Company Details
fema
19,641
538,483
92
http://www.fema.gov
0
FEM_1738871
In-progress

FEMA Company CyberSecurity Posture
http://www.fema.govWelcome to the official LinkedIn page for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). When disaster strikes, America looks to FEMA to support survivors and first responders in communities all across the country. This page provides career related information, job announcements and relevant updates for the agency’s current and future workforce. FEMA fosters innovation, rewards performance and creativity, and provides challenges on a routine basis with a well-skilled, knowledgeable, and high performance workforce. Join our mission to support Americans when they need you most!
Company Details
fema
19,641
538,483
92
http://www.fema.gov
0
FEM_1738871
In-progress
Between 550 and 599

FEMA Global Score (TPRM)XXXX

Description: A hacker infiltrated FEMA’s computer networks via compromised Citrix remote desktop credentials, maintaining unauthorized access from **June 22 to August 5, 2024**. The breach targeted **FEMA Region 6** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and involved the theft of **employee identity data** from FEMA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The attacker exploited weak security controls, including the absence of **multifactor authentication (MFA)**, to move laterally across the network, install VPN software, and exfiltrate data from **Active Directory**.The incident led to the termination of **24 FEMA employees**, including IT executives, after an investigation revealed systemic failures in cybersecurity protocols. While initial statements claimed no sensitive data was stolen, a DHS internal review confirmed the theft of **federal employee identity information**. The breach underscored vulnerabilities in government cybersecurity, compounded by a separate disclosure of hackers exploiting **Cisco firewall devices** in U.S. agencies, though no direct link to the FEMA attack was established.
Description: A hacker infiltrated FEMA’s computer networks via compromised credentials in Citrix Systems’ remote desktop software, gaining unauthorized access for nearly two months (June 22 to August 5). The breach targeted **FEMA Region 6** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and compromised **employee identity data** from both FEMA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), another DHS component. The attacker exploited weak security measures, including the absence of **multifactor authentication (MFA)**, to move laterally across the network, install VPN software, and exfiltrate data from **Microsoft Active Directory**, which manages access controls. The incident led to the termination of **two dozen FEMA employees**, including IT executives, after DHS Secretary Kristi Noem cited systemic failures like agencywide MFA gaps and 'incompetence' in cybersecurity protocols. While initial statements claimed no sensitive citizen data was stolen, investigations confirmed the theft of **federal employee identity information**. The breach underscored vulnerabilities in critical government infrastructure, though officials asserted no direct harm to American citizens occurred. The attack’s duration and depth raised concerns about persistent threats to federal agencies, compounded by a separate disclosure of hackers exploiting **Cisco firewall devices** in U.S. government systems around the same period.
Description: A large-scale cyber breach targeted FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) over several weeks, compromising its network and exposing sensitive employee data from both FEMA and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The attacker exploited vulnerabilities in **Citrix remote access software**, gaining deep access across regions including New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. While initial claims by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem stated *no sensitive data was extracted*, internal documents later confirmed the theft of **FEMA and CBP employee data**, affecting over **250,000 employees** and raising concerns about DHS’s cybersecurity capabilities. The breach led to the dismissal of **20 FEMA IT workers**, including senior leaders, accused of security failures. Remediation efforts spanned months, with DHS and FEMA struggling to contain the intrusion until at least September 2025. The attack underscored systemic vulnerabilities in federal network defenses, prompting emergency directives to strengthen protections against advanced hacker groups. The incident remains under investigation, with no confirmed attribution or link to broader espionage campaigns.
Description: An unidentified hacker executed a **months-long breach** targeting FEMA’s computer network, compromising sensitive data of **Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and FEMA employees** across a region spanning New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. The attacker exploited vulnerabilities in **Citrix remote-access software**, gaining deep access to operational systems. Despite initial containment efforts by DHS in mid-July, remediation extended into September, with confirmations that **employee data was stolen**, contradicting earlier official denials. The breach led to the firing of **24 FEMA IT staff**, including top executives, amid accusations of 'severe security lapses.' The incident exposed systemic weaknesses in DHS’s cybersecurity posture, raising concerns about the protection of **over 250,000 employees’ information** and potential broader threats to national security. The attacker’s identity and motives remain unknown, though the prolonged intrusion suggests targeted espionage or data exfiltration for malicious use.
Description: FEMA stated that they mistakenly exposed the personal information, including addresses and bank account information, of 2.3 million disaster victims. The breach occurred because FEMA did not ensure a private contractor only received the information it required to perform its official duties. The victims affected include survivors of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the 2017 California wildfires. The report found FEMA's failure to protect their data put them at risk of identity theft and fraud. According to the report, some of the data collected, such as addresses and Social Security numbers, were necessary to give aid. but other information, like electronic bank account information, was not considered necessary.
Description: FEMA suffered a cyberattack in **June 2024** where threat actors exploited **CitrixBleed 2 (CVSS 9.3)** via stolen credentials to breach its **Citrix Netscaler ADC/Gateway**, bypassing MFA. Attackers exfiltrated data from **Region 6 servers** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas), including sensitive government and citizen information. The breach remained undetected until **July**, despite prior CISA warnings about active exploitation. FEMA initially denied data loss but later evidence confirmed unauthorized uploads. The incident led to the **termination of the CISO, CIO, and 22 staff** for negligence, including falsified security audits. Remediation included forced password resets, MFA enforcement, and a complete IT overhaul. The attack exposed systemic failures in patch management and incident response, risking **national security data, emergency response capabilities, and public trust** in a critical federal agency.
Description: DHS had a privacy incident that resulted in the exposure of information for 247,167 active and retired federal employees. The database utilised by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and kept in the Department of Homeland Security OIG Case Management System was compromised by a data breach. Employee names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, jobs, grades, and duty locations are among the data that has been made public. In addition to putting additional security measures in place to restrict access to this kind of information, the Department of Homeland Security notified those who were impacted through notification letters.
Description: In March–May 2023, a misconfigured **DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN-Intel)** platform exposed **sensitive but unclassified intelligence data**—including investigative leads shared with the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, and local law enforcement—to **tens of thousands of unauthorized users**. The access controls were incorrectly set to 'everyone,' granting visibility to **non-intelligence government workers (e.g., disaster response teams), private contractors, and foreign government personnel**. The breach stemmed from **poor access management and lack of segmentation**, highlighting systemic failures in cloud security governance. While no classified data was compromised, the exposure risked operational security, counterterrorism efforts, and trust in interagency intelligence-sharing. The incident underscored how **human error and process gaps**—rather than sophisticated cyberattacks—remain a dominant cause of high-impact breaches in critical infrastructure.
Description: A Department of Justice employee's email account was compromised by a hacker, who took 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees. Delving deeper into the archive, one finds information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence. Motherboard claims that a hacker gained access to a Department of Justice employee's email account. As evidence, the hacker used the hacked account to send the email directly to Motherboard contributor Joseph Cox. The apparent job titles, names, phone numbers, and email addresses of over 9,000 purported Department of Homeland Security (DHS) workers and over 20,000 purported FBI employees.
Description: Daniil Kasatkin, a 26-year-old Russian professional basketball player, was arrested at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris on June 21, 2023, for his alleged involvement in a ransomware gang that operated between 2020 and 2022. The gang is accused of targeting around 900 organizations, including two US federal agencies. Kasatkin is facing charges of 'conspiracy to commit computer fraud' and 'computer fraud conspiracy.' His lawyers deny the allegations, claiming he is not tech-savvy and was unaware of any unlawful activities. The US has not yet released any statements or evidence regarding the crimes.
Description: The DHS encountered growing threats from commercial drones being modified to carry hazardous payloads, impacting national security. Attempted mitigations include improved detection and response capabilities through local law enforcement training and technology deployment. These clandestine drone activities pose a significant risk, requiring urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.


FEMA has 265.85% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
FEMA has 284.62% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
FEMA reported 3 incidents this year: 0 cyber attacks, 0 ransomware, 0 vulnerabilities, 3 data breaches, compared to industry peers with at least 1 incident.
FEMA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries

Welcome to the official LinkedIn page for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). When disaster strikes, America looks to FEMA to support survivors and first responders in communities all across the country. This page provides career related information, job announcements and relevant updates for the agency’s current and future workforce. FEMA fosters innovation, rewards performance and creativity, and provides challenges on a routine basis with a well-skilled, knowledgeable, and high performance workforce. Join our mission to support Americans when they need you most!


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To attend a FEMA Review Council meeting that was reportedly canceled just before she was scheduled to co-chair it, Department of Homeland...
GREENWIRE | An expert panel advising President Donald Trump about overhauling the Federal Emergency Management Agency canceled a meeting...
Sen. Ted Budd (R-N.C.) said Friday he will lift his remaining holds on President Trump's nominees to the Department of Homeland Security...
CLIMATEWIRE | The presidential council studying an overhaul of the Federal Emergency Management Agency will present its final report at a...
CLIMATEWIRE | Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem accused disaster employees in the Biden administration of violating privacy laws by...
CLIMATEWIRE | The Trump administration canceled $11 billion in disaster payments to states in an unprecedented move that could signal a...
FEMA and U.S. CBP confirmed that the agencies experienced a "widespread" breach over the summer, which lasted several weeks.
Infosec in brief On August 29, the US Federal Emergency Management Agency fired its CISO, CIO, and 22 other staff for incompetence but...
Cybercriminals offer money to BBC journalist, LinkedIn user data will train AI, Tile tracker vulnerabilities.

Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
The official website of FEMA is http://www.fema.gov.
According to Rankiteo, FEMA’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 562, reflecting their Very Poor security posture.
According to Rankiteo, FEMA currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
According to Rankiteo, FEMA is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
According to Rankiteo, FEMA does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
According to Rankiteo, FEMA is not listed as GDPR compliant.
According to Rankiteo, FEMA does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
According to Rankiteo, FEMA is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
According to Rankiteo,FEMA is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
FEMA operates primarily in the Government Administration industry.
FEMA employs approximately 19,641 people worldwide.
FEMA presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
FEMA’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 538,483 followers.
FEMA is classified under the NAICS code 92, which corresponds to Public Administration.
No, FEMA does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
Yes, FEMA maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fema.
As of December 19, 2025, Rankiteo reports that FEMA has experienced 11 cybersecurity incidents.
FEMA has an estimated 11,745 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack, Ransomware, Breach, Data Leak and Vulnerability.
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an remediation measures with notification letters sent to affected individuals, remediation measures with additional security measures implemented to restrict access to information, and containment measures with improved detection and response capabilities, containment measures with local law enforcement training, containment measures with technology deployment, and and and and containment measures with disconnected citrix remote access tool (2023-07-16), containment measures with enforced multifactor authentication, and communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary (2023-08-29), communication strategy with media disclosures (bloomberg, nextgov/fcw), and incident response plan activated with yes (dhs it leadership urgent action), and law enforcement notified with likely (no explicit confirmation), and containment measures with localization of breach (mid-july 2025), containment measures with network segmentation, containment measures with access revocation, and remediation measures with ongoing as of september 5, 2025, remediation measures with emergency directive for federal network hardening, remediation measures with identity management reforms, and communication strategy with internal fema staff updates, communication strategy with public statements by homeland security secretary kristi noem, communication strategy with media coverage (cnn), and network segmentation with implemented post-breach, and enhanced monitoring with yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities), and and and containment measures with disconnection of citrix remote access tool (2025-07-16), containment measures with enforcement of multifactor authentication (mfa), and communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary kristi noem (2025-08-29), communication strategy with media disclosures (bloomberg, nextgov/fcw), and incident response plan activated with yes (dhs task force formed), and law enforcement notified with likely (internal dhs investigation), and containment measures with initial efforts launched mid-july 2023, containment measures with ongoing remediation as of september 5, 2023, and remediation measures with cleanup operation by dhs it officials, remediation measures with firing of 24 fema it employees, and communication strategy with internal fema staff updates, communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary kristi noem (august 29, 2023), and communication strategy with foia disclosure (dhs memo), communication strategy with media reports (wired), and network segmentation with recommended as corrective action, and enhanced monitoring with recommended as corrective action, and incident response plan activated with yes (post-discovery), and containment measures with password resets, containment measures with multi-factor authentication (mfa) enforcement, and remediation measures with it staff overhaul, remediation measures with new security personnel hired, and communication strategy with public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss)..
Title: FEMA Data Breach
Description: FEMA mistakenly exposed the personal information, including addresses and bank account information, of 2.3 million disaster victims due to oversharing with a private contractor.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Oversharing of Data
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Data Handling
Title: Department of Justice Email Account Compromise
Description: A Department of Justice employee's email account was compromised by a hacker, who took 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees. The data included information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Email Compromise
Threat Actor: Hacker
Motivation: Data Theft
Title: DHS Data Breach Incident
Description: A privacy incident at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) resulted in the exposure of information for 247,167 active and retired federal employees. The compromised data includes employee names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, positions, grades, and duty locations. The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Case Management System was affected.
Type: Data Breach
Title: Commercial Drone Threats to National Security
Description: The DHS encountered growing threats from commercial drones being modified to carry hazardous payloads, impacting national security. Attempted mitigations include improved detection and response capabilities through local law enforcement training and technology deployment. These clandestine drone activities pose a significant risk, requiring urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
Type: Physical Security Threat
Attack Vector: Modified Commercial Drones
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats
Motivation: Impact national security and critical infrastructure
Title: Russian Basketball Player Arrested for Ransomware Negotiation
Description: Daniil Kasatkin, a professional basketball player, was arrested in France for allegedly acting as a negotiator for a ransomware gang that targeted around 900 organizations, including two US federal agencies.
Date Detected: 2023-06-21
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Ransomware Negotiation
Threat Actor: Unnamed Ransomware Gang
Motivation: Financial Gain
Title: FEMA and CBP Data Breach (2025)
Description: An unknown hacker carried out a large-scale breach affecting FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) and CBP (Customs and Border Protection) employees, leading to the exposure of sensitive data. The incident lasted several weeks, spanning regions from New Mexico to Texas and Louisiana, and required urgent action by DHS IT leadership. The attacker exploited Citrix software used by a government contractor for remote network access, bypassing FEMA’s digital defenses. Approximately 250,000 employees' data was at risk, and about twenty FEMA IT workers were dismissed for alleged 'serious security failures.' While initial claims suggested no sensitive data was exfiltrated, internal documents later confirmed the theft of FEMA and CBP employee data. The investigation remains ongoing, with no confirmed link to broader espionage campaigns.
Date Detected: 2025-07-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Exploitation of Citrix Remote Access SoftwareLateral MovementPrivilege Escalation
Vulnerability Exploited: Misconfigured Remote Access SystemsInsufficient Identity ManagementLack of Network Segmentation
Threat Actor: Unknown (suspected advanced hacker group)
Motivation: EspionageData TheftPotential Sabotage
Title: FEMA and Customs and Border Protection Staff Data Breach
Description: A hacker gained unauthorized access to FEMA's computer networks for several months in 2025, stealing employee data from FEMA and US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The breach was facilitated via compromised credentials in Citrix Systems Inc.’s remote desktop software, affecting FEMA’s Region 6 (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas). The intruder accessed Active Directory and exfiltrated federal employee identity data. FEMA disconnected the compromised Citrix tool and enforced multifactor authentication (MFA) post-breach. The incident led to the termination of 24 FEMA employees, including IT executives, due to alleged incompetence and lack of agencywide MFA.
Date Detected: 2025-07-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Compromised CredentialsExploitation of Citrix Remote Desktop SoftwareLateral Movement via VPN Software
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Multifactor Authentication (MFA)Weak Access Controls in Citrix SystemsUnsecured Active Directory
Title: Widespread Breach of FEMA and CBP Employee Data via Citrix Vulnerability
Description: An unidentified hacker stole sensitive data from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) employees in a months-long breach (summer 2023). The attacker exploited a Citrix software vulnerability to gain deep access to FEMA's network, which handles operations across New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. The breach led to the firing of 24 FEMA IT employees, including top executives, due to 'severe lapses in security.' Initial claims by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem that no sensitive data was extracted were contradicted by internal documents confirming the theft of employee data. Containment efforts spanned from mid-July to at least September 5, 2023.
Date Detected: 2023-07-mid
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Exploitation of Citrix Remote Access SoftwareLateral Movement within Network
Vulnerability Exploited: Citrix Software Vulnerability (specific CVE unidentified)
Threat Actor: Unidentified (possibly advanced hacking group)
Motivation: EspionageData Theft
Title: DHS Data Hub Misconfiguration Exposes Sensitive Intelligence to Unauthorized Users
Description: An internal DHS memo obtained via FOIA revealed that from March to May 2023, a DHS online platform (HSIN-Intel) used to share sensitive but unclassified intelligence was misconfigured, granting access to 'everyone' instead of only authorized users. This exposed restricted intelligence to tens of thousands of unauthorized users, including non-intelligence government workers, private contractors, and foreign government staff. The incident highlights systemic failures in cloud security, including misconfigurations tied to overly permissive IAM policies, lack of segmentation, and poor access management. Additionally, a separate 2025 breach exposed 184 million plain-text user records (including credentials for Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), emphasizing the broader crisis of cloud misconfigurations driven by human error, lack of expertise, and poor governance.
Date Detected: 2023-05-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-06-01
Type: Data Exposure
Attack Vector: Misconfigured Access ControlsOverly Permissive IAM PoliciesPublicly Exposed Storage
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Public Access ConfigurationLack of SegmentationDisabled LoggingMissing Alerts
Title: FEMA Cybersecurity Breach and Staff Terminations Due to CitrixBleed Exploitation
Description: The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) terminated its CISO, CIO, and 22 other staff after an audit revealed serious security failures, including a breach in June 2024 where attackers exploited the CitrixBleed vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966) to access FEMA's Region 6 servers (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas). The breach was discovered in July 2024, despite warnings about the vulnerability being issued as early as June. FEMA initially denied data loss, but evidence suggests otherwise. The incident led to a complete overhaul of FEMA's IT department, with new staff hired to address lax security practices. The attack involved stolen credentials to access a Citrix system, followed by data exfiltration from regional servers.
Date Detected: 2024-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Stolen CredentialsExploitation of CitrixBleed Vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966)
Vulnerability Exploited: CitrixBleed (CVE-2023-4966) - CVSS 9.3 in Netscaler ADC and Gateway (Session Token Theft, MFA Bypass)
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Breach.
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Email Account, Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials), Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor), Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials), Citrix Remote Access Software, Misconfigured HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach) and Citrix System (via stolen credentials).

Data Compromised: Addresses, Bank account information, Social security numbers
Identity Theft Risk: High
Payment Information Risk: High

Data Compromised: 200gb of data, including records of 20,000 fbi workers and 9,000 dhs employees, Information about dhs security experts, programme analysts, it, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence
Brand Reputation Impact: High
Identity Theft Risk: High

Data Compromised: Employee names, Social security numbers, Dates of birth, Positions, Grades, Duty locations
Systems Affected: DHS OIG Case Management System

Operational Impact: High

Data Compromised: Fema employee data, Cbp employee data
Systems Affected: FEMA Computer NetworkDHS Systems (partial)Citrix Remote Access Infrastructure
Downtime: Several weeks (from at least mid-July to September 2025)
Operational Impact: Disruption of DHS/FEMA OperationsPersonnel Dismissals (20 IT workers)Administrative Leave for Additional StaffEmergency Directives Issued for Federal Network Hardening
Brand Reputation Impact: Public Scrutiny of FEMA/DHS CybersecurityPolitical Controversy Over Agency RestructuringLoss of Trust in Federal Data Protection
Identity Theft Risk: High (for 250,000+ employees)

Data Compromised: Federal employee identity data (fema and cbp)
Systems Affected: FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Software
Operational Impact: Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access ToolEnforcement of MFATermination of 24 Employees (Including IT Executives)
Brand Reputation Impact: Public Disclosure of Cyber LapsesTermination of Senior IT StaffMedia Coverage (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Identity Theft Risk: ['Federal Employee Data (Potential Risk)']

Data Compromised: Fema employee data, Cbp employee data
Systems Affected: FEMA Computer Network (regional: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)Citrix Remote Access Software
Downtime: At least 7+ weeks (mid-July to September 5, 2023)
Operational Impact: Urgent cleanup operation by DHS IT officialsDisruption to FEMA/CBP operationsFiring of 24 IT employees (including top executives)
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of trust in DHS/FEMA cybersecurity capabilitiesControversy over employee firings and political motivations
Identity Theft Risk: High (employee data stolen)

Data Compromised: Sensitive intelligence (dhs), 184m user records (2025 breach), Plain-text credentials (apple, google, meta, etc.), Bank accounts, Health platforms, Government portals
Systems Affected: HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach)
Operational Impact: Unauthorized Access to Restricted IntelligenceIncreased Risk of Identity Theft/Phishing (2025 Breach)Credential Stuffing Attacks
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Trust in DHS/Federal AgenciesReputation Damage for Affected Platforms (Apple, Google, etc.)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (184M Records Exposed in Plain Text)']
Payment Information Risk: ['High (Bank Account Details Exposed in 2025 Breach)']

Data Compromised: Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss, but documents suggest exfiltration occurred)
Systems Affected: Citrix SystemFEMA Region 6 Servers (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Operational Impact: Major IT staff overhaul, including termination of CISO, CIO, and 22 others; new security measures implemented (password resets, MFA enforcement)
Brand Reputation Impact: High (public disclosure of security failures, terminations, and misleading claims)
Identity Theft Risk: Potential (if PII was exfiltrated)
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Addresses, Bank Account Information, Social Security Numbers, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Job Titles, Phone Numbers, Email Addresses, , Personally Identifiable Information, , Employee Identity Data, , Employee Records, Potentially Sensitive Operational Data, , Federal Employee Identity Data, , Employee Data (Fema/Cbp), , Intelligence Reports (Dhs), User Credentials (Plain Text), Bank Account Details, Health Data, Government Portal Access and .

Entity Name: FEMA
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United States
Customers Affected: 2300000

Entity Name: Department of Justice
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large

Entity Name: FBI
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large

Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large

Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Government
Size: Large

Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States

Entity Type: Organization

Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Emergency Management
Location: Washington, D.C., USA (HQ); regions including New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana
Size: Large (250,000+ employees across DHS)

Entity Name: Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Border Security
Location: USA

Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Federal Department
Industry: National Security
Location: USA

Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration / Emergency Management
Location: USA (Region 6: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)

Entity Name: US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement / Border Security
Location: USA

Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration / Emergency Management
Location: USA (regional focus: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)
Size: 250,000+ employees (DHS-wide)
Customers Affected: FEMA and CBP employees (number unspecified)

Entity Name: Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement / Border Security
Location: USA
Customers Affected: CBP employees (number unspecified)

Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Federal Department
Industry: National Security
Location: USA

Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Customers Affected: Tens of thousands (HSIN users)

Entity Name: Multiple Global Platforms (Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, etc.)
Entity Type: Tech Companies, Social Media, Cloud Providers
Industry: Technology
Location: Global
Size: Fortune 2000
Customers Affected: 184 million users (2025 Breach)

Entity Name: FBI
Entity Type: Law Enforcement
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large

Entity Name: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Entity Type: Intelligence Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large

Entity Name: Local Law Enforcement & Intelligence Fusion Centers
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Safety
Location: United States
Size: Varies

Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Emergency Management
Location: United States (Region 6: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)

Remediation Measures: Notification letters sent to affected individualsAdditional security measures implemented to restrict access to information

Containment Measures: Improved detection and response capabilitiesLocal law enforcement trainingTechnology deployment


Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (DHS IT leadership urgent action)
Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (no explicit confirmation)
Containment Measures: Localization of Breach (mid-July 2025)Network SegmentationAccess Revocation
Remediation Measures: Ongoing as of September 5, 2025Emergency Directive for Federal Network HardeningIdentity Management Reforms
Communication Strategy: Internal FEMA Staff UpdatesPublic Statements by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi NoemMedia Coverage (CNN)
Network Segmentation: Implemented post-breach
Enhanced Monitoring: Yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities)

Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access Tool (2025-07-16)Enforcement of Multifactor Authentication (MFA)
Communication Strategy: Public Statement by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem (2025-08-29)Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)

Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (DHS Task Force formed)
Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (internal DHS investigation)
Containment Measures: Initial efforts launched mid-July 2023Ongoing remediation as of September 5, 2023
Remediation Measures: Cleanup operation by DHS IT officialsFiring of 24 FEMA IT employees
Communication Strategy: Internal FEMA staff updatesPublic statement by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem (August 29, 2023)

Communication Strategy: FOIA Disclosure (DHS Memo)Media Reports (WIRED)
Network Segmentation: ['Recommended as Corrective Action']
Enhanced Monitoring: Recommended as Corrective Action

Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (post-discovery)
Containment Measures: Password resetsMulti-Factor Authentication (MFA) enforcement
Remediation Measures: IT staff overhaulNew security personnel hired
Communication Strategy: Public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss)
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Yes (DHS IT leadership urgent action), , Yes (DHS Task Force formed), Yes (post-discovery).

Type of Data Compromised: Addresses, Bank account information, Social security numbers
Number of Records Exposed: 2300000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes

Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Job titles, Phone numbers, Email addresses
Number of Records Exposed: 29,000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes

Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information
Number of Records Exposed: 247167
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: Employee namesSocial Security numbersDates of birthPositionsGradesDuty locations

Type of Data Compromised: Employee records, Potentially sensitive operational data
Number of Records Exposed: 250,000+ (employees across DHS/FEMA/CBP)
Sensitivity of Data: High (government employee data)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (contradicts initial denial by Secretary Noem)
Personally Identifiable Information: Likely (employee details)

Type of Data Compromised: Federal employee identity data
Sensitivity of Data: High (Government Employee PII)

Type of Data Compromised: Employee data (fema/cbp)
Sensitivity of Data: High (government employee information)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (contradicts initial DHS denial)
Personally Identifiable Information: Likely (employee records)

Type of Data Compromised: Intelligence reports (dhs), User credentials (plain text), Bank account details, Health data, Government portal access
Number of Records Exposed: Undisclosed (DHS), 184 million (2025 Breach)
Sensitivity of Data: High (Intelligence/National Security)Critical (Financial/Health Data)
Data Exfiltration: Likely (2025 Breach)Unconfirmed (DHS)
Data Encryption: ['None (Plain-Text Records in 2025 Breach)']
File Types Exposed: Database RecordsAuthorization URLsCredentials
Personally Identifiable Information: UsernamesPasswordsBank Account DetailsHealth Records

Data Exfiltration: Yes (from FEMA Region 6 servers)
Personally Identifiable Information: Potential (unconfirmed)
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Notification letters sent to affected individuals, Additional security measures implemented to restrict access to information, , Ongoing as of September 5, 2025, Emergency Directive for Federal Network Hardening, Identity Management Reforms, , Cleanup operation by DHS IT officials, Firing of 24 FEMA IT employees, , IT staff overhaul, New security personnel hired, .
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by improved detection and response capabilities, local law enforcement training, technology deployment, , disconnected citrix remote access tool (2023-07-16), enforced multifactor authentication, , localization of breach (mid-july 2025), network segmentation, access revocation, , disconnection of citrix remote access tool (2025-07-16), enforcement of multifactor authentication (mfa), , initial efforts launched mid-july 2023, ongoing remediation as of september 5, 2023, , password resets, multi-factor authentication (mfa) enforcement and .

Data Exfiltration: Yes (separate from ransomware)

Data Exfiltration: Yes (but not ransomware-related)

Legal Actions: Pending Extradition to the US

Regulations Violated: Potential FISMA (Federal Information Security Modernization Act) Non-Compliance, DHS Internal Security Policies,
Legal Actions: Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others,
Regulatory Notifications: Internal DHS/FEMA ReportsCongressional Oversight (potential open letter)

Legal Actions: Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives),
Regulatory Notifications: Internal DHS Investigation

Legal Actions: Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired),

Regulations Violated: Potential FISMA (DHS), GDPR (if EU citizens affected in 2025 Breach), State Data Breach Laws,
Regulatory Notifications: FOIA Disclosure (DHS)
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Pending Extradition to the US, Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Leadership), , Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others, , Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives), , Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired), .

Lessons Learned: Ensure that only necessary data is shared with contractors to perform their official duties.

Lessons Learned: Urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies are necessary to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.

Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities in remote access systems (e.g., Citrix) require immediate patching and monitoring., Personnel changes without transparent justification can undermine morale and operational trust., Contradictory public statements (e.g., data exfiltration denials) erode credibility during crises., Federal agencies must prioritize network segmentation and identity management to limit lateral movement.

Lessons Learned: Critical importance of enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) agencywide., Need for robust monitoring of third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix)., Consequences of inadequate access controls in Active Directory., Accountability for IT leadership failures in cybersecurity posture.

Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities in Citrix remote access software require urgent patching, Need for improved network segmentation and lateral movement detection, Political and operational risks of public contradictions in breach disclosures

Lessons Learned: Misconfigurations are systemic failures tied to people, process, and policy—not just technical oversights., Overly permissive IAM policies and lack of segmentation enable broad unauthorized access., Publicly exposed storage buckets/databases with sensitive data create high-risk vectors., Plain-text credential storage exacerbates identity theft and fraud risks., Cloud drift and lack of context in security tools lead to alert fatigue and missed critical issues., Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale.

Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed) must be patched promptly. Transparency in incident reporting is essential to maintain trust. Security preparedness claims must be audited rigorously to prevent misrepresentation.

Recommendations: Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information.

Recommendations: Improve detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threatsImprove detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threatsImprove detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats

Recommendations: Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.

Recommendations: Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.

Recommendations: Conduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidentsConduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidentsConduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidents

Recommendations: Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.

Recommendations: Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Ensure that only necessary data is shared with contractors to perform their official duties.Urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies are necessary to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.Critical need for multifactor authentication (MFA) across all systems.,Vulnerabilities in third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix) require proactive monitoring.,Lateral movement risks in Active Directory highlight the need for segmentation and access controls.,Delayed detection (hacker active for ~45 days) underscores gaps in continuous threat monitoring.Critical vulnerabilities in remote access systems (e.g., Citrix) require immediate patching and monitoring.,Personnel changes without transparent justification can undermine morale and operational trust.,Contradictory public statements (e.g., data exfiltration denials) erode credibility during crises.,Federal agencies must prioritize network segmentation and identity management to limit lateral movement.Critical importance of enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) agencywide.,Need for robust monitoring of third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix).,Consequences of inadequate access controls in Active Directory.,Accountability for IT leadership failures in cybersecurity posture.Critical vulnerabilities in Citrix remote access software require urgent patching,Need for improved network segmentation and lateral movement detection,Political and operational risks of public contradictions in breach disclosuresMisconfigurations are systemic failures tied to people, process, and policy—not just technical oversights.,Overly permissive IAM policies and lack of segmentation enable broad unauthorized access.,Publicly exposed storage buckets/databases with sensitive data create high-risk vectors.,Plain-text credential storage exacerbates identity theft and fraud risks.,Cloud drift and lack of context in security tools lead to alert fatigue and missed critical issues.,Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale.Critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed) must be patched promptly. Transparency in incident reporting is essential to maintain trust. Security preparedness claims must be audited rigorously to prevent misrepresentation.
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information., Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based. and Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives..

Source: Motherboard

Source: AFP

Source: Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN)
Date Accessed: 2025-09-10

Source: DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach)
Date Accessed: 2025-09

Source: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem
Date Accessed: 2025-08-29

Source: AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo)
Date Accessed: 2025-02-11

Source: Bloomberg News
URL: https://www.bloomberg.com
Date Accessed: 2025-09-05

Source: DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem)
Date Accessed: 2025-08-29

Source: CNN

Source: NextGov/FCW

Source: DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023)

Source: WIRED
URL: https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/
Date Accessed: 2023-06-01

Source: Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher)
Date Accessed: 2025-06-01

Source: Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security Vulnerabilities

Source: CrowdStrike - Common Cloud Misconfigurations
URL: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/
Date Accessed: 2023-01-01

Source: SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration Prevention
URL: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/

Source: SecPod - Top 10 Cloud Misconfigurations
URL: https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/

Source: Nextgov

Source: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem

Source: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: Motherboard, and Source: AFP, and Source: Bloomberg News, and Source: Nextgov/FCW, and Source: DHS Public Statement (2023-08-29), and Source: CNNDate Accessed: 2025-09-12, and Source: Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN)Date Accessed: 2025-09-10, and Source: DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach)Date Accessed: 2025-09, and Source: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi NoemDate Accessed: 2025-08-29, and Source: AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo)Url: https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fema-headquarters-is-pictured-in-washington-dc-on-february-news-photo/1238567890Date Accessed: 2025-02-11, and Source: Bloomberg NewsUrl: https://www.bloomberg.comDate Accessed: 2025-09-05, and Source: Nextgov/FCWUrl: https://www.nextgov.comDate Accessed: 2025-09-05, and Source: DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem)Date Accessed: 2025-08-29, and Source: CNN, and Source: NextGov/FCW, and Source: DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023), and Source: WIREDUrl: https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/Date Accessed: 2023-06-01, and Source: Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher)Date Accessed: 2025-06-01, and Source: Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security VulnerabilitiesUrl: https://www.wiz.io/academy/top-cloud-vulnerabilities, and Source: CrowdStrike - Common Cloud MisconfigurationsUrl: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/Date Accessed: 2023-01-01, and Source: SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration PreventionUrl: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/, and Source: SecPod - Top 10 Cloud MisconfigurationsUrl: https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/, and Source: Nextgov, and Source: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem, and Source: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed.

Investigation Status: Ongoing

Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of September 2025)

Investigation Status: Completed (DHS Internal Investigation)

Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of September 2023)

Investigation Status: ['DHS Internal Inquiry Completed (2023)', '2025 Breach Under Investigation']

Investigation Status: Ongoing (audit findings released, but full scope of breach unclear)
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Public Statement By Dhs Secretary (2023-08-29), Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/Fcw), Internal Fema Staff Updates, Public Statements By Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, Media Coverage (Cnn), Public Statement By Dhs Secretary Kristi Noem (2025-08-29), Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/Fcw), Internal Fema Staff Updates, Public Statement By Dhs Secretary Kristi Noem (August 29, 2023), Foia Disclosure (Dhs Memo), Media Reports (Wired) and Public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss).

Stakeholder Advisories: Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Working Group Reports.

Stakeholder Advisories: Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Task Force Findings.

Stakeholder Advisories: Foia Memo (Dhs), Media Statements.
Customer Advisories: None (DHS)Recommended Password Resets for 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach)
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Dhs Secretary’S Public Statement, Media Briefings, Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Working Group Reports, Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Task Force Findings, Foia Memo (Dhs), Media Statements, None (Dhs), Recommended Password Resets For 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach) and .

Entry Point: Email Account

Entry Point: Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor)
Reconnaissance Period: Unknown (likely weeks prior to mid-July 2025)
Backdoors Established: Likely (given lateral movement)
High Value Targets: Fema Employee Data, Cbp Employee Data, Dhs Network Access,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Fema Employee Data, Cbp Employee Data, Dhs Network Access,

Entry Point: Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials)
Backdoors Established: ['Installation of VPN Software for Lateral Movement']
High Value Targets: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema Region 6 Servers,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema Region 6 Servers,

Entry Point: Citrix Remote Access Software
Reconnaissance Period: Unknown (breach lasted 'several weeks' in summer 2023)
High Value Targets: Fema Regional Operations Network, Cbp/Employee Data,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Fema Regional Operations Network, Cbp/Employee Data,

Entry Point: Misconfigured Hsin-Intel Platform (Dhs), Unsecured Database (2025 Breach),
High Value Targets: Intelligence Data (Dhs), User Credentials (2025 Breach),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Intelligence Data (Dhs), User Credentials (2025 Breach),

Entry Point: Citrix System (via stolen credentials)
High Value Targets: FEMA Region 6 servers
Data Sold on Dark Web: FEMA Region 6 servers

Root Causes: Oversharing of data with a private contractor.
Corrective Actions: Review and tighten data sharing practices.

Root Causes: Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats
Corrective Actions: Improve Detection And Response Capabilities, Enhance Local Law Enforcement Training, Deploy Advanced Technologies To Mitigate Drone Threats,

Root Causes: Inadequate Security Controls For Remote Access Systems (Citrix)., Failure To Detect Lateral Movement In A Timely Manner., Potential Insider Threats Or Misconfigured Privileges Enabling Deep Access., Organizational Turmoil (E.G., Dismissals, Restructuring) Distracting From Cybersecurity Focus.,
Corrective Actions: Mandatory Network Segmentation And Least-Privilege Access Policies., Continuous Monitoring For Anomalous Activity, Especially In Remote Access Vectors., Review Of Personnel Practices To Align Dismissals With Evidence-Based Accountability., Transparency In Breach Communications To Maintain Public Trust.,

Root Causes: Lack Of Multifactor Authentication (Mfa) Across Fema Systems., Exploitation Of Vulnerable Citrix Remote Access Software., Inadequate Monitoring Of Network Access And Lateral Movement., It Leadership Failures In Cybersecurity Governance.,
Corrective Actions: Enforcement Of Mfa For All Fema Employees., Disconnection Of Compromised Citrix Tools., Termination Of Responsible It Personnel., Public Disclosure Of Cybersecurity Lapses To Drive Accountability.,

Root Causes: Unpatched Citrix Vulnerability, Inadequate Network Monitoring, Lateral Movement Controls Failure, Possible Insider Threats Or Misconfigurations,
Corrective Actions: Personnel Changes (24 It Employees Fired), Dhs Emergency Directive For Federal Agencies To Defend Against Similar Threats,

Root Causes: Overly Permissive Iam Policies ('Everyone' Access)., Lack Of Network Segmentation (Dhs)., Disabled Logging/Missing Alerts (No Detection Of Unauthorized Access)., Human Error In Access Configuration (Hsin-Intel)., Plain-Text Storage Of Credentials (2025 Breach)., Complex Cloud Architectures Without Adequate Governance., Shadow It/Unmonitored Accounts (Potential Factor)., Inadequate Policy-As-Code Enforcement.,
Corrective Actions: Revised Iam Policies With Least-Privilege Principles., Implemented Network Segmentation For Hsin Platforms., Enabled Centralized Logging And Monitoring (Dhs)., Mandated Encryption For Sensitive Data (Post-2025 Breach)., Conducted Staff Training On Secure Cloud Configurations., Deployed Automated Misconfiguration Detection Tools., Established Regular Audits For Public-Facing Resources.,

Root Causes: Failure To Patch Citrixbleed Vulnerability Despite Prior Warnings., Misrepresentation Of Security Preparedness By Fema Staff., Lack Of Centralized It Monitoring To Detect The Breach Earlier.,
Corrective Actions: Termination Of Incompetent Staff (Ciso, Cio, And 22 Others)., Hiring Of New It Security Personnel., Enforcement Of Mfa And Password Resets., Potential Restructuring Of Fema'S Cybersecurity Governance.,
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities), Recommended As Corrective Action, .
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Review and tighten data sharing practices., Improve Detection And Response Capabilities, Enhance Local Law Enforcement Training, Deploy Advanced Technologies To Mitigate Drone Threats, , Enforced Mfa For Fema Region 6., Disconnected Vulnerable Citrix Remote Access Tool., Terminated It Leadership Responsible For Security Failures., Public Disclosure To Raise Awareness Of Risks., , Mandatory Network Segmentation And Least-Privilege Access Policies., Continuous Monitoring For Anomalous Activity, Especially In Remote Access Vectors., Review Of Personnel Practices To Align Dismissals With Evidence-Based Accountability., Transparency In Breach Communications To Maintain Public Trust., , Enforcement Of Mfa For All Fema Employees., Disconnection Of Compromised Citrix Tools., Termination Of Responsible It Personnel., Public Disclosure Of Cybersecurity Lapses To Drive Accountability., , Personnel Changes (24 It Employees Fired), Dhs Emergency Directive For Federal Agencies To Defend Against Similar Threats, , Revised Iam Policies With Least-Privilege Principles., Implemented Network Segmentation For Hsin Platforms., Enabled Centralized Logging And Monitoring (Dhs)., Mandated Encryption For Sensitive Data (Post-2025 Breach)., Conducted Staff Training On Secure Cloud Configurations., Deployed Automated Misconfiguration Detection Tools., Established Regular Audits For Public-Facing Resources., , Termination Of Incompetent Staff (Ciso, Cio, And 22 Others)., Hiring Of New It Security Personnel., Enforcement Of Mfa And Password Resets., Potential Restructuring Of Fema'S Cybersecurity Governance., .
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Hacker, Unnamed Ransomware Gang, Unknown (suspected advanced hacker group) and Unidentified (possibly advanced hacking group).
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2023-06-21.
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2024-08-29.
Most Recent Incident Resolved: The most recent incident resolved was on 2023-08-05.
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were Addresses, Bank Account Information, Social Security Numbers, , 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees, Information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence, , Employee names, Social Security numbers, Dates of birth, Positions, Grades, Duty locations, , Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA & CBP), , FEMA Employee Data, CBP Employee Data, , Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA and CBP), , FEMA Employee Data, CBP Employee Data, , Sensitive Intelligence (DHS), 184M User Records (2025 Breach), Plain-Text Credentials (Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), Bank Accounts, Health Platforms, Government Portals, , Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss and but documents suggest exfiltration occurred).
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident were DHS OIG Case Management System and FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Tool and FEMA Computer NetworkDHS Systems (partial)Citrix Remote Access Infrastructure and FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Software and FEMA Computer Network (regional: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)Citrix Remote Access Software and HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach) and Citrix SystemFEMA Region 6 Servers (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas).
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Improved detection and response capabilitiesLocal law enforcement trainingTechnology deployment, Disconnected Citrix Remote Access Tool (2023-07-16)Enforced Multifactor Authentication, Localization of Breach (mid-July 2025)Network SegmentationAccess Revocation, Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access Tool (2025-07-16)Enforcement of Multifactor Authentication (MFA), Initial efforts launched mid-July 2023Ongoing remediation as of September 5, 2023 and Password resetsMulti-Factor Authentication (MFA) enforcement.
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were 184M User Records (2025 Breach), 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees, Bank Account Information, Sensitive Intelligence (DHS), Dates of birth, Duty locations, Government Portals, Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA & CBP), Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA and CBP), Information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence, Health Platforms, Addresses, Plain-Text Credentials (Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), FEMA Employee Data, Bank Accounts, Social Security Numbers, CBP Employee Data, Grades, Positions, Social Security numbers, Employee names, Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss and but documents suggest exfiltration occurred).
Number of Records Exposed in Most Significant Breach: The number of records exposed in the most significant breach was 184.3M.
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Pending Extradition to the US, Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Leadership), , Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others, , Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives), , Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired), .
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale., Critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed) must be patched promptly. Transparency in incident reporting is essential to maintain trust. Security preparedness claims must be audited rigorously to prevent misrepresentation.
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats, Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches., Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Conduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Improve detection and response capabilities, Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff., Enhance transparency in public communications about incidents, Enhance local law enforcement training, Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift. and Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications..
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem), Motherboard, Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, SecPod - Top 10 Cloud Misconfigurations, US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem, DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach), DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023), CNN, Nextgov/FCW, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed, AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo), DHS Public Statement (2023-08-29), Bloomberg News, CrowdStrike - Common Cloud Misconfigurations, SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration Prevention, Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher), Nextgov, AFP, WIRED, Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security Vulnerabilities, Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN) and NextGov/FCW.
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fema-headquarters-is-pictured-in-washington-dc-on-february-news-photo/1238567890, https://www.bloomberg.com, https://www.nextgov.com, https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/, https://www.wiz.io/academy/top-cloud-vulnerabilities, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/ .
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing.
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was DHS Secretary’s Public Statement, Media Briefings, Internal FEMA Staff Updates, DHS Working Group Reports, Internal FEMA staff updates, DHS Task Force findings, FOIA Memo (DHS), Media Statements, .
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued was an None (DHS)Recommended Password Resets for 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach).
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an Citrix Remote Access Software, Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor), Citrix System (via stolen credentials), Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials) and Email Account.
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was Unknown (likely weeks prior to mid-July 2025), Unknown (breach lasted 'several weeks' in summer 2023).
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Oversharing of data with a private contractor., Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats, Lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) for remote access.Compromised credentials in Citrix remote desktop software.Inadequate monitoring of lateral movement within the network.Failure to segment high-value systems (e.g., Active Directory)., Inadequate security controls for remote access systems (Citrix).Failure to detect lateral movement in a timely manner.Potential insider threats or misconfigured privileges enabling deep access.Organizational turmoil (e.g., dismissals, restructuring) distracting from cybersecurity focus., Lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) across FEMA systems.Exploitation of vulnerable Citrix remote access software.Inadequate monitoring of network access and lateral movement.IT leadership failures in cybersecurity governance., Unpatched Citrix vulnerabilityInadequate network monitoringLateral movement controls failurePossible insider threats or misconfigurations, Overly permissive IAM policies ('everyone' access).Lack of network segmentation (DHS).Disabled logging/missing alerts (no detection of unauthorized access).Human error in access configuration (HSIN-Intel).Plain-text storage of credentials (2025 Breach).Complex cloud architectures without adequate governance.Shadow IT/unmonitored accounts (potential factor).Inadequate policy-as-code enforcement., Failure to patch CitrixBleed vulnerability despite prior warnings.Misrepresentation of security preparedness by FEMA staff.Lack of centralized IT monitoring to detect the breach earlier..
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Review and tighten data sharing practices., Improve detection and response capabilitiesEnhance local law enforcement trainingDeploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats, Enforced MFA for FEMA Region 6.Disconnected vulnerable Citrix remote access tool.Terminated IT leadership responsible for security failures.Public disclosure to raise awareness of risks., Mandatory network segmentation and least-privilege access policies.Continuous monitoring for anomalous activity, especially in remote access vectors.Review of personnel practices to align dismissals with evidence-based accountability.Transparency in breach communications to maintain public trust., Enforcement of MFA for all FEMA employees.Disconnection of compromised Citrix tools.Termination of responsible IT personnel.Public disclosure of cybersecurity lapses to drive accountability., Personnel changes (24 IT employees fired)DHS emergency directive for federal agencies to defend against similar threats, Revised IAM policies with least-privilege principles.Implemented network segmentation for HSIN platforms.Enabled centralized logging and monitoring (DHS).Mandated encryption for sensitive data (post-2025 Breach).Conducted staff training on secure cloud configurations.Deployed automated misconfiguration detection tools.Established regular audits for public-facing resources., Termination of incompetent staff (CISO, CIO, and 22 others).Hiring of new IT security personnel.Enforcement of MFA and password resets.Potential restructuring of FEMA's cybersecurity governance..
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Improper Authorization (CWE-285) in Kibana can lead to privilege escalation (CAPEC-233) by allowing an authenticated user to bypass intended permission restrictions via a crafted HTTP request. This allows an attacker who lacks the live queries - read permission to successfully retrieve the list of live queries.
Weblate is a web based localization tool. In versions prior to 5.15.1, it was possible to overwrite Git configuration remotely and override some of its behavior. Version 5.15.1 fixes the issue.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (CWE-770) in Elasticsearch can allow an authenticated user with snapshot restore privileges to cause Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) of memory and a denial of service (DoS) via crafted HTTP request.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (CWE-770) in Kibana can allow a low-privileged authenticated user to cause Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130) of computing resources and a denial of service (DoS) of the Kibana process via a crafted HTTP request.
Improper neutralization of input during web page generation ('Cross-site Scripting') (CWE-79) allows an unauthenticated user to embed a malicious script in content that will be served to web browsers causing cross-site scripting (XSS) (CAPEC-63) via a vulnerability a function handler in the Vega AST evaluator.

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