurity Failures), Mod Personnel: Monitor For Phishing/Social Engineering Attacks Using Leaked Pii., Contractors: Reset Credentials And Enable Mfa For All Mod-Linked Systems., Affiliated Organizations: Audit Third-Party Access To Sensitive Networks., , Mps (Via David Williams' Letter), Public Accounts Committee (Pac), Defence Select Committee, Letter From Mod Permanent Secretary David Williams To Mps (2023-10-07), Public Accounts Committee Evidence Session (2023-09), Defence Select Committee Call For Evidence (Closed 2023-11), Defence Select Committee Hearings, Media Disclosures Post-Superinjunction Lift, Limited Communication To Affected Afghans (Details Undisclosed), , Defence Select Committee Hearings, Auditor General Reports, Pac Report To Parliament, Media Statements By Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, Letter To Mod Permanent Secretary, No Direct Advisories To Affected Afghans Documented; Resettlement Updates Mandated, , Letter From 73 Academics, Lawyers, And Organizations To Chi Onwurah (Committee Chair), Public Statements By Ico Defending Its Regulatory Approach and Consultation with CNI organizations and private sector to ensure proposal effectiveness..
Initial Access Broker
How did the initial access broker gain entry for each incident ?
Incident : Redirect Attack DEP225811123
Entry Point: Open Redirect
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Entry Point: Email
High Value Targets: Afghan individuals
Data Sold on Dark Web: Afghan individuals
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Entry Point: Student Access To Staff Devices, Exploitation Of Weak Credentials,
High Value Targets: School Information Management Systems,
Data Sold on Dark Web: School Information Management Systems,
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Entry Point: Human Error (E.G., Accidental Publication), Insecure Data Storage,
High Value Targets: Afghan Interpreters, Psni Officers, Abuse Survivors, Potential Future: Entire Uk Adult Population (Digital Id),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Afghan Interpreters, Psni Officers, Abuse Survivors, Potential Future: Entire Uk Adult Population (Digital Id),
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entry Point: Dodd Group (third-party contractor)
Backdoors Established: ['likely (persistent access to exfiltrate 4TB)']
High Value Targets: Raf Lakenheath (F-35/Nuclear Bombs), Raf Portreath (Radar Base), Mod Personnel Data, Secured Document Repositories,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Raf Lakenheath (F-35/Nuclear Bombs), Raf Portreath (Radar Base), Mod Personnel Data, Secured Document Repositories,
Post-Incident Analysis
What were the root causes and corrective actions taken for each incident ?
Incident : Redirect Attack DEP225811123
Root Causes: Open Redirect Vulnerability
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Root Causes: Improper email handling
Incident : Insider Threat UK-5592155091125
Root Causes: Lack Of Access Controls For Students, Poor Data Protection Practices (E.G., Unattended Devices), Student Curiosity And Peer Pressure (Dares, Notoriety), Inadequate Cybersecurity Education For Minors,
Corrective Actions: Enhanced Parental And Student Awareness Programs, Stricter Device And Credential Management In Schools, Collaboration With Nca’S Cyber Choices Program, Ico Guidance On Insider Threat Mitigation,
Incident : Data Breach UK-0694206092025
Root Causes: Chronic Underinvestment In Public Sector Cybersecurity., Culture Of Secrecy (E.G., Gagging Orders) Prioritized Over Transparency., Lack Of Accountability For Repeated Breaches., Failure To Implement Existing Security Recommendations., Over-Reliance On Centralized Data Storage Without Adequate Protections.,
Corrective Actions: Cabinet Office Review (Incomplete Implementation)., Public Campaigning Against Digital Id (E.G., Big Brother Watch)., Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Breach Responses., Proposed Decentralized Alternatives To Digital Id (By Privacy Advocates).,
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Root Causes: Cultural Neglect Of Data Protection (Per Lawyers/Experts), Inadequate Technical Safeguards (E.G., No Dlp For Spreadsheets), Lack Of Accountability Up The Chain Of Command (Per Ben Wallace), Over-Reliance On Manual Reviews (Pre-'Two Pairs Of Eyes' Rule),
Corrective Actions: New Software (Labour Government, Post-July 2024), Stricter Email Review Processes, Public Disclosure Of Largest Breach (July 2025), Ongoing Ico Collaboration,
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Root Causes: Inadequate Data Protection For Sensitive Resettlement Records., Policy Gaps In Risk Categorization For Afghan Nationals Post-Withdrawal., Delayed Transparency Due To Superinjunction.,
Corrective Actions: Policy Refinement For High-Risk Assessments (As Upheld In Court)., Potential Review Of Data Handling In Resettlement Programs.,
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Root Causes: Inadequate Third-Party Risk Management (Dodd Group Compromise)., Over-Reliance On Perimeter Defenses Without Zero-Trust Controls., Legacy It Systems Vulnerable To Modern Exfiltration Techniques., Lack Of Real-Time Dark Web Monitoring For Leaked Data., Cultural Issues: 'Lack Of Care' And Accountability In Mod Cybersecurity (Per Expert Comments).,
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Root Causes: Lack Of Data Protection Awareness, Inadequate Technical Safeguards (E.G., Bcc Enforcement), Cultural Failures In Handling Sensitive Data, Over-Reliance On Manual Processes (Spreadsheets, Emails),
Corrective Actions: Ico-Mandated Training Programs, Policy Updates For Data Classification, Enhanced Oversight For Afghan Relocation Data,
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Root Causes: Human Error (Email Misdirection), Lack Of Data Encryption/Protection For Sensitive Files, Institutional Failure In Data Governance (Mod), Regulatory Capture (Ico'S Informal Handling), Culture Of Secrecy (Superinjunction To Conceal Breach),
Corrective Actions: Mod Claims To Have Addressed 'Bad Data Practices' (No Verification), Ico Acknowledged Need For More Staff With Top-Secret Clearance (But No Action Taken For This Case), Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Ico'S Role In Government Breaches,
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Root Causes: Human Error (Failure To Use Bcc; Improper Data Handling), Inadequate Training On Data Protection Policies, Lack Of Technical Safeguards (E.G., Email Validation, Data Classification Enforcement), Cultural Issues (E.G., Whatsapp Use For Sensitive Communications), Process Failures (E.G., Spreadsheet Access Controls),
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Root Causes: Lack Of Physical Security For Devices In Transit, Inadequate Remote Work Policies For Handling Sensitive Data, Insufficient Employee Training On Data Protection In Non-Office Environments, Systemic Failure In Institutional Data Governance,
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Root Causes: Human Error In Data Handling, Lack Of Oversight For Sensitive Resettlement Data, Cultural Secrecy Within Mod, Prioritizing Operational Security Over Transparency,
Corrective Actions: Pending Inquiry Recommendations, Potential Reforms To Arap Scheme Data Management, Increased Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Mod Practices,
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Root Causes: Inadequate Data Protection Measures For Sensitive Records., Failure To Preempt Risks To Afghan Allies Post-Withdrawal., Overuse Of Legal Suppression (Super-Injunction) To Hide Failures., Lack Of Financial Planning For Resettlement Costs.,
Corrective Actions: Lifting Of Super-Injunction (July 2023)., Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Mod’S Handling Of Arap/Arr., Media-Driven Public Awareness Campaigns., Potential Policy Reforms For Future Resettlement Programs.,
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Root Causes: Over-Reliance On Insecure Tools (Excel/Sharepoint) For Sensitive Data, Lack Of Digital Expertise At Senior Levels, Inadequate Access Controls And Audit Trails, Cultural Failure To Prioritize Data Security In Crisis Scenarios, Delayed Breach Disclosure (Superinjunction Complications),
Corrective Actions: Pac-Enforced Six-Monthly Progress Reports, Planned System Upgrades (Funding Allocated But Implementation Unclear), Recruitment Drive For Cybersecurity Roles, Review Of Data Handling Protocols For Refugee/Asylum Processes,
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Root Causes: Ico’S Reluctance To Use Enforcement Powers For Public Sector Breaches., Mod’S Repeated Failures In Data Management., Lack Of Deterrent Penalties For Systemic Non-Compliance.,
Corrective Actions: Proposed Parliamentary Inquiry Into Ico’S Operations., Potential Reforms To Ico’S Enforcement Framework., Increased Transparency In Breach Investigations.,
Incident : Policy Change DCM1765433387
Root Causes: Outdated cybersecurity laws (e.g., UK's 1990 Computer Misuse Act) may constrain the work of ethical hackers and researchers, limiting their ability to identify and report vulnerabilities.
Corrective Actions: Update legal frameworks to provide exemptions for cybersecurity research and ethical hacking, encouraging collaboration between researchers and governments.
What is the company's process for conducting post-incident analysis ?
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Legal Representation By Leigh Day Law Firm, , National Crime Agency (Nca), Cyber Choices Program, , Information Commissioner'S Office (Ico) Engagement, Legal Counsel (High Court Gagging Order, 2023–2025), Data Protection Specialists (E.G., Mishcon De Reya, Barings Law), , Yes (Post-2021, Details Undisclosed).
What corrective actions has the company taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Enhanced Parental And Student Awareness Programs, Stricter Device And Credential Management In Schools, Collaboration With Nca’S Cyber Choices Program, Ico Guidance On Insider Threat Mitigation, , Cabinet Office Review (Incomplete Implementation)., Public Campaigning Against Digital Id (E.G., Big Brother Watch)., Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Breach Responses., Proposed Decentralized Alternatives To Digital Id (By Privacy Advocates)., , New Software (Labour Government, Post-July 2024), Stricter Email Review Processes, Public Disclosure Of Largest Breach (July 2025), Ongoing Ico Collaboration, , Policy Refinement For High-Risk Assessments (As Upheld In Court)., Potential Review Of Data Handling In Resettlement Programs., , Ico-Mandated Training Programs, Policy Updates For Data Classification, Enhanced Oversight For Afghan Relocation Data, , Mod Claims To Have Addressed 'Bad Data Practices' (No Verification), Ico Acknowledged Need For More Staff With Top-Secret Clearance (But No Action Taken For This Case), Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Ico'S Role In Government Breaches, , Pending Inquiry Recommendations, Potential Reforms To Arap Scheme Data Management, Increased Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Mod Practices, , Lifting Of Super-Injunction (July 2023)., Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Mod’S Handling Of Arap/Arr., Media-Driven Public Awareness Campaigns., Potential Policy Reforms For Future Resettlement Programs., , Pac-Enforced Six-Monthly Progress Reports, Planned System Upgrades (Funding Allocated But Implementation Unclear), Recruitment Drive For Cybersecurity Roles, Review Of Data Handling Protocols For Refugee/Asylum Processes, , Proposed Parliamentary Inquiry Into Ico’S Operations., Potential Reforms To Ico’S Enforcement Framework., Increased Transparency In Breach Investigations., , Update legal frameworks to provide exemptions for cybersecurity research and ethical hacking, encouraging collaboration between researchers and governments..
Additional Questions
General Information
What was the amount of the last ransom demanded ?
Last Ransom Demanded: The amount of the last ransom demanded was ["implied ('resolve this matter before consequences unfold')"].
Who was the attacking group in the last incident ?
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Lizard Squad, Organized Crime, Unnamed official, Student Hackers (Aged 10–16)Teenage Cybercriminals, Insider Threat (Accidental)Unauthorized Third PartiesPotential State-Sponsored Actors (for future digital ID risks), Name: LynxAffiliation: Russian-speaking cybercriminal groupLocation: Russia (suspected)Type: ['hacktivist', 'cybercriminal', 'state-aligned (possible)'] and Internal (Accidental).
Incident Details
What was the most recent incident detected ?
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2024.
What was the most recent incident publicly disclosed ?
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2025-09-02.
Impact of the Incidents
What was the highest financial loss from an incident ?
Highest Financial Loss: The highest financial loss from an incident was £850 million (estimated; excludes legal/compensation costs; potential to reach billions).
What was the most significant data compromised in an incident ?
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were Names of civil servants, Credit-card spend details, , Personal Information, , Personal details of 19,000+ people, Personal details of Afghan interpreters and special forces members, Relocation application statuses, Family member information, , Personal Information of Staff, Students, and Applicants, , Personal Identifiable Information (PII), Biometric Data (potential future risk with digital ID), National Insurance Numbers, Criminal History Records, Addresses, Names, Sensitive Role Identifiers (e.g., MI6, Special Forces), Abuse Survivor Details, Legal Aid Client Data, , Email Addresses (265 in 2021), Personal Details (Names, Contact Information, Family/Associate Data for ~19,000 in 2022), Spreadsheet Metadata (Hidden Data), , Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Religious/Ethnic Identity (Shia/Hazara), Perceived Affiliation (e.g., 'spy' misclassification), , military documents (RAF/Royal Navy bases), MoD personnel names/emails, contractor names/car registrations/mobile numbers, internal email guidance/security instructions, visitor logs (RAF Portreath, RNAS Culdrose), construction details (Kier’s work at RAF Lakenheath), 4TB of data (including secured repositories), , Personal Data of ~18,700 Afghans (spreadsheet error), Email Recipients' Identities (BCC errors), Sensitive Personal Data (WhatsApp, misdirected emails, laptop screen), , Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Sensitive Military-Associated Data, , Personal information of Afghan nationals (including ~18,700 in spreadsheet error), Sensitive relocation/assistance data, Contact details (visible in BCC incidents), , Confidential Government Information, Afghan Refugee Application Data, Employee Records, , Personal Details of 18,700 Applicants (e.g., names, contact information, resettlement eligibility status), , Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Relocation/Resettlement Details, Sensitive Operational Data, , Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan refugees, Contact details, Application statuses, , Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan nationals, Names of individuals who collaborated with British forces and .
What was the most significant system affected in an incident ?
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident was NCA Website and DEFRA Website and Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) accounts and School Information Management SystemsCollege Administrative Systems and Defence Ministry Systems (Afghan leak)Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) DatabasesChurch of England Compensation SchemeLegal Aid Agency Systems and ARAP (Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy) DatabaseMoD Email SystemsInternal Spreadsheet Storage/Sharing Tools and Dodd Group (third-party contractor)MoD email systemssecured document repositoriesRAF Lakenheath (F-35 stealth jets/nuclear bomb data)RAF Portreath (radar base)RAF Predannack (National Drone Hub)RNAS Culdrose (Royal Navy air station) and SharePoint platformExcel spreadsheets.
Response to the Incidents
What third-party assistance was involved in the most recent incident ?
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was legal representation by leigh day law firm, , national crime agency (nca), cyber choices program, , information commissioner's office (ico) engagement, legal counsel (high court gagging order, 2023–2025), data protection specialists (e.g., mishcon de reya, barings law), .
What containment measures were taken in the most recent incident ?
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Shut down fake accountsRemoved false information, Data removal requests (PSNI)Legal suppression (Afghan leak), High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025, Lifted July 2025)Internal Reviews of BreachesLimited Public Disclosure (Only 4 of 49 Breaches Initially Public), investigation ongoingno public details on containment, Super-Injunction (Lifted in July 2025)ICO Reporting for 5/49 IncidentsInternal Reviews, Limited to MoD's Internal Actions (per ICO), Super-injunction for spreadsheet error (lifted in 2023-07)ICO reporting for selected incidentsInternal reviews by MoD, Superinjunction to suppress public disclosure (controversial), Super-injunction (later lifted)Limited public communication and Superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted)Internal review triggered by PAC.
Data Breach Information
What was the most sensitive data compromised in a breach ?
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Legal Aid Client Data, Sensitive Operational Data, contractor names/car registrations/mobile numbers, Email Recipients' Identities (BCC errors), Personal Information of Staff, Students, and Applicants, construction details (Kier’s work at RAF Lakenheath), military documents (RAF/Royal Navy bases), Personal information of Afghan nationals (including ~18,700 in spreadsheet error), Afghan Refugee Application Data, Personal Identifiable Information (PII), internal email guidance/security instructions, visitor logs (RAF Portreath, RNAS Culdrose), Addresses, 4TB of data (including secured repositories), Employee Records, Sensitive Personal Data (WhatsApp, misdirected emails, laptop screen), Credit-card spend details, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan refugees, Sensitive Role Identifiers (e.g., MI6, Special Forces), Sensitive relocation/assistance data, Relocation application statuses, Personal Data of ~18,700 Afghans (spreadsheet error), National Insurance Numbers, Criminal History Records, Sensitive Military-Associated Data, Abuse Survivor Details, Spreadsheet Metadata (Hidden Data), Religious/Ethnic Identity (Shia/Hazara), Personal Information, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Contact details, Confidential Government Information, Personal details of 19,000+ people, Perceived Affiliation (e.g., 'spy' misclassification), MoD personnel names/emails, Names of individuals who collaborated with British forces, Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan nationals, Biometric Data (potential future risk with digital ID), Personal Details of 18,700 Applicants (e.g., names, contact information, resettlement eligibility status), Application statuses, Names, Family member information, Contact details (visible in BCC incidents), Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Relocation/Resettlement Details, Names of civil servants, Personal details of Afghan interpreters and special forces members, Email Addresses (265 in 2021), Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Personal Details (Names, Contact Information, Family/Associate Data for ~19 and000 in 2022).
What was the number of records exposed in the most significant breach ?
Number of Records Exposed in Most Significant Breach: The number of records exposed in the most significant breach was 18.9M.
Ransomware Information
What was the highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident ?
Highest Ransom Demanded: The highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident was ["implied ('resolve this matter before consequences unfold')"].
Regulatory Compliance
What was the highest fine imposed for a regulatory violation ?
Highest Fine Imposed: The highest fine imposed for a regulatory violation was £350,000 (2021 Breaches), £350,000 (for BCC incidents), None (ICO Chose Not to Investigate), , £350,000 (for BCC incidents), None (ICO issued reprimands but no formal penalties).
What was the most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation ?
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Potential lawsuits, High Court applications to challenge visa refusals, Potential lawsuits for endangering lives, , Police Reports Filed in Some Cases, , Potential lawsuits from affected parties, Parliamentary scrutiny, , High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025), Ongoing ICO Engagement, Potential Further Investigations (Per Jon Baines, Mishcon de Reya), , Judicial review (R (QP1 & Anor) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 2504), Dismissed on grounds of rational policy application, , Defence Select Committee Inquiry (Ongoing), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Scrutiny, , Court Battle Over Superinjunction by Media Outlets (e.g., The Independent), , Public Accounts Committee inquiry (2023-09), Defence Select Committee inquiry (ongoing, launched 2023-11), Potential further actions pending inquiry outcomes, , Superinjunction (later lifted), Defence Select Committee inquiry, Intelligence and Security Committee investigation, , Parliamentary inquiry, Auditor General critique, Potential compensation lawsuits, , PAC investigation ongoing, Potential compensation lawsuits, , Calls for parliamentary inquiry, Potential lawsuits by affected individuals, .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What was the most significant lesson learned from past incidents ?
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Parliamentary oversight may be necessary to restore trust in regulatory enforcement., Current arrangements for organizations to choose whether to pay ransoms are not sustainable and do not guarantee data recovery., Cybersecurity researchers play a critical role in identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities, and outdated laws may hinder their ability to improve system resilience.
What was the most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Implement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices., Governments should consider updating cybersecurity laws to provide exemptions for ethical hacking and security research to foster collaboration and improve national cybersecurity posture., Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan Data, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Enhance data protection measures for sensitive government databases involving vulnerable populations., Collaboration with Law Enforcement to Address Teen Cybercrime, Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing., Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable Populations, Parental Guidance on Responsible Online Behavior, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Independent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Implement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Establish clearer communication protocols for breaches with national security dimensions., Educate Students on Legal and Ethical Hacking (e.g., Cyber Choices Program), Reject mandatory digital ID proposals to prevent mass surveillance risks., Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest., Formal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reporting, Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Conduct independent audits of public sector data security practices., Strengthen legal protections for whistleblowers reporting data mishandling., Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Review risk assessment frameworks for Afghan resettlement programs to include nuanced threats (e.g., religious/ethnic targeting)., Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Regular Audits of Data Protection Practices in Schools, Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Enhance transparency in breach disclosures (avoid gagging orders)., Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Adopt decentralized, privacy-preserving identity solutions if digital ID is pursued., Consultation with CNI organizations and the private sector to refine the proposal for effectiveness., Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reporting, Implement Stricter Access Controls for School Systems, Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors., Immediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting Risks and Implement all Cabinet Office review recommendations for existing systems..
References
What is the most recent source of information about an incident ?
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are Parliament TV (Defence Select Committee Hearing), David Williams' Letter to MPs (Published by PAC), The Guardian (coverage of Afghan data breach), Open Rights Group (coordinated letter), Big Brother Watch Report: 'Checkpoint Britain: the dangers of digital ID and why privacy must be protected', UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), Portuguese Parliament Act, Government Legal Department, Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Evidence Session, AFP via Getty (images), Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill), UK Cabinet Office Review of 11 Major Data Breaches, House of Commons session (Dame Chi Onwurah), UK Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report, BBC Politics Investigations, UK Government Policy Paper, Leigh Day Law Firm (statement by Erin Alcock), Mishcon de Reya (Jon Baines, Data Protection Specialist), Financial Times’ Cyber Resilience Summit: Europe, Defence Select Committee Inquiry Announcement, CIPD Factsheet on Data Protection and GDPR, National Audit Office (NAO) Annual Report on MoD, Bloomberg L.P., U.K. Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), YouGov Polling (commissioned by Big Brother Watch), National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) report, National Crime Agency (NCA), Judgment: R (QP1 & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2025] EWHC 2504 (Admin), UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee, Daily Mail, UK Parliament Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, The Mail on Sunday, BBC, CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892 (Admin), Barings Law (Representing Affected Afghans), The Independent, Big Brother Watch Petition Against Digital ID, UK Parliament (Science, Innovation and Technology Committee), The Register, UK Parliament Defence Select Committee, BFBS Forces News, The Times (Larisa Brown), UK Ministry of Defence Letter to MPs (2023-10-07), Speech by British Security Minister Dan Jarvis, Academic research linking breach to 49 Afghan deaths, The Record - 'UK MoD discloses dozens of data breaches in Afghan relocation blunders' (Jim Dunton), The Sun, High Court Ruling (Gagging Order Lift and July 2025).
What is the most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.independent.co.uk, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics, https://ico.org.uk, https://www.baringslaw.com, https://www.mishcon.com, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/24312344/russian-hackers-steal-mod-files-dark-web/, https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/16/uk_mod_afghan_data_breaches/, https://www.independent.co.uk, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/465/science-innovation-and-technology-committee/, https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/factsheet, https://www.independent.co.uk, https://parliamentlive.tv, https://www.dailymail.co.uk, https://www.thetimes.co.uk, https://www.dailymail.co.uk, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/77/defence-committee/, https://www.nao.org.uk .
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the most recent investigation ?
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
What was the most recent stakeholder advisory issued ?
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was MoD spokesperson statements, Legal advisories from Leigh Day, ICO Warning to Parents and Schools, NCA Cyber Choices Program, Big Brother Watch warns of Orwellian surveillance risks with digital ID., Public opposition via 95,000+ petition signatories., MPs criticize government for failing to act on breach review recommendations., Afghans Affected by ARAP Breaches (Via Legal Representatives), UK Parliament (Post-July 2024 Disclosures), Media Outlets (BBC, Others), UK Government (MOD/Home Office), Afghan resettlement programs, Legal representatives of claimants, US Armed Forces (F-35/nuclear asset exposure), UK Royal Navy/RAF (operational security risks), Dodd Group/Kier (contractor accountability), UK Parliament (oversight of MoD cybersecurity failures), MPs (via David Williams' Letter), Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Defence Select Committee, Letter from MoD Permanent Secretary David Williams to MPs (2023-10-07), Public Accounts Committee evidence session (2023-09), Defence Select Committee call for evidence (closed 2023-11), Defence Select Committee hearings, Media disclosures post-superinjunction lift, Defence Select Committee hearings, Auditor General reports, PAC report to Parliament, Media statements by Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, Letter to MOD Permanent Secretary, Letter from 73 academics, lawyers, and organizations to Chi Onwurah (Committee Chair), Public statements by ICO defending its regulatory approach, Consultation with CNI organizations and private sector to ensure proposal effectiveness., .
What was the most recent customer advisory issued ?
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued were an Parents Advised to Monitor Children’s Online Activities, Affected individuals in Afghan/PSNI breaches likely received risk notifications.Church of England abuse survivors offered support (unclear if adequate).General public advised to oppose mandatory digital ID proposals., Limited Direct Communication (Due to Security Risks for Afghans)Public Apologies via Political Channels, MoD personnel: monitor for phishing/social engineering attacks using leaked PII.Contractors: reset credentials and enable MFA for all MoD-linked systems.Affiliated organizations: audit third-party access to sensitive networks., Limited communication to affected Afghans (details undisclosed) and No direct advisories to affected Afghans documented; resettlement updates mandated.
Initial Access Broker
What was the most recent entry point used by an initial access broker ?
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an Open Redirect, Dodd Group (third-party contractor) and Email.
Post-Incident Analysis
What was the most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Open Redirect Vulnerability, Improper email handling, Lack of Access Controls for StudentsPoor Data Protection Practices (e.g., Unattended Devices)Student Curiosity and Peer Pressure (Dares, Notoriety)Inadequate Cybersecurity Education for Minors, Chronic underinvestment in public sector cybersecurity.Culture of secrecy (e.g., gagging orders) prioritized over transparency.Lack of accountability for repeated breaches.Failure to implement existing security recommendations.Over-reliance on centralized data storage without adequate protections., Cultural Neglect of Data Protection (Per Lawyers/Experts)Inadequate Technical Safeguards (e.g., No DLP for Spreadsheets)Lack of Accountability Up the Chain of Command (Per Ben Wallace)Over-Reliance on Manual Reviews (Pre-'Two Pairs of Eyes' Rule), Inadequate data protection for sensitive resettlement records.Policy gaps in risk categorization for Afghan nationals post-withdrawal.Delayed transparency due to superinjunction., Inadequate third-party risk management (Dodd Group compromise).Over-reliance on perimeter defenses without zero-trust controls.Legacy IT systems vulnerable to modern exfiltration techniques.Lack of real-time dark web monitoring for leaked data.Cultural issues: 'lack of care' and accountability in MoD cybersecurity (per expert comments)., Lack of Data Protection AwarenessInadequate Technical Safeguards (e.g., BCC Enforcement)Cultural Failures in Handling Sensitive DataOver-Reliance on Manual Processes (Spreadsheets, Emails), Human Error (Email Misdirection)Lack of Data Encryption/Protection for Sensitive FilesInstitutional Failure in Data Governance (MoD)Regulatory Capture (ICO's Informal Handling)Culture of Secrecy (Superinjunction to Conceal Breach), Human error (failure to use BCC; improper data handling)Inadequate training on data protection policiesLack of technical safeguards (e.g., email validation, data classification enforcement)Cultural issues (e.g., WhatsApp use for sensitive communications)Process failures (e.g., spreadsheet access controls), Lack of physical security for devices in transitInadequate remote work policies for handling sensitive dataInsufficient employee training on data protection in non-office environmentsSystemic failure in institutional data governance, Human error in data handlingLack of oversight for sensitive resettlement dataCultural secrecy within MoD, prioritizing operational security over transparency, Inadequate data protection measures for sensitive records.Failure to preempt risks to Afghan allies post-withdrawal.Overuse of legal suppression (super-injunction) to hide failures.Lack of financial planning for resettlement costs., Over-reliance on insecure tools (Excel/SharePoint) for sensitive dataLack of digital expertise at senior levelsInadequate access controls and audit trailsCultural failure to prioritize data security in crisis scenariosDelayed breach disclosure (superinjunction complications), ICO’s reluctance to use enforcement powers for public sector breaches.MoD’s repeated failures in data management.Lack of deterrent penalties for systemic non-compliance., Outdated cybersecurity laws (e.g., UK's 1990 Computer Misuse Act) may constrain the work of ethical hackers and researchers, limiting their ability to identify and report vulnerabilities..
What was the most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Enhanced Parental and Student Awareness ProgramsStricter Device and Credential Management in SchoolsCollaboration with NCA’s Cyber Choices ProgramICO Guidance on Insider Threat Mitigation, Cabinet Office review (incomplete implementation).Public campaigning against digital ID (e.g., Big Brother Watch).Parliamentary scrutiny of breach responses.Proposed decentralized alternatives to digital ID (by privacy advocates)., New Software (Labour Government, Post-July 2024)Stricter Email Review ProcessesPublic Disclosure of Largest Breach (July 2025)Ongoing ICO Collaboration, Policy refinement for high-risk assessments (as upheld in court).Potential review of data handling in resettlement programs., ICO-Mandated Training ProgramsPolicy Updates for Data ClassificationEnhanced Oversight for Afghan Relocation Data, MoD Claims to Have Addressed 'Bad Data Practices' (No Verification)ICO Acknowledged Need for More Staff with Top-Secret Clearance (But No Action Taken for This Case)Parliamentary Scrutiny of ICO's Role in Government Breaches, Pending inquiry recommendationsPotential reforms to ARAP scheme data managementIncreased parliamentary scrutiny of MoD practices, Lifting of super-injunction (July 2023).Parliamentary scrutiny of MoD’s handling of ARAP/ARR.Media-driven public awareness campaigns.Potential policy reforms for future resettlement programs., PAC-enforced six-monthly progress reportsPlanned system upgrades (funding allocated but implementation unclear)Recruitment drive for cybersecurity rolesReview of data handling protocols for refugee/asylum processes, Proposed parliamentary inquiry into ICO’s operations.Potential reforms to ICO’s enforcement framework.Increased transparency in breach investigations., Update legal frameworks to provide exemptions for cybersecurity research and ethical hacking, encouraging collaboration between researchers and governments..
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Latest Global CVEs (Not Company-Specific)
Description
LibreChat is a ChatGPT clone with additional features. In versions 0.8.0 and below, there is no handler for JSON parsing errors; SyntaxError from express.json() includes user input in the error message, which gets reflected in responses. User input (including HTML/JavaScript) can be exposed in error responses, creating an XSS risk if Content-Type isn't strictly enforced. This issue does not have a fix at the time of publication.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 5.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
LibreChat is a ChatGPT clone with additional features. In versions 0.8.0 and below, when creating prompts, JSON requests are sent to define and modify the prompts via PATCH endpoint for prompt groups (/api/prompts/groups/:groupId). However, the request bodies are not sufficiently validated for proper input, enabling users to modify prompts in a way that was not intended as part of the front end system. The patchPromptGroup function passes req.body directly to updatePromptGroup() without filtering sensitive fields. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.1.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 5.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
LibreChat is a ChatGPT clone with additional features. In versions 0.8.0 and below, when a user posts a question, the iconURL parameter of the POST request can be modified by an attacker. The malicious code is then stored in the chat which can then be shared to other users. When sharing chats with a potentially malicious “tracker”, resources loaded can lead to loss of privacy for users who view the chat link that is sent to them. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.1.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 8.6
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
MaxKB is an open-source AI assistant for enterprise. Versions 2.3.1 and below have improper file permissions which allow attackers to overwrite the built-in dynamic linker and other critical files, potentially resulting in privilege escalation. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 8.8
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Description
MaxKB is an open-source AI assistant for enterprise. In versions 2.3.1 and below, the tool module allows an attacker to escape the sandbox environment and escalate privileges under certain concurrent conditions. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 8.8
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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