UK Ministry of Defence Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (UK-2893428111425)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the UK Ministry of Defence breach identified under incident ID UK-2893428111425.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of UK Ministry of Defence's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/uk-ministry-of-defence, the number of followers: 676008, the industry type: Defense and Space Manufacturing and the number of employees: 29703 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 100 and after the incident was 100 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on UK Ministry of Defence and their customers.

UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) recently reported "MOD Afghan Citizens Data Breach (2022)", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) accidentally leaked the personal details of ~19,000 Afghan citizens seeking refuge in the UK after the Taliban takeover.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting SharePoint platform and Excel spreadsheets, and exposing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of Afghan refugees, Contact details and Application statuses, with nearly ~19,000 records at risk, plus an estimated financial loss of £850 million (estimated; excludes legal/compensation costs; potential to reach billions).

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Superinjunction initially imposed (later lifted) and Internal review triggered by PAC, and began remediation that includes PAC-mandated six-monthly updates on resettlement/costs and Calls for system modernization and digital specialist recruitment, while recovery efforts such as Ongoing; no specific technical details disclosed continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through Delayed public disclosure (2023), PAC report and media interviews and Letter to MOD Permanent Secretary expressing disappointment.

The case underscores how Ongoing (PAC oversight; MOD internal review), teams are taking away lessons such as Critical need for modernized data systems (beyond Excel/SharePoint), Urgent recruitment of digital/security specialists at senior levels and Importance of timely breach disclosure and transparency, and recommending next steps like Immediate allocation of funds to upgrade legacy systems (per PAC), Hiring surge for digital/IT security roles across MOD and Regular audits of data handling practices, especially for sensitive operations, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering PAC report to Parliament, Media statements by Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown and Letter to MOD Permanent Secretary.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating insecure handling of Excel spreadsheets on a **SharePoint site** (cloud-based access). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Information Repositories (T1039) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including **Excel spreadsheets** containing PII of ~19,000 Afghan citizens stored on SharePoint, and **Sensitive refugee status information** exposed via unsecured files. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including **Accidental exposure via shared Excel/SharePoint** (implied unauthorized access to cloud-stored data), and **No encryption** applied to spreadsheets. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (0%), Data Destruction (T1495) with lower confidence (0%), Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood (T1498.002) with lower confidence (0%), and Account Access Removal (T1531) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including **49 confirmed deaths** linked to Taliban reprisals against exposed individuals, and **Compromised resettlement operations** (life-threatening impact on victims). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (75%), with evidence including **Lack of access controls** and audit trails on SharePoint/Excel, and **Legacy system risks** and outdated IT infrastructure. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate confidence (60%), with evidence including **Unsecured Excel spreadsheets** containing PII (potential for embedded credentials), and **No encryption** applied to sensitive files. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating **SharePoint site** (implied internal network access to discover/expose data). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.