DIGOGD A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
13/03/2026
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for Digital Innovation, Geoinformation & Open Government Data in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Digital Innovation, Geoinformation & Open Government Data in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Digital Innovation, Geoinformation & Open Government Data in 2026.
MANTECH is more than a technology company. We are a company dedicated to service, and we consider our work a part of the public trust. The people of MANTECH are privileged to work for the security of the United States, the welfare of our service members and veterans, the protection of our communities, and the cause of better health care. We have served the nation for more than 57 years, and in that time we have continually changed and grown to provide the technology that government needs to meet new challenges. We seek people with the same strong ethic of service, creativity, energy, and dedication to serving our country. We are comprised of more than 9,800 talented employees around the world. Nearly 40% of our employees are veterans. Many others come from the Intelligence Community, Homeland Security and federal civilian agencies. We understand our customers’ challenges because we know their world firsthand. When Federal managers and military leaders face tough challenges in cyber, data collection & analysis, enterprise IT or systems and software engineering, they turn to MANTECH to get the job done right. These professionals trust MANTECH and stay with us for years because we understand their needs and tackle their most complex challenges head on. They know that reaching their goal is our ultimate objective.
Latest updates, reports, and threat intel affecting the global network.
Ainur Rychshanova is an experienced GIS Analyst based in Doha, Qatar, with over eight years of expertise in geospatial data management,...
Baku, March 2, AZERTAC. The Space Agency of Azerbaijan (Azercosmos), a company of AZCON Holding, is attending the Mobile World Congress (MWC...
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Under the glitz and glamour of online casinos and sports betting sites, a surprising combination of technologies can be found, such as those pulled from the...
Advancing Climate Resilience through Geospatial Innovation: GIS and Remote Sensing Coordinator at People in Need.
The most recent edition of Intergeo – the world's leading geospatial gathering – left no doubt that geoinformation has moved into th...
Topcon Positioning Systems announces the expansion of its geomatics portfolio, featuring advancements in mass data software solutions...
Topcon Positioning Systems today announced the creation of a dedicated business structure focused on delivering high-precision technology,...
From Oct. 7-9, the Frankfurt Exhibition Center will host the world's leading conference and trade show for geodesy, geoinformation and land...
A remote attacker who controls a container registry may be able to direct a client's token request to a host of the attacker's choice, and disclose the victim's registry credentials to that host. This vulnerability is addressed in containerization version 0.41.0.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and before any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "<any.importable.module>.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name. Version 1.0.7 fixes the issue with a fail-closed resolution gate (`djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed`): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (`sys.modules` — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before `__import__` at all three sinks (+ defense-in-depth inside `_instantiate_view`). As a workaround, set `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` to the narrow list of modules that contain your mountable LiveView classes. (Note: pre-patch the allowlist is `startswith`-matched and the import still precedes the subclass check, so this is mitigation, not a complete fix.)
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, djust's per-object authorization (`get_object` + `has_object_permission`, ADR-017) was enforced on the WebSocket mount and event paths but not on three other render entry points: (a) the initial HTTP GET render, (b) SPA `url_change` navigation, and (c) `{% live_render %}` embedded child views. An authenticated user could therefore view (and on some paths act on) an object they are not authorized for by loading the page directly, navigating to it via SPA url-change, or composing it as an embedded child — a classic IDOR / broken object-level access control on object-scoped views. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. All render entry points now route through a shared `enforce_object_permission` chokepoint: HTTP GET returns 403, `url_change` emits a `permission_denied` frame and skips the render, and `{% live_render %}` (eager + lazy) refuses the embed. Views without a custom `get_object` are unaffected (no-op). No reliable workaround short of upgrading. Do not expose object-scoped views through the HTTP-GET / url_change / live_render paths until patched.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the WebSocket `handle_mount` and `ViewRuntime._build_request` rebuild an `HttpRequest` via `RequestFactory().get(...)` with no `HTTP_HOST`, so `request.get_host()` defaulted to `"testserver"` on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain `TenantResolver`s then misresolved the tenant — `None` on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With `STRICT_MODE=False` the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (cross-tenant disclosure); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy). This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django's `split_domain_port` so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated — with the TLS scheme — into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly. There is no known workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Users are most exposed when combined with `STRICT_MODE=False`.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, when a Django `Model` instance is assigned to a public view attribute, djust serialized it to the client with no sensitive-field denylist — sending fields such as `password` (the hash), privilege flags (e.g. `is_staff` / `is_superuser`), tokens, and other PII to the browser. Because exposing model objects to templates is a normal djust pattern, this could leak credentials/PII without the developer realizing the full object crossed the wire. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. Model serialization applies a secure-by-default sensitive-field denylist (password/hash/token/secret-style fields and known privilege flags are withheld) with an identity-subset fallback. As a workaround, keep `Model` instances on `_private` attributes and expose only the specific fields needed, until patched.
curl -i -X GET 'https://api.rankiteo.com/underwriter-getcompany-history?
linkedin_id=axa' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
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