UMD
Company Details
Linkedin ID:
uk-ministry-of-defence
Website:
Employees number:
29,703
Number of followers:
676,008
NAICS:
336414
Industry Type:
Homepage:
www.gov.uk
IP Addresses:
0
Company ID:
UK _3229847
Scan Status:
In-progress
UK Ministry of Defence Company CyberSecurity Posture
www.gov.uk
We protect the security, independence and interests of the United Kingdom at home and abroad. We work with our allies and partners whenever possible. Our aim is to ensure that the UK’s Armed Forces have the training, equipment and support necessary for their work, and that we keep within budget. Our priorities 2015 to 2020 are to: · protect our people · project our global influence · promote our prosperity · maintain a strategic base and integrated global support network, and manage the Department of State
UK Ministry of Defence A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
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UMD Company CyberSecurity News & History
Past Incidents
24
Attack Types
2
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: A Ministry of Defence (MoD) official accidentally exposed confidential government data by leaving their laptop unattended on a train. The breach involved sensitive information related to Afghan refugees fleeing the Taliban, alongside multiple other incidents within the same unit, including emails sent to incorrect recipients, insecure system access, and unauthorized employee data access. The case was criticized in Parliament as an institutional failure, highlighting systemic vulnerabilities in handling classified information. The incident underscores broader risks tied to remote work, such as unsecured environments (e.g., public Wi-Fi, public spaces) and inadequate monitoring of compliance. Experts emphasized the need for stricter policies, employee training, and secure handling protocols to prevent recurring breaches, particularly in high-stakes sectors like defense. The breach further erodes public trust in government data practices and raises concerns about operational security in hybrid work models.
UK Intelligence and Special Forces
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The Afghan data breach has exposed the names and details of MI6 officers and members of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS). This leak is considered one of the worst in UK government history, potentially endangering the lives of those involved in covert operations. The greatest risk is to Afghans still in Afghanistan, with around 100 British operatives also affected. The breach was discovered in August 2023, providing nearly two years to implement protective measures.
UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The **Afghan data breach** involved the unauthorized exposure of sensitive personal data belonging to Afghan nationals, including **QP1 and another claimant (QP2)**, who had worked with or were associated with UK forces during the Afghanistan conflict. The breach led to the **leak of identities, roles, religious affiliations (e.g., Shia/Hazara), and perceived associations (e.g., falsely labeled as a 'spy')**, placing individuals at severe risk of **Taliban retaliation, persecution, or targeted violence**. The UK government’s **Defence Secretary refused relocation assistance** in April 2024, arguing the claimants did not meet the 'highest risk' threshold, despite their vulnerable status.The **judicial review challenge** (dismissed in June 2025) highlighted systemic failures in risk assessment, where **misclassification of high-profile status** and **underestimation of ethnic/religious threats** (e.g., Hazara Shia minority) were central. The breach’s fallout included **legal battles over accountability**, with closed proceedings (e.g., 'Afghan superinjunction') obscuring full transparency. The incident underscores **gaps in post-conflict data protection**, where leaked information directly endangers lives, particularly in regions under hostile regime control. The case reflects broader **governmental negligence in safeguarding at-risk collaborators**, with long-term reputational and humanitarian consequences.
Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The Ministry of Defence (MoD) experienced a significant data breach where the names and details of more than 19,000 people were leaked. This breach occurred when an unnamed official emailed a spreadsheet outside the government team processing Afghan relocation applications, leading to the data entering the public domain. The leak was discovered in August 2023 when names of individuals who applied to move to the UK appeared on Facebook. Many Afghans now fear retribution from the Taliban, and the MoD has stated it will not provide compensation or proactively give payouts to those affected. The breach has led to significant distress and worries for the affected families, who are seeking relocation to safer countries.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) experienced **49 separate data breaches** over four years within its **Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)** unit, which handles relocation applications for Afghans at risk due to their work with British forces. The most severe incident involved a **spreadsheet leak in 2022**, where a soldier unknowingly shared hidden data containing **personal details of nearly 19,000 Afghans**, including names, contact information, and family associations. This breach, suppressed by a gagging order until 2024, risked exposing vulnerable individuals to Taliban reprisals. Other breaches included **email misconfigurations** (e.g., 265 Afghans’ email addresses exposed in 2021) and repeated failures in data handling protocols despite remedial measures like the 'two pairs of eyes' review rule. The breaches prompted fines (e.g., £350,000 for the 2021 email incident), legal scrutiny, and criticism over **lax security culture**, with lawyers and data protection experts questioning the MoD’s ability to safeguard highly sensitive information. The ICO acknowledged ongoing engagement but took no further action on the largest breach, citing resource constraints. Political blame shifted between Conservative and Labour administrations, with the latter claiming improved measures post-2024.
Ministry of Defence (MOD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: In 2022, the UK’s **Ministry of Defence (MOD)** suffered a severe **data breach** involving the accidental leak of personal details of **~19,000 Afghan citizens** seeking refuge in the UK post-Taliban takeover. The breach occurred due to **insecure handling of Excel spreadsheets on a SharePoint site**, exposing sensitive information that led to **49 confirmed deaths** (linked to Taliban reprisals) and placed thousands more at risk. The incident, concealed under a superinjunction until 2024, has incurred an estimated **£850 million in costs** (excluding legal/compensation claims, which could push totals into **billions**). The **Public Accounts Committee (PAC)** criticized the MOD for **systemic failures**, including outdated IT infrastructure, lack of cybersecurity specialists, and repeated breaches (e.g., a 2023 leak of military personnel data). The breach’s fallout includes **operational disruptions**, reputational damage, and potential long-term geopolitical consequences, as compromised Afghans included interpreters and allies critical to UK missions. The PAC demanded urgent reforms, including **modernized systems** and **enhanced recruitment of digital security experts** to prevent future incidents.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: A catastrophic data breach at the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) exposed the personal details of **33,000 Afghans**—individuals at risk from the Taliban due to their ties to British forces. The leak occurred when a highly classified **Excel spreadsheet** containing sensitive data was **emailed to an unauthorized external recipient**. The breach triggered a covert evacuation program but was concealed from the public and MPs for nearly two years under a **superinjunction**, only revealed after a prolonged legal battle by media outlets, including *The Independent*. The UK’s data regulator, the **Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)**, opted **not to launch a formal investigation**, citing reliance on the MoD’s 'honesty' and claiming resource constraints. No contemporaneous notes were taken due to the **classified nature of the information**, raising concerns over institutional failures. MPs criticized the ICO’s handling, describing it as **‘a few unrecorded meetings and a handshake’**, while the MoD’s data practices were condemned as **‘top-secret information bandied about like confetti’**. The breach risked **life-threatening consequences** for exposed Afghans, with no accountability or systemic reforms enforced until public scrutiny forced limited action in 2024.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could bring to a war
Description: A severe **data breach** at the UK’s **Ministry of Defence (MoD)** in **February 2022** exposed a spreadsheet containing **33,000 records** of Afghan nationals seeking UK resettlement, including interpreters, military personnel, and their families. The leaked data—later found in a **Facebook group in August 2023**—put up to **100,000 lives at risk** of Taliban retaliation, including torture and execution. The MoD failed to detect the breach for **18 months**, concealed it under a **superinjunction**, and spent **£7bn on a secret evacuation program** (with only **3,383 of 27,278 affected individuals resettled** as of 2024). The breach stemmed from **inadequate data controls**, repeated failures to learn from prior incidents, and **deliberate obfuscation**—including withholding details from the **National Audit Office (NAO)**. MPs warned the MoD’s systemic failures increase the risk of **recurrence**, while Afghan allies remain stranded in hiding. The financial and humanitarian fallout remains unresolved, with **£850m in unaccounted costs** and ongoing delays in resettlement.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: A catastrophic **data breach** at the **UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)** exposed the personal details of thousands of Afghan interpreters and former special forces members who had worked alongside British troops. The leaked information—including identities, locations, and eligibility for UK relocation—was accessed by hostile actors, leading to direct threats from the Taliban. As a result, at least two families (including a former patrol interpreter and a special forces commando) had their **UK relocation offers revoked** despite prior approval. Pakistani police detained them, moving them to deportation camps with imminent risk of forced return to Afghanistan, where execution by the Taliban is highly probable. The breach has left vulnerable individuals—many of whom had waited **years** in limbo—without visas, financial support, or safe shelter. Children and wives of affected personnel now face severe psychological trauma (e.g., PTSD) and potential violence. Legal challenges have been filed, but the UK government cites **failed security checks** (conducted only after the breach) as justification for reversals. The incident underscores systemic failures in protecting at-risk allies, with critics condemning the move as **‘morally bankrupt’**, given the life-or-death stakes for those abandoned. The reputational damage to the MoD and UK government is severe, compounded by accusations of betrayal toward those who served British forces.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) suffered a **mass data breach** exposing highly sensitive personal details of thousands of Afghans who had supported British forces, including interpreters, staff, and their families. The breach led to a **top-secret airlift operation** to relocate at-risk individuals to Britain, costing £7 billion, while the MoD imposed a **draconian super-injunction** to suppress details for nearly two years. The exposed data placed Afghan allies in grave danger of retaliation from the Taliban, with the MoD failing to allocate funds for compensation or resettlement. Despite the court order being lifted in July 2024, the MoD continues to evade transparency, ignoring journalist inquiries and parliamentary scrutiny. The incident revealed systemic failures in data protection, financial accountability, and ethical governance, with MPs condemning the cover-up as a betrayal of those who served alongside UK forces. The breach’s fallout extends beyond financial mismanagement to **life-threatening consequences** for vulnerable individuals, eroding public trust in institutional accountability.
Ministry of Defence (UK)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: In February 2022, a catastrophic **data breach** within the UK’s **Ministry of Defence (MoD)** exposed the personal details of up to **100,000 Afghans**—including interpreters, contractors, and allies—who had collaborated with British forces. The leak placed their lives at direct risk from the Taliban, forcing the UK government to launch **Operation Rubific**, a covert £7bn evacuation scheme that relocated **16,000 individuals** to Britain under emergency conditions, with another **8,000 pending relocation**. The breach was concealed for nearly two years under an **unprecedented super-injunction**, with Parliament and the public kept in the dark. The exposed data included identities, locations, and affiliations with UK military operations, making the affected individuals prime targets for retaliation. The incident not only endangered lives but also triggered a **clandestine, large-scale humanitarian operation**, straining diplomatic and logistical resources while raising severe questions about the MoD’s data security protocols and transparency failures.
Ministry of Defence (UK)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: In February 2022, a massive **Ministry of Defence (MoD) data breach** exposed the personal details of up to **100,000 Afghans** who had collaborated with UK forces, placing them at severe risk of Taliban retaliation. The leak triggered **Operation Rubific**, a covert £7bn evacuation scheme that relocated **16,000 Afghans to the UK**, with another **8,000 pending relocation**. The breach was concealed under an **unprecedented super-injunction** for nearly two years, hiding the operation from Parliament, the public, and even MPs. The exposed individuals—including interpreters, contractors, and allies—faced **direct threats to their lives**, forcing an emergency, large-scale extraction under classified conditions. The secrecy surrounding the breach and evacuation raised significant ethical and transparency concerns, as ministers **deliberately misled Parliament** about the true reasons for the mission. The incident underscored critical failures in **data protection, crisis response, and governmental accountability**, with life-or-death consequences for those affected.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed **49 data breaches** tied to its **Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)** and related schemes for Afghan nationals who aided UK forces. The most severe incident—a **February 2022 spreadsheet error**—exposed **18,700 Afghans’ personal data**, including those seeking UK resettlement after the Taliban’s return. The breach, concealed under a super-injunction until July 2025, incurred **£850M+ in mitigation costs** and risked endangering lives by revealing identities to hostile actors. Other breaches included: - **Blind carbon copy (BCC) failures** (3 incidents, £350K ICO fine), exposing email recipients’ identities. - **WhatsApp messages** with insecure personal data. - **Misdirected emails** (e.g., sent to the *Civil Service Sports Club* or with incorrect classification levels). - **Physical exposure**: An **MODNET laptop screen** displaying sensitive data on public transport. - **Microsoft Forms incident** (October 2021), further compromising data. Only **5 of 49 incidents** were reported to the ICO, though the watchdog accepted the MoD’s risk assessments. The breaches stemmed from **operational negligence** during high-stakes relocation efforts, heightening risks for vulnerable Afghan allies. The **Defence Select Committee** is investigating the 2022 breach under a broader inquiry.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The **Afghan data breach** involved the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive personal information belonging to Afghan nationals who had collaborated with British forces prior to the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021. The leak exposed names and other identifying details, placing these individuals—and potentially their families—at severe risk of retaliation, persecution, or fatal harm under Taliban rule. Despite the gravity of the breach, the **UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)** opted **not to launch a formal investigation** into the MoD, nor did it impose any enforceable penalties. Critics argue this reflects a broader **systemic failure in enforcement**, where the ICO’s ‘public sector approach’—relying on non-binding reprimands rather than legal action—undermines deterrence and accountability. The breach is deemed one of the **most serious in UK history**, with life-threatening consequences for affected individuals, yet regulatory inaction has left victims without recourse. The incident has also eroded trust in the ICO’s ability to uphold data protection laws, particularly in high-stakes government failures.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: In August 2023, the UK’s **Ministry of Defence (MoD)** suffered a **catastrophic data breach** exposing the personal details of **18,700 applicants** to the Afghan resettlement schemes, along with thousands of their family members. The leak, discovered after the 2021 fall of Kabul, forced the MoD to impose a **superinjunction on the UK press** and initiate an emergency evacuation of affected Afghans to prevent Taliban reprisals. The breach led to the creation of covert resettlement programs (**Afghan Response Route, ARR**) at an estimated cost of **£850 million**, though the **National Audit Office (NAO) questioned the accuracy** of this figure due to poor financial tracking. The MoD failed to segregate costs, blending them with broader Afghan resettlement spending, and later revised total projected expenses to **£5.5–6 billion** for all related schemes. The breach not only endangered lives but also triggered **legal, compensation, and operational chaos**, with the government initially planning to evacuate **42,000+ individuals** before scaling back. The incident exposed systemic failures in data protection, financial transparency, and crisis response, with long-term reputational and geopolitical consequences.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK Government
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: In February 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) suffered a catastrophic data breach involving the leak of a database containing **33,000 records**, including details of over **18,000 Afghan applicants and their families** who had collaborated with British forces. The leaked data—dubbed a potential 'kill list'—exposed individuals at severe risk of Taliban reprisals, including murder. The breach originated from an unnamed British serviceman who **accidentally emailed the full dataset** (believing it contained only 150 names) to unsecured contacts. The MoD took **16 months to detect the leak**, only discovering it after the list surfaced in a Facebook group. The government responded with an **unprecedented global superinjunction**, suppressing media and parliamentary scrutiny for **18 months**, while delaying resettlement efforts for affected Afghans. The breach not only endangered lives but also triggered legal threats, reputational damage, and accusations of a **cover-up** to avoid political accountability. Investigations later revealed that the secrecy measures may have **increased the Taliban’s ability to exploit the data**, exacerbating risks to those exposed.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: In February 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) suffered a catastrophic **data breach** involving the leak of a database containing **33,000 records**, including details of **over 18,000 Afghan applicants and their families** who had collaborated with British forces. The leaked data—dubbed a potential 'kill list'—was accidentally emailed by a British serviceman to unsecured contacts, exposing individuals at extreme risk of Taliban reprisals. The breach remained undetected for **16 months** until a Facebook group user claimed possession of the list. The MoD responded with an unprecedented **global superinjunction**, suppressing media and parliamentary scrutiny for **18 months**, delaying resettlement efforts, and leaving affected Afghans vulnerable. The incident triggered legal threats, international intelligence alerts (MI6, CIA), and accusations of a government cover-up. An investigation later concluded that the secrecy measures may have **increased the Taliban’s interest in the data**, exacerbating risks to those exposed.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could bring to a war
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) suffered a severe **data breach** in 2022 when an official accidentally leaked a spreadsheet containing the personal details of nearly **19,000 Afghan applicants** under the **Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)** scheme. The leaked data—including names, contact details, and relocation statuses—was posted anonymously on a **Facebook group**, exposing vulnerable individuals to risks from the Taliban. The breach, discovered in **August 2023**, led to a **super injunction** blocking media coverage until July 2024.The **Public Accounts Committee (PAC)** criticized the MoD for **repeated failures** in data handling, noting prior breaches (including a 2021 incident reported to the ICO) and a **culture of negligence** in using insecure systems like **Excel spreadsheets** for sensitive data. The leak forced the creation of the **Afghanistan Response Route (ARR)**, expanding relocation eligibility to **27,278 individuals**, with estimated costs exceeding **£850 million** (excluding legal/compensation claims). MPs expressed **no confidence** in the MoD’s ability to prevent future breaches, despite claims of improved practices, including a new **secure casework system**.The breach **endangered thousands of lives**, triggered **mass relocations**, and imposed **substantial financial and reputational damage** on the UK government, with long-term geopolitical and humanitarian consequences.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK Government
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could bring to a war
Description: In a catastrophic data breach, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) inadvertently leaked the personal details of **18,700 applicants** to the Afghan resettlement schemes, exposing highly sensitive information that placed thousands of vulnerable individuals—including Afghan interpreters, allies, and their families—at severe risk of retaliation, persecution, or harm. The breach was concealed under an **unprecedented 18-month superinjunction**, blocking public and parliamentary scrutiny while the government failed to address the fallout effectively. Despite the legal gag being lifted in July 2023, **4,200 eligible applicants and their families remain stranded**, awaiting relocation under the scheme. The incident revealed systemic failures in data protection, transparency, and accountability, with MPs and journalists highlighting a **culture of secrecy** within the MoD. The breach not only endangered lives but also undermined trust in the UK’s resettlement programs and its commitment to protecting at-risk Afghans who had assisted British forces.
UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: In February 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) suffered a catastrophic **data breach** exposing the personal details of nearly **19,000 Afghans**—interpreters, soldiers, and support staff—who had worked with British forces during the Afghanistan War. The leaked dataset, undiscovered until **August 2023**, included names and resettlement applications, placing individuals and their families at **direct risk of Taliban retaliation**, including **targeted killings, torture, and forced displacement**. Evidence later revealed that the Taliban’s **Yarmouk 60 unit** actively hunted UK-affiliated Afghans, exploiting the breach to locate and harm victims. Despite initial government denials (via the **Rimmer Review**), testimonies confirmed **49 deaths** linked to the leak, with families systematically targeted when primary individuals could not be found. The MoD’s delayed response—including a **super-injunction suppressing public disclosure**—further endangered lives by preventing warnings. Only **~1,500 of the 19,000 affected** were resettled in the UK, leaving most exposed. The breach’s **lethal consequences** underscore systemic failures in data protection, risk assessment, and humanitarian accountability.
UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed **49 data breaches** tied to its Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) and related schemes, exposing sensitive personal data of Afghan nationals who worked with the UK government. The most severe incident—a **February 2022 spreadsheet error**—compromised **18,700 individuals**, with mitigation costs estimated at **£850 million**. Other breaches included **blind carbon copy (BCC) email failures** (fined £350,000 by the ICO), **WhatsApp messages with insecure personal data**, **emails sent to wrong recipients** (including non-relevant entities like a sports club), **misclassified emails**, and **a laptop screen displaying sensitive data in public**. Only **5 of 49 incidents** were reported to the ICO, though the watchdog deemed the MoD’s reporting judgment satisfactory. The breaches risked endangering Afghan allies by exposing their identities to potential Taliban retaliation, while also damaging the MoD’s reputation and operational trust.
Ministry of Defence (UK)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) suffered a catastrophic data breach involving the accidental disclosure of sensitive personal details of **18,700 Afghan nationals**—including those who had worked with British forces—via misdirected emails to unrelated recipients, such as the **Civil Service Sports & Social Club** (140,000 members). The leaked spreadsheets contained contact information, relocation statuses, and other critical data under the **Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)**. At least **49 individuals** are believed to have been killed as a direct result of the exposure, with their identities potentially falling into the hands of the Taliban or other hostile actors. Additional breaches included **unsecured WhatsApp sharing of personal data**, **flight manifests of Afghan evacuees**, and an official’s laptop left open on a train. The scandal was **covered up for years** before legal action by *The Independent* forced disclosure. The MoD’s permanent secretary resigned amid criticism of systemic failures, including employees’ ignorance of basic data-handling protocols (e.g., hidden Excel tabs). The breaches underscore **life-threatening consequences** for vulnerable allies and raise grave concerns about the UK government’s ability to safeguard classified or sensitive information in an era of escalating cyber and human-error risks.
UK Ministry of Defense (MoD)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could bring to a war
Description: In 2022, the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) suffered a severe data breach when a British soldier accidentally sent a spreadsheet containing sensitive personal information of up to **19,000 Afghans** (with risks extending to **100,000 individuals**) seeking relocation to Britain. The exposed data included details of individuals linked to British special forces and government operations, placing them at extreme risk under Taliban rule. The breach occurred due to inadequate data handling—reliance on **Excel spreadsheets stored on SharePoint**—and went undetected for over a year until an Afghan recipient threatened to publish the file on Facebook in **August 2023**.The incident triggered a **secret multibillion-pound extraction operation**, a **superinjunction** (the longest ever issued), and left thousands of Afghans stranded in danger. Investigations revealed systemic failures: the MoD had ignored prior warnings about data vulnerabilities, used inappropriate systems for sensitive information, and withheld details from parliamentary oversight bodies. The breach compromised **national security**, endangered lives, and exposed critical flaws in the MoD’s cybersecurity and crisis response protocols. Nearly **30,000 affected individuals** have since been resettled or are awaiting relocation, but accountability remains unclear.
Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: Russian hackers (Lynx group) breached the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) by exploiting a third-party contractor (Dodd Group), gaining access to **hundreds of classified military documents**—including files marked *‘Controlled’* or *‘Official Sensitive’*—from **eight RAF and Royal Navy bases**. The leaked data (4TB total) includes **names, emails, and mobile numbers of MoD personnel and contractors**, **car registrations**, **visitor logs for high-security sites (e.g., RAF Lakenheath, home to US F-35 stealth jets and nuclear bombs)**, and **internal security instructions**, aiding future phishing attacks. Two of four planned data dumps have been released on the dark web, with hackers threatening further leaks. The breach, described as *‘catastrophic’* by experts, compromises **national security**, **embarrasses key allies (e.g., the US)**, and exposes critical vulnerabilities in the MoD’s supply chain and IT infrastructure. The attack leveraged a *‘gateway’* via a maintenance contractor, bypassing the MoD’s primary cyber defenses.
UMD Company Scoring based on AI Models
Cyber Incidents Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
A.I Risk Score Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
Underwriter Stats for UMD
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Average (This Year)
UK Ministry of Defence has 497.01% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs All-Companies Average (This Year)
UK Ministry of Defence has 525.0% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident Types UMD vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
UK Ministry of Defence reported 4 incidents this year: 1 cyber attacks, 0 ransomware, 0 vulnerabilities, 3 data breaches, compared to industry peers with at least 1 incident.
Incident History — UMD (X = Date, Y = Severity)
UMD cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
UMD Company Subsidiaries
We protect the security, independence and interests of the United Kingdom at home and abroad. We work with our allies and partners whenever possible. Our aim is to ensure that the UK’s Armed Forces have the training, equipment and support necessary for their work, and that we keep within budget. Our priorities 2015 to 2020 are to: · protect our people · project our global influence · promote our prosperity · maintain a strategic base and integrated global support network, and manage the Department of State
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UMD CyberSecurity News
November 11, 2025 11:00 PM
UK unveils cyber-defence bill
With cyberattacks setting the country back GBP 15 billion per year, the government has taken action to bolster cyber defences for the...
October 20, 2025 07:00 AM
Russian Hackers Suspected of Leaking Secret UK Military Files On Dark Web
The U.K. Ministry of Defence is investigating claims Russian hackers stole hundreds of sensitive documents.
October 20, 2025 07:00 AM
Ransomware at UK military contractor leads to dark-web dump
U.K. MoD investigates claims that Russian hackers leaked sensitive RAF and Royal Navy base files via a contractor ransomware breach.
October 20, 2025 07:00 AM
Russian hackers target MoD contractor in data leak
The UK Ministry of Defence is investigating allegations that Russian hackers stole and leaked hundreds of classified military documents on...
October 20, 2025 07:00 AM
Russian hackers leak documents linked to eight UK military bases as MoD launches probe
Russian hackers have published internal documents related to eight British military bases. The materials contain the personal data of...
October 20, 2025 06:07 AM
MOD Data Breach update and 8Base ransomware attack on Volkswagen
A Russian-based hacking collective known as Lynx has claimed responsibility for a major data breach involving the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MoD)...
October 19, 2025 07:00 AM
Russian hackers breach UK military bases and steal classified documents – British news outlets
The UK Ministry of Defence is investigating a possible cyberattack in which Russian hackers reportedly stole hundreds of confidential...
October 08, 2025 07:00 AM
Kahua Expands UK Presence and Achieves Ministry of Defence Cybersecurity Accreditation
Kahua, which provides secure collaboration, cost control and maintaining a golden thread for large-scale construction and infrastructure...
September 26, 2025 07:00 AM
UK, USA and Canada Collaborate to Pursue AI and Cyber Technologies
The UK's Ministry of Defence, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Canadian Department of National Defence are...
Frequently Asked Questions
Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
UMD CyberSecurity History Information
Official Website of UK Ministry of Defence
The official website of UK Ministry of Defence is https://www.gov.uk/mod.
UK Ministry of Defence’s AI-Generated Cybersecurity Score
According to Rankiteo, UK Ministry of Defence’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 100, reflecting their Critical security posture.
How many security badges does UK Ministry of Defence’ have ?
According to Rankiteo, UK Ministry of Defence currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
Does UK Ministry of Defence have SOC 2 Type 1 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, UK Ministry of Defence is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
Does UK Ministry of Defence have SOC 2 Type 2 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, UK Ministry of Defence does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
Does UK Ministry of Defence comply with GDPR ?
According to Rankiteo, UK Ministry of Defence is not listed as GDPR compliant.
Does UK Ministry of Defence have PCI DSS certification ?
According to Rankiteo, UK Ministry of Defence does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
Does UK Ministry of Defence comply with HIPAA ?
According to Rankiteo, UK Ministry of Defence is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
Does UK Ministry of Defence have ISO 27001 certification ?
According to Rankiteo,UK Ministry of Defence is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Industry Classification of UK Ministry of Defence
UK Ministry of Defence operates primarily in the Defense and Space Manufacturing industry.
Number of Employees at UK Ministry of Defence
UK Ministry of Defence employs approximately 29,703 people worldwide.
Subsidiaries Owned by UK Ministry of Defence
UK Ministry of Defence presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
UK Ministry of Defence’s LinkedIn Followers
UK Ministry of Defence’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 676,008 followers.
NAICS Classification of UK Ministry of Defence
UK Ministry of Defence is classified under the NAICS code 336414, which corresponds to Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Manufacturing.
UK Ministry of Defence’s Presence on Crunchbase
No, UK Ministry of Defence does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
UK Ministry of Defence’s Presence on LinkedIn
Yes, UK Ministry of Defence maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/uk-ministry-of-defence.
Cybersecurity Incidents Involving UK Ministry of Defence
As of November 27, 2025, Rankiteo reports that UK Ministry of Defence has experienced 24 cybersecurity incidents.
Number of Peer and Competitor Companies
UK Ministry of Defence has an estimated 2,228 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
What types of cybersecurity incidents have occurred at UK Ministry of Defence ?
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Breach and Cyber Attack.
What was the total financial impact of these incidents on UK Ministry of Defence ?
Total Financial Loss: The total financial loss from these incidents is estimated to be $852.55 billion.
How does UK Ministry of Defence detect and respond to cybersecurity incidents ?
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an third party assistance with legal representation by leigh day law firm, and recovery measures with high court applications to halt deportations, recovery measures with special immigration appeals commission reviews, and communication strategy with statements by mod spokesperson defending security checks, communication strategy with media coverage highlighting humanitarian crisis, and incident response plan activated with yes (clandestine evacuation via arr/arp), and containment measures with superinjunction on uk press to prevent taliban reprisals, containment measures with use of existing arap scheme as operational cover, and remediation measures with evacuation of affected individuals via arr/arp, remediation measures with reassessment of arap eligibility for breach victims, and recovery measures with establishment of afghanistan response route (arr) and afghan resettlement programme (arp), recovery measures with budget allocations via uk spending review, and communication strategy with limited transparency due to superinjunction (lifted later), communication strategy with nao report (2025-07) detailing cost uncertainties, communication strategy with public statements by mod and public accounts committee, and incident response plan activated with yes (post-2021 breaches), and third party assistance with information commissioner's office (ico) engagement, third party assistance with legal counsel (high court gagging order, 2023–2025), third party assistance with data protection specialists (e.g., mishcon de reya, barings law), and containment measures with high court gagging order (2023–2025, lifted july 2025), containment measures with internal reviews of breaches, containment measures with limited public disclosure (only 4 of 49 breaches initially public), and remediation measures with new data handling procedures (november 2021), remediation measures with mandatory training for staff, remediation measures with 'two pairs of eyes' rule for external emails (post-november 2021), remediation measures with new software (introduced by labour government, post-july 2024), and recovery measures with closure of arap scheme (july 2025), recovery measures with public apology by defence secretary, recovery measures with parliamentary scrutiny (post-july 2024 disclosures), and communication strategy with delayed disclosure (gagging orders, legal restrictions), communication strategy with selective transparency (bbc foia request, 2025), communication strategy with apologies via political statements, and enhanced monitoring with yes (post-2021, details undisclosed), and remediation measures with judicial review process, remediation measures with policy rationalization (as per cx1 and mp1 v sshd [2024] ewhc 892), and communication strategy with superinjunction initially imposed (lifted july 2024), communication strategy with open judgment published in 2025, and and and containment measures with investigation ongoing, containment measures with no public details on containment, and communication strategy with mod statement: 'actively investigating', communication strategy with no public disclosure of remediation steps, and incident response plan activated with yes (partial; ico satisfied with escalation judgments), and containment measures with super-injunction (lifted in july 2025), containment measures with ico reporting for 5/49 incidents, containment measures with internal reviews, and remediation measures with mitigation spending (£850m for spreadsheet error), remediation measures with policy/process reviews (ongoing), and communication strategy with letter to mps (7 october 2023), communication strategy with public accounts committee (pac) disclosures, communication strategy with defence select committee inquiry, and incident response plan activated with secret evacuation program, incident response plan activated with mod internal review, and containment measures with limited to mod's internal actions (per ico), and remediation measures with mod claimed to address 'bad data practices', remediation measures with no formal ico oversight, and communication strategy with concealment via superinjunction (for ~2 years), communication strategy with public disclosure after legal battle, and incident response plan activated with yes (internal investigations; reporting to ico for 5 incidents), and containment measures with super-injunction for spreadsheet error (lifted in 2023-07), containment measures with ico reporting for selected incidents, containment measures with internal reviews by mod, and remediation measures with £850m allocated for mitigation of spreadsheet error, remediation measures with policy/process reviews (implied by parliamentary inquiries), and communication strategy with letter to mps (2023-10-07, published 2023-11), communication strategy with public accounts committee evidence session (2023-09), communication strategy with defence select committee inquiry (ongoing), and incident response plan activated with yes (after public exposure), and third party assistance with media (*the independent* investigations), third party assistance with legal teams (for damage control), and containment measures with public disclosure (after delay), containment measures with internal reviews, containment measures with permanent secretary resignation, and remediation measures with policy reviews, remediation measures with training programs (proposed), remediation measures with asylum grants for affected afghans (retroactive), and communication strategy with delayed and reactive, communication strategy with media statements post-exposure, communication strategy with limited transparency, and enhanced monitoring with proposed (not confirmed), and incident response plan activated with yes (super-injunction imposed in 2023), and third party assistance with legal (court injunction), third party assistance with intelligence assessments (rimmer review), and containment measures with super-injunction to suppress disclosure (2023–2024), containment measures with limited resettlement offers (7,355 total, including family members), and remediation measures with rimmer review (risk assessment), remediation measures with closure of afghanistan response route, and recovery measures with partial resettlement of 1,500 direct victims + families, and communication strategy with initial suppression via super-injunction, communication strategy with delayed public disclosure (july 2024), communication strategy with defensive statements by mod, and incident response plan activated with operation rubific (covert evacuation), incident response plan activated with super-injunction to suppress disclosure, and containment measures with secrecy via super-injunction, containment measures with limited disclosure to parliament, and recovery measures with evacuation of 16,000 afghans, recovery measures with ongoing relocation efforts, and communication strategy with suppression of details via legal injunction, communication strategy with selective disclosure to defence committee (2024), and remediation measures with review of internal processes (implied), remediation measures with potential policy updates for remote work, and communication strategy with no public comment (mod declined to comment), and incident response plan activated with yes (but delayed and opaque), and third party assistance with mi6, third party assistance with cia, third party assistance with foreign office, and law enforcement notified with yes (internal mod and intelligence agencies), and containment measures with superinjunction to suppress reporting, containment measures with limited resettlement scheme for 150 individuals (initially), and recovery measures with eventual lifting of superinjunction (2024), recovery measures with investigation by paul rimmer (former mod intelligence deputy), and communication strategy with controlled narrative via selected facts, communication strategy with gagging orders to prevent scrutiny, and incident response plan activated with superinjunction imposed (later lifted), incident response plan activated with internal review (details undisclosed), and containment measures with superinjunction to suppress public disclosure (controversial), and remediation measures with defence select committee inquiry, remediation measures with intelligence and security committee investigation, remediation measures with potential policy reforms (pending inquiry outcomes), and recovery measures with limited evacuations resumed post-superinjunction, recovery measures with ongoing parliamentary scrutiny, and communication strategy with initial suppression via superinjunction, communication strategy with post-disclosure: parliamentary hearings and media engagement, and containment measures with super-injunction (later lifted), containment measures with limited public communication, and remediation measures with secret airlift of exposed afghans, remediation measures with parliamentary inquiry, remediation measures with media investigations, and recovery measures with lifting of super-injunction (july 2023), recovery measures with ongoing parliamentary scrutiny, and communication strategy with initial suppression via super-injunction, communication strategy with selective disclosure to journalists, communication strategy with parliamentary testimony, and incident response plan activated with yes (delayed; 16 months after leak), and third party assistance with mi6, third party assistance with cia, third party assistance with foreign office, and containment measures with superinjunction to suppress reporting, containment measures with limited resettlement scheme for 150 individuals, and recovery measures with independent investigation by paul rimmer (former mod intelligence deputy), recovery measures with partial lifting of superinjunction under legal pressure, and communication strategy with narrative control via selective disclosures, communication strategy with suppression of media/parliamentary debate, and incident response plan activated with operation rubific (covert evacuation), incident response plan activated with super-injunction, and containment measures with secrecy via super-injunction, containment measures with limited disclosure to parliament, and remediation measures with evacuation of 16,000 afghans (8,000 pending), and communication strategy with media blackout, communication strategy with parliamentary obfuscation, and incident response plan activated with superinjunction to suppress reporting (2022–2024), incident response plan activated with secret evacuation program, and containment measures with superinjunction (later lifted in july 2024), containment measures with facebook group takedown (implied), and remediation measures with introduction of a dedicated secure casework system for afghan resettlement (post-breach), remediation measures with policy changes in data handling (ongoing), and recovery measures with £7bn evacuation scheme (approved 2024), recovery measures with resettlement of 3,383 affected individuals (as of 2024), and communication strategy with secrecy and limited disclosure (2022–2024), communication strategy with public disclosure after superinjunction lifted (july 2024), communication strategy with pac report publication (2024-10), and and containment measures with super injunction imposed (sept 2023, lifted july 2024), containment measures with removal of leaked data from facebook, and remediation measures with introduction of a dedicated, secure casework system for afghan resettlement, remediation measures with improvements in data handling processes across mod, and recovery measures with establishment of afghanistan response route (arr) for resettlement, recovery measures with public apology by defence secretary john healey, and communication strategy with public disclosure after lifting of super injunction (july 2024), communication strategy with parliamentary scrutiny and pac report, communication strategy with media statements, and enhanced monitoring with ongoing improvements in data handling, enhanced monitoring with pac oversight and recommendations, and incident response plan activated with yes (though criticized as inadequate by pac), and containment measures with superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted), containment measures with internal review triggered by pac, and remediation measures with pac-mandated six-monthly updates on resettlement/costs, remediation measures with calls for system modernization and digital specialist recruitment, and recovery measures with ongoing; no specific technical details disclosed, and communication strategy with delayed public disclosure (2023), communication strategy with pac report and media interviews, communication strategy with letter to mod permanent secretary expressing disappointment, and and containment measures with superinjunction to suppress data publication, containment measures with secret extraction efforts for affected individuals, and recovery measures with relocation of ~30,000 affected individuals to uk, recovery measures with review of data handling practices, and communication strategy with initial secrecy under superinjunction, communication strategy with limited disclosure after injunction lifted, communication strategy with parliamentary report, and communication strategy with public statements by ico, communication strategy with letter from civil liberties groups to parliamentary committee..
Incident Details
Can you provide details on each incident ?
Title: Afghan Data Breach Involving MI6 and SAS
Description: A significant data breach involving the names and details of MI6 officers and members of the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) has been discovered. The breach includes potentially vulnerable Afghans and British operatives.
Date Detected: August 2023
Type: Data Breach
Title: Data Breach of Afghan Personal Details by UK Ministry of Defence
Description: The names and details of more than 19,000 people were leaked, with many Afghans now saying they fear retribution from the Taliban.
Date Detected: 2023-08
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-08
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Email
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper email handling
Threat Actor: Unnamed official
Motivation: Unknown
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Data Breach Exposing Afghan Interpreters' Details
Description: A catastrophic data breach at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) exposed the personal details of thousands of Afghans, including former interpreters and special forces members who had applied for relocation to the UK due to risks from the Taliban. The breach led to the revocation of relocation offers for some individuals, including a former Afghan interpreter and his family, who were detained by Pakistani police and faced deportation to Afghanistan. The exposed data included sensitive information that placed these individuals and their families at severe risk of Taliban retaliation. Legal challenges have been filed to contest the sudden visa refusals and deportation threats.
Type: Data Breach
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Data Leak and Resettlement Response
Description: A catastrophic data breach at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) in August 2023 exposed the personal details of ~18,700 applicants to the UK’s Afghan resettlement schemes, along with thousands of their family members. The breach triggered a clandestine evacuation operation (Afghan Response Route, or ARR) with estimated costs of £850m, though the MoD’s accounting practices—driven by a superinjunction to protect affected individuals—left spending records opaque. The total forecasted cost of all Afghan resettlement activities (2021–2029) is £2.074bn, with per-individual resettlement costs estimated at £128,000 (£53,000 covered by MoD). The breach led to legal uncertainties, compensation claims, and operational challenges, including the use of existing resettlement programs (Arap) as cover for evacuations.
Date Detected: 2023-08
Type: Data Breach
Title: Dozens of UK Afghan Data Breaches Uncovered at Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Description: The Ministry of Defence (MoD) admitted to 49 separate data breaches over four years within the unit handling relocation applications for Afghans seeking safety in the UK. The breaches include the 2022 leak of a spreadsheet containing details of nearly 19,000 individuals fleeing the Taliban, which was concealed under a gagging order until July 2025. Other incidents involved inadvertent disclosure of email addresses and personal details of applicants to third parties. Concerns have been raised about systemic lax security, inadequate remedial measures, and insufficient oversight by the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). The Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) scheme, now closed, was marred by repeated failures, risking the lives of Afghans who collaborated with British forces.
Date Detected: 2021-04-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2021-09-012022-02-012023-08-012025-07-012025-08-21
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (Email Misconfiguration)Improper Data Handling (Spreadsheet Hidden Data)Insufficient Access ControlsLack of Oversight/Review Processes
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of 'Two Pairs of Eyes' Review (Pre-November 2021)Inadequate Data Redaction in SpreadsheetsPoor Training on Data Protection ProtocolsAbsence of Automated Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Tools
Motivation: Unintentional (Negligence/Lack of Compliance)
Title: Afghan Data Breach and Relocation Assistance Dispute
Description: A judicial review case involving a data breach of Afghan individuals' information, where the UK Defence Secretary refused relocation assistance to claimants (QP1 and another) on 29 April 2024, deeming them not high-risk. The decision was challenged on grounds of irrationality in risk assessment, but the court dismissed the claims in June 2025 (R (QP1 & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2025] EWHC 2504). The breach exposed sensitive personal data, including religious/ethnic identities (e.g., Shia/Hazara), leading to perceived risks like misidentification as a 'spy.' The case was initially under a superinjunction, lifted in July 2024.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-07-26
Type: Data Breach
Motivation: EspionageTargeted HarassmentPolitical
Title: Major Breach: Russian Hackers Steal Hundreds of Ministry of Defence Files and Leak Them to Dark Web
Description: Russian cybercriminals (group 'Lynx') stole hundreds of military documents from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and leaked them on the dark web. The breach compromised eight RAF and Royal Navy bases, including sensitive data such as personnel names, emails, contractor details, and operational documents. The attack was executed via a third-party contractor (Dodd Group), bypassing the MoD’s cyber defenses. Approximately 4TB of data, including 'Controlled' and 'Official Sensitive' files, were exfiltrated. The hackers have released two of four planned data dumps, with threats of further leaks if unresolved.
Date Detected: 2023-09-23
Type: data breach
Attack Vector: third-party compromise (Dodd Group)gateway attackphishing (likely)dark web data exfiltration
Vulnerability Exploited: weak supply chain securityinadequate third-party access controlsoutdated IT infrastructure
Threat Actor: Name: LynxAffiliation: Russian-speaking cybercriminal groupLocation: Russia (suspected)Type: ['hacktivist', 'cybercriminal', 'state-aligned (possible)']
Motivation: financial gain (ransom threats)espionagegeopolitical disruptionreputation damage
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Data Breaches Related to Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed 49 data breaches related to its handling of efforts to help Afghan nationals who worked for the UK government. These breaches include a major incident involving a spreadsheet error exposing ~18,700 Afghans' data (costing £850m to mitigate), BCC email errors, WhatsApp messages with insecure personal data, misdirected emails, and a laptop screen displaying sensitive data in public. Only five incidents were reported to the ICO, with fines of £350,000 imposed for three 'blind carbon copy' breaches in 2021.
Date Detected: August 2023 (spreadsheet error from February 2022)2021 (BCC incidents)2021 (Microsoft Forms incident on 8 October)
Date Publicly Disclosed: July 2025 (super-injunction lifted for spreadsheet error)7 October 2023 (letter to MPs published by PAC)
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (Spreadsheet Mismanagement)Misconfigured Email (BCC Errors)Insecure Communication (WhatsApp)Physical Exposure (Laptop Screen in Public)Incorrect Data Classification (Emails)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Data Handling TrainingInadequate Email Security ProtocolsPoor Access Controls for Sensitive DataImproper Use of Collaboration Tools (WhatsApp, Microsoft Forms)
Motivation: Unintentional (Human Error)
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Data Breach
Description: A catastrophic breach exposed the personal details of thousands of Afghans linked to UK forces, endangering their lives under Taliban rule. The leak occurred when a 33,000-line spreadsheet was emailed to an unauthorized recipient outside the government. The incident triggered a secret evacuation program but was concealed from the public and MPs for nearly two years. The UK's Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) did not launch a formal investigation, relying instead on informal meetings and assurances from the MoD.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-06-00
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human ErrorImproper Data HandlingEmail Misdirection
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Data EncryptionInadequate Access ControlsPoor Data Governance
Title: Multiple Data Breaches in UK Ministry of Defence's Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP)
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed 49 data breaches related to its handling of efforts to relocate Afghan nationals who worked for the UK government. These breaches included wrongful disclosure or inadequate security of personal information, with incidents ranging from spreadsheet errors to insecure WhatsApp messages and misclassified emails. The most severe incident, a February 2022 spreadsheet error affecting ~18,700 Afghans, was initially under a super-injunction and had estimated mitigation costs of £850 million. Only five incidents were reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), including three 'blind carbon copy' (BCC) breaches that resulted in a £350,000 fine.
Date Detected: 2021-10-08 (Microsoft Forms incident)2022-02 (spreadsheet error, discovered in 2023-08)2021 (multiple BCC incidents)Various dates for 44 other unreported incidents
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-07 (spreadsheet error super-injunction lifted)2023-10-07 (letter to MPs published by PAC on 2023-11)
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (BCC misconfiguration)Improper Data Storage (spreadsheet error)Insecure Communication (WhatsApp messages)Misclassified EmailsPhysical Exposure (laptop screen visibility)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of BCC usage in group emailsInadequate access controls for sensitive spreadsheetsUnsecured communication channels (WhatsApp)Improper data classification proceduresLack of physical security for sensitive data display
Title: UK Ministry of Defence and Civil Service Data Breaches Affecting Afghan Nationals (2023)
Description: A series of data breaches within the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and civil service resulted in the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive personal data of at least 18,700 Afghan nationals seeking asylum under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) and predecessor schemes. The breaches included emails sent to unintended recipients (e.g., the Civil Service Sports & Social Club), unsecured laptops left on trains, insecure WhatsApp sharing, and exposed flight manifests. The leaks reportedly led to fatal consequences for some Afghans, with research suggesting 49 deaths may have resulted. The scandal was initially covered up but later exposed by *The Independent* after persistent lobbying and legal action. Additional breaches included 49 incidents at the MoD, highlighting systemic failures in data handling, including a lack of understanding of basic Excel functionalities (e.g., hidden tabs). The breaches were part of a broader pattern of poor data security practices in UK government agencies, with historical precedents such as the 2007 HMRC data loss affecting 25 million individuals.
Date Detected: 2023-08
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-11
Type: Data Leak
Attack Vector: Misconfigured EmailPhysical Theft/Loss (Laptop)Insecure Communication (WhatsApp)Improper Data Handling (Excel)Human Error
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Data Handling TrainingInadequate Access ControlsFailure to Redact/Protect Sensitive DataPoor Encryption PracticesOrganizational Culture of Negligence
Threat Actor: None (Unintentional Internal Actors)
Motivation: Negligence/Incompetence
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghanistan Interpreters and Staff Data Leak (2022)
Description: A leak of personal data belonging to nearly 19,000 Afghans who worked with British forces during the Afghanistan war was discovered in August 2023, though the breach occurred in February 2022. The dataset included details of individuals who had applied for resettlement in the UK post-Taliban takeover. The leak was initially suppressed by a super-injunction due to fears of 'grave risk, including risk of death' if the data fell into Taliban hands. Evidence later emerged suggesting the leak led to targeted killings by a Taliban unit (Yarmouk 60), contradicting the UK government's downplayed risk assessment (Rimmer Review). The incident raised concerns about inadequate protection for affected individuals and their families, with only ~1,500 of the 19,000 leaked records resulting in resettlement offers.
Date Detected: 2023-08
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-07
Type: data breach
Threat Actor: Primary: Unknown (initial leak)Secondary: ['Taliban (exploitation)', 'Yarmouk 60 (Taliban unit targeting affected individuals)']
Motivation: Exploitation: ['targeted persecution', 'retaliation against UK-affiliated Afghans', 'intimidation'],
Title: Ministry of Defence Afghan Data Breach (2022)
Description: A data breach at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) in February 2022 exposed the personal details of up to 100,000 Afghans linked to UK forces, putting their lives at risk from the Taliban. The breach triggered a covert evacuation operation (Operation Rubific), relocating 16,000 Afghans to the UK under a £7bn scheme, with 8,000 more pending. The incident was concealed under a super-injunction for nearly two years, hiding the true reason for the evacuation from Parliament and the public.
Date Detected: 2022-02
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-11-04
Type: Data Breach
Motivation: Espionage (potential)Human Error (likely)Operational Security Failure
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Data Exposure on Public Train
Description: A Ministry of Defence (MoD) official inadvertently exposed confidential government information after leaving their laptop open on a train. The MoD unit responsible for handling applications of Afghans fleeing the Taliban was also involved in several other data breaches, including emails sent to wrong recipients, insecure systems, and unauthorized employee access to sensitive information. The incident highlights institutional failures in data handling practices, particularly in remote working environments.
Type: Data Leak
Attack Vector: Physical ExposureNegligenceInsecure Work Practices
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Physical SecurityInadequate Remote Work PoliciesPoor Employee Training
Threat Actor: Internal (Accidental)
Motivation: None (Unintentional)
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Data Leak and Superinjunction Cover-Up
Description: A massive data leak by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) in February 2022 exposed the personal details of over 33,000 Afghans, including 18,000 applicants and their families, who had ties to UK forces and were seeking sanctuary in Britain. The leak, described as a potential 'kill list' if obtained by the Taliban, was covered up by an unprecedented global superinjunction that prevented media reporting and parliamentary scrutiny for 18 months. The breach was caused by an unnamed British serviceman who accidentally emailed a database containing far more records than intended (33,000 instead of 150) to untrusted sources. The leak was discovered in 2023 when a Facebook group user claimed to possess the list. The MoD's slow response, use of legal gagging orders, and lack of transparency drew criticism from journalists, MPs, and advocacy groups, who argued that the cover-up exacerbated risks to affected individuals and undermined democratic accountability.
Date Detected: 2023-02-00
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-05-00
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (Accidental Data Leak via Email)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Data Access Controls / Inadequate Redaction or Validation of Sensitive Data
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Resettlement Scheme Data Breach
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) inadvertently breached the personal details of 18,700 applicants to the UK resettlement schemes, primarily affecting Afghans eligible for relocation under the ARAP (Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy) program. The breach was concealed under a superinjunction for nearly two years, raising concerns about government transparency and the safety of affected individuals. The data leak exposed applicants to potential risks, including identity theft and targeted threats, while the MoD's handling of the incident—including the use of legal gag orders and lack of parliamentary disclosure—sparked a high-profile inquiry by the Defence Select Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-07
Type: Data Breach
Vulnerability Exploited: Human ErrorImproper Data HandlingLack of Oversight
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Data Breach Exposing Afghan Relocation Details
Description: A mass data breach at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) exposed sensitive information about thousands of Afghans who had worked with British forces, leading to a top-secret airlift operation. The breach was initially covered up under a super-injunction for nearly two years, delaying public disclosure. Journalists from the Daily Mail, including David Williams and Sam Greenhill, played a key role in exposing the incident and its impact on Afghan interpreters, support staff, and their families. The breach raised concerns about transparency, operational security, and the UK government's handling of resettlement efforts for at-risk Afghans. The MoD was later criticized for failing to allocate funds for compensation and resettlement costs tied to the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) and the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR).
Date Detected: 2021-08-17
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-07
Type: Data Breach
Motivation: Espionage (potential)Accidental ExposureGovernment Oversight Failure
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Data Leak and Superinjunction Cover-Up
Description: A massive data leak by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) exposed the personal details of over 33,000 Afghans, including 18,000 applicants and their families, who had ties to UK forces and sought sanctuary in Britain. The leak, discovered in February 2022 but originating from an August 2021 email error, was covered up by an unprecedented global superinjunction that prevented media reporting and parliamentary scrutiny for 18 months. The leaked data, described as a potential 'kill list' for the Taliban, put over 100,000 Afghans at risk of reprisals. The MoD's slow response, use of legal gagging orders, and lack of transparency were later criticized in a parliamentary inquiry and independent investigation.
Date Detected: 2022-02
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (Misaddressed Email)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Data Validation/Segregation in Email Systems
Title: Ministry of Defence Afghan Data Breach (2022)
Description: A massive data breach at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) in February 2022 exposed the personal details of up to 100,000 Afghans linked to UK forces, putting their lives at risk from the Taliban. The breach triggered a covert £7bn evacuation scheme (Operation Rubific), relocating 16,000 Afghans to the UK under a super-injunction that concealed the operation from MPs and the public for nearly two years.
Date Detected: 2022-02
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-11-04
Type: Data Breach
Motivation: Espionage (potential)Human Error (likely)Taliban Targeting (indirect)
Title: Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Resettlement Data Breach (2022)
Description: A devastating data breach at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) exposed the personal details of ~33,000 Afghans (up to 100,000 lives at risk) seeking UK sanctuary. The breach occurred in February 2022 when a spreadsheet was emailed externally, but was only discovered in August 2023 after parts appeared in a Facebook group. The MoD used a superinjunction to suppress reporting and initiated a secret £7bn evacuation program. The breach was compounded by systemic failures, lack of transparency, and inadequate data handling controls. MPs warn similar incidents could recur due to unaddressed vulnerabilities.
Date Detected: 2023-08
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-07
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human Error (Misaddressed Email)Inadequate Access ControlsLack of Data Encryption
Vulnerability Exploited: Poor Data Handling PracticesLack of Secure Casework SystemsInsufficient Oversight
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Relocation Data Breach (2022-2023)
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) suffered a major data breach in 2022 where personal details of nearly 19,000 Afghans applying for the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) scheme were leaked. The breach occurred due to the use of insecure Excel spreadsheets to handle sensitive data, which were later posted anonymously on a Facebook group. The incident exposed applicants to significant risks, including potential retaliation by the Taliban, and led to the creation of the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) for resettlement. The MoD faced criticism for failing to address known vulnerabilities and prevent repeated breaches over successive years. The estimated cost of the ARR scheme is £850 million, excluding legal actions or compensation claims.
Date Detected: 2023-08
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-07
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human ErrorInsecure Data Storage (Excel Spreadsheets)Improper Access ControlsSocial Media Leak (Facebook)
Vulnerability Exploited: Use of inappropriate systems (Excel) for sensitive dataLack of data encryptionPoor data handling processesInadequate employee training
Title: MOD Afghan Citizens Data Breach (2022)
Description: The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) accidentally leaked the personal details of ~19,000 Afghan citizens seeking refuge in the UK after the Taliban takeover. The breach occurred due to improper use of Excel spreadsheets on a SharePoint site and was publicly disclosed in 2023 after a superinjunction was lifted. The incident has been linked to the deaths of 49 Afghans and exposed thousands to Taliban reprisals. The estimated financial impact is ~£850 million (excluding legal/compensation costs), with potential to escalate to billions. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) criticized the MOD for systemic failures, lack of digital expertise, and inadequate post-breach remediation.
Date Detected: 2022
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Human ErrorImproper Data HandlingInsecure Storage (SharePoint/Excel)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Access ControlsPoor Data GovernanceInadequate TrainingLegacy System Risks
Motivation: Accidental (No malicious intent; attributed to procedural failures)
Title: UK Ministry of Defense Afghan Relocation Data Leak (2022)
Description: The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) suffered a significant data breach in 2022 when a British soldier mistakenly sent a spreadsheet containing sensitive personal information of up to 19,000 Afghans seeking relocation to Britain. The breach exposed data of individuals connected to British special forces and government operations, placing up to 100,000 Afghans at risk. The incident was discovered in August 2023 when an Afghan recipient threatened to publish the data on Facebook. The MoD was criticized for inadequate data handling practices, reliance on Excel spreadsheets, and failure to implement proper safeguards despite prior awareness of vulnerabilities. A secret multibillion-pound extraction effort was initiated, and a superinjunction was imposed to suppress details of the breach.
Date Detected: 2023-08
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-07-19
Type: data breach
Attack Vector: accidental disclosure (human error)
Vulnerability Exploited: inadequate data handling practicesuse of Excel spreadsheets for sensitive datalack of access controlshidden rows in spreadsheet
Title: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Afghan Data Breach and ICO Enforcement Concerns
Description: A serious data breach involving the leak of personal information of Afghan individuals who worked with British forces before the Taliban takeover in August 2021. The breach exposed these individuals to life-threatening risks. The UK's Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) faced criticism for its 'collapse in enforcement activity,' including its decision not to formally investigate the MoD despite the severity of the breach. Civil liberties groups, legal professionals, and data protection experts have called for an inquiry into the ICO’s handling of the incident, citing broader structural failures in enforcement across both public and private sectors.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2021-08
Type: Data Breach
Vulnerability Exploited: Poor Data ManagementLack of Compliance Oversight
Motivation: NegligenceSystemic Enforcement Failure
What are the most common types of attacks the company has faced ?
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Breach.
How does the company identify the attack vectors used in incidents ?
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Email, Dodd Group (third-party contractor), Human Error (Email Misrouting)Physical Loss (Laptop)Insecure Communication Channels (WhatsApp), Accidental email from MoD serviceman to untrusted Afghan contacts and Misaddressed email by unnamed British serviceman (Whitehall office).
Impact of the Incidents
What was the impact of each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-557071825
Data Compromised: Names and details of mi6 officers, Names of sas and sbs members, Names and details of potentially vulnerable afghans
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Data Compromised: Personal details of 19,000+ people
Brand Reputation Impact: Significant
Legal Liabilities: Potential lawsuits
Identity Theft Risk: High
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Data Compromised: Personal details of afghan interpreters and special forces members, Relocation application statuses, Family member information
Operational Impact: Revocations of relocation offersLegal challenges and High Court applicationsDeportation threats to affected families
Brand Reputation Impact: Criticism of UK government's handling of Afghan alliesAccusations of moral bankruptcyPublic outcry over humanitarian failures
Legal Liabilities: Urgent High Court applications to challenge visa refusalsPotential legal actions for endangering livesSpecial Immigration Appeals Commission reviews
Identity Theft Risk: ['High risk for exposed Afghans due to Taliban threats']
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Data Compromised: Records Exposed: 1, 8, ,, 7, 0, 0, , a, p, p, l, i, c, a, n, t, s, , +, , t, h, o, u, s, a, n, d, s, , o, f, , f, a, m, i, l, y, , m, e, m, b, e, r, s, Sensitivity: H, i, g, h, , (, p, e, r, s, o, n, a, l, , d, e, t, a, i, l, s, , o, f, , a, t, -, r, i, s, k, , A, f, g, h, a, n, s, ),
Operational Impact: Superinjunction imposed on UK pressClandestine evacuation of 23,463+ individuals (as of July 2025)Use of Arap scheme as 'cover' for breach-affected evacuationsCreation of new Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) and Afghan Resettlement Programme (ARP)Reduction in ARP scope post-superinjunction lift (from 42,000 to 36,000 targeted evacuations)
Brand Reputation Impact: Criticism from Public Accounts Committee over cost transparencyQuestions about MoD’s accounting practices and superinjunction justification
Legal Liabilities: Potential compensation claims from affected individualsHigh Court superinjunction (later lifted)Regulatory scrutiny by National Audit Office (NAO)
Identity Theft Risk: High (Taliban reprisal threats against exposed individuals)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Financial Loss: £350,000 (Fine for 2021 Email Breaches)
Data Compromised: Email addresses (265 in 2021), Personal details (names, contact information, family/associate data for ~19,000 in 2022), Spreadsheet metadata (hidden data)
Systems Affected: ARAP (Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy) DatabaseMoD Email SystemsInternal Spreadsheet Storage/Sharing Tools
Operational Impact: Closure of ARAP Scheme (July 2025)Legal Scrutiny and High Court InterventionsReputational Damage to MoD and UK GovernmentIncreased Workload for Remediation and Compliance
Customer Complaints: ['Hundreds of Affected Afghans Represented by Barings Law', 'Public Outcry and Calls for Transparency']
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Trust in MoD Data HandlingCriticism from Lawyers, Data Protection Experts, and Opposition PartiesMedia Scrutiny (BBC, High Court Rulings)
Legal Liabilities: £350,000 Fine (2021 Breaches)Potential Further Fines or Legal Actions Pending ICO ReviewHigh Court Gagging Order (Lifted July 2025)
Identity Theft Risk: High (Exposed PII Could Be Exploited by Threat Actors)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Religious/ethnic identity (shia/hazara), Perceived affiliation (e.g., 'spy' misclassification)
Brand Reputation Impact: High (due to government involvement and national security implications)
Legal Liabilities: Judicial review challenges (dismissed in 2025)Potential future litigation from affected individuals
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (due to exposed PII and sensitive attributes)']
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Data Compromised: Military documents (raf/royal navy bases), Mod personnel names/emails, Contractor names/car registrations/mobile numbers, Internal email guidance/security instructions, Visitor logs (raf portreath, rnas culdrose), Construction details (kier’s work at raf lakenheath), 4tb of data (including secured repositories)
Systems Affected: Dodd Group (third-party contractor)MoD email systemssecured document repositoriesRAF Lakenheath (F-35 stealth jets/nuclear bomb data)RAF Portreath (radar base)RAF Predannack (National Drone Hub)RNAS Culdrose (Royal Navy air station)
Operational Impact: compromised security protocols (phishing aid)embarrassment to UK/US alliespotential disruption to military operationsloss of trust in MoD supply chain
Brand Reputation Impact: severe damage to MoD credibilityeroded trust in UK national securityinternational embarrassment (especially with US allies)
Legal Liabilities: potential GDPR violations (personal data)contractual breaches with third parties
Identity Theft Risk: ['high (personnel/contractor PII exposed)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Financial Loss: £850m (mitigation costs for spreadsheet error)£350,000 (ICO fines for BCC incidents)
Data Compromised: Personal data of ~18,700 afghans (spreadsheet error), Email recipients' identities (bcc errors), Sensitive personal data (whatsapp, misdirected emails, laptop screen)
Operational Impact: Reputation Damage to MoDLoss of Trust Among Afghan NationalsRegulatory Scrutiny (ICO, PAC, Defence Select Committee)
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe (Public and Parliamentary Scrutiny)Erosion of Trust in Government Data Handling
Legal Liabilities: ICO Fines (£350,000)Potential Further Legal Actions (Defence Select Committee Inquiry)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (Exposed Afghans at Risk of Taliban Retaliation)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii) of afghans, Sensitive military-associated data
Operational Impact: Secret Evacuation Program TriggeredPublic Trust ErosionRegulatory Scrutiny
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe Damage to MoD and UK Government CredibilityCriticism of ICO's Handling
Legal Liabilities: Potential Violations of Data Protection LawsCourt Battle Over Superinjunction
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for Affected Afghans)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Financial Loss: £850 million (estimated mitigation cost for spreadsheet error) + £350,000 (ICO fine for BCC incidents)
Data Compromised: Personal information of afghan nationals (including ~18,700 in spreadsheet error), Sensitive relocation/assistance data, Contact details (visible in bcc incidents)
Operational Impact: Ongoing parliamentary inquiries (Public Accounts Committee, Defence Select Committee); reputational damage to MoD and UK government
Brand Reputation Impact: High (public disclosure of failures in protecting vulnerable Afghan allies; scrutiny from MPs and media)
Legal Liabilities: £350,000 ICO fine for BCC incidentsPotential further fines/legal actions from ongoing inquiries
Identity Theft Risk: High (exposed personal data of at-risk Afghan nationals)
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Contact details, Asylum application data, Flight manifests, Military affiliation records
Systems Affected: Email SystemsMicrosoft ExcelWhatsAppPhysical Devices (Laptops)Internal Databases
Operational Impact: Loss of Trust in Government SystemsDisruption to Asylum ProcessingReputational Damage to MoD/Civil ServiceLegal and Regulatory Scrutiny
Customer Complaints: ['Public Outcry', 'Legal Challenges by Affected Individuals', 'Media Backlash']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe Damage to UK Government CredibilityErosion of Public Trust in Data SecurityInternational Criticism for Endangering Afghan Allies
Legal Liabilities: Potential Lawsuits from Affected AfghansRegulatory InvestigationsViolations of Data Protection Laws (e.g., UK GDPR)
Identity Theft Risk: High (for Afghan nationals, including risk of Taliban targeting)
Payment Information Risk: Low (limited to some historical cases like the 2007 HMRC breach)
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Data Compromised: Records: 1, 8, ,, 8, 2, 5, , (, a, p, p, r, o, x, ., ), Types: [, ', p, e, r, s, o, n, a, l, , i, d, e, n, t, i, f, i, a, b, l, e, , i, n, f, o, r, m, a, t, i, o, n, , (, P, I, I, ), ', ,, , ', r, e, s, e, t, t, l, e, m, e, n, t, , a, p, p, l, i, c, a, t, i, o, n, , d, e, t, a, i, l, s, ', ,, , ', f, a, m, i, l, y, , m, e, m, b, e, r, , i, d, e, n, t, i, t, i, e, s, ', ], Sensitivity: e, x, t, r, e, m, e, , (, l, i, f, e, -, t, h, r, e, a, t, e, n, i, n, g, ),
Operational Impact: closure of Afghanistan Response Route (resettlement scheme)loss of trust in UK government protection programs
Customer Complaints: ['widespread distress among affected Afghans', 'criticism from humanitarian organizations']
Brand Reputation Impact: damage to UK MoD/GOV credibilityaccusations of downplaying risksperceived abandonment of allies
Legal Liabilities: potential lawsuits for negligenceviolation of data protection obligations
Identity Theft Risk: high (exploited for targeted violence)
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghans linked to uk forces, Evacuation operation details
Operational Impact: Covert evacuation operation (Operation Rubific) involving 16,000 AfghansOngoing relocation of 8,000 more individualsSuper-injunction to suppress disclosure
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of public trust in MoD data handlingCriticism over secrecy and lack of transparency
Legal Liabilities: Potential violations of data protection lawsSuper-injunction controversies
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for exposed Afghans)', 'Risk of Taliban retaliation']
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Data Compromised: Confidential government information, Afghan refugee application data, Employee records
Operational Impact: Potential disruption to Afghan refugee processing; erosion of trust in MoD data handling
Brand Reputation Impact: Significant (criticized in House of Commons; institutional failure acknowledged)
Identity Theft Risk: Possible (if exposed data included PII)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Family details, Application records for uk sanctuary
Operational Impact: Delayed resettlement scheme implementation; lack of transparency in government response.
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to UK government and MoD credibility due to cover-up and slow response.
Legal Liabilities: Potential lawsuits from affected AfghansLiability for endangerment of lives if reprisals occur
Identity Theft Risk: High (exposed PII could be used for targeted attacks by Taliban)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Data Compromised: Personal details of 18,700 applicants (e.g., names, contact information, resettlement eligibility status)
Operational Impact: Legal battles spanning 18 monthsParliamentary and public distrust in MoD transparencyOngoing delays in resettlement processing
Customer Complaints: ['Reports from affected Afghans and advocacy groups regarding safety risks and relocation delays']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to MoD's reputation due to secrecy and mishandlingErosion of public trust in governmental data protection practices
Legal Liabilities: Superinjunction imposed for ~2 years (later lifted)Defence Select Committee inquiryIntelligence and Security Committee investigationPotential legal actions from affected individuals
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (exposed personal data of vulnerable applicants)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghans, Relocation/resettlement details, Sensitive operational data
Operational Impact: Compromised safety of Afghan alliesDelayed resettlement effortsErosion of trust in UK governmentLegal and diplomatic repercussions
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to MoD's credibilityPublic and parliamentary distrustCriticism from auditors and watchdogs
Legal Liabilities: Potential compensation claims from affected AfghansViolation of data protection lawsSuper-injunction controversies
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for exposed Afghans)', 'Risk of retaliation by Taliban or hostile actors']
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Family details, Military affiliation records
Operational Impact: Delayed resettlement of at-risk Afghans; 18-month suppression of public/parliamentary scrutiny
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to UK government/MoD trust, accusations of Orwellian censorship and negligence
Legal Liabilities: Potential lawsuits from affected AfghansViolation of democratic accountability principles
Identity Theft Risk: High (Taliban-targeted reprisals)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghans, Links to uk forces, Evacuation eligibility data
Operational Impact: Covert Evacuation Operation (Operation Rubific)Super-Injunction EnforcementParliamentary Secrecy
Brand Reputation Impact: Loss of Public Trust in MoDCriticism of Government TransparencyMedia Scrutiny
Legal Liabilities: Potential Violations of Data Protection LawsSuper-Injunction Controversy
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for exposed Afghans)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Data Compromised: Records Exposed: 3, 3, 0, 0, 0, Estimated Lives At Risk: 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, Types: [, ', P, e, r, s, o, n, a, l, , I, d, e, n, t, i, f, i, a, b, l, e, , I, n, f, o, r, m, a, t, i, o, n, , (, P, I, I, ), ', ,, , ', R, e, s, e, t, t, l, e, m, e, n, t, , A, p, p, l, i, c, a, t, i, o, n, , D, e, t, a, i, l, s, ', ],
Systems Affected: MoD Email SystemsAfghan Resettlement Casework Database
Operational Impact: Secret evacuation program triggeredSuperinjunction imposed to suppress reporting (2022–2024)Resettlement pathway stalled; only 3,383 of 27,278 affected individuals relocated by 2024NAO and parliamentary oversight obstructed
Customer Complaints: ['Afghan caseworkers and affected individuals reported lack of transparency and delays']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to UK government trust among Afghan alliesCriticism from cross-party MPs (Public Accounts Committee)Media scrutiny over secrecy and accountability failures
Legal Liabilities: Potential violations of UK data protection laws (e.g., GDPR)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (exposed PII of vulnerable Afghans at risk of Taliban retaliation)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Financial Loss: £850 million (estimated cost of ARR scheme, excluding legal/compensation costs)
Data Compromised: Personal details of ~19,000 arap applicants, Names, contact information, and other sensitive data
Systems Affected: Excel spreadsheetsMoD internal data handling systems
Operational Impact: Creation of Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) for resettlementSuper injunction imposed (Sept 2023)Increased scrutiny and parliamentary oversight
Customer Complaints: ['Reports of affected individuals returning to Afghanistan due to risks', 'Potential legal actions and compensation claims']
Brand Reputation Impact: Loss of public trust in MoD data handlingCriticism from MPs and Public Accounts Committee (PAC)Media scrutiny and negative coverage
Legal Liabilities: Potential compensation claimsLegal actions (costs not included in £850m estimate)Reporting to Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (exposed personal data of vulnerable individuals)', 'Risk of Taliban retaliation against exposed Afghans']
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Financial Loss: £850 million (estimated; excludes legal/compensation costs; potential to reach billions)
Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii) of afghan refugees, Contact details, Application statuses
Systems Affected: SharePoint platformExcel spreadsheets
Operational Impact: Compromised resettlement operationsLoss of trust in MOD data handlingIncreased scrutiny from regulatory bodies
Customer Complaints: ['Reports of Taliban reprisals against exposed individuals', 'Public outcry and media criticism']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to MOD's credibilityErosion of public trust in government data securityCriticism from Parliamentary committees
Legal Liabilities: Potential compensation claims from affected AfghansOngoing legal investigations
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (exposed PII could be exploited by malicious actors)']
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Data Compromised: Personal information of ~19,000 afghans, Potential risk to ~100,000 individuals
Systems Affected: SharePoint systemExcel spreadsheets
Operational Impact: secret multibillion-pound extraction effortsuperinjunction imposeddelayed relocation processing
Brand Reputation Impact: loss of public trustcriticism from lawmakerslack of confidence in MoD's data handling
Legal Liabilities: superinjunction (longest ever issued)potential legal risks for exposed individuals
Identity Theft Risk: ['high (for Afghans connected to UK operations)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghan nationals, Names of individuals who collaborated with british forces
Operational Impact: Risk to lives of exposed individualsErosion of trust in UK government data handling
Customer Complaints: ['Public outcry', 'Calls for inquiry by civil liberties groups']
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to UK MoD and ICO credibilityPerceived failure in data protection enforcement
Legal Liabilities: Potential legal actions by affected individualsScrutiny by parliamentary committees
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (life-threatening due to Taliban exposure)']
What is the average financial loss per incident ?
Average Financial Loss: The average financial loss per incident is $35.52 billion.
What types of data are most commonly compromised in incidents ?
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Names, Details, , Personal details, Personal Identifiable Information (Pii) Of Afghan Interpreters And Special Forces, Relocation Eligibility Statuses, Family Details, , Personal details (names, locations, resettlement status) of Afghan applicants and family members, Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Email Addresses, Family/Associate Details, Application Status For Relocation, , Pii, Religious/Ethnic Data, Perceived Intelligence Affiliations, , Military Operational Documents, Personnel Pii (Names, Emails, Mobile Numbers), Contractor Data (Car Registrations, Contact Details), Visitor Logs, Construction Project Details, Internal Security Guidance, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii) Of Afghan Nationals, Email Addresses (Bcc Errors), Official Sensitive Personal Data (Laptop Screen), , Pii (Names, Locations, Associations With Uk Forces), Sensitive Military-Related Data, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii) Of Afghan Nationals, Relocation/Assistance Application Details, Contact Information (Emails, Phone Numbers), Official Sensitive Data (Displayed On Laptop), , Pii (Names, Contact Details), Asylum Application Data, Military Service Records, Flight Manifests, , Full Names, Roles With Uk Forces, Resettlement Application Status, Family Member Details, , Personal Details Of Afghans (Names, Links To Uk Forces), Evacuation Operation Specifics, , Government Confidential Information, Refugee Application Data, Employee Records, , Full Names, Family Details, Application Records, Links To Uk Forces, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Resettlement Application Details, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Relocation/Resettlement Records, Military Operational Data, , Full Names, Military Affiliation Details, Family Member Information, Contact Details, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Military Affiliation Data, Evacuation Requests, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Resettlement Application Data, Sensitive Afghan Ally Details, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Relocation Application Details, , Pii (Names, Contact Details, Application Data), Sensitive Refugee Status Information, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Names, Contact Details, Association With Uk Special Forces/Government Operations, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Names Of Afghan Collaborators and .
Which entities were affected by each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-557071825
Entity Name: MI6
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Intelligence
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach UK-557071825
Entity Name: SAS
Entity Type: Military Unit
Industry: Defense
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach UK-557071825
Entity Name: SBS
Entity Type: Military Unit
Industry: Defense
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Defence
Location: UK
Customers Affected: 19,000+ Afghans
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Entity Name: Former Afghan interpreters and their families
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: PakistanAfghanistan
Size: Thousands (exact number unspecified)
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Entity Name: Former Afghan special forces members and their families
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: PakistanAfghanistan
Size: At least 13 members in one family (exact total unspecified)
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Public Sector
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 18,700 applicants + family members (total evacuations: 23,463 as of 2025-07)
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Entity Name: Afghan Resettlement Scheme Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals/Refugees
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Customers Affected: 23,463 (evacuated or planned for evacuation)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Entity Name: Ministry of Defence (MoD), UK
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Size: Large (10,000+ Employees)
Customers Affected: ~19,000 Afghans (2022 Breach) + 265 (2021 Email Breaches) + Undisclosed Others
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals/Refugees
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Customers Affected: 49 Breaches Affecting Thousands (Exact Numbers Undisclosed for Most Incidents)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MOD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/National Security
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Afghan nationals (including QP1 and others; exact number undisclosed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Entity Name: UK Home Office
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Immigration/Resettlement
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: government/military
Industry: defense
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: Dodd Group
Entity Type: private contractor
Industry: construction/maintenance
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: MoD personnel, contractors, visitors to RAF/Royal Navy bases
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: RAF Lakenheath
Entity Type: military base
Industry: defense/aviation
Location: Suffolk, UK
Customers Affected: US Armed Forces (F-35 stealth jets), MoD personnel
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: RAF Portreath
Entity Type: military base (radar)
Industry: defense
Location: Cornwall, UK
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: RAF Predannack (National Drone Hub)
Entity Type: military base
Industry: defense/UAV
Location: Cornwall, UK
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: RNAS Culdrose
Entity Type: Royal Navy air station
Industry: defense/aviation
Location: Cornwall, UK
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entity Name: Kier Group
Entity Type: private contractor
Industry: construction
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: Defence and National Security
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: ~18,700 Afghan Nationals (and others in smaller breaches)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Beneficiaries
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Customers Affected: ~18,700 (spreadsheet error) + others in 48 additional incidents
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Entity Name: Afghanistan Locally Employed Staff Ex-Gratia Scheme Beneficiaries
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 33,000+ Afghans (and potentially their families)
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Entity Name: Afghan Nationals Linked to UK Forces
Entity Type: Individuals at Risk
Location: Afghanistan
Customers Affected: 33,000+ records exposed
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Ministry
Industry: Defence/Public Sector
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Afghan nationals under ARAP and Afghanistan Locally Employed Staff Ex-Gratia Scheme (~18,700 in spreadsheet error; total across 49 incidents unspecified)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Customers Affected: ~18,700 (spreadsheet error) + unknown additional in other incidents
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Entity Name: Afghanistan Locally Employed Staff Ex-Gratia Scheme Participants
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Public Sector
Location: United Kingdom
Size: Large (200,000+ employees)
Customers Affected: 18,700+ Afghan nationals (directly); broader public trust impacted
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Entity Name: Civil Service Sports & Social Club
Entity Type: Internal Organization
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United Kingdom
Size: 140,000 members
Customers Affected: None (unintended recipients)
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: AfghanistanUnited Kingdom
Size: 18,700+
Customers Affected: All (directly impacted)
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: government agency
Industry: defense/military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 18,825 Afghans (direct) + family members (indirect)
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Entity Name: Afghan interpreters, soldiers, and staff who worked with UK forces
Entity Type: individuals/civilians
Location: Afghanistan (primarily)
Customers Affected: 18,825 (direct) + families
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defence/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Up to 100,000 Afghans (indirectly)
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Entity Name: Afghan Nationals Linked to UK Forces
Entity Type: Individuals at Risk
Location: Afghanistan/UK (evacuees)
Customers Affected: 16,000 evacuated (8,000 pending)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense & National Security
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Afghan Refugees, MoD Employees, Potentially Other Government Stakeholders
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 33,000 records (18,000+ Afghan applicants and families)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Entity Name: Afghan Nationals (Applicants for UK Sanctuary)
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan (and diaspora)
Customers Affected: 100,000+ at risk (per journalists' estimates)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defence/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 18,700 applicants (primarily Afghans under resettlement schemes)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Entity Name: Afghan Resettlement Scheme Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: AfghanistanUnited Kingdom (pending relocation)
Customers Affected: 18,700 (including 4,200 still awaiting relocation as of October 2023)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Thousands of Afghans (interpreters, support staff, and families)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Beneficiaries
Entity Type: Individuals/Refugees
Location: AfghanistanUnited Kingdom (relocated)
Customers Affected: Thousands
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 33,000+ records (18,000+ Afghan applicants and families)
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Entity Name: Afghan Nationals at Risk
Entity Type: Individuals/Families
Location: Afghanistan/Global Diaspora
Customers Affected: 100,000+ estimated at risk
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defence/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Up to 100,000 Afghans
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: Defence/Public Sector
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 33000
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Entity Name: Afghan Nationals (Resettlement Applicants)
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: Afghanistan/UK
Customers Affected: 100000
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Entity Name: National Audit Office (NAO)
Entity Type: Government Watchdog
Industry: Public Sector Oversight
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: Defence and National Security
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: ~19,000 ARAP applicants (initial breach); ~27,278 total candidates for relocation (including post-breach additions)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Entity Name: Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) Applicants
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: AfghanistanUnited Kingdom (relocated individuals)
Customers Affected: ~19,000 (directly exposed); ~7,355 additional individuals made eligible for resettlement post-breach
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MOD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: ~19,000 Afghan citizens (primary) + unspecified number of military personnel (secondary breach mentioned)
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defense (MoD)
Entity Type: government ministry
Industry: defense
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: up to 100,000 Afghans (19,000 directly exposed)
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Entity Name: Afghan applicants for UK relocation
Entity Type: individuals
Location: AfghanistanUnited Kingdom
Customers Affected: 19,000 (directly exposed); ~100,000 at risk
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Defense/Military
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Afghan nationals who worked with British forces (exact number undisclosed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Entity Name: Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
Entity Type: Regulatory Body
Industry: Data Protection
Location: United Kingdom
Response to the Incidents
What measures were taken in response to each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Third Party Assistance: Legal Representation By Leigh Day Law Firm.
Recovery Measures: High Court applications to halt deportationsSpecial Immigration Appeals Commission reviews
Communication Strategy: Statements by MoD spokesperson defending security checksMedia coverage highlighting humanitarian crisis
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (clandestine evacuation via ARR/ARP)
Containment Measures: Superinjunction on UK press to prevent Taliban reprisalsUse of existing Arap scheme as operational cover
Remediation Measures: Evacuation of affected individuals via ARR/ARPReassessment of Arap eligibility for breach victims
Recovery Measures: Establishment of Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) and Afghan Resettlement Programme (ARP)Budget allocations via UK Spending Review
Communication Strategy: Limited transparency due to superinjunction (lifted later)NAO report (2025-07) detailing cost uncertaintiesPublic statements by MoD and Public Accounts Committee
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (Post-2021 Breaches)
Third Party Assistance: Information Commissioner'S Office (Ico) Engagement, Legal Counsel (High Court Gagging Order, 2023–2025), Data Protection Specialists (E.G., Mishcon De Reya, Barings Law).
Containment Measures: High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025, Lifted July 2025)Internal Reviews of BreachesLimited Public Disclosure (Only 4 of 49 Breaches Initially Public)
Remediation Measures: New Data Handling Procedures (November 2021)Mandatory Training for Staff'Two Pairs of Eyes' Rule for External Emails (Post-November 2021)New Software (Introduced by Labour Government, Post-July 2024)
Recovery Measures: Closure of ARAP Scheme (July 2025)Public Apology by Defence SecretaryParliamentary Scrutiny (Post-July 2024 Disclosures)
Communication Strategy: Delayed Disclosure (Gagging Orders, Legal Restrictions)Selective Transparency (BBC FOIA Request, 2025)Apologies via Political Statements
Enhanced Monitoring: Yes (Post-2021, Details Undisclosed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Remediation Measures: Judicial review processPolicy rationalization (as per CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892)
Communication Strategy: Superinjunction initially imposed (lifted July 2024)Open judgment published in 2025
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: investigation ongoingno public details on containment
Communication Strategy: MoD statement: 'actively investigating'no public disclosure of remediation steps
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (Partial; ICO satisfied with escalation judgments)
Containment Measures: Super-Injunction (Lifted in July 2025)ICO Reporting for 5/49 IncidentsInternal Reviews
Remediation Measures: Mitigation Spending (£850m for spreadsheet error)Policy/Process Reviews (Ongoing)
Communication Strategy: Letter to MPs (7 October 2023)Public Accounts Committee (PAC) DisclosuresDefence Select Committee Inquiry
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Secret Evacuation Program', 'MoD Internal Review']
Containment Measures: Limited to MoD's Internal Actions (per ICO)
Remediation Measures: MoD Claimed to Address 'Bad Data Practices'No Formal ICO Oversight
Communication Strategy: Concealment via Superinjunction (for ~2 years)Public Disclosure After Legal Battle
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (internal investigations; reporting to ICO for 5 incidents)
Containment Measures: Super-injunction for spreadsheet error (lifted in 2023-07)ICO reporting for selected incidentsInternal reviews by MoD
Remediation Measures: £850m allocated for mitigation of spreadsheet errorPolicy/process reviews (implied by parliamentary inquiries)
Communication Strategy: Letter to MPs (2023-10-07, published 2023-11)Public Accounts Committee evidence session (2023-09)Defence Select Committee inquiry (ongoing)
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (after public exposure)
Third Party Assistance: Media (*The Independent* Investigations), Legal Teams (For Damage Control).
Containment Measures: Public Disclosure (after delay)Internal ReviewsPermanent Secretary Resignation
Remediation Measures: Policy ReviewsTraining Programs (proposed)Asylum Grants for Affected Afghans (retroactive)
Communication Strategy: Delayed and ReactiveMedia Statements Post-ExposureLimited Transparency
Enhanced Monitoring: Proposed (not confirmed)
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Incident Response Plan Activated: yes (super-injunction imposed in 2023)
Third Party Assistance: Legal (Court Injunction), Intelligence Assessments (Rimmer Review).
Containment Measures: super-injunction to suppress disclosure (2023–2024)limited resettlement offers (7,355 total, including family members)
Remediation Measures: Rimmer Review (risk assessment)closure of Afghanistan Response Route
Recovery Measures: partial resettlement of 1,500 direct victims + families
Communication Strategy: initial suppression via super-injunctiondelayed public disclosure (July 2024)defensive statements by MoD
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Operation Rubific (covert evacuation)', 'Super-injunction to suppress disclosure']
Containment Measures: Secrecy via super-injunctionLimited disclosure to Parliament
Recovery Measures: Evacuation of 16,000 AfghansOngoing relocation efforts
Communication Strategy: Suppression of details via legal injunctionSelective disclosure to Defence Committee (2024)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Remediation Measures: Review of internal processes (implied)Potential policy updates for remote work
Communication Strategy: No public comment (MoD declined to comment)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (but delayed and opaque)
Third Party Assistance: Mi6, Cia, Foreign Office.
Law Enforcement Notified: Yes (internal MoD and intelligence agencies)
Containment Measures: Superinjunction to suppress reportingLimited resettlement scheme for 150 individuals (initially)
Recovery Measures: Eventual lifting of superinjunction (2024)Investigation by Paul Rimmer (former MoD intelligence deputy)
Communication Strategy: Controlled narrative via selected factsGagging orders to prevent scrutiny
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Superinjunction imposed (later lifted)', 'Internal review (details undisclosed)']
Containment Measures: Superinjunction to suppress public disclosure (controversial)
Remediation Measures: Defence Select Committee inquiryIntelligence and Security Committee investigationPotential policy reforms (pending inquiry outcomes)
Recovery Measures: Limited evacuations resumed post-superinjunctionOngoing parliamentary scrutiny
Communication Strategy: Initial suppression via superinjunctionPost-disclosure: Parliamentary hearings and media engagement
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Containment Measures: Super-injunction (later lifted)Limited public communication
Remediation Measures: Secret airlift of exposed AfghansParliamentary inquiryMedia investigations
Recovery Measures: Lifting of super-injunction (July 2023)Ongoing parliamentary scrutiny
Communication Strategy: Initial suppression via super-injunctionSelective disclosure to journalistsParliamentary testimony
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (Delayed; 16 months after leak)
Third Party Assistance: Mi6, Cia, Foreign Office.
Containment Measures: Superinjunction to suppress reportingLimited resettlement scheme for 150 individuals
Recovery Measures: Independent investigation by Paul Rimmer (former MoD intelligence deputy)Partial lifting of superinjunction under legal pressure
Communication Strategy: Narrative control via selective disclosuresSuppression of media/parliamentary debate
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Operation Rubific (Covert Evacuation)', 'Super-Injunction']
Containment Measures: Secrecy via Super-InjunctionLimited Disclosure to Parliament
Remediation Measures: Evacuation of 16,000 Afghans (8,000 pending)
Communication Strategy: Media BlackoutParliamentary Obfuscation
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Superinjunction to suppress reporting (2022–2024)', 'Secret evacuation program']
Containment Measures: Superinjunction (later lifted in July 2024)Facebook group takedown (implied)
Remediation Measures: Introduction of a dedicated secure casework system for Afghan resettlement (post-breach)Policy changes in data handling (ongoing)
Recovery Measures: £7bn evacuation scheme (approved 2024)Resettlement of 3,383 affected individuals (as of 2024)
Communication Strategy: Secrecy and limited disclosure (2022–2024)Public disclosure after superinjunction lifted (July 2024)PAC report publication (2024-10)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: Super injunction imposed (Sept 2023, lifted July 2024)Removal of leaked data from Facebook
Remediation Measures: Introduction of a dedicated, secure casework system for Afghan resettlementImprovements in data handling processes across MoD
Recovery Measures: Establishment of Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) for resettlementPublic apology by Defence Secretary John Healey
Communication Strategy: Public disclosure after lifting of super injunction (July 2024)Parliamentary scrutiny and PAC reportMedia statements
Enhanced Monitoring: Ongoing improvements in data handlingPAC oversight and recommendations
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (though criticized as inadequate by PAC)
Containment Measures: Superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted)Internal review triggered by PAC
Remediation Measures: PAC-mandated six-monthly updates on resettlement/costsCalls for system modernization and digital specialist recruitment
Recovery Measures: Ongoing; no specific technical details disclosed
Communication Strategy: Delayed public disclosure (2023)PAC report and media interviewsLetter to MOD Permanent Secretary expressing disappointment
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: superinjunction to suppress data publicationsecret extraction efforts for affected individuals
Recovery Measures: relocation of ~30,000 affected individuals to UKreview of data handling practices
Communication Strategy: initial secrecy under superinjunctionlimited disclosure after injunction liftedparliamentary report
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Communication Strategy: Public statements by ICOLetter from civil liberties groups to parliamentary committee
What is the company's incident response plan?
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Yes (clandestine evacuation via ARR/ARP), Yes (Post-2021 Breaches), , Yes (Partial; ICO satisfied with escalation judgments), Secret Evacuation Program, MoD Internal Review, , Yes (internal investigations; reporting to ICO for 5 incidents), Yes (after public exposure), , Operation Rubific (covert evacuation), Super-injunction to suppress disclosure, , Yes (but delayed and opaque), Superinjunction imposed (later lifted), Internal review (details undisclosed), , Yes (Delayed; 16 months after leak), Operation Rubific (Covert Evacuation), Super-Injunction, , Superinjunction to suppress reporting (2022–2024), Secret evacuation program, , , Yes (though criticized as inadequate by PAC), .
How does the company involve third-party assistance in incident response ?
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through Legal representation by Leigh Day law firm, , Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) Engagement, Legal Counsel (High Court Gagging Order, 2023–2025), Data Protection Specialists (e.g., Mishcon de Reya, Barings Law), , Media (*The Independent* investigations), Legal Teams (for damage control), , legal (court injunction), intelligence assessments (Rimmer Review), , MI6, CIA, Foreign Office, , MI6, CIA, Foreign Office, .
Data Breach Information
What type of data was compromised in each breach ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-557071825
Type of Data Compromised: Names, Details
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Type of Data Compromised: Personal details
Number of Records Exposed: 19,000+
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghan interpreters and special forces, Relocation eligibility statuses, Family details
Number of Records Exposed: Thousands (exact number unspecified)
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risks due to Taliban retaliation)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (details leaked and accessed by unauthorized parties)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesRelocation application detailsFamily member informationPotentially addresses or contact details
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Type of Data Compromised: Personal details (names, locations, resettlement status) of Afghan applicants and family members
Number of Records Exposed: 18,700+ (applicants) + unknown (family members)
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (life-threatening risk from Taliban reprisals)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (details exposed externally)
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Email addresses, Family/associate details, Application status for relocation
Number of Records Exposed: 265 (2021 Email Breaches), ~19,000 (2022 Spreadsheet Leak), Undisclosed (45 Other Breaches)
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (Life-Threatening Risk to Afghans)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (Unintentional, via Email/Spreadsheet Sharing)
File Types Exposed: Spreadsheets (Excel)Emails (Outlook/Internal Systems)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact Details (Email, Phone)Family Member InformationAssociate Networks
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Type of Data Compromised: Pii, Religious/ethnic data, Perceived intelligence affiliations
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risk to individuals if exposed in Afghanistan)
Data Exfiltration: Likely (implied by risk assessments)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesReligious/Ethnic Background (Shia/Hazara)Potential Role Classifications (e.g., 'spy')
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Type of Data Compromised: Military operational documents, Personnel pii (names, emails, mobile numbers), Contractor data (car registrations, contact details), Visitor logs, Construction project details, Internal security guidance
Number of Records Exposed: hundreds of files (4TB total)
Sensitivity of Data: ControlledOfficial Sensitivepotentially Secret (e.g., F-35/nuclear bomb references)
Data Exfiltration: dark web leaks (2/4 dumps released)planned staged releases
File Types Exposed: PDFsemailsspreadsheetsvisitor formsconstruction documents
Personally Identifiable Information: namesemail addressesmobile numberscar registrations
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghan nationals, Email addresses (bcc errors), Official sensitive personal data (laptop screen)
Number of Records Exposed: ~18,700 (spreadsheet error), Hundreds (BCC errors), None
Sensitivity of Data: High (Life-Threatening Risk for Afghans)
Data Exfiltration: No (Unintentional Disclosure)
File Types Exposed: Spreadsheet (February 2022)Emails (BCC Errors)WhatsApp MessagesMicrosoft Forms Data
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact DetailsRelocation StatusEmployment History with UK Government
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Type of Data Compromised: Pii (names, locations, associations with uk forces), Sensitive military-related data
Number of Records Exposed: 33,000+
Sensitivity of Data: Top SecretLife-Endangering for Affected Individuals
Data Exfiltration: Yes (via Unauthorized Email)
Data Encryption: ['No (Spreadsheet Sent in Cleartext)']
File Types Exposed: Excel Spreadsheet
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact DetailsAssociations with UK Forces
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii) of afghan nationals, Relocation/assistance application details, Contact information (emails, phone numbers), Official sensitive data (displayed on laptop)
Number of Records Exposed: ~18,700 (spreadsheet error) + unknown in other incidents
Sensitivity of Data: High (personal data of at-risk individuals; potential life-threatening consequences if exposed to Taliban)
File Types Exposed: Spreadsheets (e.g., February 2022 incident)Emails (BCC incidents)WhatsApp messagesMicrosoft Forms submissions
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes (names, contact details, relocation status)
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Type of Data Compromised: Pii (names, contact details), Asylum application data, Military service records, Flight manifests
Number of Records Exposed: 18,700+ (primary breach); additional unknown records in 49 other MoD incidents
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (life-threatening for Afghan nationals)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (unintentional, via email/WhatsApp/physical loss)
Data Encryption: No (data sent unencrypted in some cases)
File Types Exposed: Excel SpreadsheetsEmailsPDFs (flight manifests)WhatsApp Messages
Personally Identifiable Information: Full NamesContact DetailsMilitary AffiliationsAsylum StatusFamily Member Data
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Type of Data Compromised: Full names, Roles with uk forces, Resettlement application status, Family member details
Number of Records Exposed: 18,825 (approx.)
Sensitivity of Data: extreme (life-endangering; used for targeted killings)
Data Exfiltration: yes (leaked externally)
Personally Identifiable Information: yes (comprehensive PII)
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Type of Data Compromised: Personal details of afghans (names, links to uk forces), Evacuation operation specifics
Number of Records Exposed: Up to 100,000
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (life-threatening risk to exposed individuals)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesAssociations with UK militaryEvacuation eligibility status
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Type of Data Compromised: Government confidential information, Refugee application data, Employee records
Sensitivity of Data: High (government/military; refugee personal data)
Data Exfiltration: No (exposure via physical access)
Personally Identifiable Information: Likely (refugee applications may include PII)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Type of Data Compromised: Full names, Family details, Application records, Links to uk forces
Number of Records Exposed: 33,000
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (life-endangering if obtained by Taliban)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (via accidental email to untrusted sources; later surfaced on Facebook)
File Types Exposed: Database/Spreadsheet
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Resettlement application details
Number of Records Exposed: 18,700
Sensitivity of Data: High (included identities of at-risk Afghans)
Data Exfiltration: Unintentional (via human error/misconfiguration)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact InformationResettlement Eligibility Status
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Relocation/resettlement records, Military operational data
Number of Records Exposed: Thousands
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risk to exposed individuals)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesRoles (e.g., interpreters)Family detailsResettlement status
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Type of Data Compromised: Full names, Military affiliation details, Family member information, Contact details
Number of Records Exposed: 33,000+
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (Life-threatening if obtained by Taliban)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (Shared via Facebook group; potential Taliban access)
Data Encryption: No (Unencrypted email attachment)
File Types Exposed: Spreadsheet/Database
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Military affiliation data, Evacuation requests
Number of Records Exposed: Up to 100,000
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (Life-Threatening Risk)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (Leaked to Unauthorized Parties)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesLinks to UK ForcesLocation Data (Afghanistan)
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Resettlement application data, Sensitive afghan ally details
Number of Records Exposed: 33000
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (life-threatening risk to Afghans)
Data Exfiltration: Spreadsheet emailed externallyData surfaced on Facebook group (2023)
Data Encryption: None (implied by breach details)
File Types Exposed: Spreadsheet (CSV/Excel)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact DetailsResettlement StatusFamily Links
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Relocation application details
Number of Records Exposed: ~19,000
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risks to exposed individuals)
Data Exfiltration: Excerpts from spreadsheets posted on FacebookAnonymous leak
Data Encryption: No (data stored in unsecured Excel spreadsheets)
File Types Exposed: Excel spreadsheets
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesContact detailsApplication statusOther sensitive personal data
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Type of Data Compromised: Pii (names, contact details, application data), Sensitive refugee status information
Number of Records Exposed: ~19,000
Sensitivity of Data: High (life-threatening risk to exposed individuals)
Data Exfiltration: No (accidental exposure via shared Excel/SharePoint)
Data Encryption: No (data stored in unsecured spreadsheets)
File Types Exposed: Excel (.xlsx)SharePoint documents
Personally Identifiable Information: Full namesContact informationRefugee application details
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Names, Contact details, Association with uk special forces/government operations
Number of Records Exposed: 19,000 (directly); up to 100,000 at risk
Sensitivity of Data: high (life-threatening risk to exposed individuals)
File Types Exposed: Excel spreadsheet (.xlsx)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Names of afghan collaborators
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (life-threatening if exposed)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (leaked to unauthorized parties)
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
What measures does the company take to prevent data exfiltration ?
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Evacuation of affected individuals via ARR/ARP, Reassessment of Arap eligibility for breach victims, , New Data Handling Procedures (November 2021), Mandatory Training for Staff, 'Two Pairs of Eyes' Rule for External Emails (Post-November 2021), New Software (Introduced by Labour Government, Post-July 2024), , Judicial review process, Policy rationalization (as per CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892), , Mitigation Spending (£850m for spreadsheet error), Policy/Process Reviews (Ongoing), , MoD Claimed to Address 'Bad Data Practices', No Formal ICO Oversight, , £850m allocated for mitigation of spreadsheet error, Policy/process reviews (implied by parliamentary inquiries), , Policy Reviews, Training Programs (proposed), Asylum Grants for Affected Afghans (retroactive), , Rimmer Review (risk assessment), closure of Afghanistan Response Route, , Review of internal processes (implied), Potential policy updates for remote work, , Defence Select Committee inquiry, Intelligence and Security Committee investigation, Potential policy reforms (pending inquiry outcomes), , Secret airlift of exposed Afghans, Parliamentary inquiry, Media investigations, , Evacuation of 16,000 Afghans (8,000 pending), , Introduction of a dedicated secure casework system for Afghan resettlement (post-breach), Policy changes in data handling (ongoing), , Introduction of a dedicated, secure casework system for Afghan resettlement, Improvements in data handling processes across MoD, , PAC-mandated six-monthly updates on resettlement/costs, Calls for system modernization and digital specialist recruitment, .
How does the company handle incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) ?
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by superinjunction on uk press to prevent taliban reprisals, use of existing arap scheme as operational cover, , high court gagging order (2023–2025, lifted july 2025), internal reviews of breaches, limited public disclosure (only 4 of 49 breaches initially public), , investigation ongoing, no public details on containment, , super-injunction (lifted in july 2025), ico reporting for 5/49 incidents, internal reviews, , limited to mod's internal actions (per ico), , super-injunction for spreadsheet error (lifted in 2023-07), ico reporting for selected incidents, internal reviews by mod, , public disclosure (after delay), internal reviews, permanent secretary resignation, , super-injunction to suppress disclosure (2023–2024), limited resettlement offers (7,355 total, including family members), , secrecy via super-injunction, limited disclosure to parliament, , superinjunction to suppress reporting, limited resettlement scheme for 150 individuals (initially), , superinjunction to suppress public disclosure (controversial), , super-injunction (later lifted), limited public communication, , superinjunction to suppress reporting, limited resettlement scheme for 150 individuals, , secrecy via super-injunction, limited disclosure to parliament, , superinjunction (later lifted in july 2024), facebook group takedown (implied), , super injunction imposed (sept 2023, lifted july 2024), removal of leaked data from facebook, , superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted), internal review triggered by pac, , superinjunction to suppress data publication, secret extraction efforts for affected individuals and .
Ransomware Information
Was ransomware involved in any of the incidents ?
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Ransom Demanded: ["implied ('resolve this matter before consequences unfold')"]
Data Exfiltration: True
How does the company recover data encrypted by ransomware ?
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through High Court applications to halt deportations, Special Immigration Appeals Commission reviews, , Establishment of Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) and Afghan Resettlement Programme (ARP), Budget allocations via UK Spending Review, , Closure of ARAP Scheme (July 2025), Public Apology by Defence Secretary, Parliamentary Scrutiny (Post-July 2024 Disclosures), , partial resettlement of 1,500 direct victims + families, , Evacuation of 16,000 Afghans, Ongoing relocation efforts, , Eventual lifting of superinjunction (2024), Investigation by Paul Rimmer (former MoD intelligence deputy), , Limited evacuations resumed post-superinjunction, Ongoing parliamentary scrutiny, , Lifting of super-injunction (July 2023), Ongoing parliamentary scrutiny, , Independent investigation by Paul Rimmer (former MoD intelligence deputy), Partial lifting of superinjunction under legal pressure, , £7bn evacuation scheme (approved 2024), Resettlement of 3,383 affected individuals (as of 2024), , Establishment of Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) for resettlement, Public apology by Defence Secretary John Healey, , Ongoing; no specific technical details disclosed, , relocation of ~30,000 affected individuals to UK, review of data handling practices, .
Regulatory Compliance
Were there any regulatory violations and fines imposed for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Legal Actions: Potential lawsuits
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Regulations Violated: Potential violations of UK data protection laws (e.g., GDPR), Human rights obligations toward Afghan allies,
Legal Actions: High Court applications to challenge visa refusals, Potential lawsuits for endangering lives,
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Legal Actions: High Court superinjunction (later lifted), NAO investigation into cost accounting,
Regulatory Notifications: National Audit Office (NAO) report (2025)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR, Data Protection Act 2018, ICO Reporting Requirements,
Fines Imposed: £350,000 (2021 Breaches)
Legal Actions: High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025), Ongoing ICO Engagement, Potential Further Investigations (Per Jon Baines, Mishcon de Reya),
Regulatory Notifications: 7 of 49 Breaches Reported to ICOICO Declined Further Action on 2022 Spreadsheet Breach
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018 (potential), GDPR (potential, if EU citizens affected),
Legal Actions: Judicial review (R (QP1 & Anor) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 2504), Dismissed on grounds of rational policy application,
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Regulations Violated: potential GDPR (personal data), UK Official Secrets Act (military data),
Regulatory Notifications: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) involved
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), Data Protection Act 2018,
Fines Imposed: £350,000 (for BCC incidents)
Legal Actions: Defence Select Committee Inquiry (Ongoing), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Scrutiny,
Regulatory Notifications: 5/49 Incidents Reported to ICOICO Confirmed Satisfaction with MoD's Judgment
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Regulations Violated: Potential GDPR/UK Data Protection Act Violations,
Fines Imposed: ['None (ICO Chose Not to Investigate)']
Legal Actions: Court Battle Over Superinjunction by Media Outlets (e.g., The Independent),
Regulatory Notifications: ICO Informed but No Formal Action Taken
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), Data Protection Act 2018,
Fines Imposed: £350,000 (for BCC incidents)
Legal Actions: Public Accounts Committee inquiry (2023-09), Defence Select Committee inquiry (ongoing, launched 2023-11), Potential further actions pending inquiry outcomes,
Regulatory Notifications: 5 incidents reported to ICO (including 3 BCC incidents and February 2022 spreadsheet error)
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR, Data Protection Act 2018, Official Secrets Act (potential),
Legal Actions: Investigations by ICO (likely), Potential Lawsuits from Affected Parties,
Regulatory Notifications: Delayed (after media exposure)
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018 (likely), GDPR (potential), human rights obligations,
Legal Actions: super-injunction (2023–2024), defense select committee inquiry (2024), potential future lawsuits,
Regulatory Notifications: delayed disclosure to publiclimited transparency with affected individuals
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Regulations Violated: Potential breaches of UK GDPR/Data Protection Act 2018, Parliamentary transparency norms,
Legal Actions: Super-injunction to suppress disclosure (controversial),
Regulatory Notifications: Limited to Defence Committee (2024)No public or broader Parliamentary disclosure until forced
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR (potential), Data Protection Act 2018 (potential),
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018, GDPR (potential), Parliamentary Transparency Norms,
Legal Actions: Superinjunction (later lifted), Potential lawsuits from affected Afghans,
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018 (GDPR), Parliamentary Transparency Obligations,
Legal Actions: Superinjunction (later lifted), Defence Select Committee inquiry, Intelligence and Security Committee investigation,
Regulatory Notifications: Delayed (due to superinjunction)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act (potential), Freedom of Information laws (via super-injunction),
Legal Actions: Parliamentary inquiry, Auditor General critique, Potential compensation lawsuits,
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Regulations Violated: UK Freedom of Information Act (suppression of public interest disclosure), Democratic Accountability Principles,
Legal Actions: Potential lawsuits from affected Afghans, Parliamentary inquiry by House of Commons Defence Committee,
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Regulations Violated: Potential GDPR/UK Data Protection Act Violations, Parliamentary Transparency Rules,
Legal Actions: Super-Injunction (Controversial), Potential Investigations,
Regulatory Notifications: Delayed/Withheld from Public and MPs
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR (potential), Public Sector Data Handling Standards,
Legal Actions: PAC inquiry (2024), Potential future litigation by affected individuals,
Regulatory Notifications: Delayed/obstructed (NAO not fully informed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018, GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation),
Legal Actions: Potential compensation claims, Ongoing legal risks,
Regulatory Notifications: Reported to Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018 (likely), GDPR (potential non-compliance),
Legal Actions: PAC investigation ongoing, Potential compensation lawsuits,
Regulatory Notifications: Delayed; disclosed only after superinjunction lifted
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Legal Actions: superinjunction (later lifted),
Regulatory Notifications: delayed notification to parliamentary committees
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Regulations Violated: UK Data Protection Act 2018, GDPR (potential non-compliance),
Fines Imposed: None (ICO issued reprimands but no formal penalties)
Legal Actions: Calls for parliamentary inquiry, Potential lawsuits by affected individuals,
Regulatory Notifications: ICO notified but no formal investigation launched
How does the company ensure compliance with regulatory requirements ?
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Potential lawsuits, High Court applications to challenge visa refusals, Potential lawsuits for endangering lives, , High Court superinjunction (later lifted), NAO investigation into cost accounting, , High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025), Ongoing ICO Engagement, Potential Further Investigations (Per Jon Baines, Mishcon de Reya), , Judicial review (R (QP1 & Anor) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 2504), Dismissed on grounds of rational policy application, , Defence Select Committee Inquiry (Ongoing), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Scrutiny, , Court Battle Over Superinjunction by Media Outlets (e.g., The Independent), , Public Accounts Committee inquiry (2023-09), Defence Select Committee inquiry (ongoing, launched 2023-11), Potential further actions pending inquiry outcomes, , Investigations by ICO (likely), Potential Lawsuits from Affected Parties, , super-injunction (2023–2024), defense select committee inquiry (2024), potential future lawsuits, , Super-injunction to suppress disclosure (controversial), , Superinjunction (later lifted), Potential lawsuits from affected Afghans, , Superinjunction (later lifted), Defence Select Committee inquiry, Intelligence and Security Committee investigation, , Parliamentary inquiry, Auditor General critique, Potential compensation lawsuits, , Potential lawsuits from affected Afghans, Parliamentary inquiry by House of Commons Defence Committee, , Super-Injunction (Controversial), Potential Investigations, , PAC inquiry (2024), Potential future litigation by affected individuals, , Potential compensation claims, Ongoing legal risks, , PAC investigation ongoing, Potential compensation lawsuits, , superinjunction (later lifted), , Calls for parliamentary inquiry, Potential lawsuits by affected individuals, .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What lessons were learned from each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Lessons Learned: Need for transparent cost tracking in crisis-driven operations, Challenges of balancing operational security (superinjunction) with accountability, Risks of data breaches in high-stakes resettlement programs
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Lessons Learned: Systemic Failures in Data Handling Require Cultural Change, Not Just Procedural Fixes, Gagging Orders Undermine Public Trust and Accountability, High-Risk Data (e.g., Refugee/Asylum Information) Demands Specialized Protections, ICO Oversight May Be Insufficient for Government Agencies Handling Sensitive Data
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Lessons Learned: High-risk categorization policies must balance individual circumstances with scalable criteria., Superinjunctions can delay transparency but may be necessary for national security cases., Data breaches in conflict zones have severe human rights implications beyond typical cyber risks.
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Lessons Learned: Supply chain vulnerabilities are critical attack vectors for nation-state/advanced threats., Third-party contractors with MoD access require stricter cybersecurity oversight., Outdated IT infrastructure and rigid processes exacerbate breach risks., Dark web monitoring is essential for early detection of leaked sensitive data., Lack of accountability in repeated MoD breaches undermines public trust.
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Lessons Learned: Need for Stricter Data Handling Protocols, Mandatory Training on Email/BCC Usage, Secure Communication Channels for Sensitive Data, Proactive Monitoring of Physical Data Exposure Risks
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Lessons Learned: Inadequate ICO Oversight for High-Severity Breaches, Failure of MoD Data Governance and Classification Controls, Lack of Transparency in Government Data Breaches, Over-Reliance on Informal Assurances Without Documentation
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Lessons Learned: Critical need for mandatory data handling training across civil service/MoD., Systemic failures in access controls and redaction protocols., Cultural issues around accountability and transparency in government data breaches., High stakes of data leaks for vulnerable populations (e.g., Afghan allies)., Historical patterns of repeated failures (e.g., 2007 HMRC breach) indicate deep-rooted problems.
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Lessons Learned: Super-injunctions may exacerbate risks by drawing attention to suppressed data., Risk assessments must incorporate ground-level evidence (e.g., Afghan testimonies) alongside intelligence reports., Resettlement programs require agility to respond to dynamic threats (e.g., Taliban units like Yarmouk 60)., Transparency delays can erode trust and hinder protective measures.
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Lessons Learned: Critical failures in data protection for high-risk individuals, Over-reliance on secrecy over transparency, Need for robust oversight of covert operations with civilian impacts
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Lessons Learned: Institutional failure in data protection practices, not just individual negligence, Remote work policies must explicitly address physical security of devices, Need for regular training on handling sensitive data in public/remote settings, HR plays a critical role in enforcing confidentiality obligations
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Lessons Learned: Overuse of legal gagging orders can exacerbate risks by suppressing accountability., Human error in handling sensitive data requires stricter access controls and validation., Transparency in government responses to breaches is critical for public trust and safety., Delayed resettlement schemes for at-risk individuals can have life-threatening consequences.
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Lessons Learned: Transparency failures in governmental data breaches can exacerbate harm to vulnerable populations., Legal gag orders (e.g., superinjunctions) may undermine public trust and accountability., Ongoing delays in resettlement schemes highlight systemic issues in crisis response.
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Lessons Learned: Lack of transparency in government data breaches can exacerbate harm., Super-injunctions may delay accountability and remediation., Financial provisions must be pre-allocated for high-risk resettlement programs., Journalistic persistence is critical in exposing government failures.
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Lessons Learned: Overuse of legal suppression (superinjunctions) can exacerbate risks by delaying transparency and remediation., Human error in data handling requires stricter validation controls, especially for high-stakes datasets., Lack of parliamentary/media oversight undermines democratic accountability in crisis response., Delayed incident response (16 months) significantly increases harm to affected individuals.
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Lessons Learned: Critical risks of data mishandling in high-stakes contexts, Ethical dilemmas of secrecy vs. transparency, Need for robust PII protection in military operations
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Lessons Learned: Systemic failures in MoD data handling and transparency, Inadequate oversight mechanisms for sensitive operations, Need for secure casework systems and access controls, Risks of secrecy in public accountability
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Lessons Learned: Inadequate data handling processes and culture within MoD, Failure to act on prior warnings and breaches (e.g., 2021 incidents reported to ICO), Risks of using inappropriate systems (e.g., Excel) for sensitive data, Need for robust casework systems and employee training, Importance of transparency and accountability in breach disclosure
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Lessons Learned: Critical need for modernized data systems (beyond Excel/SharePoint), Urgent recruitment of digital/security specialists at senior levels, Importance of timely breach disclosure and transparency, Mandatory access controls and data governance frameworks, Consequences of underinvestment in cybersecurity for high-risk operations
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Lessons Learned: Inadequate systems (Excel/SharePoint) for handling sensitive data at scale, Failure to implement safeguards despite known vulnerabilities, Lack of transparency with oversight bodies during crisis, Need for improved data access controls and validation processes, Importance of timely breach detection and response
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Lessons Learned: ICO's public sector enforcement approach lacks deterrence and fails to drive compliance., Systemic failures in data protection oversight require structural reforms., Parliamentary oversight may be necessary to restore trust in regulatory enforcement.
What recommendations were made to prevent future incidents ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Recommendations: Improve segregation of emergency program costs in accounting systems, Clarify legal frameworks for superinjunctions in data breach responses, Enhance data protection measures for sensitive refugee/resettlement dataImprove segregation of emergency program costs in accounting systems, Clarify legal frameworks for superinjunctions in data breach responses, Enhance data protection measures for sensitive refugee/resettlement dataImprove segregation of emergency program costs in accounting systems, Clarify legal frameworks for superinjunctions in data breach responses, Enhance data protection measures for sensitive refugee/resettlement data
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Recommendations: Independent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting RisksIndependent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting Risks
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Recommendations: Review risk assessment frameworks for Afghan resettlement programs to include nuanced threats (e.g., religious/ethnic targeting)., Enhance data protection measures for sensitive government databases involving vulnerable populations., Establish clearer communication protocols for breaches with national security dimensions.Review risk assessment frameworks for Afghan resettlement programs to include nuanced threats (e.g., religious/ethnic targeting)., Enhance data protection measures for sensitive government databases involving vulnerable populations., Establish clearer communication protocols for breaches with national security dimensions.Review risk assessment frameworks for Afghan resettlement programs to include nuanced threats (e.g., religious/ethnic targeting)., Enhance data protection measures for sensitive government databases involving vulnerable populations., Establish clearer communication protocols for breaches with national security dimensions.
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Recommendations: Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing.
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Recommendations: Implement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan DataImplement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan DataImplement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan DataImplement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan Data
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Recommendations: Formal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable PopulationsFormal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable PopulationsFormal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable PopulationsFormal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable PopulationsFormal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable Populations
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Recommendations: Immediate overhaul of data protection policies in UK government agencies., Mandatory encryption for all sensitive data transfers., Regular audits of data access and sharing practices., Whistleblower protections for reporting breaches internally., Independent oversight body for government data security., Public transparency in breach disclosures to rebuild trust.Immediate overhaul of data protection policies in UK government agencies., Mandatory encryption for all sensitive data transfers., Regular audits of data access and sharing practices., Whistleblower protections for reporting breaches internally., Independent oversight body for government data security., Public transparency in breach disclosures to rebuild trust.Immediate overhaul of data protection policies in UK government agencies., Mandatory encryption for all sensitive data transfers., Regular audits of data access and sharing practices., Whistleblower protections for reporting breaches internally., Independent oversight body for government data security., Public transparency in breach disclosures to rebuild trust.Immediate overhaul of data protection policies in UK government agencies., Mandatory encryption for all sensitive data transfers., Regular audits of data access and sharing practices., Whistleblower protections for reporting breaches internally., Independent oversight body for government data security., Public transparency in breach disclosures to rebuild trust.Immediate overhaul of data protection policies in UK government agencies., Mandatory encryption for all sensitive data transfers., Regular audits of data access and sharing practices., Whistleblower protections for reporting breaches internally., Independent oversight body for government data security., Public transparency in breach disclosures to rebuild trust.Immediate overhaul of data protection policies in UK government agencies., Mandatory encryption for all sensitive data transfers., Regular audits of data access and sharing practices., Whistleblower protections for reporting breaches internally., Independent oversight body for government data security., Public transparency in breach disclosures to rebuild trust.
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Recommendations: Reopen and expand resettlement pathways for all affected individuals, including family members., Conduct an independent inquiry with Afghan community representation., Establish a compensation fund for victims and families of those harmed., Review and reform data protection practices for high-risk humanitarian datasets., Publish a public apology and corrective action plan.Reopen and expand resettlement pathways for all affected individuals, including family members., Conduct an independent inquiry with Afghan community representation., Establish a compensation fund for victims and families of those harmed., Review and reform data protection practices for high-risk humanitarian datasets., Publish a public apology and corrective action plan.Reopen and expand resettlement pathways for all affected individuals, including family members., Conduct an independent inquiry with Afghan community representation., Establish a compensation fund for victims and families of those harmed., Review and reform data protection practices for high-risk humanitarian datasets., Publish a public apology and corrective action plan.Reopen and expand resettlement pathways for all affected individuals, including family members., Conduct an independent inquiry with Afghan community representation., Establish a compensation fund for victims and families of those harmed., Review and reform data protection practices for high-risk humanitarian datasets., Publish a public apology and corrective action plan.Reopen and expand resettlement pathways for all affected individuals, including family members., Conduct an independent inquiry with Afghan community representation., Establish a compensation fund for victims and families of those harmed., Review and reform data protection practices for high-risk humanitarian datasets., Publish a public apology and corrective action plan.
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Recommendations: Independent review of MoD data handling practices, Reform of super-injunction use in national security cases, Enhanced support for at-risk Afghans affected by the breachIndependent review of MoD data handling practices, Reform of super-injunction use in national security cases, Enhanced support for at-risk Afghans affected by the breachIndependent review of MoD data handling practices, Reform of super-injunction use in national security cases, Enhanced support for at-risk Afghans affected by the breach
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Recommendations: Implement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reportingImplement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reporting
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Recommendations: Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive military/asylum datasets., Avoid superinjunctions that hinder democratic oversight unless absolutely necessary., Accelerate resettlement processes for at-risk individuals linked to military operations., Conduct independent reviews of breach responses to ensure accountability.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive military/asylum datasets., Avoid superinjunctions that hinder democratic oversight unless absolutely necessary., Accelerate resettlement processes for at-risk individuals linked to military operations., Conduct independent reviews of breach responses to ensure accountability.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive military/asylum datasets., Avoid superinjunctions that hinder democratic oversight unless absolutely necessary., Accelerate resettlement processes for at-risk individuals linked to military operations., Conduct independent reviews of breach responses to ensure accountability.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive military/asylum datasets., Avoid superinjunctions that hinder democratic oversight unless absolutely necessary., Accelerate resettlement processes for at-risk individuals linked to military operations., Conduct independent reviews of breach responses to ensure accountability.
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Recommendations: Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices.Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices.
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Recommendations: Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest.Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest.Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest.Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest.
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Recommendations: Implement automated data segregation/validation for sensitive emails., Establish clear protocols for rapid disclosure of life-threatening breaches, balancing transparency with risk mitigation., Avoid legal gagging orders that suppress public/parliamentary scrutiny without compelling justification., Proactively engage with media/NGOs to manage high-risk breaches involving vulnerable populations.Implement automated data segregation/validation for sensitive emails., Establish clear protocols for rapid disclosure of life-threatening breaches, balancing transparency with risk mitigation., Avoid legal gagging orders that suppress public/parliamentary scrutiny without compelling justification., Proactively engage with media/NGOs to manage high-risk breaches involving vulnerable populations.Implement automated data segregation/validation for sensitive emails., Establish clear protocols for rapid disclosure of life-threatening breaches, balancing transparency with risk mitigation., Avoid legal gagging orders that suppress public/parliamentary scrutiny without compelling justification., Proactively engage with media/NGOs to manage high-risk breaches involving vulnerable populations.Implement automated data segregation/validation for sensitive emails., Establish clear protocols for rapid disclosure of life-threatening breaches, balancing transparency with risk mitigation., Avoid legal gagging orders that suppress public/parliamentary scrutiny without compelling justification., Proactively engage with media/NGOs to manage high-risk breaches involving vulnerable populations.
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Recommendations: Independent review of MoD data security protocols, Transparency in national security-related breaches (where feasible), Enhanced protection for at-risk individuals in conflict zones, Reevaluation of super-injunction use in public interest casesIndependent review of MoD data security protocols, Transparency in national security-related breaches (where feasible), Enhanced protection for at-risk individuals in conflict zones, Reevaluation of super-injunction use in public interest casesIndependent review of MoD data security protocols, Transparency in national security-related breaches (where feasible), Enhanced protection for at-risk individuals in conflict zones, Reevaluation of super-injunction use in public interest casesIndependent review of MoD data security protocols, Transparency in national security-related breaches (where feasible), Enhanced protection for at-risk individuals in conflict zones, Reevaluation of super-injunction use in public interest cases
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Recommendations: Implement robust data protection controls (e.g., encryption, access limits), Establish clear protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies (e.g., NAO), Accelerate resettlement of affected Afghans to mitigate ongoing risks, Create parliamentary oversight committee for sensitive defence operations, Regular audits of MoD data handling practicesImplement robust data protection controls (e.g., encryption, access limits), Establish clear protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies (e.g., NAO), Accelerate resettlement of affected Afghans to mitigate ongoing risks, Create parliamentary oversight committee for sensitive defence operations, Regular audits of MoD data handling practicesImplement robust data protection controls (e.g., encryption, access limits), Establish clear protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies (e.g., NAO), Accelerate resettlement of affected Afghans to mitigate ongoing risks, Create parliamentary oversight committee for sensitive defence operations, Regular audits of MoD data handling practicesImplement robust data protection controls (e.g., encryption, access limits), Establish clear protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies (e.g., NAO), Accelerate resettlement of affected Afghans to mitigate ongoing risks, Create parliamentary oversight committee for sensitive defence operations, Regular audits of MoD data handling practicesImplement robust data protection controls (e.g., encryption, access limits), Establish clear protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies (e.g., NAO), Accelerate resettlement of affected Afghans to mitigate ongoing risks, Create parliamentary oversight committee for sensitive defence operations, Regular audits of MoD data handling practices
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Recommendations: Implement and enforce secure data handling systems (e.g., dedicated casework platforms), Conduct regular audits and risk assessments for sensitive data, Enhance employee training on data protection and cybersecurity, Establish clear protocols for breach response and disclosure, Improve transparency with parliament and the public on costs and impacts, Address cultural and procedural failures within MoD to prevent recurrenceImplement and enforce secure data handling systems (e.g., dedicated casework platforms), Conduct regular audits and risk assessments for sensitive data, Enhance employee training on data protection and cybersecurity, Establish clear protocols for breach response and disclosure, Improve transparency with parliament and the public on costs and impacts, Address cultural and procedural failures within MoD to prevent recurrenceImplement and enforce secure data handling systems (e.g., dedicated casework platforms), Conduct regular audits and risk assessments for sensitive data, Enhance employee training on data protection and cybersecurity, Establish clear protocols for breach response and disclosure, Improve transparency with parliament and the public on costs and impacts, Address cultural and procedural failures within MoD to prevent recurrenceImplement and enforce secure data handling systems (e.g., dedicated casework platforms), Conduct regular audits and risk assessments for sensitive data, Enhance employee training on data protection and cybersecurity, Establish clear protocols for breach response and disclosure, Improve transparency with parliament and the public on costs and impacts, Address cultural and procedural failures within MoD to prevent recurrenceImplement and enforce secure data handling systems (e.g., dedicated casework platforms), Conduct regular audits and risk assessments for sensitive data, Enhance employee training on data protection and cybersecurity, Establish clear protocols for breach response and disclosure, Improve transparency with parliament and the public on costs and impacts, Address cultural and procedural failures within MoD to prevent recurrenceImplement and enforce secure data handling systems (e.g., dedicated casework platforms), Conduct regular audits and risk assessments for sensitive data, Enhance employee training on data protection and cybersecurity, Establish clear protocols for breach response and disclosure, Improve transparency with parliament and the public on costs and impacts, Address cultural and procedural failures within MoD to prevent recurrence
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Recommendations: Immediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reportingImmediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reporting
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Recommendations: Replace Excel/SharePoint with secure, scalable data management systems, Implement stricter access controls and audit trails for sensitive data, Enhance training for personnel handling high-risk information, Establish clearer protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies, Conduct regular vulnerability assessments for data handling processesReplace Excel/SharePoint with secure, scalable data management systems, Implement stricter access controls and audit trails for sensitive data, Enhance training for personnel handling high-risk information, Establish clearer protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies, Conduct regular vulnerability assessments for data handling processesReplace Excel/SharePoint with secure, scalable data management systems, Implement stricter access controls and audit trails for sensitive data, Enhance training for personnel handling high-risk information, Establish clearer protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies, Conduct regular vulnerability assessments for data handling processesReplace Excel/SharePoint with secure, scalable data management systems, Implement stricter access controls and audit trails for sensitive data, Enhance training for personnel handling high-risk information, Establish clearer protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies, Conduct regular vulnerability assessments for data handling processesReplace Excel/SharePoint with secure, scalable data management systems, Implement stricter access controls and audit trails for sensitive data, Enhance training for personnel handling high-risk information, Establish clearer protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies, Conduct regular vulnerability assessments for data handling processes
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Recommendations: Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors.Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors.Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors.Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors.
What are the key lessons learned from past incidents ?
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Need for transparent cost tracking in crisis-driven operations,Challenges of balancing operational security (superinjunction) with accountability,Risks of data breaches in high-stakes resettlement programsSystemic Failures in Data Handling Require Cultural Change, Not Just Procedural Fixes,Gagging Orders Undermine Public Trust and Accountability,High-Risk Data (e.g., Refugee/Asylum Information) Demands Specialized Protections,ICO Oversight May Be Insufficient for Government Agencies Handling Sensitive DataHigh-risk categorization policies must balance individual circumstances with scalable criteria.,Superinjunctions can delay transparency but may be necessary for national security cases.,Data breaches in conflict zones have severe human rights implications beyond typical cyber risks.Supply chain vulnerabilities are critical attack vectors for nation-state/advanced threats.,Third-party contractors with MoD access require stricter cybersecurity oversight.,Outdated IT infrastructure and rigid processes exacerbate breach risks.,Dark web monitoring is essential for early detection of leaked sensitive data.,Lack of accountability in repeated MoD breaches undermines public trust.Need for Stricter Data Handling Protocols,Mandatory Training on Email/BCC Usage,Secure Communication Channels for Sensitive Data,Proactive Monitoring of Physical Data Exposure RisksInadequate ICO Oversight for High-Severity Breaches,Failure of MoD Data Governance and Classification Controls,Lack of Transparency in Government Data Breaches,Over-Reliance on Informal Assurances Without DocumentationCritical need for mandatory data handling training across civil service/MoD.,Systemic failures in access controls and redaction protocols.,Cultural issues around accountability and transparency in government data breaches.,High stakes of data leaks for vulnerable populations (e.g., Afghan allies).,Historical patterns of repeated failures (e.g., 2007 HMRC breach) indicate deep-rooted problems.Super-injunctions may exacerbate risks by drawing attention to suppressed data.,Risk assessments must incorporate ground-level evidence (e.g., Afghan testimonies) alongside intelligence reports.,Resettlement programs require agility to respond to dynamic threats (e.g., Taliban units like Yarmouk 60).,Transparency delays can erode trust and hinder protective measures.Critical failures in data protection for high-risk individuals,Over-reliance on secrecy over transparency,Need for robust oversight of covert operations with civilian impactsInstitutional failure in data protection practices, not just individual negligence,Remote work policies must explicitly address physical security of devices,Need for regular training on handling sensitive data in public/remote settings,HR plays a critical role in enforcing confidentiality obligationsOveruse of legal gagging orders can exacerbate risks by suppressing accountability.,Human error in handling sensitive data requires stricter access controls and validation.,Transparency in government responses to breaches is critical for public trust and safety.,Delayed resettlement schemes for at-risk individuals can have life-threatening consequences.Transparency failures in governmental data breaches can exacerbate harm to vulnerable populations.,Legal gag orders (e.g., superinjunctions) may undermine public trust and accountability.,Ongoing delays in resettlement schemes highlight systemic issues in crisis response.Lack of transparency in government data breaches can exacerbate harm.,Super-injunctions may delay accountability and remediation.,Financial provisions must be pre-allocated for high-risk resettlement programs.,Journalistic persistence is critical in exposing government failures.Overuse of legal suppression (superinjunctions) can exacerbate risks by delaying transparency and remediation.,Human error in data handling requires stricter validation controls, especially for high-stakes datasets.,Lack of parliamentary/media oversight undermines democratic accountability in crisis response.,Delayed incident response (16 months) significantly increases harm to affected individuals.Critical risks of data mishandling in high-stakes contexts,Ethical dilemmas of secrecy vs. transparency,Need for robust PII protection in military operationsSystemic failures in MoD data handling and transparency,Inadequate oversight mechanisms for sensitive operations,Need for secure casework systems and access controls,Risks of secrecy in public accountabilityInadequate data handling processes and culture within MoD,Failure to act on prior warnings and breaches (e.g., 2021 incidents reported to ICO),Risks of using inappropriate systems (e.g., Excel) for sensitive data,Need for robust casework systems and employee training,Importance of transparency and accountability in breach disclosureCritical need for modernized data systems (beyond Excel/SharePoint),Urgent recruitment of digital/security specialists at senior levels,Importance of timely breach disclosure and transparency,Mandatory access controls and data governance frameworks,Consequences of underinvestment in cybersecurity for high-risk operationsInadequate systems (Excel/SharePoint) for handling sensitive data at scale,Failure to implement safeguards despite known vulnerabilities,Lack of transparency with oversight bodies during crisis,Need for improved data access controls and validation processes,Importance of timely breach detection and responseICO's public sector enforcement approach lacks deterrence and fails to drive compliance.,Systemic failures in data protection oversight require structural reforms.,Parliamentary oversight may be necessary to restore trust in regulatory enforcement.
What recommendations has the company implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Immediate overhaul of data protection policies in UK government agencies., Mandatory encryption for all sensitive data transfers., Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting Risks, Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Public transparency in breach disclosures to rebuild trust., Independent oversight body for government data security., Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Whistleblower protections for reporting breaches internally., Regular audits of data access and sharing practices., Independent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data and Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems.
References
Where can I find more information about each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-557071825
Source: BBC News
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Source: BBC
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Source: Leigh Day Law Firm (statement by Erin Alcock)
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Source: AFP via Getty (images)
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Source: The Independent - 'MoD unable to calculate cost of secret Afghan resettlement plan after data leak'
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Source: UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee Statement (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: BBC Politics Investigations
URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics
Date Accessed: 2025-08-21
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)
URL: https://ico.org.uk
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: High Court Ruling (Gagging Order Lift, July 2025)
Date Accessed: 2025-07-01
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: Barings Law (Representing Affected Afghans)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Source: Mishcon de Reya (Jon Baines, Data Protection Specialist)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Source: Judgment: R (QP1 & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2025] EWHC 2504 (Admin)
Date Accessed: 2025-06-00
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Source: CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892 (Admin)
Date Accessed: 2024-00-00
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Source: The Mail on Sunday
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Source: The Sun
URL: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/24312344/russian-hackers-steal-mod-files-dark-web/
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Source: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) report
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Source: Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Evidence Session
Date Accessed: September 2023
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Source: David Williams' Letter to MPs (Published by PAC)
Date Accessed: October 2023
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Source: Defence Select Committee Inquiry Announcement
Date Accessed: October 2023
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Source: The Record - 'UK MoD discloses dozens of data breaches in Afghan relocation blunders' (Jim Dunton)
URL: https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/16/uk_mod_afghan_data_breaches/
Date Accessed: 2023-10-16
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Source: The Independent
URL: https://www.independent.co.uk
Date Accessed: 2024-07-00
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Source: UK Parliament (Science, Innovation and Technology Committee)
URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/465/science-innovation-and-technology-committee/
Date Accessed: 2024-07-00
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Source: The Register
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Source: UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Source: UK Ministry of Defence Letter to MPs (2023-10-07)
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Source: The Independent
URL: https://www.independent.co.uk
Date Accessed: 2023-11
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Source: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Statements
Date Accessed: 2023-11
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Source: Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) Guidelines
URL: https://ico.org.uk
Date Accessed: 2023-11
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Source: UK Defence Select Committee Inquiry Evidence
Date Accessed: 2024-10
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Source: Refugee Legal Support Survey (Prof. Sara de Jong & Prof. Victoria Canning)
Date Accessed: 2024-10
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Source: UK Parliament Defence Committee Hearing
Date Accessed: 2024-11-04
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Source: The Independent
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Source: House of Commons session (Dame Chi Onwurah)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Source: CIPD Factsheet on Data Protection and GDPR
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Source: The Independent
URL: https://www.independent.co.uk
Date Accessed: 2024-05-22
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Source: The Times
URL: https://www.thetimes.co.uk
Date Accessed: 2024-05-22
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Source: Daily Mail
URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk
Date Accessed: 2024-05-22
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Source: UK Parliament Defence Committee Hearing
URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/118/defence-committee/
Date Accessed: 2024-05-22
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Source: Parliament TV (Defence Select Committee Hearing)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Source: Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Source: The Times (Larisa Brown)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Source: UK Parliament Defence Select Committee
URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/77/defence-committee/
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Source: National Audit Office (NAO) Annual Report on MoD
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Source: House of Commons Defence Committee Hearing
URL: https://parliamentlive.tv
Date Accessed: 2024
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Source: Paul Rimmer Investigation Report (MoD)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Source: UK Parliament Defence Committee Hearing
Date Accessed: 2024-11-04
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Source: The Times (Larisa Brown)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Source: Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill)
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Source: The Independent
URL: https://www.independent.co.uk
Date Accessed: 2024-10
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Source: Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report
Date Accessed: 2024-10
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Source: Lighthouse Reports
URL: https://www.lighthousereports.nl
Date Accessed: 2024-10
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Source: Sky News
URL: https://news.sky.com
Date Accessed: 2024-10
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Source: House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report
URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/127/public-accounts-committee/
Date Accessed: 2024-10
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Source: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Statements
URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence
Date Accessed: 2024-10
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Source: BFBS Forces News
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Source: UK Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Source: Academic research linking breach to 49 Afghan deaths
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Source: House of Commons Public Accounts Committee Report
Date Accessed: 2024-07-19
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Source: Reuters - 'UK lawmakers slam ‘chaotic’ MoD over Afghan data breach'
URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-lawmakers-slam-chaotic-mod-over-afghan-data-breach-2024-07-19/
Date Accessed: 2024-07-19
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Source: Open Rights Group (coordinated letter)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Source: The Guardian (coverage of Afghan data breach)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Source: UK Parliament Science, Innovation and Technology Committee
Where can stakeholders find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: BBC News, and Source: BBC, and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.uk, and Source: Leigh Day Law Firm (statement by Erin Alcock), and Source: AFP via Getty (images), and Source: National Audit Office (NAO) ReportDate Accessed: 2025-07, and Source: The Independent - 'MoD unable to calculate cost of secret Afghan resettlement plan after data leak', and Source: UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee Statement (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown), and Source: BBC Politics InvestigationsUrl: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politicsDate Accessed: 2025-08-21, and Source: UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)Url: https://ico.org.uk, and Source: High Court Ruling (Gagging Order Lift, July 2025)Date Accessed: 2025-07-01, and Source: Barings Law (Representing Affected Afghans)Url: https://www.baringslaw.com, and Source: Mishcon de Reya (Jon Baines, Data Protection Specialist)Url: https://www.mishcon.com, and Source: Judgment: R (QP1 & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2025] EWHC 2504 (Admin)Date Accessed: 2025-06-00, and Source: CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892 (Admin)Date Accessed: 2024-00-00, and Source: The Mail on Sunday, and Source: The SunUrl: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/24312344/russian-hackers-steal-mod-files-dark-web/, and Source: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) report, and Source: Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Evidence SessionDate Accessed: September 2023, and Source: David Williams' Letter to MPs (Published by PAC)Date Accessed: October 2023, and Source: Defence Select Committee Inquiry AnnouncementDate Accessed: October 2023, and Source: The Record - 'UK MoD discloses dozens of data breaches in Afghan relocation blunders' (Jim Dunton)Url: https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/16/uk_mod_afghan_data_breaches/Date Accessed: 2023-10-16, and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.ukDate Accessed: 2024-07-00, and Source: UK Parliament (Science, Innovation and Technology Committee)Url: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/465/science-innovation-and-technology-committee/Date Accessed: 2024-07-00, and Source: The Register, and Source: UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee, and Source: UK Ministry of Defence Letter to MPs (2023-10-07), and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.ukDate Accessed: 2023-11, and Source: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) StatementsDate Accessed: 2023-11, and Source: Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) GuidelinesUrl: https://ico.org.ukDate Accessed: 2023-11, and Source: The Observer / The GuardianUrl: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jul/28/afghan-interpreters-data-leak-taliban-killings-uk-governmentDate Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: UK Defence Select Committee Inquiry EvidenceDate Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: Refugee Legal Support Survey (Prof. Sara de Jong & Prof. Victoria Canning)Date Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: Rimmer Review (UK MoD)Date Accessed: 2024-06, and Source: The IndependentDate Accessed: 2024-11-04, and Source: UK Parliament Defence Committee HearingDate Accessed: 2024-11-04, and Source: The Independent, and Source: House of Commons session (Dame Chi Onwurah), and Source: CIPD Factsheet on Data Protection and GDPRUrl: https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/factsheet, and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.ukDate Accessed: 2024-05-22, and Source: The TimesUrl: https://www.thetimes.co.ukDate Accessed: 2024-05-22, and Source: Daily MailUrl: https://www.dailymail.co.ukDate Accessed: 2024-05-22, and Source: UK Parliament Defence Committee HearingUrl: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/118/defence-committee/Date Accessed: 2024-05-22, and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.uk, and Source: Parliament TV (Defence Select Committee Hearing)Url: https://parliamentlive.tv, and Source: Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill)Url: https://www.dailymail.co.uk, and Source: The Times (Larisa Brown)Url: https://www.thetimes.co.uk, and Source: Daily MailUrl: https://www.dailymail.co.uk, and Source: UK Parliament Defence Select CommitteeUrl: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/77/defence-committee/, and Source: National Audit Office (NAO) Annual Report on MoDUrl: https://www.nao.org.uk, and Source: The Independent (Holly Bancroft)Date Accessed: 2024, and Source: The Times (Larisa Brown)Date Accessed: 2024, and Source: Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill)Date Accessed: 2024, and Source: House of Commons Defence Committee HearingUrl: https://parliamentlive.tvDate Accessed: 2024, and Source: Paul Rimmer Investigation Report (MoD), and Source: The IndependentDate Accessed: 2024-11-04, and Source: UK Parliament Defence Committee HearingDate Accessed: 2024-11-04, and Source: The Times (Larisa Brown), and Source: Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill), and Source: The IndependentUrl: https://www.independent.co.ukDate Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: Public Accounts Committee (PAC) ReportDate Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: Lighthouse ReportsUrl: https://www.lighthousereports.nlDate Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: Sky NewsUrl: https://news.sky.comDate Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) ReportUrl: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/127/public-accounts-committee/Date Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) StatementsUrl: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defenceDate Accessed: 2024-10, and Source: BFBS Forces News, and Source: UK Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report, and Source: Academic research linking breach to 49 Afghan deaths, and Source: The TimesDate Accessed: 2024-07-19, and Source: House of Commons Public Accounts Committee ReportDate Accessed: 2024-07-19, and Source: Reuters - 'UK lawmakers slam ‘chaotic’ MoD over Afghan data breach'Url: https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-lawmakers-slam-chaotic-mod-over-afghan-data-breach-2024-07-19/Date Accessed: 2024-07-19, and Source: Open Rights Group (coordinated letter), and Source: The Guardian (coverage of Afghan data breach), and Source: UK Parliament Science, Innovation and Technology Committee.
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the investigation for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Investigation Status: Ongoing
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Investigation Status: Ongoing (legal challenges and High Court reviews in progress)
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Investigation Status: Ongoing (NAO review; legal/financial uncertainties remain)
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Investigation Status: Ongoing (ICO Engagement, Potential Further Reviews)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Investigation Status: Closed (judicial review dismissed in 2025)
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Investigation Status: active (MoD-led, NCSC involved)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Investigation Status: ['Ongoing (Defence Select Committee Inquiry)', 'PAC Review Completed (Letter Published)', 'ICO Investigation Closed (For Reported Incidents)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Investigation Status: ['Closed Without Formal Investigation (ICO)', 'MoD Internal Review (Undisclosed Details)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Investigation Status: Ongoing (Defence Select Committee inquiry; PAC follow-up)
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of 2023-11); partial findings released via media
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Investigation Status: ongoing (Defence Select Committee inquiry; independent reviews demanded)
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (Defence Committee inquiry as of November 2024)
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Investigation Status: Acknowledged in House of Commons; MoD declined to comment (status unclear)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Investigation Status: Completed (Independent review by Paul Rimmer; findings critical of MoD response)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Investigation Status: ['Ongoing (Defence Select Committee inquiry)', 'Ongoing (Intelligence and Security Committee investigation)']
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (parliamentary inquiry, media investigations)
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Investigation Status: Completed (Independent investigation by Paul Rimmer; ongoing parliamentary scrutiny)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Investigation Status: Ongoing (Parliamentary Scrutiny)
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (PAC inquiry, NAO review)
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (PAC oversight, MoD internal improvements)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (PAC oversight; MOD internal review)
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Investigation Status: completed (parliamentary report published)
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Investigation Status: No formal investigation by ICO; under scrutiny by parliamentary committee
How does the company communicate the status of incident investigations to stakeholders ?
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Statements By Mod Spokesperson Defending Security Checks, Media Coverage Highlighting Humanitarian Crisis, Limited Transparency Due To Superinjunction (Lifted Later), Nao Report (2025-07) Detailing Cost Uncertainties, Public Statements By Mod And Public Accounts Committee, Delayed Disclosure (Gagging Orders, Legal Restrictions), Selective Transparency (Bbc Foia Request, 2025), Apologies Via Political Statements, Superinjunction Initially Imposed (Lifted July 2024), Open Judgment Published In 2025, Mod Statement: 'Actively Investigating', No Public Disclosure Of Remediation Steps, Letter To Mps (7 October 2023), Public Accounts Committee (Pac) Disclosures, Defence Select Committee Inquiry, Concealment Via Superinjunction (For ~2 Years), Public Disclosure After Legal Battle, Letter To Mps (2023-10-07, Published 2023-11), Public Accounts Committee Evidence Session (2023-09), Defence Select Committee Inquiry (Ongoing), Delayed And Reactive, Media Statements Post-Exposure, Limited Transparency, Initial Suppression Via Super-Injunction, Delayed Public Disclosure (July 2024), Defensive Statements By Mod, Suppression Of Details Via Legal Injunction, Selective Disclosure To Defence Committee (2024), No public comment (MoD declined to comment), Controlled Narrative Via Selected Facts, Gagging Orders To Prevent Scrutiny, Initial Suppression Via Superinjunction, Post-Disclosure: Parliamentary Hearings And Media Engagement, Initial Suppression Via Super-Injunction, Selective Disclosure To Journalists, Parliamentary Testimony, Narrative Control Via Selective Disclosures, Suppression Of Media/Parliamentary Debate, Media Blackout, Parliamentary Obfuscation, Secrecy And Limited Disclosure (2022–2024), Public Disclosure After Superinjunction Lifted (July 2024), Pac Report Publication (2024-10), Public Disclosure After Lifting Of Super Injunction (July 2024), Parliamentary Scrutiny And Pac Report, Media Statements, Delayed Public Disclosure (2023), Pac Report And Media Interviews, Letter To Mod Permanent Secretary Expressing Disappointment, Initial Secrecy Under Superinjunction, Limited Disclosure After Injunction Lifted, Parliamentary Report, Public Statements By Ico and Letter From Civil Liberties Groups To Parliamentary Committee.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
Were there any advisories issued to stakeholders or customers for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-841081625
Stakeholder Advisories: Mod Spokesperson Statements, Legal Advisories From Leigh Day.
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Stakeholder Advisories: Mod Statements On Cost Transparency Post-Superinjunction, Public Accounts Committee Hearings.
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Stakeholder Advisories: Afghans Affected By Arap Breaches (Via Legal Representatives), Uk Parliament (Post-July 2024 Disclosures), Media Outlets (Bbc, Others).
Customer Advisories: Limited Direct Communication (Due to Security Risks for Afghans)Public Apologies via Political Channels
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Stakeholder Advisories: Uk Government (Mod/Home Office), Afghan Resettlement Programs, Legal Representatives Of Claimants.
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Stakeholder Advisories: Us Armed Forces (F-35/Nuclear Asset Exposure), Uk Royal Navy/Raf (Operational Security Risks), Dodd Group/Kier (Contractor Accountability), Uk Parliament (Oversight Of Mod Cybersecurity Failures).
Customer Advisories: MoD personnel: monitor for phishing/social engineering attacks using leaked PII.Contractors: reset credentials and enable MFA for all MoD-linked systems.Affiliated organizations: audit third-party access to sensitive networks.
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Stakeholder Advisories: Mps (Via David Williams' Letter), Public Accounts Committee (Pac), Defence Select Committee.
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Stakeholder Advisories: Letter From Mod Permanent Secretary David Williams To Mps (2023-10-07), Public Accounts Committee Evidence Session (2023-09), Defence Select Committee Call For Evidence (Closed 2023-11).
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Stakeholder Advisories: Limited; Primarily Reactive To Media Pressure.
Customer Advisories: None (affected Afghans not directly notified initially)
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Stakeholder Advisories: Uk Parliament (Defence Select Committee), Humanitarian Organizations (E.G., Refugee Legal Support), Afghan Community Representatives, Journalists Covering Afghanistan.
Customer Advisories: Limited direct communication with affected Afghans due to super-injunction (2023–2024).Post-disclosure: MoD statements downplaying risks (contrasted by victim testimonies).Charities (e.g., Refugee Legal Support) providing informal warnings to at-risk individuals.
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Stakeholder Advisories: Defence Committee Briefings, Limited Disclosure To Affected Afghan Communities.
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Stakeholder Advisories: Journalists (Holly Bancroft, Larisa Brown, Sam Greenhill) Testified To Parliamentary Committee About Lack Of Transparency., Afghan Advocacy Groups And Law Firms Representing Affected Individuals Pushed For Disclosure..
Customer Advisories: None (superinjunction prevented public advisories until 2024)
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Stakeholder Advisories: Defence Select Committee Hearings, Media Disclosures Post-Superinjunction Lift.
Customer Advisories: Limited communication to affected Afghans (details undisclosed)
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Stakeholder Advisories: Defence Select Committee Hearings, Auditor General Reports.
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Stakeholder Advisories: Afghan Resettlement Ngos Warned Of Heightened Risks To Clients., Uk Parliament (House Of Commons Defence Committee) Briefed Post-Superinjunction..
Customer Advisories: None (Suppressed by superinjunction; limited outreach to 150 resettled individuals)
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Stakeholder Advisories: Defence Committee Briefings, Media Testimonies (Holly Bancroft, Larisa Brown, Sam Greenhill).
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Stakeholder Advisories: Pac Report Warnings On Recurrence Risks (2024-10), Mod Statement On Improved Practices (2024-07).
Customer Advisories: Limited; affected Afghans reported lack of direct communication
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Stakeholder Advisories: Parliamentary Scrutiny, Public Accounts Committee Recommendations, Information Commissioner'S Office (Ico) Involvement.
Customer Advisories: Apology from Defence SecretaryResettlement support via ARRLegal and compensation pathways for affected individuals
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Stakeholder Advisories: Pac Report To Parliament, Media Statements By Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, Letter To Mod Permanent Secretary.
Customer Advisories: No direct advisories to affected Afghans documented; resettlement updates mandated
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Stakeholder Advisories: House Of Commons Public Accounts Committee, Intelligence And Security Committee (Delayed Notification).
Customer Advisories: limited communication to affected Afghans due to security risks
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Stakeholder Advisories: Letter From 73 Academics, Lawyers, And Organizations To Chi Onwurah (Committee Chair), Public Statements By Ico Defending Its Regulatory Approach.
What advisories does the company provide to stakeholders and customers following an incident ?
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Mod Spokesperson Statements, Legal Advisories From Leigh Day, Mod Statements On Cost Transparency Post-Superinjunction, Public Accounts Committee Hearings, Afghans Affected By Arap Breaches (Via Legal Representatives), Uk Parliament (Post-July 2024 Disclosures), Media Outlets (Bbc, Others), Limited Direct Communication (Due To Security Risks For Afghans), Public Apologies Via Political Channels, , Uk Government (Mod/Home Office), Afghan Resettlement Programs, Legal Representatives Of Claimants, Us Armed Forces (F-35/Nuclear Asset Exposure), Uk Royal Navy/Raf (Operational Security Risks), Dodd Group/Kier (Contractor Accountability), Uk Parliament (Oversight Of Mod Cybersecurity Failures), Mod Personnel: Monitor For Phishing/Social Engineering Attacks Using Leaked Pii., Contractors: Reset Credentials And Enable Mfa For All Mod-Linked Systems., Affiliated Organizations: Audit Third-Party Access To Sensitive Networks., , Mps (Via David Williams' Letter), Public Accounts Committee (Pac), Defence Select Committee, Letter From Mod Permanent Secretary David Williams To Mps (2023-10-07), Public Accounts Committee Evidence Session (2023-09), Defence Select Committee Call For Evidence (Closed 2023-11), Limited; Primarily Reactive To Media Pressure, None (Affected Afghans Not Directly Notified Initially), , Uk Parliament (Defence Select Committee), Humanitarian Organizations (E.G., Refugee Legal Support), Afghan Community Representatives, Journalists Covering Afghanistan, Limited Direct Communication With Affected Afghans Due To Super-Injunction (2023–2024)., Post-Disclosure: Mod Statements Downplaying Risks (Contrasted By Victim Testimonies)., Charities (E.G., Refugee Legal Support) Providing Informal Warnings To At-Risk Individuals., , Defence Committee Briefings, Limited Disclosure To Affected Afghan Communities, Journalists (Holly Bancroft, Larisa Brown, Sam Greenhill) Testified To Parliamentary Committee About Lack Of Transparency., Afghan Advocacy Groups And Law Firms Representing Affected Individuals Pushed For Disclosure., None (superinjunction prevented public advisories until 2024), Defence Select Committee Hearings, Media Disclosures Post-Superinjunction Lift, Limited Communication To Affected Afghans (Details Undisclosed), , Defence Select Committee Hearings, Auditor General Reports, Afghan Resettlement Ngos Warned Of Heightened Risks To Clients., Uk Parliament (House Of Commons Defence Committee) Briefed Post-Superinjunction., None (Suppressed by superinjunction; limited outreach to 150 resettled individuals), Defence Committee Briefings, Media Testimonies (Holly Bancroft, Larisa Brown, Sam Greenhill), Pac Report Warnings On Recurrence Risks (2024-10), Mod Statement On Improved Practices (2024-07), Limited; Affected Afghans Reported Lack Of Direct Communication, , Parliamentary Scrutiny, Public Accounts Committee Recommendations, Information Commissioner'S Office (Ico) Involvement, Apology From Defence Secretary, Resettlement Support Via Arr, Legal And Compensation Pathways For Affected Individuals, , Pac Report To Parliament, Media Statements By Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, Letter To Mod Permanent Secretary, No Direct Advisories To Affected Afghans Documented; Resettlement Updates Mandated, , House Of Commons Public Accounts Committee, Intelligence And Security Committee (Delayed Notification), Limited Communication To Affected Afghans Due To Security Risks, , Letter From 73 Academics, Lawyers, And Organizations To Chi Onwurah (Committee Chair) and Public Statements By Ico Defending Its Regulatory Approach.
Initial Access Broker
How did the initial access broker gain entry for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Entry Point: Email
High Value Targets: Afghan individuals
Data Sold on Dark Web: Afghan individuals
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Entry Point: Dodd Group (third-party contractor)
Backdoors Established: ['likely (persistent access to exfiltrate 4TB)']
High Value Targets: Raf Lakenheath (F-35/Nuclear Bombs), Raf Portreath (Radar Base), Mod Personnel Data, Secured Document Repositories,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Raf Lakenheath (F-35/Nuclear Bombs), Raf Portreath (Radar Base), Mod Personnel Data, Secured Document Repositories,
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Entry Point: Human Error (Email Misrouting), Physical Loss (Laptop), Insecure Communication Channels (Whatsapp),
Backdoors Established: No
High Value Targets: Afghan Nationals’ Pii, Military Affiliation Data,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Afghan Nationals’ Pii, Military Affiliation Data,
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
High Value Targets: Afghan Interpreters, Special Forces Collaborators, Resettlement Applicants,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Afghan Interpreters, Special Forces Collaborators, Resettlement Applicants,
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Entry Point: Accidental email from MoD serviceman to untrusted Afghan contacts
High Value Targets: Afghan nationals with UK military ties
Data Sold on Dark Web: Afghan nationals with UK military ties
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Entry Point: Misaddressed email by unnamed British serviceman (Whitehall office)
Reconnaissance Period: 16 months (between leak and detection)
High Value Targets: Afghan Interpreters, Military Collaborators, Families Of Uk-Affiliated Personnel,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Afghan Interpreters, Military Collaborators, Families Of Uk-Affiliated Personnel,
Post-Incident Analysis
What were the root causes and corrective actions taken for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach UK-707072025
Root Causes: Improper email handling
Incident : Data Breach UK-506090325
Root Causes: Inadequate Data Protection For Sensitive Resettlement Records, Lack Of Cost Segregation For Emergency Programs, Over-Reliance On Superinjunctions For Operational Security,
Corrective Actions: Revised Cost Estimates For Arr/Arp Programs, Partial Lifting Of Superinjunction For Transparency, Nao-Led Review Of Accounting Practices,
Incident : Data Breach UK-0893808100325
Root Causes: Cultural Neglect Of Data Protection (Per Lawyers/Experts), Inadequate Technical Safeguards (E.G., No Dlp For Spreadsheets), Lack Of Accountability Up The Chain Of Command (Per Ben Wallace), Over-Reliance On Manual Reviews (Pre-'Two Pairs Of Eyes' Rule),
Corrective Actions: New Software (Labour Government, Post-July 2024), Stricter Email Review Processes, Public Disclosure Of Largest Breach (July 2025), Ongoing Ico Collaboration,
Incident : Data Breach UK-4933149101325
Root Causes: Inadequate Data Protection For Sensitive Resettlement Records., Policy Gaps In Risk Categorization For Afghan Nationals Post-Withdrawal., Delayed Transparency Due To Superinjunction.,
Corrective Actions: Policy Refinement For High-Risk Assessments (As Upheld In Court)., Potential Review Of Data Handling In Resettlement Programs.,
Incident : data breach UK-5562155102025
Root Causes: Inadequate Third-Party Risk Management (Dodd Group Compromise)., Over-Reliance On Perimeter Defenses Without Zero-Trust Controls., Legacy It Systems Vulnerable To Modern Exfiltration Techniques., Lack Of Real-Time Dark Web Monitoring For Leaked Data., Cultural Issues: 'Lack Of Care' And Accountability In Mod Cybersecurity (Per Expert Comments).,
Incident : Data Breach UK-5033050102025
Root Causes: Lack Of Data Protection Awareness, Inadequate Technical Safeguards (E.G., Bcc Enforcement), Cultural Failures In Handling Sensitive Data, Over-Reliance On Manual Processes (Spreadsheets, Emails),
Corrective Actions: Ico-Mandated Training Programs, Policy Updates For Data Classification, Enhanced Oversight For Afghan Relocation Data,
Incident : Data Breach UK-1692216102125
Root Causes: Human Error (Email Misdirection), Lack Of Data Encryption/Protection For Sensitive Files, Institutional Failure In Data Governance (Mod), Regulatory Capture (Ico'S Informal Handling), Culture Of Secrecy (Superinjunction To Conceal Breach),
Corrective Actions: Mod Claims To Have Addressed 'Bad Data Practices' (No Verification), Ico Acknowledged Need For More Staff With Top-Secret Clearance (But No Action Taken For This Case), Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Ico'S Role In Government Breaches,
Incident : Data Breach UK-5762957102325
Root Causes: Human Error (Failure To Use Bcc; Improper Data Handling), Inadequate Training On Data Protection Policies, Lack Of Technical Safeguards (E.G., Email Validation, Data Classification Enforcement), Cultural Issues (E.G., Whatsapp Use For Sensitive Communications), Process Failures (E.G., Spreadsheet Access Controls),
Incident : Data Leak UK-1362113103125
Root Causes: Lack Of Basic Data Handling Competence (E.G., Excel Hidden Tabs)., Absence Of Robust Access Controls And Redaction Processes., Cultural Normalization Of Negligence In Data Security., Failure To Learn From Past Breaches (E.G., 2007 Hmrc Incident)., Inadequate Oversight And Accountability Mechanisms.,
Corrective Actions: Resignation Of Mod Permanent Secretary (Symbolic)., Retroactive Asylum Grants For Affected Afghans., Proposed Training Programs (Implementation Unclear)., Media-Driven Transparency (Not Proactive).,
Incident : data breach UK-3562135110225
Root Causes: Inadequate Data Protection For High-Risk Humanitarian Datasets., Over-Reliance On Intelligence Assessments Without Ground-Level Validation., Political Prioritization Of Suppression (Super-Injunction) Over Victim Protection., Failure To Anticipate Taliban Exploitation Tactics (E.G., Yarmouk 60)., Bureaucratic Delays In Resettlement Processing.,
Corrective Actions: Proposed: Independent Public Inquiry With Afghan Participation., Demanded: Expansion Of Resettlement Quotas And Accelerated Processing., Suggested: Reform Of Super-Injunction Protocols For Life-Threatening Breaches., Urged: Transparency About Taliban Targeting Methods (E.G., Yarmouk 60).,
Incident : Data Breach UK-1533515110425
Root Causes: Human Error In Data Handling, Inadequate Safeguards For High-Sensitivity Data, Cultural Overemphasis On Secrecy,
Corrective Actions: Pending Defence Committee Recommendations, Potential Mod Policy Reforms,
Incident : Data Leak UK-5234752110425
Root Causes: Lack Of Physical Security For Devices In Transit, Inadequate Remote Work Policies For Handling Sensitive Data, Insufficient Employee Training On Data Protection In Non-Office Environments, Systemic Failure In Institutional Data Governance,
Incident : Data Breach UK-2493624110425
Root Causes: Human Error (Misjudgment Of Email Recipients And Data Scope)., Inadequate Data Protection Measures For Highly Sensitive Records., Overreliance On Legal Suppression (Superinjunction) Instead Of Proactive Remediation., Slow Bureaucratic Response To Resettlement Needs.,
Corrective Actions: Lifting Of Superinjunction (2024) To Allow Scrutiny., Independent Review By Paul Rimmer (Former Mod Intelligence Deputy)., Ongoing Parliamentary Inquiries Into Mod Handling Of The Breach.,
Incident : Data Breach UK-22100222110425
Root Causes: Human Error In Data Handling, Lack Of Oversight For Sensitive Resettlement Data, Cultural Secrecy Within Mod, Prioritizing Operational Security Over Transparency,
Corrective Actions: Pending Inquiry Recommendations, Potential Reforms To Arap Scheme Data Management, Increased Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Mod Practices,
Incident : Data Breach UK-42101642110425
Root Causes: Inadequate Data Protection Measures For Sensitive Records., Failure To Preempt Risks To Afghan Allies Post-Withdrawal., Overuse Of Legal Suppression (Super-Injunction) To Hide Failures., Lack Of Financial Planning For Resettlement Costs.,
Corrective Actions: Lifting Of Super-Injunction (July 2023)., Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Mod’S Handling Of Arap/Arr., Media-Driven Public Awareness Campaigns., Potential Policy Reforms For Future Resettlement Programs.,
Incident : Data Breach UK-3110731110525
Root Causes: Human Error (Email Misaddressing) Combined With Lack Of Data Validation., Inadequate Incident Detection Capabilities (16-Month Delay)., Overreliance On Legal Suppression (Superinjunction) Instead Of Proactive Remediation., Bureaucratic Delays In Resettlement Scheme Implementation.,
Corrective Actions: Mod Commissioned Independent Investigation (Paul Rimmer)., Partial Lifting Of Superinjunction Under Legal/Media Pressure., Ongoing Parliamentary Review Of Transparency Protocols.,
Incident : Data Breach UK-2203522110625
Root Causes: Human Error (Likely), Inadequate Data Protection Measures, Lack Of Oversight For High-Risk Data,
Corrective Actions: Operation Rubific (Mitigation Via Evacuation), Pending Policy Reforms,
Incident : Data Breach UK-3062530111425
Root Causes: Human Error (Misaddressed Email), Lack Of Secure Data Transfer Protocols, Inadequate Access Controls For Sensitive Data, Cultural Issues (Secrecy Over Accountability), Failure To Learn From Prior Breaches,
Corrective Actions: New Secure Casework System For Afghan Resettlement, Policy Reviews On Data Handling, Lifting Of Superinjunction (2024-07), Pac Recommendations Implementation (Pending),
Incident : Data Breach UK-4762947111425
Root Causes: Use Of Insecure Systems (Excel) For Sensitive Data, Failure To Heed Prior Warnings (E.G., 2021 Breaches), Inadequate Data Handling Culture And Processes, Lack Of Accountability And Proactive Risk Mitigation,
Corrective Actions: Introduction Of Secure Casework System For Afghan Resettlement, Improvements In Data Handling Processes, Enhanced Parliamentary And Public Scrutiny, Lifting Of Super Injunction For Transparency,
Incident : Data Breach UK-2893428111425
Root Causes: Over-Reliance On Insecure Tools (Excel/Sharepoint) For Sensitive Data, Lack Of Digital Expertise At Senior Levels, Inadequate Access Controls And Audit Trails, Cultural Failure To Prioritize Data Security In Crisis Scenarios, Delayed Breach Disclosure (Superinjunction Complications),
Corrective Actions: Pac-Enforced Six-Monthly Progress Reports, Planned System Upgrades (Funding Allocated But Implementation Unclear), Recruitment Drive For Cybersecurity Roles, Review Of Data Handling Protocols For Refugee/Asylum Processes,
Incident : data breach UK-0993709111425
Root Causes: Use Of Inappropriate Tools (Excel/Sharepoint) For Sensitive Data, Lack Of Validation For Hidden Data In Spreadsheets, Failure To Scale Safeguards With Increasing Data Volume, Inadequate Breach Detection Mechanisms, Cultural Issues Around Transparency And Accountability,
Corrective Actions: Lifting Of Superinjunction For Transparency, Review Of Data Handling Practices (Ongoing), Relocation Efforts For Affected Individuals, Parliamentary Oversight And Recommendations,
Incident : Data Breach UK-5521755112425
Root Causes: Ico’S Reluctance To Use Enforcement Powers For Public Sector Breaches., Mod’S Repeated Failures In Data Management., Lack Of Deterrent Penalties For Systemic Non-Compliance.,
Corrective Actions: Proposed Parliamentary Inquiry Into Ico’S Operations., Potential Reforms To Ico’S Enforcement Framework., Increased Transparency In Breach Investigations.,
What is the company's process for conducting post-incident analysis ?
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Legal Representation By Leigh Day Law Firm, , Information Commissioner'S Office (Ico) Engagement, Legal Counsel (High Court Gagging Order, 2023–2025), Data Protection Specialists (E.G., Mishcon De Reya, Barings Law), , Yes (Post-2021, Details Undisclosed), Media (*The Independent* Investigations), Legal Teams (For Damage Control), , Proposed (not confirmed), Legal (Court Injunction), Intelligence Assessments (Rimmer Review), , Mi6, Cia, Foreign Office, , Mi6, Cia, Foreign Office, , Ongoing Improvements In Data Handling, Pac Oversight And Recommendations, .
What corrective actions has the company taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Revised Cost Estimates For Arr/Arp Programs, Partial Lifting Of Superinjunction For Transparency, Nao-Led Review Of Accounting Practices, , New Software (Labour Government, Post-July 2024), Stricter Email Review Processes, Public Disclosure Of Largest Breach (July 2025), Ongoing Ico Collaboration, , Policy Refinement For High-Risk Assessments (As Upheld In Court)., Potential Review Of Data Handling In Resettlement Programs., , Ico-Mandated Training Programs, Policy Updates For Data Classification, Enhanced Oversight For Afghan Relocation Data, , Mod Claims To Have Addressed 'Bad Data Practices' (No Verification), Ico Acknowledged Need For More Staff With Top-Secret Clearance (But No Action Taken For This Case), Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Ico'S Role In Government Breaches, , Resignation Of Mod Permanent Secretary (Symbolic)., Retroactive Asylum Grants For Affected Afghans., Proposed Training Programs (Implementation Unclear)., Media-Driven Transparency (Not Proactive)., , Proposed: Independent Public Inquiry With Afghan Participation., Demanded: Expansion Of Resettlement Quotas And Accelerated Processing., Suggested: Reform Of Super-Injunction Protocols For Life-Threatening Breaches., Urged: Transparency About Taliban Targeting Methods (E.G., Yarmouk 60)., , Pending Defence Committee Recommendations, Potential Mod Policy Reforms, , Lifting Of Superinjunction (2024) To Allow Scrutiny., Independent Review By Paul Rimmer (Former Mod Intelligence Deputy)., Ongoing Parliamentary Inquiries Into Mod Handling Of The Breach., , Pending Inquiry Recommendations, Potential Reforms To Arap Scheme Data Management, Increased Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Mod Practices, , Lifting Of Super-Injunction (July 2023)., Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Mod’S Handling Of Arap/Arr., Media-Driven Public Awareness Campaigns., Potential Policy Reforms For Future Resettlement Programs., , Mod Commissioned Independent Investigation (Paul Rimmer)., Partial Lifting Of Superinjunction Under Legal/Media Pressure., Ongoing Parliamentary Review Of Transparency Protocols., , Operation Rubific (Mitigation Via Evacuation), Pending Policy Reforms, , New Secure Casework System For Afghan Resettlement, Policy Reviews On Data Handling, Lifting Of Superinjunction (2024-07), Pac Recommendations Implementation (Pending), , Introduction Of Secure Casework System For Afghan Resettlement, Improvements In Data Handling Processes, Enhanced Parliamentary And Public Scrutiny, Lifting Of Super Injunction For Transparency, , Pac-Enforced Six-Monthly Progress Reports, Planned System Upgrades (Funding Allocated But Implementation Unclear), Recruitment Drive For Cybersecurity Roles, Review Of Data Handling Protocols For Refugee/Asylum Processes, , Lifting Of Superinjunction For Transparency, Review Of Data Handling Practices (Ongoing), Relocation Efforts For Affected Individuals, Parliamentary Oversight And Recommendations, , Proposed Parliamentary Inquiry Into Ico’S Operations., Potential Reforms To Ico’S Enforcement Framework., Increased Transparency In Breach Investigations., .
Additional Questions
General Information
What was the amount of the last ransom demanded ?
Last Ransom Demanded: The amount of the last ransom demanded was ["implied ('resolve this matter before consequences unfold')"].
Who was the attacking group in the last incident ?
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Unnamed official, Name: LynxAffiliation: Russian-speaking cybercriminal groupLocation: Russia (suspected)Type: ['hacktivist', 'cybercriminal', 'state-aligned (possible)'], None (Unintentional Internal Actors), Primary: Unknown (initial leak)Secondary: ['Taliban (exploitation)', 'Yarmouk 60 (Taliban unit targeting affected individuals)'] and Internal (Accidental).
Incident Details
What was the most recent incident detected ?
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on August 2023.
What was the most recent incident publicly disclosed ?
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2021-08.
Impact of the Incidents
What was the highest financial loss from an incident ?
Highest Financial Loss: The highest financial loss from an incident was £850 million (estimated; excludes legal/compensation costs; potential to reach billions).
What was the most significant data compromised in an incident ?
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were Names and details of MI6 officers, Names of SAS and SBS members, Names and details of potentially vulnerable Afghans, , Personal details of 19,000+ people, Personal details of Afghan interpreters and special forces members, Relocation application statuses, Family member information, Records Exposed: 18,700 applicants + thousands of family members, Sensitivity: High (personal details of at-risk Afghans), , Records Exposed: 18,700 applicants + thousands of family members, Sensitivity: High (personal details of at-risk Afghans), , Email Addresses (265 in 2021), Personal Details (Names, Contact Information, Family/Associate Data for ~19,000 in 2022), Spreadsheet Metadata (Hidden Data), , Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Religious/Ethnic Identity (Shia/Hazara), Perceived Affiliation (e.g., 'spy' misclassification), , military documents (RAF/Royal Navy bases), MoD personnel names/emails, contractor names/car registrations/mobile numbers, internal email guidance/security instructions, visitor logs (RAF Portreath, RNAS Culdrose), construction details (Kier’s work at RAF Lakenheath), 4TB of data (including secured repositories), , Personal Data of ~18,700 Afghans (spreadsheet error), Email Recipients' Identities (BCC errors), Sensitive Personal Data (WhatsApp, misdirected emails, laptop screen), , Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Sensitive Military-Associated Data, , Personal information of Afghan nationals (including ~18,700 in spreadsheet error), Sensitive relocation/assistance data, Contact details (visible in BCC incidents), , Personal Identifiable Information (PII), Contact Details, Asylum Application Data, Flight Manifests, Military Affiliation Records, Records: 18,825 (approx.), Types: ['personal identifiable information (PII)', 'resettlement application details', 'family member identities'], Sensitivity: extreme (life-threatening), , Records: 18,825 (approx.), Types: ['personal identifiable information (PII)', 'resettlement application details', 'family member identities'], Sensitivity: extreme (life-threatening), , Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans linked to UK forces, Evacuation operation details, , Confidential Government Information, Afghan Refugee Application Data, Employee Records, , Personal Identifiable Information (PII), Family Details, Application Records for UK Sanctuary, , Personal Details of 18,700 Applicants (e.g., names, contact information, resettlement eligibility status), , Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Relocation/Resettlement Details, Sensitive Operational Data, , Personal Identifiable Information (PII), Family Details, Military Affiliation Records, , Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Links to UK Forces, Evacuation Eligibility Data, Records Exposed: 33000, Estimated Lives At Risk: 100000, Types: ['Personal Identifiable Information (PII)', 'Resettlement Application Details'], , Records Exposed: 33000, Estimated Lives At Risk: 100000, Types: ['Personal Identifiable Information (PII)', 'Resettlement Application Details'], , Personal details of ~19,000 ARAP applicants, Names, contact information, and other sensitive data, , Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan refugees, Contact details, Application statuses, , personal information of ~19,000 Afghans, potential risk to ~100,000 individuals, , Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan nationals, Names of individuals who collaborated with British forces and .
What was the most significant system affected in an incident ?
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident was ARAP (Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy) DatabaseMoD Email SystemsInternal Spreadsheet Storage/Sharing Tools and Dodd Group (third-party contractor)MoD email systemssecured document repositoriesRAF Lakenheath (F-35 stealth jets/nuclear bomb data)RAF Portreath (radar base)RAF Predannack (National Drone Hub)RNAS Culdrose (Royal Navy air station) and Email SystemsMicrosoft ExcelWhatsAppPhysical Devices (Laptops)Internal Databases and MoD Email SystemsAfghan Resettlement Casework Database and Excel spreadsheetsMoD internal data handling systems and SharePoint platformExcel spreadsheets and SharePoint systemExcel spreadsheets.
Response to the Incidents
What third-party assistance was involved in the most recent incident ?
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was legal representation by leigh day law firm, , information commissioner's office (ico) engagement, legal counsel (high court gagging order, 2023–2025), data protection specialists (e.g., mishcon de reya, barings law), , media (*the independent* investigations), legal teams (for damage control), , legal (court injunction), intelligence assessments (rimmer review), , mi6, cia, foreign office, , mi6, cia, foreign office, .
What containment measures were taken in the most recent incident ?
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Superinjunction on UK press to prevent Taliban reprisalsUse of existing Arap scheme as operational cover, High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025, Lifted July 2025)Internal Reviews of BreachesLimited Public Disclosure (Only 4 of 49 Breaches Initially Public), investigation ongoingno public details on containment, Super-Injunction (Lifted in July 2025)ICO Reporting for 5/49 IncidentsInternal Reviews, Limited to MoD's Internal Actions (per ICO), Super-injunction for spreadsheet error (lifted in 2023-07)ICO reporting for selected incidentsInternal reviews by MoD, Public Disclosure (after delay)Internal ReviewsPermanent Secretary Resignation, super-injunction to suppress disclosure (2023–2024)limited resettlement offers (7,355 total, including family members), Secrecy via super-injunctionLimited disclosure to Parliament, Superinjunction to suppress reportingLimited resettlement scheme for 150 individuals (initially), Superinjunction to suppress public disclosure (controversial), Super-injunction (later lifted)Limited public communication, Superinjunction to suppress reportingLimited resettlement scheme for 150 individuals, Secrecy via Super-InjunctionLimited Disclosure to Parliament, Superinjunction (later lifted in July 2024)Facebook group takedown (implied), Super injunction imposed (Sept 2023, lifted July 2024)Removal of leaked data from Facebook, Superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted)Internal review triggered by PAC and superinjunction to suppress data publicationsecret extraction efforts for affected individuals.
Data Breach Information
What was the most sensitive data compromised in a breach ?
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Personal details of ~19,000 ARAP applicants, Family Details, Personal Data of ~18,700 Afghans (spreadsheet error), visitor logs (RAF Portreath, RNAS Culdrose), Military Affiliation Records, Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Relocation/Resettlement Details, potential risk to ~100,000 individuals, 4TB of data (including secured repositories), MoD personnel names/emails, Confidential Government Information, Spreadsheet Metadata (Hidden Data), Names of individuals who collaborated with British forces, Sensitive Personal Data (WhatsApp, misdirected emails, laptop screen), Evacuation Eligibility Data, Personal details of 19,000+ people, Email Addresses (265 in 2021), Contact Details, Evacuation operation details, Religious/Ethnic Identity (Shia/Hazara), Personal details of Afghan interpreters and special forces members, Contact details (visible in BCC incidents), contractor names/car registrations/mobile numbers, Sensitive Operational Data, Personal Details of 18,700 Applicants (e.g., names, contact information, resettlement eligibility status), Links to UK Forces, Relocation application statuses, internal email guidance/security instructions, military documents (RAF/Royal Navy bases), Sensitive Military-Associated Data, Sensitive relocation/assistance data, Contact details, Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Names, contact information, and other sensitive data, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans, Names and details of MI6 officers, Family member information, Afghan Refugee Application Data, Names and details of potentially vulnerable Afghans, Employee Records, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan refugees, Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghans linked to UK forces, Perceived Affiliation (e.g., 'spy' misclassification), Personal information of Afghan nationals (including ~18,700 in spreadsheet error), personal information of ~19,000 Afghans, Names of SAS and SBS members, Personal Details (Names, Contact Information, Family/Associate Data for ~19,000 in 2022), Flight Manifests, Application statuses, Personal Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan nationals, Asylum Application Data, Email Recipients' Identities (BCC errors), construction details (Kier’s work at RAF Lakenheath), Personal Identifiable Information (PII) and Application Records for UK Sanctuary.
What was the number of records exposed in the most significant breach ?
Number of Records Exposed in Most Significant Breach: The number of records exposed in the most significant breach was 19.3M.
Ransomware Information
What was the highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident ?
Highest Ransom Demanded: The highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident was ["implied ('resolve this matter before consequences unfold')"].
Regulatory Compliance
What was the highest fine imposed for a regulatory violation ?
Highest Fine Imposed: The highest fine imposed for a regulatory violation was £350,000 (2021 Breaches), £350,000 (for BCC incidents), None (ICO Chose Not to Investigate), , £350,000 (for BCC incidents), None (ICO issued reprimands but no formal penalties).
What was the most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation ?
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Potential lawsuits, High Court applications to challenge visa refusals, Potential lawsuits for endangering lives, , High Court superinjunction (later lifted), NAO investigation into cost accounting, , High Court Gagging Order (2023–2025), Ongoing ICO Engagement, Potential Further Investigations (Per Jon Baines, Mishcon de Reya), , Judicial review (R (QP1 & Anor) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 2504), Dismissed on grounds of rational policy application, , Defence Select Committee Inquiry (Ongoing), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Scrutiny, , Court Battle Over Superinjunction by Media Outlets (e.g., The Independent), , Public Accounts Committee inquiry (2023-09), Defence Select Committee inquiry (ongoing, launched 2023-11), Potential further actions pending inquiry outcomes, , Investigations by ICO (likely), Potential Lawsuits from Affected Parties, , super-injunction (2023–2024), defense select committee inquiry (2024), potential future lawsuits, , Super-injunction to suppress disclosure (controversial), , Superinjunction (later lifted), Potential lawsuits from affected Afghans, , Superinjunction (later lifted), Defence Select Committee inquiry, Intelligence and Security Committee investigation, , Parliamentary inquiry, Auditor General critique, Potential compensation lawsuits, , Potential lawsuits from affected Afghans, Parliamentary inquiry by House of Commons Defence Committee, , Super-Injunction (Controversial), Potential Investigations, , PAC inquiry (2024), Potential future litigation by affected individuals, , Potential compensation claims, Ongoing legal risks, , PAC investigation ongoing, Potential compensation lawsuits, , superinjunction (later lifted), , Calls for parliamentary inquiry, Potential lawsuits by affected individuals, .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What was the most significant lesson learned from past incidents ?
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Parliamentary oversight may be necessary to restore trust in regulatory enforcement.
What was the most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Implement robust data protection controls (e.g., encryption, access limits), Reform super-injunction practices to balance secrecy with public interest., Enhance parliamentary and independent oversight of MoD data practices., Avoid superinjunctions that hinder democratic oversight unless absolutely necessary., Proactive risk assessments for humanitarian/data-intensive missions, Conduct regular audits of data access controls and employee compliance, Enhance data protection measures for sensitive refugee/resettlement data, Enhanced support for at-risk Afghans affected by the breach, Enhanced training on secure data storage/sharing protocols, Enhance collaboration with Five Eyes allies on cyber threat intelligence sharing., Implement stricter access controls and audit trails for sensitive data, Conduct an independent inquiry with Afghan community representation., Independent Audits of MoD Data Handling Practices, Independent inquiry into ICO’s enforcement practices., Clearer Escalation Paths for Whistleblowers/Staff Reporting Risks, Improve segregation of emergency program costs in accounting systems, Accelerate resettlement of affected Afghans to mitigate ongoing risks, Public Disclosure Protocols for Severe Breaches Affecting Vulnerable Populations, Avoid legal suppression tactics that hinder public oversight., Establish clear protocols for breach response and disclosure, Conduct regular audits and risk assessments for sensitive data, Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication for Sensitive Data Access, Avoid legal gagging orders that suppress public/parliamentary scrutiny without compelling justification., Enhance whistleblower protections for government employees reporting breaches., Establish a transparent breach disclosure protocol to rebuild stakeholder trust., Transparency in decision-making processes for high-risk incidents., Implement zero-trust architecture for third-party access to MoD systems., Enhance data protection measures for sensitive government databases involving vulnerable populations., Replace Excel/SharePoint with secure, scalable data management systems, Transparency in Breach Disclosures (Avoiding Legal Suppression), Publish a public apology and corrective action plan., Formal Investigations for High-Impact Breaches Regardless of Classification, Clarify legal frameworks for superinjunctions in data breach responses, Reform of super-injunction use in national security cases, Establish clearer protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies, Establish rapid response protocols for suspected breaches, including containment and reporting, Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive resettlement programs., Enhance training for personnel handling high-risk information, Transparency in national security-related breaches (where feasible), Dark Web Monitoring for Exposed Afghan Data, Whistleblower protections for reporting breaches internally., Establish clear funding mechanisms for ARAP/ARR programs., Implement stricter data handling protocols for sensitive military/asylum datasets., Mandatory Documentation of Regulatory Interactions, Conduct independent reviews of breach responses to ensure accountability., Reevaluation of super-injunction use in public interest cases, Public transparency in breach disclosures to rebuild trust., Enhanced protection for at-risk individuals in conflict zones, Resource allocation to ensure compliance across public and private sectors., Immediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Independent Audit of MoD Data Protection Practices, Establish a compensation fund for victims and families of those harmed., Independent review of MoD data security protocols, Implement automated data segregation/validation for sensitive emails., Reopen and expand resettlement pathways for all affected individuals, including family members., Implement and enforce secure data handling systems (e.g., dedicated casework platforms), Implement stricter physical security protocols for devices containing sensitive data, Establish clear escalation paths for breach reporting, Enhance remote work policies with clear guidelines on device usage in transit/public areas, Improve MoD data security protocols for sensitive personnel records., Stronger Whistleblower Protections for Data Misconduct, Enhance employee training on data protection and cybersecurity, Establish clear protocols for breach disclosure to oversight bodies (e.g., NAO), Regular audits of MoD data handling practices, Mandate secure work environments (e.g., no public spaces) for handling classified information, Establish clear protocols for rapid disclosure of life-threatening breaches, balancing transparency with risk mitigation., Establish clearer communication protocols for breaches with national security dimensions., Review and reform data protection practices for high-risk humanitarian datasets., Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, Conduct regular red-team exercises targeting supply chain weaknesses., Immediate overhaul of data protection policies in UK government agencies., Enhanced Training with Real-World Scenarios (e.g., Hidden Spreadsheet Data), Address cultural and procedural failures within MoD to prevent recurrence, Third-Party Penetration Testing for Government Systems, Mandatory encryption for all sensitive data transfers., Mandate multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring for all contractors., Regular Audits of Data Sharing Practices, Review risk assessment frameworks for Afghan resettlement programs to include nuanced threats (e.g., religious/ethnic targeting)., Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD, Regular audits of data access and sharing practices., Improve transparency with parliament and the public on costs and impacts, Accelerate resettlement processes for at-risk individuals linked to military operations., Upgrade legacy IT systems to modern, segmented networks with behavioral analytics., Accelerate relocation efforts for at-risk applicants affected by the breach., Stronger use of legally binding penalties for severe breaches., Create parliamentary oversight committee for sensitive defence operations, Provide ongoing training on data protection, especially for roles handling high-sensitivity information, Proactively engage with media/NGOs to manage high-risk breaches involving vulnerable populations., Conduct regular vulnerability assessments for data handling processes, Implement Automated Redaction Tools for Emails/Spreadsheets, Independent oversight body for government data security., Independent review of MoD data handling practices and Automated DLP Tools for Sensitive Data.
References
What is the most recent source of information about an incident ?
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are UK Defence Select Committee Inquiry Evidence, The Independent, BBC, House of Commons session (Dame Chi Onwurah), BBC News, The Independent (Holly Bancroft), Daily Mail (Sam Greenhill), Sky News, BFBS Forces News, Academic research linking breach to 49 Afghan deaths, Mishcon de Reya (Jon Baines, Data Protection Specialist), National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) report, House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report, Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) Guidelines, The Times (Larisa Brown), The Guardian (coverage of Afghan data breach), UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Statements, House of Commons Public Accounts Committee Report, The Times, The Register, Lighthouse Reports, UK Parliament (Science, Innovation and Technology Committee), UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee Statement (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown), CIPD Factsheet on Data Protection and GDPR, Defence Select Committee Inquiry Announcement, UK Parliament Public Accounts Committee, BBC Politics Investigations, The Observer / The Guardian, Refugee Legal Support Survey (Prof. Sara de Jong & Prof. Victoria Canning), Leigh Day Law Firm (statement by Erin Alcock), Judgment: R (QP1 & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2025] EWHC 2504 (Admin), Rimmer Review (UK MoD), UK Parliament Defence Select Committee, National Audit Office (NAO) Report, Parliament TV (Defence Select Committee Hearing), Reuters - 'UK lawmakers slam ‘chaotic’ MoD over Afghan data breach', UK Parliament Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report, Paul Rimmer Investigation Report (MoD), UK Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Report, Open Rights Group (coordinated letter), House of Commons Defence Committee Hearing, CX1 and MP1 v SSHD [2024] EWHC 892 (Admin), The Record - 'UK MoD discloses dozens of data breaches in Afghan relocation blunders' (Jim Dunton), Daily Mail, David Williams' Letter to MPs (Published by PAC), The Mail on Sunday, The Independent - 'MoD unable to calculate cost of secret Afghan resettlement plan after data leak', Barings Law (Representing Affected Afghans), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) Evidence Session, The Sun, UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), UK Parliament Defence Committee Hearing, AFP via Getty (images), UK Ministry of Defence Letter to MPs (2023-10-07), High Court Ruling (Gagging Order Lift, July 2025) and National Audit Office (NAO) Annual Report on MoD.
What is the most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.independent.co.uk, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics, https://ico.org.uk, https://www.baringslaw.com, https://www.mishcon.com, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/24312344/russian-hackers-steal-mod-files-dark-web/, https://www.theregister.com/2023/10/16/uk_mod_afghan_data_breaches/, https://www.independent.co.uk, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/465/science-innovation-and-technology-committee/, https://www.independent.co.uk, https://ico.org.uk, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jul/28/afghan-interpreters-data-leak-taliban-killings-uk-government, https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/factsheet, https://www.independent.co.uk, https://www.thetimes.co.uk, https://www.dailymail.co.uk, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/118/defence-committee/, https://www.independent.co.uk, https://parliamentlive.tv, https://www.dailymail.co.uk, https://www.thetimes.co.uk, https://www.dailymail.co.uk, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/77/defence-committee/, https://www.nao.org.uk, https://parliamentlive.tv, https://www.independent.co.uk, https://www.lighthousereports.nl, https://news.sky.com, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/127/public-accounts-committee/, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-lawmakers-slam-chaotic-mod-over-afghan-data-breach-2024-07-19/ .
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the most recent investigation ?
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
What was the most recent stakeholder advisory issued ?
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was MoD spokesperson statements, Legal advisories from Leigh Day, MoD statements on cost transparency post-superinjunction, Public Accounts Committee hearings, Afghans Affected by ARAP Breaches (Via Legal Representatives), UK Parliament (Post-July 2024 Disclosures), Media Outlets (BBC, Others), UK Government (MOD/Home Office), Afghan resettlement programs, Legal representatives of claimants, US Armed Forces (F-35/nuclear asset exposure), UK Royal Navy/RAF (operational security risks), Dodd Group/Kier (contractor accountability), UK Parliament (oversight of MoD cybersecurity failures), MPs (via David Williams' Letter), Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Defence Select Committee, Letter from MoD Permanent Secretary David Williams to MPs (2023-10-07), Public Accounts Committee evidence session (2023-09), Defence Select Committee call for evidence (closed 2023-11), Limited; primarily reactive to media pressure, UK Parliament (Defence Select Committee), Humanitarian organizations (e.g., Refugee Legal Support), Afghan community representatives, Journalists covering Afghanistan, Defence Committee briefings, Limited disclosure to affected Afghan communities, Journalists (Holly Bancroft, Larisa Brown, Sam Greenhill) testified to parliamentary committee about lack of transparency., Afghan advocacy groups and law firms representing affected individuals pushed for disclosure., Defence Select Committee hearings, Media disclosures post-superinjunction lift, Defence Select Committee hearings, Auditor General reports, Afghan resettlement NGOs warned of heightened risks to clients., UK Parliament (House of Commons Defence Committee) briefed post-superinjunction., Defence Committee Briefings, Media Testimonies (Holly Bancroft, Larisa Brown, Sam Greenhill), PAC report warnings on recurrence risks (2024-10), MoD statement on improved practices (2024-07), Parliamentary scrutiny, Public Accounts Committee recommendations, Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) involvement, PAC report to Parliament, Media statements by Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, Letter to MOD Permanent Secretary, House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, Intelligence and Security Committee (delayed notification), Letter from 73 academics, lawyers, and organizations to Chi Onwurah (Committee Chair), Public statements by ICO defending its regulatory approach, .
What was the most recent customer advisory issued ?
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued were an Limited Direct Communication (Due to Security Risks for Afghans)Public Apologies via Political Channels, MoD personnel: monitor for phishing/social engineering attacks using leaked PII.Contractors: reset credentials and enable MFA for all MoD-linked systems.Affiliated organizations: audit third-party access to sensitive networks., None (affected Afghans not directly notified initially), Limited direct communication with affected Afghans due to super-injunction (2023–2024).Post-disclosure: MoD statements downplaying risks (contrasted by victim testimonies).Charities (e.g., Refugee Legal Support) providing informal warnings to at-risk individuals., None (superinjunction prevented public advisories until 2024), Limited communication to affected Afghans (details undisclosed), None (Suppressed by superinjunction; limited outreach to 150 resettled individuals), Limited; affected Afghans reported lack of direct communication, Apology from Defence SecretaryResettlement support via ARRLegal and compensation pathways for affected individuals, No direct advisories to affected Afghans documented; resettlement updates mandated and limited communication to affected Afghans due to security risks.
Initial Access Broker
What was the most recent entry point used by an initial access broker ?
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an Misaddressed email by unnamed British serviceman (Whitehall office), Accidental email from MoD serviceman to untrusted Afghan contacts, Email and Dodd Group (third-party contractor).
What was the most recent reconnaissance period for an incident ?
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was 16 months (between leak and detection).
Post-Incident Analysis
What was the most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Improper email handling, Inadequate data protection for sensitive resettlement recordsLack of cost segregation for emergency programsOver-reliance on superinjunctions for operational security, Cultural Neglect of Data Protection (Per Lawyers/Experts)Inadequate Technical Safeguards (e.g., No DLP for Spreadsheets)Lack of Accountability Up the Chain of Command (Per Ben Wallace)Over-Reliance on Manual Reviews (Pre-'Two Pairs of Eyes' Rule), Inadequate data protection for sensitive resettlement records.Policy gaps in risk categorization for Afghan nationals post-withdrawal.Delayed transparency due to superinjunction., Inadequate third-party risk management (Dodd Group compromise).Over-reliance on perimeter defenses without zero-trust controls.Legacy IT systems vulnerable to modern exfiltration techniques.Lack of real-time dark web monitoring for leaked data.Cultural issues: 'lack of care' and accountability in MoD cybersecurity (per expert comments)., Lack of Data Protection AwarenessInadequate Technical Safeguards (e.g., BCC Enforcement)Cultural Failures in Handling Sensitive DataOver-Reliance on Manual Processes (Spreadsheets, Emails), Human Error (Email Misdirection)Lack of Data Encryption/Protection for Sensitive FilesInstitutional Failure in Data Governance (MoD)Regulatory Capture (ICO's Informal Handling)Culture of Secrecy (Superinjunction to Conceal Breach), Human error (failure to use BCC; improper data handling)Inadequate training on data protection policiesLack of technical safeguards (e.g., email validation, data classification enforcement)Cultural issues (e.g., WhatsApp use for sensitive communications)Process failures (e.g., spreadsheet access controls), Lack of basic data handling competence (e.g., Excel hidden tabs).Absence of robust access controls and redaction processes.Cultural normalization of negligence in data security.Failure to learn from past breaches (e.g., 2007 HMRC incident).Inadequate oversight and accountability mechanisms., Inadequate data protection for high-risk humanitarian datasets.Over-reliance on intelligence assessments without ground-level validation.Political prioritization of suppression (super-injunction) over victim protection.Failure to anticipate Taliban exploitation tactics (e.g., Yarmouk 60).Bureaucratic delays in resettlement processing., Human error in data handlingInadequate safeguards for high-sensitivity dataCultural overemphasis on secrecy, Lack of physical security for devices in transitInadequate remote work policies for handling sensitive dataInsufficient employee training on data protection in non-office environmentsSystemic failure in institutional data governance, Human error (misjudgment of email recipients and data scope).Inadequate data protection measures for highly sensitive records.Overreliance on legal suppression (superinjunction) instead of proactive remediation.Slow bureaucratic response to resettlement needs., Human error in data handlingLack of oversight for sensitive resettlement dataCultural secrecy within MoD, prioritizing operational security over transparency, Inadequate data protection measures for sensitive records.Failure to preempt risks to Afghan allies post-withdrawal.Overuse of legal suppression (super-injunction) to hide failures.Lack of financial planning for resettlement costs., Human error (email misaddressing) combined with lack of data validation.Inadequate incident detection capabilities (16-month delay).Overreliance on legal suppression (superinjunction) instead of proactive remediation.Bureaucratic delays in resettlement scheme implementation., Human Error (Likely)Inadequate Data Protection MeasuresLack of Oversight for High-Risk Data, Human error (misaddressed email)Lack of secure data transfer protocolsInadequate access controls for sensitive dataCultural issues (secrecy over accountability)Failure to learn from prior breaches, Use of insecure systems (Excel) for sensitive dataFailure to heed prior warnings (e.g., 2021 breaches)Inadequate data handling culture and processesLack of accountability and proactive risk mitigation, Over-reliance on insecure tools (Excel/SharePoint) for sensitive dataLack of digital expertise at senior levelsInadequate access controls and audit trailsCultural failure to prioritize data security in crisis scenariosDelayed breach disclosure (superinjunction complications), Use of inappropriate tools (Excel/SharePoint) for sensitive dataLack of validation for hidden data in spreadsheetsFailure to scale safeguards with increasing data volumeInadequate breach detection mechanismsCultural issues around transparency and accountability, ICO’s reluctance to use enforcement powers for public sector breaches.MoD’s repeated failures in data management.Lack of deterrent penalties for systemic non-compliance..
What was the most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Revised cost estimates for ARR/ARP programsPartial lifting of superinjunction for transparencyNAO-led review of accounting practices, New Software (Labour Government, Post-July 2024)Stricter Email Review ProcessesPublic Disclosure of Largest Breach (July 2025)Ongoing ICO Collaboration, Policy refinement for high-risk assessments (as upheld in court).Potential review of data handling in resettlement programs., ICO-Mandated Training ProgramsPolicy Updates for Data ClassificationEnhanced Oversight for Afghan Relocation Data, MoD Claims to Have Addressed 'Bad Data Practices' (No Verification)ICO Acknowledged Need for More Staff with Top-Secret Clearance (But No Action Taken for This Case)Parliamentary Scrutiny of ICO's Role in Government Breaches, Resignation of MoD Permanent Secretary (symbolic).Retroactive asylum grants for affected Afghans.Proposed training programs (implementation unclear).Media-driven transparency (not proactive)., Proposed: Independent public inquiry with Afghan participation.Demanded: Expansion of resettlement quotas and accelerated processing.Suggested: Reform of super-injunction protocols for life-threatening breaches.Urged: Transparency about Taliban targeting methods (e.g., Yarmouk 60)., Pending Defence Committee recommendationsPotential MoD policy reforms, Lifting of superinjunction (2024) to allow scrutiny.Independent review by Paul Rimmer (former MoD intelligence deputy).Ongoing parliamentary inquiries into MoD handling of the breach., Pending inquiry recommendationsPotential reforms to ARAP scheme data managementIncreased parliamentary scrutiny of MoD practices, Lifting of super-injunction (July 2023).Parliamentary scrutiny of MoD’s handling of ARAP/ARR.Media-driven public awareness campaigns.Potential policy reforms for future resettlement programs., MoD commissioned independent investigation (Paul Rimmer).Partial lifting of superinjunction under legal/media pressure.Ongoing parliamentary review of transparency protocols., Operation Rubific (Mitigation via Evacuation)Pending Policy Reforms, New secure casework system for Afghan resettlementPolicy reviews on data handlingLifting of superinjunction (2024-07)PAC recommendations implementation (pending), Introduction of secure casework system for Afghan resettlementImprovements in data handling processesEnhanced parliamentary and public scrutinyLifting of super injunction for transparency, PAC-enforced six-monthly progress reportsPlanned system upgrades (funding allocated but implementation unclear)Recruitment drive for cybersecurity rolesReview of data handling protocols for refugee/asylum processes, Lifting of superinjunction for transparencyReview of data handling practices (ongoing)Relocation efforts for affected individualsParliamentary oversight and recommendations, Proposed parliamentary inquiry into ICO’s operations.Potential reforms to ICO’s enforcement framework.Increased transparency in breach investigations..
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Latest Global CVEs (Not Company-Specific)
Description
Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to versions 19.2.16, 20.3.14, and 21.0.1, there is a XSRF token leakage via protocol-relative URLs in angular HTTP clients. The vulnerability is a Credential Leak by App Logic that leads to the unauthorized disclosure of the Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF) token to an attacker-controlled domain. Angular's HttpClient has a built-in XSRF protection mechanism that works by checking if a request URL starts with a protocol (http:// or https://) to determine if it is cross-origin. If the URL starts with protocol-relative URL (//), it is incorrectly treated as a same-origin request, and the XSRF token is automatically added to the X-XSRF-TOKEN header. This issue has been patched in versions 19.2.16, 20.3.14, and 21.0.1. A workaround for this issue involves avoiding using protocol-relative URLs (URLs starting with //) in HttpClient requests. All backend communication URLs should be hardcoded as relative paths (starting with a single /) or fully qualified, trusted absolute URLs.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 7.7
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
References
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/0276479e7d0e280e0f8d26fa567d3b7aa97a516f
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/05fe6686a97fa0bcd3cf157805b3612033f975bc
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/3240d856d942727372a705252f7c8c115394a41e
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/19.2.16
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/20.3.14
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/21.0.1
- https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37
Description
Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. An Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and below enables remote, unauthenticated attackers to craft deep ASN.1 structures that trigger unbounded recursive parsing. This leads to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) via stack exhaustion when parsing untrusted DER inputs. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.2.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 8.7
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. An Integer Overflow vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and below enables remote, unauthenticated attackers to craft ASN.1 structures containing OIDs with oversized arcs. These arcs may be decoded as smaller, trusted OIDs due to 32-bit bitwise truncation, enabling the bypass of downstream OID-based security decisions. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.2.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 6.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
Suricata is a network IDS, IPS and NSM engine developed by the OISF (Open Information Security Foundation) and the Suricata community. Prior to versions 7.0.13 and 8.0.2, working with large buffers in Lua scripts can lead to a stack overflow. Users of Lua rules and output scripts may be affected when working with large buffers. This includes a rule passing a large buffer to a Lua script. This issue has been patched in versions 7.0.13 and 8.0.2. A workaround for this issue involves disabling Lua rules and output scripts, or making sure limits, such as stream.depth.reassembly and HTTP response body limits (response-body-limit), are set to less than half the stack size.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description
Suricata is a network IDS, IPS and NSM engine developed by the OISF (Open Information Security Foundation) and the Suricata community. In versions from 8.0.0 to before 8.0.2, a NULL dereference can occur when the entropy keyword is used in conjunction with base64_data. This issue has been patched in version 8.0.2. A workaround involves disabling rules that use entropy in conjunction with base64_data.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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