UK Ministry of Defence Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (UK-0993709111425)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the UK Ministry of Defence breach identified under incident ID UK-0993709111425.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of UK Ministry of Defence's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/uk-ministry-of-defence, the number of followers: 676008, the industry type: Defense and Space Manufacturing and the number of employees: 29703 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 100 and after the incident was 100 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on UK Ministry of Defence and their customers.

On 19 July 2024, UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) disclosed data breach, unauthorized disclosure and human error issues under the banner "UK Ministry of Defense Afghan Relocation Data Leak (2022)".

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) suffered a significant data breach in 2022 when a British soldier mistakenly sent a spreadsheet containing sensitive personal information of up to 19,000 Afghans seeking relocation to Britain.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting SharePoint system and Excel spreadsheets, and exposing personal information of ~19,000 Afghans and potential risk to ~100,000 individuals, with nearly 19,000 (directly); up to 100,000 at risk records at risk.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like superinjunction to suppress data publication and secret extraction efforts for affected individuals, while recovery efforts such as relocation of ~30,000 affected individuals to UK and review of data handling practices continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through initial secrecy under superinjunction, limited disclosure after injunction lifted and parliamentary report.

The case underscores how completed (parliamentary report published), teams are taking away lessons such as Inadequate systems (Excel/SharePoint) for handling sensitive data at scale, Failure to implement safeguards despite known vulnerabilities and Lack of transparency with oversight bodies during crisis, and recommending next steps like Replace Excel/SharePoint with secure, scalable data management systems, Implement stricter access controls and audit trails for sensitive data and Enhance training for personnel handling high-risk information, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering House of Commons Public Accounts Committee and Intelligence and Security Committee (delayed notification).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating reliance on Excel spreadsheets stored on **SharePoint** (cloud-based collaboration platform). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including spreadsheet containing sensitive personal information of up to **19,000 Afghans**, and hidden rows in spreadsheet (unintended data collection) and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating excel spreadsheets stored on **SharePoint** (network shared drive). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including soldier **accidentally sent** a spreadsheet (likely via email or SharePoint sharing), and afghan recipient threatened to publish the file on **Facebook** (unencrypted transfer). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (0%), Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with lower confidence (0%), Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (0%), Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1659) with lower confidence (0%), and Data from Cloud Storage (T1530) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including excel spreadsheets stored on **SharePoint** (cloud storage), and data of individuals connected to **British special forces** (high-impact exposure). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with lower confidence (0%), Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with lower confidence (0%), and Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including **hidden rows in spreadsheet** (data obfuscation within legitimate file), and inadequate data handling—reliance on Excel (blending with normal operations). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (75%), with evidence including spreadsheet containing **sensitive personal information** (potential credentials/PII), and association with UK **special forces/government operations** (high-value targets). Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Cloud Account (T1087.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating spreadsheet ... **sent** by a British soldier (potential access to other cloud-stored data). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.