U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Company CyberSecurity Posture
ice.gov
Official | ICE protects America through criminal investigations and by enforcing immigration law to preserve national security and public safety. Created in 2003 through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, ICE now has more than 20,000 law enforcement and support personnel in more than 400 offices in the United States and around the world. ICE’s broad mission includes counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, immigration law enforcement within the interior, and investigating crimes ranging from customs fraud to human trafficking and child exploitation. Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) enforces immigration law in the U.S. interior, detains removable noncitizens and provides ICE’s detained population with healthcare. Arresting and removing noncitizens who threaten public safety and national security — including known or suspected terrorists, gang members, and those who have committed egregious human rights violations or war crimes — are among ERO’s most important missions. Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) identifies and builds criminal cases against transnational criminal organizations, terrorist networks and other criminal elements that threaten the United States. It investigates and prosecutes human trafficking, child exploitation, cybercrime, financial crime and a variety of other crimes of exploitation. The directorate’s expert special agents also investigate intellectual property crime, trade fraud and export violations. Visit HSI.gov to learn more about HSI. ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor is the largest legal program in DHS, representing the U.S. in hearings before the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review and prosecuting human rights violator and national security cases. Privacy: https://go.dhs.gov/UC8
Company Details
u-s-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-ice
1,756
183,213
92212
ice.gov
0
U.S_2744538
In-progress
UICE Risk Score (AI oriented)Between 700 and 749
UICE Global Score (TPRM)XXXX
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faced a tumultuous period marked by significant breaches, including the Salt Typhoon espionage campaign linked to Beijing, which compromised American telecoms, collecting sensitive data such as call logs, recordings, and potential location information. The largest hack in US telecom history occurred under the leadership of Jen Easterly, who was not asked to stay post-Inauguration Day. Her departure coincided with demands for CISA to become 'smaller' and 'more nimble' and the dismissal of the Cyber Safety Review Board members who were investigating the breaches, potentially jeopardizing the agency’s future and national cybersecurity.
Description: The lapse of the **Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015)** and the **State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program**, combined with a **staffing reduction to under 900 employees** (from ~2,500) due to government funding expiration, has left CISA critically under-resourced. Without liability protections for private-sector threat-sharing, companies may hesitate to report cyber threats, increasing systemic vulnerabilities. The absence of grant funding further weakens state/local defenses (e.g., hospitals, schools, water systems), raising risks of cascading disruptions. Experts warn of **potential major cyberattacks** during this period, with CISA lacking sufficient personnel to respond effectively. Legal uncertainties (e.g., antitrust exposure, FOIA disclosures) and reduced real-time intelligence-sharing exacerbate the threat landscape, particularly for critical infrastructure. Senators and industry leaders emphasize the urgency of reauthorization, citing risks to **national/economic security**, but partisan delays persist.
Description: The U.S. government shutdown has severely weakened **CISA**, the nation’s leading civilian cybersecurity agency, by furloughing **65% of its 2,540-strong workforce** (1,651 employees) and issuing **Reductions in Force (RIF) notices** that may lead to permanent layoffs. Critical divisions like the **Infrastructure Security Division (ISD)**, responsible for protecting power grids, water treatment plants, and chemical facilities, face deep cuts—including the elimination of the **Chemical Security subdivision**, which secured high-risk chemical sites from cyber-physical threats. The **Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED)**, which coordinates national and international cybersecurity partnerships, is also targeted. Experts warn that this reduction—amid rising **nation-state cyber threats, ransomware, and misinformation campaigns**—creates exploitable blind spots, crippling the U.S. government’s ability to **detect, respond, and recover** from attacks. The shutdown and political redirection of CISA’s mission (e.g., accusations of censorship) further destabilize its operational capacity, leaving **critical infrastructure (energy, water, chemical sectors) vulnerable to cyberattacks** that could disrupt essential services or trigger cascading failures. The long-term impact includes **eroded national resilience**, increased risk of **state-sponsored espionage or sabotage**, and potential **physical harm** if industrial control systems (e.g., power grids, water treatment) are compromised.
Description: As a relatively new and essential cyber-security component of the DHS, CISA faces a significant potential setback. With changing political climates and Trump’s apparent intentions to reshape the agency, its core missions of protecting government systems and supporting private and nonprofit entities could be compromised. Employees fear that reduced corporate oversight and a possible dismantling or repurposing of the agency may impair its ability to safeguard against cyber threats, potentially weakening national cybersecurity infrastructure. There is a palpable fear among the staff of a decline in efficacy and a change in direction that could pose threats not just to the agency's mandate but also to the broader security landscape.
Description: CISA faces potential undermining from elements within the Heritage Foundation who seek to scale back its operations, especially concerning its role in mitigating misinformation online. This approach could significantly weaken the agency, impacting its principal cybersecurity functions and potentially affecting its efforts to combat foreign propaganda. If the 2024 election leads to an administration aligning with the Project 2025 playbook, CISA could experience reduced effectiveness or an existential crisis. Such a shift could have far-reaching consequences for national cybersecurity and the protection against online falsehoods that threaten societal stability.
Description: In order to assist critical infrastructure organizations in thwarting ransomware gang attacks, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released new information detailing security flaws and configuration errors that ransomware gangs have exploited. This information was made public by CISA as part of the Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) program, and said that it would notify critical infrastructure organizations of any ransomware-vulnerable devices found on its network. Since its launch, CISA's RVWP has found and exchanged information about more than 800 susceptible systems with internet-accessible flaws regularly targeted by various ransomware activities. The U.S. cybersecurity agency has also released a dedicated website, StopRansomware.gov, which acts as the focal point for CISA's initiative to give defenders all the information they need to anticipate and neutralize ransomware assaults.
Description: In January 2023, the **BianLian ransomware group** shifted its tactics from encrypting files to **data theft-based extortion**, leveraging stolen **Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials**—often obtained via phishing or initial access brokers. The group deployed **custom Go-based backdoors**, remote management tools, and credential-harvesting utilities to infiltrate networks undetected. Once inside, they exfiltrated sensitive data and threatened to publish it on a **leak site**, demanding ransom payments in cryptocurrency. To evade security measures, BianLian **disabled antivirus processes** using PowerShell and Windows Command Shell, escalating risks for targeted organizations. The attack posed severe threats to **critical infrastructure sectors**, prompting warnings from **CISA, FBI, and ACSC**. Victim organizations faced potential **operational disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage**, with stolen data ranging from **employee records to proprietary business information**. While no specific company was named, the group’s focus on **high-value targets**—such as healthcare, energy, or government-adjacent entities—suggested systemic risks. Mitigations included **auditing RDP access, restricting PowerShell, and enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA)**, but the breach’s scale and sophistication highlighted vulnerabilities in defensive postures.
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), created in 2018, faces uncertain times as the return of former President Trump could significantly alter its function and direction. Trump's promises to reduce government spending and oversight have CISA staffers concerned about the potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives and a shift in focus toward immigration enforcement. The agency, which has a reputation for bipartisanship and was involved in election security and countering online misinformation, now finds itself at odds with Republican claims of censorship and surveillance. The fear of policy reversal and mission compromise looms among the employees, who remain dedicated to protecting national cyber infrastructure.
Description: Amid rising cyber threats, the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 proposes to significantly reduce the scope of CISA, which could undermine the agency's ability to protect against cyber attacks and misinformation. This move aligns with former President Trump's agenda and his critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation. If implemented, CISA's counter-misinformation efforts would be halted, its relationship with social media firms would change, and its cyber defense responsibilities could be redistributed to military and intelligence agencies. As a result, the United States could face an increased risk of cyber threats that can disrupt societal stability, influence elections, or compromise sensitive information.
Description: A misconfigured data hub within the **DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)** exposed sensitive national security information to thousands of unauthorized users—including government workers, private-sector employees, and foreign nationals—over a **two-month period (March–May 2023)**. The breach stemmed from a **programming error**, allowing improper access to **439 I&A products**, which were accessed **1,525 times** without authorization. Among these, **518 accesses were from the private sector**, and **46 were by non-American citizens**, primarily targeting **cybersecurity intel** (39% of accessed data), including details on **foreign hacking campaigns, state-sponsored hacker groups, and domestic protest surveillance**. The exposed records included **surveillance data on American citizens**, law enforcement investigations, and **foreign disinformation operations**, raising concerns about the integrity of the **Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)**, which DHS markets as a secure platform for critical national security sharing. While the memo confirmed some records were accessed, it **lacked an impact assessment** on affected agencies, leaving uncertainties about broader operational or intelligence compromises. The incident underscores systemic vulnerabilities in handling **classified intelligence**, with potential repercussions for **national security, diplomatic relations, and public trust** in government cybersecurity protocols.
Description: A hacker infiltrated FEMA’s computer networks via compromised Citrix remote desktop credentials, maintaining unauthorized access from **June 22 to August 5, 2024**. The breach targeted **FEMA Region 6** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and involved the theft of **employee identity data** from FEMA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The attacker exploited weak security controls, including the absence of **multifactor authentication (MFA)**, to move laterally across the network, install VPN software, and exfiltrate data from **Active Directory**.The incident led to the termination of **24 FEMA employees**, including IT executives, after an investigation revealed systemic failures in cybersecurity protocols. While initial statements claimed no sensitive data was stolen, a DHS internal review confirmed the theft of **federal employee identity information**. The breach underscored vulnerabilities in government cybersecurity, compounded by a separate disclosure of hackers exploiting **Cisco firewall devices** in U.S. agencies, though no direct link to the FEMA attack was established.
Description: A hacker infiltrated FEMA’s computer networks via compromised credentials in Citrix Systems’ remote desktop software, gaining unauthorized access for nearly two months (June 22 to August 5). The breach targeted **FEMA Region 6** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and compromised **employee identity data** from both FEMA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), another DHS component. The attacker exploited weak security measures, including the absence of **multifactor authentication (MFA)**, to move laterally across the network, install VPN software, and exfiltrate data from **Microsoft Active Directory**, which manages access controls. The incident led to the termination of **two dozen FEMA employees**, including IT executives, after DHS Secretary Kristi Noem cited systemic failures like agencywide MFA gaps and 'incompetence' in cybersecurity protocols. While initial statements claimed no sensitive citizen data was stolen, investigations confirmed the theft of **federal employee identity information**. The breach underscored vulnerabilities in critical government infrastructure, though officials asserted no direct harm to American citizens occurred. The attack’s duration and depth raised concerns about persistent threats to federal agencies, compounded by a separate disclosure of hackers exploiting **Cisco firewall devices** in U.S. government systems around the same period.
Description: A large-scale cyber breach targeted FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) over several weeks, compromising its network and exposing sensitive employee data from both FEMA and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The attacker exploited vulnerabilities in **Citrix remote access software**, gaining deep access across regions including New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. While initial claims by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem stated *no sensitive data was extracted*, internal documents later confirmed the theft of **FEMA and CBP employee data**, affecting over **250,000 employees** and raising concerns about DHS’s cybersecurity capabilities. The breach led to the dismissal of **20 FEMA IT workers**, including senior leaders, accused of security failures. Remediation efforts spanned months, with DHS and FEMA struggling to contain the intrusion until at least September 2025. The attack underscored systemic vulnerabilities in federal network defenses, prompting emergency directives to strengthen protections against advanced hacker groups. The incident remains under investigation, with no confirmed attribution or link to broader espionage campaigns.
Description: An unidentified hacker executed a **months-long breach** targeting FEMA’s computer network, compromising sensitive data of **Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and FEMA employees** across a region spanning New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. The attacker exploited vulnerabilities in **Citrix remote-access software**, gaining deep access to operational systems. Despite initial containment efforts by DHS in mid-July, remediation extended into September, with confirmations that **employee data was stolen**, contradicting earlier official denials. The breach led to the firing of **24 FEMA IT staff**, including top executives, amid accusations of 'severe security lapses.' The incident exposed systemic weaknesses in DHS’s cybersecurity posture, raising concerns about the protection of **over 250,000 employees’ information** and potential broader threats to national security. The attacker’s identity and motives remain unknown, though the prolonged intrusion suggests targeted espionage or data exfiltration for malicious use.
Description: FEMA stated that they mistakenly exposed the personal information, including addresses and bank account information, of 2.3 million disaster victims. The breach occurred because FEMA did not ensure a private contractor only received the information it required to perform its official duties. The victims affected include survivors of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the 2017 California wildfires. The report found FEMA's failure to protect their data put them at risk of identity theft and fraud. According to the report, some of the data collected, such as addresses and Social Security numbers, were necessary to give aid. but other information, like electronic bank account information, was not considered necessary.
Description: FEMA suffered a cyberattack in **June 2024** where threat actors exploited **CitrixBleed 2 (CVSS 9.3)** via stolen credentials to breach its **Citrix Netscaler ADC/Gateway**, bypassing MFA. Attackers exfiltrated data from **Region 6 servers** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas), including sensitive government and citizen information. The breach remained undetected until **July**, despite prior CISA warnings about active exploitation. FEMA initially denied data loss but later evidence confirmed unauthorized uploads. The incident led to the **termination of the CISO, CIO, and 22 staff** for negligence, including falsified security audits. Remediation included forced password resets, MFA enforcement, and a complete IT overhaul. The attack exposed systemic failures in patch management and incident response, risking **national security data, emergency response capabilities, and public trust** in a critical federal agency.
Description: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement accidentally exposed the names, birthdates, nationalities and locations of more than 6,000 immigrants who claimed to be fleeing torture and persecution to its website. The unprecedented data dump exposed the immigrants to retaliation from the very individuals, gangs and governments they fled, attorneys for people who have sought protection in the U.S
Description: DHS had a privacy incident that resulted in the exposure of information for 247,167 active and retired federal employees. The database utilised by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and kept in the Department of Homeland Security OIG Case Management System was compromised by a data breach. Employee names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, jobs, grades, and duty locations are among the data that has been made public. In addition to putting additional security measures in place to restrict access to this kind of information, the Department of Homeland Security notified those who were impacted through notification letters.
Description: In March–May 2023, a misconfigured **DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN-Intel)** platform exposed **sensitive but unclassified intelligence data**—including investigative leads shared with the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, and local law enforcement—to **tens of thousands of unauthorized users**. The access controls were incorrectly set to 'everyone,' granting visibility to **non-intelligence government workers (e.g., disaster response teams), private contractors, and foreign government personnel**. The breach stemmed from **poor access management and lack of segmentation**, highlighting systemic failures in cloud security governance. While no classified data was compromised, the exposure risked operational security, counterterrorism efforts, and trust in interagency intelligence-sharing. The incident underscored how **human error and process gaps**—rather than sophisticated cyberattacks—remain a dominant cause of high-impact breaches in critical infrastructure.
Description: A misconfiguration in the **Homeland Security Information Network-Intel (HSIN-Intel)**—an internal DHS platform used to share **sensitive but unclassified intelligence**—exposed restricted data to **tens of thousands of unauthorized users** between **March and May 2023**. The breach allowed access to **439 intelligence products**, improperly viewed **1,525 times**, including by **518 private-sector contractors and 46 foreign nationals**. Exposed data included **law enforcement leads, domestic protest analysis (e.g., Stop Cop City protests), foreign hacking reports, and disinformation campaigns**, with **39% of accessed materials related to cybersecurity threats** (e.g., state-sponsored hacking). While some unauthorized US users *could* have requested access, the incident revealed systemic failures in **access controls**, raising concerns over **national security risks** and the DHS’s ability to safeguard sensitive intelligence shared with agencies like the **FBI and National Counterterrorism Center**. The leak underscored vulnerabilities in handling **domestic surveillance data**, potentially compromising **counterterrorism operations, protest monitoring, and foreign cyber threat intelligence**.
Description: The DHS has identified a growing threat from commercial drones being weaponized by violent extremists in the US. Although technological capabilities are advancing, state and local law enforcement lack the authority and means to effectively counter this new form of aerial menace. Despite efforts to enhance detection and response, including repositioning CCTV and training police to handle hazardous drones, the accessibility of advanced evasion technologies complicates tracking and neutralization efforts. Reports of uncorroborated drone sightings have increased public concern, prompting the DHS to seek expanded legislative counter-drone authorities.
Description: The DHS memo highlighted the vulnerability of US cities to weaponized drones, with extremists potentially modifying drones to carry threats like explosives and chemicals. Despite observing nefarious drone activities, local authorities often lack the authority to intervene. To combat this, the DHS has recommended repositioning CCTV cameras, training police on handling hazardous drones, and deploying sensors for drone detection. The rising threat emphasizes the need for improved countermeasures and preparedness against unmanned aircraft systems.
Description: A Department of Justice employee's email account was compromised by a hacker, who took 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees. Delving deeper into the archive, one finds information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence. Motherboard claims that a hacker gained access to a Department of Justice employee's email account. As evidence, the hacker used the hacked account to send the email directly to Motherboard contributor Joseph Cox. The apparent job titles, names, phone numbers, and email addresses of over 9,000 purported Department of Homeland Security (DHS) workers and over 20,000 purported FBI employees.
Description: Daniil Kasatkin, a 26-year-old Russian professional basketball player, was arrested at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris on June 21, 2023, for his alleged involvement in a ransomware gang that operated between 2020 and 2022. The gang is accused of targeting around 900 organizations, including two US federal agencies. Kasatkin is facing charges of 'conspiracy to commit computer fraud' and 'computer fraud conspiracy.' His lawyers deny the allegations, claiming he is not tech-savvy and was unaware of any unlawful activities. The US has not yet released any statements or evidence regarding the crimes.
Description: The DHS encountered growing threats from commercial drones being modified to carry hazardous payloads, impacting national security. Attempted mitigations include improved detection and response capabilities through local law enforcement training and technology deployment. These clandestine drone activities pose a significant risk, requiring urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
Description: The FBI issued a public warning about a sophisticated **smishing (SMS phishing) and vishing (voice phishing) campaign** targeting **current/former senior U.S. government officials and their contacts** since April 2025. Malicious actors impersonate high-ranking officials using **AI-generated voice cloning** and fraudulent text messages to deceive victims into revealing **sensitive personal data, login credentials, or financial information**. The attack exploits **trust in authoritative figures**, leveraging publicly available data (e.g., job titles, photos) to craft convincing lures. Victims are tricked into clicking malicious links, downloading malware, or granting access to accounts under false pretenses (e.g., switching to a 'secure' messaging platform).The stolen credentials risk **further impersonation, disinformation campaigns, or financial fraud**, with potential cascading effects on **national security** if government communications or networks are compromised. While no large-scale data breach has been confirmed, the campaign’s **targeted nature**—focusing on high-profile individuals—poses a severe risk of **credential harvesting, identity theft, and unauthorized access to classified or sensitive systems**. The FBI emphasizes the threat’s **evolving sophistication**, combining **social engineering with AI-driven deception** to bypass traditional defenses.
Description: The article highlights systemic vulnerabilities in the **E-Verify system** (administered jointly by USCIS and SSA), where **Social Security Numbers (SSNs)**—critical for employment verification, credit applications, and government benefits—are at risk of exploitation in **identity theft schemes**. While the article promotes proactive measures like SSN locks and credit freezes, it implicitly reveals that **unauthorized access to SSNs via data breaches or phishing** could enable criminals to impersonate individuals for fraudulent employment, tax refunds, or benefit claims.The **E-Verify Self Lock feature**, though a protective tool, underscores a reactive approach to a persistent threat: **leaked or misused SSNs** due to inadequate safeguards in government databases or third-party breaches. The reliance on manual locks (expiring annually) and credit freezes suggests **gaps in automated, real-time fraud detection**, leaving individuals responsible for mitigating risks. The potential for **large-scale SSN exposure**—whether through insider threats, system exploits, or external attacks—poses a **direct risk to financial stability and public trust** in federal identity verification infrastructure.The article’s emphasis on **post-breach mitigation** (e.g., IRS identity protection PINs) rather than prevention implies that **SSN-related breaches are frequent enough to warrant systemic warnings**, signaling a **high-stakes vulnerability** in a foundational component of U.S. identity management.
No incidents recorded for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 2025.
No incidents recorded for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 2025.
No incidents recorded for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 2025.
UICE cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Official | ICE protects America through criminal investigations and by enforcing immigration law to preserve national security and public safety. Created in 2003 through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, ICE now has more than 20,000 law enforcement and support personnel in more than 400 offices in the United States and around the world. ICE’s broad mission includes counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, immigration law enforcement within the interior, and investigating crimes ranging from customs fraud to human trafficking and child exploitation. Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) enforces immigration law in the U.S. interior, detains removable noncitizens and provides ICE’s detained population with healthcare. Arresting and removing noncitizens who threaten public safety and national security — including known or suspected terrorists, gang members, and those who have committed egregious human rights violations or war crimes — are among ERO’s most important missions. Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) identifies and builds criminal cases against transnational criminal organizations, terrorist networks and other criminal elements that threaten the United States. It investigates and prosecutes human trafficking, child exploitation, cybercrime, financial crime and a variety of other crimes of exploitation. The directorate’s expert special agents also investigate intellectual property crime, trade fraud and export violations. Visit HSI.gov to learn more about HSI. ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor is the largest legal program in DHS, representing the U.S. in hearings before the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review and prosecuting human rights violator and national security cases. Privacy: https://go.dhs.gov/UC8
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Policing in South Africa. I am attached to the newly formed Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations. Formally I was attached to the Detecitve Service and have been conduction investigations for over 25 years. I have also been attached to the National Inspectorate Division of the SAPS for soem
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Vi gör hela Sverige tryggt och säkert! Att arbeta inom polisen är ett av de finaste uppdrag man kan ha. Du bidrar till samhället genom att göra hela Sverige tryggt och säkert. Oavsett om du jobbar i en civil roll eller som polis, är möjligheterna att växa med en större uppgift många. Vi är Sverig
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Career paths in management, information technology, law, mission support, public affairs and community outreach are available within the agency.
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Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
The official website of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is http://www.ice.gov.
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 727, reflecting their Moderate security posture.
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is not listed as GDPR compliant.
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
According to Rankiteo,U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operates primarily in the Law Enforcement industry.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) employs approximately 1,756 people worldwide.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 183,213 followers.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is classified under the NAICS code 92212, which corresponds to Police Protection.
No, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
Yes, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/u-s-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-ice.
As of November 27, 2025, Rankiteo reports that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has experienced 27 cybersecurity incidents.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has an estimated 1,471 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack, Vulnerability, Ransomware, Data Leak and Breach.
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an remediation measures with notification letters sent to affected individuals, remediation measures with additional security measures implemented to restrict access to information, and containment measures with improved detection and response capabilities, containment measures with local law enforcement training, containment measures with technology deployment, and law enforcement notified with yes, and containment measures with repositioning cctv, containment measures with training police to handle hazardous drones, and and and containment measures with auditing rdp usage, containment measures with disabling command-line scripting, containment measures with restricting powershell, and remediation measures with enforcing strong authentication (e.g., mfa), remediation measures with patching vulnerable systems, and communication strategy with warnings issued by cisa, fbi, and acsc, and incident response plan activated with yes (internal memo via brennan center for justice), and third party assistance with brennan center for justice (via foia disclosure), and communication strategy with limited (internal memo obtained via foia; no public statement detailed), and and and containment measures with disconnected citrix remote access tool (2023-07-16), containment measures with enforced multifactor authentication, and communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary (2023-08-29), communication strategy with media disclosures (bloomberg, nextgov/fcw), and incident response plan activated with yes (dhs it leadership urgent action), and law enforcement notified with likely (no explicit confirmation), and containment measures with localization of breach (mid-july 2025), containment measures with network segmentation, containment measures with access revocation, and remediation measures with ongoing as of september 5, 2025, remediation measures with emergency directive for federal network hardening, remediation measures with identity management reforms, and communication strategy with internal fema staff updates, communication strategy with public statements by homeland security secretary kristi noem, communication strategy with media coverage (cnn), and network segmentation with implemented post-breach, and enhanced monitoring with yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities), and and and containment measures with disconnection of citrix remote access tool (2025-07-16), containment measures with enforcement of multifactor authentication (mfa), and communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary kristi noem (2025-08-29), communication strategy with media disclosures (bloomberg, nextgov/fcw), and incident response plan activated with yes (dhs task force formed), and law enforcement notified with likely (internal dhs investigation), and containment measures with initial efforts launched mid-july 2023, containment measures with ongoing remediation as of september 5, 2023, and remediation measures with cleanup operation by dhs it officials, remediation measures with firing of 24 fema it employees, and communication strategy with internal fema staff updates, communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary kristi noem (august 29, 2023), and communication strategy with foia disclosure (dhs memo), communication strategy with media reports (wired), and network segmentation with recommended as corrective action, and enhanced monitoring with recommended as corrective action, and incident response plan activated with yes (post-discovery), and containment measures with password resets, containment measures with multi-factor authentication (mfa) enforcement, and remediation measures with it staff overhaul, remediation measures with new security personnel hired, and communication strategy with public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss), and third party assistance with cyber threat alliance (information-sharing coordination), third party assistance with internet security alliance (advocacy for policy updates), and remediation measures with sen. gary peters' 10-year cisa 2015 reauthorization bill (protecting america from cyber threats act), remediation measures with house homeland security committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by rep. andrew garbarino), remediation measures with proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, ai threats), remediation measures with incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by internet security alliance), and recovery measures with short-term extensions via continuing resolution (cr) in house/senate bills, recovery measures with potential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles, and communication strategy with sen. peters' public warnings about national/economic security risks, communication strategy with media outreach by cyber threat alliance and internet security alliance, communication strategy with house democratic staffer comments on program success in state/local governments, and communication strategy with public warnings by cybersecurity experts, communication strategy with media coverage highlighting risks, and third party assistance with identity protection services, third party assistance with credit monitoring services, and containment measures with ssn lock via ssa or e-verify, containment measures with credit freeze via credit bureaus, containment measures with irs identity protection pin, and remediation measures with monitoring financial accounts, remediation measures with dark web monitoring (via id theft protection services), remediation measures with white glove restoration services for identity recovery, and recovery measures with unlocking ssn for legitimate use (e.g., employment verification), recovery measures with temporary lift of credit freeze for authorized credit applications, and communication strategy with public advisory via cnet article, communication strategy with ssa and e-verify user notifications (e.g., lock expiration alerts), and enhanced monitoring with credit monitoring, enhanced monitoring with dark web monitoring for compromised pii, and and and containment measures with public service announcement (psa), containment measures with awareness campaign, containment measures with reporting via ic3 (internet crime complaint center), and remediation measures with password changes, remediation measures with multi-factor authentication (mfa) enforcement, remediation measures with account monitoring, and communication strategy with fbi psa, communication strategy with media outreach, communication strategy with direct warnings to potential targets, and enhanced monitoring with recommendation for individuals to monitor accounts..
Title: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Data Exposure
Description: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement accidentally exposed the names, birthdates, nationalities and locations of more than 6,000 immigrants who claimed to be fleeing torture and persecution to its website. The unprecedented data dump exposed the immigrants to retaliation from the very individuals, gangs and governments they fled.
Type: Data Exposure
Attack Vector: Website Data Leak
Title: FEMA Data Breach
Description: FEMA mistakenly exposed the personal information, including addresses and bank account information, of 2.3 million disaster victims due to oversharing with a private contractor.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Oversharing of Data
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Data Handling
Title: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program
Description: CISA released new information detailing security flaws and configuration errors exploited by ransomware gangs to assist critical infrastructure organizations in thwarting ransomware attacks.
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Vulnerability ExploitationConfiguration Errors
Vulnerability Exploited: Internet-accessible flaws
Motivation: Ransomware
Title: Department of Justice Email Account Compromise
Description: A Department of Justice employee's email account was compromised by a hacker, who took 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees. The data included information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Email Compromise
Threat Actor: Hacker
Motivation: Data Theft
Title: DHS Data Breach Incident
Description: A privacy incident at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) resulted in the exposure of information for 247,167 active and retired federal employees. The compromised data includes employee names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, positions, grades, and duty locations. The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Case Management System was affected.
Type: Data Breach
Title: Potential Undermining of CISA by Heritage Foundation
Description: CISA faces potential undermining from elements within the Heritage Foundation who seek to scale back its operations, especially concerning its role in mitigating misinformation online. This approach could significantly weaken the agency, impacting its principal cybersecurity functions and potentially affecting its efforts to combat foreign propaganda. If the 2024 election leads to an administration aligning with the Project 2025 playbook, CISA could experience reduced effectiveness or an existential crisis. Such a shift could have far-reaching consequences for national cybersecurity and the protection against online falsehoods that threaten societal stability.
Type: Operational Undermining
Attack Vector: Political Influence
Threat Actor: Heritage Foundation
Motivation: Political
Title: Proposed Reduction of CISA's Scope by Heritage Foundation's Project 2025
Description: The Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 proposes to significantly reduce the scope of CISA, which could undermine the agency's ability to protect against cyber attacks and misinformation. This move aligns with former President Trump's agenda and his critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation. If implemented, CISA's counter-misinformation efforts would be halted, its relationship with social media firms would change, and its cyber defense responsibilities could be redistributed to military and intelligence agencies. As a result, the United States could face an increased risk of cyber threats that can disrupt societal stability, influence elections, or compromise sensitive information.
Type: Policy Change
Threat Actor: Heritage Foundation's Project 2025
Motivation: Align with former President Trump's agenda and critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation.
Title: Potential Setback in CISA's Cybersecurity Operations
Description: As a relatively new and essential cyber-security component of the DHS, CISA faces a significant potential setback. With changing political climates and Trump’s apparent intentions to reshape the agency, its core missions of protecting government systems and supporting private and nonprofit entities could be compromised. Employees fear that reduced corporate oversight and a possible dismantling or repurposing of the agency may impair its ability to safeguard against cyber threats, potentially weakening national cybersecurity infrastructure. There is a palpable fear among the staff of a decline in efficacy and a change in direction that could pose threats not just to the agency's mandate but also to the broader security landscape.
Type: Organizational Change Impacting Cybersecurity
Threat Actor: Political ClimateTrump Administration
Motivation: Reshaping AgencyReduced Corporate Oversight
Title: Potential Policy Reversal and Mission Compromise at CISA
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), created in 2018, faces uncertain times as the return of former President Trump could significantly alter its function and direction. Trump's promises to reduce government spending and oversight have CISA staffers concerned about the potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives and a shift in focus toward immigration enforcement. The agency, which has a reputation for bipartisanship and was involved in election security and countering online misinformation, now finds itself at odds with Republican claims of censorship and surveillance. The fear of policy reversal and mission compromise looms among the employees, who remain dedicated to protecting national cyber infrastructure.
Type: Policy and Mission Compromise
Threat Actor: Political Leadership Changes
Motivation: Reduction in government spending and oversight, shift in focus toward immigration enforcement
Title: Weaponized Drones Threat to US Cities
Description: The DHS memo highlighted the vulnerability of US cities to weaponized drones, with extremists potentially modifying drones to carry threats like explosives and chemicals. Despite observing nefarious drone activities, local authorities often lack the authority to intervene. To combat this, the DHS has recommended repositioning CCTV cameras, training police on handling hazardous drones, and deploying sensors for drone detection. The rising threat emphasizes the need for improved countermeasures and preparedness against unmanned aircraft systems.
Type: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Threat
Attack Vector: Weaponized Drones
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of local authority to intervene with nefarious drone activities
Threat Actor: Extremists
Motivation: To cause harm or disruption using weaponized drones
Title: Commercial Drone Threats to National Security
Description: The DHS encountered growing threats from commercial drones being modified to carry hazardous payloads, impacting national security. Attempted mitigations include improved detection and response capabilities through local law enforcement training and technology deployment. These clandestine drone activities pose a significant risk, requiring urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
Type: Physical Security Threat
Attack Vector: Modified Commercial Drones
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats
Motivation: Impact national security and critical infrastructure
Title: Weaponized Drones Threat by Violent Extremists
Description: The DHS has identified a growing threat from commercial drones being weaponized by violent extremists in the US. Although technological capabilities are advancing, state and local law enforcement lack the authority and means to effectively counter this new form of aerial menace. Despite efforts to enhance detection and response, including repositioning CCTV and training police to handle hazardous drones, the accessibility of advanced evasion technologies complicates tracking and neutralization efforts. Reports of uncorroborated drone sightings have increased public concern, prompting the DHS to seek expanded legislative counter-drone authorities.
Type: Weaponized Drones
Attack Vector: Drones
Threat Actor: Violent Extremists
Motivation: Terrorism
Title: Salt Typhoon Espionage Campaign
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faced a tumultuous period marked by significant breaches, including the Salt Typhoon espionage campaign linked to Beijing, which compromised American telecoms, collecting sensitive data such as call logs, recordings, and potential location information. The largest hack in US telecom history occurred under the leadership of Jen Easterly, who was not asked to stay post-Inauguration Day. Her departure coincided with demands for CISA to become 'smaller' and 'more nimble' and the dismissal of the Cyber Safety Review Board members who were investigating the breaches, potentially jeopardizing the agency’s future and national cybersecurity.
Type: Espionage Campaign
Attack Vector: Unknown
Threat Actor: Beijing
Motivation: Espionage
Title: Russian Basketball Player Arrested for Ransomware Negotiation
Description: Daniil Kasatkin, a professional basketball player, was arrested in France for allegedly acting as a negotiator for a ransomware gang that targeted around 900 organizations, including two US federal agencies.
Date Detected: 2023-06-21
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Ransomware Negotiation
Threat Actor: Unnamed Ransomware Gang
Motivation: Financial Gain
Title: DHS Intelligence Data Leak via Misconfigured HSIN-Intel Platform
Description: An internal DHS memo obtained via a FOIA request revealed that from March to May 2023, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) misconfigured its Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) platform, exposing restricted intelligence information to tens of thousands of unauthorized users, including US government workers (e.g., disaster response), private sector contractors, and foreign nationals. The leak involved 439 I&A 'products' accessed 1,525 times, with 518 accesses by private sector users and 46 by non-US citizens. Exposed data included law enforcement leads, reports on foreign hacking/disinformation, and analyses of domestic protests (e.g., Stop Cop City). Nearly 40% of improperly accessed materials pertained to cybersecurity threats like state-sponsored hacking.
Type: data leak
Attack Vector: misconfigured access controls (platform set to 'everyone' instead of restricted HSIN-Intel users)
Vulnerability Exploited: improper access control configuration
Title: BianLian Ransomware Group Shifts to Data Theft-Based Extortion (2023)
Description: In January 2023, the BianLian ransomware group transitioned from file encryption to data theft-based extortion after a decryption tool was released by Avast. The group, active since June 2022, gains network access via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, often obtained through phishing or initial access brokers. They deploy custom Go-based backdoors, remote management software, and tools for reconnaissance and credential harvesting. BianLian threatens to publish exfiltrated data on a leak site and demands ransom in cryptocurrency. To evade detection, they disable antivirus processes using PowerShell and Windows Command Shell. Warnings have been issued by CISA, FBI, and ACSC to critical infrastructure organizations. Mitigations include auditing RDP usage, restricting PowerShell, and enforcing strong authentication.
Date Detected: 2022-06
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-01
Type: ransomware
Attack Vector: Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) exploitationphishinginitial access brokers (IAB)custom Go-based backdoorsremote management software
Vulnerability Exploited: weak RDP credentialslack of multi-factor authentication (MFA)unrestricted PowerShell usagedisabled antivirus processes
Threat Actor: BianLian ransomware group
Motivation: financial gaindata extortion
Title: DHS Data Hub Misconfiguration Exposes National Security Information
Description: A misconfigured platform within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) exposed a data hub, allowing thousands of unauthorized users—including government/private sector workers and foreign nationals—to access sensitive national security intelligence. The exposure lasted two months (March–May 2023) and involved 439 inappropriately accessed intelligence products (1,525 total unauthorized accesses), with 518 from the private sector and 46 from non-American citizens. Exposed data included surveillance records, foreign hacking campaigns, law enforcement tips, and domestic protest analyses. The breach stemmed from a programming error in the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) platform, raising concerns about DHS's information security practices.
Date Resolved: 2023-05-31
Type: Data Exposure
Attack Vector: Misconfigured Platform (Programming Error)
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Access Controls / Platform Misconfiguration
Threat Actor: Unauthorized Government WorkersPrivate Sector EmployeesForeign Nationals
Motivation: Opportunistic AccessEspionage (Potential)Information Gathering
Title: FEMA Network Breach via Compromised Citrix Remote Desktop Credentials
Description: A hacker gained unauthorized access to FEMA's computer networks for several months in 2023, exploiting compromised credentials in Citrix Systems Inc.’s remote desktop software. The intruder breached FEMA’s Region 6 (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and stole identity data of FEMA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees. The breach was detected on **July 7**, with the hacker active from **June 22 to August 5**. FEMA disconnected the Citrix tool on **July 16** and enforced multifactor authentication (MFA). DHS Secretary Kristi Noem fired 24 FEMA employees, including IT executives, citing 'agencywide lack of MFA' and incompetence. While initially claimed that no sensitive data or citizen data was stolen, DHS later confirmed federal employee identity data was exfiltrated.
Date Detected: 2023-07-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-08-29
Date Resolved: 2023-08-05
Type: Unauthorized Access
Attack Vector: Compromised CredentialsCitrix Remote Desktop ExploitationLateral Movement via VPN SoftwareActive Directory Access
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Multifactor Authentication (MFA)Citrix Remote Desktop Software Vulnerability
Title: FEMA and CBP Data Breach (2025)
Description: An unknown hacker carried out a large-scale breach affecting FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) and CBP (Customs and Border Protection) employees, leading to the exposure of sensitive data. The incident lasted several weeks, spanning regions from New Mexico to Texas and Louisiana, and required urgent action by DHS IT leadership. The attacker exploited Citrix software used by a government contractor for remote network access, bypassing FEMA’s digital defenses. Approximately 250,000 employees' data was at risk, and about twenty FEMA IT workers were dismissed for alleged 'serious security failures.' While initial claims suggested no sensitive data was exfiltrated, internal documents later confirmed the theft of FEMA and CBP employee data. The investigation remains ongoing, with no confirmed link to broader espionage campaigns.
Date Detected: 2025-07-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Exploitation of Citrix Remote Access SoftwareLateral MovementPrivilege Escalation
Vulnerability Exploited: Misconfigured Remote Access SystemsInsufficient Identity ManagementLack of Network Segmentation
Threat Actor: Unknown (suspected advanced hacker group)
Motivation: EspionageData TheftPotential Sabotage
Title: FEMA and Customs and Border Protection Staff Data Breach
Description: A hacker gained unauthorized access to FEMA's computer networks for several months in 2025, stealing employee data from FEMA and US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The breach was facilitated via compromised credentials in Citrix Systems Inc.’s remote desktop software, affecting FEMA’s Region 6 (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas). The intruder accessed Active Directory and exfiltrated federal employee identity data. FEMA disconnected the compromised Citrix tool and enforced multifactor authentication (MFA) post-breach. The incident led to the termination of 24 FEMA employees, including IT executives, due to alleged incompetence and lack of agencywide MFA.
Date Detected: 2025-07-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Compromised CredentialsExploitation of Citrix Remote Desktop SoftwareLateral Movement via VPN Software
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Multifactor Authentication (MFA)Weak Access Controls in Citrix SystemsUnsecured Active Directory
Title: Widespread Breach of FEMA and CBP Employee Data via Citrix Vulnerability
Description: An unidentified hacker stole sensitive data from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) employees in a months-long breach (summer 2023). The attacker exploited a Citrix software vulnerability to gain deep access to FEMA's network, which handles operations across New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. The breach led to the firing of 24 FEMA IT employees, including top executives, due to 'severe lapses in security.' Initial claims by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem that no sensitive data was extracted were contradicted by internal documents confirming the theft of employee data. Containment efforts spanned from mid-July to at least September 5, 2023.
Date Detected: 2023-07-mid
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Exploitation of Citrix Remote Access SoftwareLateral Movement within Network
Vulnerability Exploited: Citrix Software Vulnerability (specific CVE unidentified)
Threat Actor: Unidentified (possibly advanced hacking group)
Motivation: EspionageData Theft
Title: DHS Data Hub Misconfiguration Exposes Sensitive Intelligence to Unauthorized Users
Description: An internal DHS memo obtained via FOIA revealed that from March to May 2023, a DHS online platform (HSIN-Intel) used to share sensitive but unclassified intelligence was misconfigured, granting access to 'everyone' instead of only authorized users. This exposed restricted intelligence to tens of thousands of unauthorized users, including non-intelligence government workers, private contractors, and foreign government staff. The incident highlights systemic failures in cloud security, including misconfigurations tied to overly permissive IAM policies, lack of segmentation, and poor access management. Additionally, a separate 2025 breach exposed 184 million plain-text user records (including credentials for Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), emphasizing the broader crisis of cloud misconfigurations driven by human error, lack of expertise, and poor governance.
Date Detected: 2023-05-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-06-01
Type: Data Exposure
Attack Vector: Misconfigured Access ControlsOverly Permissive IAM PoliciesPublicly Exposed Storage
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Public Access ConfigurationLack of SegmentationDisabled LoggingMissing Alerts
Title: FEMA Cybersecurity Breach and Staff Terminations Due to CitrixBleed Exploitation
Description: The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) terminated its CISO, CIO, and 22 other staff after an audit revealed serious security failures, including a breach in June 2024 where attackers exploited the CitrixBleed vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966) to access FEMA's Region 6 servers (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas). The breach was discovered in July 2024, despite warnings about the vulnerability being issued as early as June. FEMA initially denied data loss, but evidence suggests otherwise. The incident led to a complete overhaul of FEMA's IT department, with new staff hired to address lax security practices. The attack involved stolen credentials to access a Citrix system, followed by data exfiltration from regional servers.
Date Detected: 2024-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Stolen CredentialsExploitation of CitrixBleed Vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966)
Vulnerability Exploited: CitrixBleed (CVE-2023-4966) - CVSS 9.3 in Netscaler ADC and Gateway (Session Token Theft, MFA Bypass)
Title: Lapse of Federal Cybersecurity Programs Increases Vulnerability to Cyberattacks
Description: The expiration of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015) and the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, combined with reduced staffing at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) due to a government funding lapse, has heightened concerns about the U.S.'s vulnerability to cyberattacks. The lapse removes liability protections for companies sharing cyber-threat information, discouraging collaboration and leaving critical infrastructure at risk. Key stakeholders, including Sen. Gary Peters, have warned of potential national and economic security risks, while efforts to reauthorize the programs face political hurdles. The reduced CISA workforce may also limit the agency's ability to respond effectively to a major incident.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-10-01
Type: Policy/Regulatory Failure
Vulnerability Exploited: Lapse of CISA 2015 liability protectionsReduced CISA staffing (from ~2,500 to <900)Expiration of State and Local Cybersecurity Grant ProgramLack of real-time threat-sharing incentives
Title: Potential Cybersecurity Risks Due to CISA Downsizing Amid Government Shutdown
Description: As the U.S. government shutdown continues, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faces significant workforce reductions, budget cuts, and potential permanent downsizing. This creates heightened cybersecurity risks, as CISA—responsible for coordinating national cyber defense, protecting critical infrastructure, and combating threats from hackers, cybercriminals, and nation-states—operates with reduced capacity. Over 1,000 employees have already left CISA this year, with further Reductions in Force (RIFs) underway. Key divisions like the Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED) and Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) are targeted, raising concerns about blind spots in threat detection, response, and recovery. Political disputes and misinformation-related controversies have also contributed to the agency's challenges, despite its critical role in national defense.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-10-01
Type: Operational Risk
Vulnerability Exploited: Reduced Workforce CapacityBudget ConstraintsPolitical DistractionsDelayed Threat Response
Threat Actor: Nation-State ActorsCybercriminalsHacktivistsOpportunistic Hackers
Motivation: Exploit Government VulnerabilitiesDisrupt Critical InfrastructureLeverage Political InstabilityCapitalize on Reduced Oversight
Title: Social Security Number (SSN) Lock and Credit Freeze Advisory for Identity Theft Prevention
Description: The article discusses the importance of locking your Social Security Number (SSN) and freezing credit to prevent identity theft, particularly employment fraud and unauthorized credit account openings. It outlines two methods to lock an SSN: contacting the Social Security Administration (SSA) or using the E-Verify Self Lock feature. The article also highlights the differences between SSN locks and credit freezes, their limitations, and additional protective measures like IRS Identity Protection PINs and credit monitoring services.
Type: Identity Theft Prevention Advisory
Threat Actor: Identity Thieves / Fraudsters
Motivation: Financial Gain (e.g., unauthorized loans, employment fraud, government benefits fraud)
Title: FBI Warns of AI-Powered Smishing and Vishing Scams Targeting U.S. Government Officials
Description: The FBI has disclosed a coordinated campaign involving smishing (malicious text messages) and vishing (AI-generated voice messages) targeting senior U.S. government officials (current/former) and their contacts since April 2025. Attackers impersonate trusted figures to harvest credentials, spread disinformation, or commit fraud. The scams exploit AI voice cloning, publicly available data, and trust-based manipulation. Victims are tricked into revealing sensitive information or granting account access via fake messaging platforms or malicious links.
Date Detected: 2025-04
Type: social engineering
Attack Vector: SMS/MMS (smishing)voice calls/voicemails (vishing)AI-generated audiomalicious linksfake messaging platformstrust exploitation
Vulnerability Exploited: human trustlack of multi-factor authentication (MFA)publicly available personal data (e.g., photos, job titles)AI voice cloning limitationsurgency/authority manipulation
Motivation: financial gaincredential harvestingdisinformationespionagefraudnetwork infiltration
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Breach.
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Email Account, RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs), Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials), Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor), Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials), Citrix Remote Access Software, Misconfigured HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach), Citrix System (via stolen credentials) and SMS/MMS messagesvoice calls/voicemailsfake messaging platforms.
Data Compromised: Names, Birthdates, Nationalities, Locations
Data Compromised: Addresses, Bank account information, Social security numbers
Identity Theft Risk: High
Payment Information Risk: High
Systems Affected: More than 800 susceptible systems
Data Compromised: 200gb of data, including records of 20,000 fbi workers and 9,000 dhs employees, Information about dhs security experts, programme analysts, it, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence
Brand Reputation Impact: High
Identity Theft Risk: High
Data Compromised: Employee names, Social security numbers, Dates of birth, Positions, Grades, Duty locations
Systems Affected: DHS OIG Case Management System
Operational Impact: Reduced effectiveness or existential crisis
Systems Affected: Government Systems
Operational Impact: Potential Decline in Efficacy
Brand Reputation Impact: Weakening National Cybersecurity Infrastructure
Operational Impact: Potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives
Operational Impact: High
Data Compromised: Call logs, Recordings, Potential location information
Data Compromised: Law enforcement leads and tips, Reports on foreign hacking and disinformation campaigns, Analysis of domestic protest movements (e.g., stop cop city protests in atlanta), Cybersecurity intelligence (39% of exposed products), Media reports praising violent actions against police
Systems Affected: Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) platform
Operational Impact: exposure of sensitive but unclassified intelligence to unauthorized parties, undermining trust in DHS information security
Brand Reputation Impact: eroded public and stakeholder trust in DHS's ability to secure sensitive intelligence data
Brand Reputation Impact: high (due to public leak threats and warnings from CISA/FBI/ACSC)
Identity Theft Risk: potential (if PII was exfiltrated)
Data Compromised: Surveillance records of american citizens, Foreign hacking/disinformation campaigns, Law enforcement tips, Domestic protest examinations, Cybersecurity intelligence (39% of accessed products)
Systems Affected: DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) PlatformHomeland Security Information Network (HSIN)
Operational Impact: Loss of trust among agencies sharing information via the hub; potential compromise of sensitive intelligence operations
Brand Reputation Impact: Significant reputational damage to DHS's claims of secure information handling; erosion of confidence in HSIN's security
Data Compromised: Federal employee identity data (fema & cbp)
Systems Affected: FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Tool
Downtime: {'start': '2023-06-22', 'end': '2023-08-05', 'description': 'Hacker present in network for ~45 days; Citrix tool disconnected on 2023-07-16.'}
Operational Impact: Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access ToolEnforcement of Multifactor AuthenticationFiring of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives)
Brand Reputation Impact: Public Disclosure of IT Leadership FailuresMedia Coverage (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (Federal Employee Data Stolen)']
Data Compromised: Fema employee data, Cbp employee data
Systems Affected: FEMA Computer NetworkDHS Systems (partial)Citrix Remote Access Infrastructure
Downtime: Several weeks (from at least mid-July to September 2025)
Operational Impact: Disruption of DHS/FEMA OperationsPersonnel Dismissals (20 IT workers)Administrative Leave for Additional StaffEmergency Directives Issued for Federal Network Hardening
Brand Reputation Impact: Public Scrutiny of FEMA/DHS CybersecurityPolitical Controversy Over Agency RestructuringLoss of Trust in Federal Data Protection
Identity Theft Risk: High (for 250,000+ employees)
Data Compromised: Federal employee identity data (fema and cbp)
Systems Affected: FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Software
Operational Impact: Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access ToolEnforcement of MFATermination of 24 Employees (Including IT Executives)
Brand Reputation Impact: Public Disclosure of Cyber LapsesTermination of Senior IT StaffMedia Coverage (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Identity Theft Risk: ['Federal Employee Data (Potential Risk)']
Data Compromised: Fema employee data, Cbp employee data
Systems Affected: FEMA Computer Network (regional: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)Citrix Remote Access Software
Downtime: At least 7+ weeks (mid-July to September 5, 2023)
Operational Impact: Urgent cleanup operation by DHS IT officialsDisruption to FEMA/CBP operationsFiring of 24 IT employees (including top executives)
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of trust in DHS/FEMA cybersecurity capabilitiesControversy over employee firings and political motivations
Identity Theft Risk: High (employee data stolen)
Data Compromised: Sensitive intelligence (dhs), 184m user records (2025 breach), Plain-text credentials (apple, google, meta, etc.), Bank accounts, Health platforms, Government portals
Systems Affected: HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach)
Operational Impact: Unauthorized Access to Restricted IntelligenceIncreased Risk of Identity Theft/Phishing (2025 Breach)Credential Stuffing Attacks
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Trust in DHS/Federal AgenciesReputation Damage for Affected Platforms (Apple, Google, etc.)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (184M Records Exposed in Plain Text)']
Payment Information Risk: ['High (Bank Account Details Exposed in 2025 Breach)']
Data Compromised: Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss, but documents suggest exfiltration occurred)
Systems Affected: Citrix SystemFEMA Region 6 Servers (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Operational Impact: Major IT staff overhaul, including termination of CISO, CIO, and 22 others; new security measures implemented (password resets, MFA enforcement)
Brand Reputation Impact: High (public disclosure of security failures, terminations, and misleading claims)
Identity Theft Risk: Potential (if PII was exfiltrated)
Operational Impact: Reduced federal cybersecurity response capabilityDiscouraged private-sector information sharingIncreased legal/regulatory risks for companies sharing threat dataPotential delays in state/local government cybersecurity improvements
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of public trust in federal cybersecurity preparednessPerception of political dysfunction hindering cyber defense
Legal Liabilities: Loss of antitrust protections for threat-sharing companiesRisk of FOIA-disclosure of shared threat dataPotential regulatory fines for companies sharing information without protections
Systems Affected: Critical Infrastructure (e.g., power grids, water treatment plants)Federal Cyber Defense SystemsThreat Intelligence Sharing Platforms
Operational Impact: Reduced Threat Detection CapabilitiesDelayed Incident ResponseWeakened Partnership CoordinationIncreased Risk of Successful Cyber Attacks
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Public Trust in Government CybersecurityPerception of Political Interference in National Security
Data Compromised: Social security numbers (ssns), Potential personally identifiable information (pii) in breaches
Identity Theft Risk: High (employment fraud, tax fraud, credit account fraud)
Data Compromised: Personal information, Login credentials, Contact lists, Potentially sensitive government communications
Brand Reputation Impact: potential erosion of trust in government communicationsreputational damage to impersonated officials
Identity Theft Risk: high
Payment Information Risk: high
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Personal Information, , Addresses, Bank Account Information, Social Security Numbers, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Job Titles, Phone Numbers, Email Addresses, , Personally Identifiable Information, , Call Logs, Recordings, Potential Location Information, , Sensitive But Unclassified Intelligence, Investigative Leads, Law Enforcement Tips, Foreign Hacking/Disinformation Reports, Domestic Protest Analyses, Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence, , Classified/Restricted Intelligence Products, Surveillance Data, Cyber Threat Intelligence, Law Enforcement Investigations, Domestic Protest Analysis, , Employee Identity Data, , Employee Records, Potentially Sensitive Operational Data, , Federal Employee Identity Data, , Employee Data (Fema/Cbp), , Intelligence Reports (Dhs), User Credentials (Plain Text), Bank Account Details, Health Data, Government Portal Access, , Social Security Numbers (Ssns), Potentially Other Pii In Unrelated Breaches, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Credentials, Contact Lists, Potentially Sensitive Communications and .
Entity Name: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Government
Location: United States
Customers Affected: More than 6,000 immigrants
Entity Name: FEMA
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United States
Customers Affected: 2300000
Entity Type: Critical Infrastructure Organizations
Entity Name: Department of Justice
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Entity Name: FBI
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Government
Size: Large
Entity Name: CISA
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Entity Type: US Cities
Industry: Public Safety
Location: United States
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Organization
Industry: Security
Location: United States
Entity Name: American Telecoms
Entity Type: Telecommunications
Industry: Telecommunications
Location: United States
Entity Type: Organization
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: federal government agency
Industry: national security/homeland security
Location: United States
Entity Name: DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
Entity Type: intelligence agency (subdivision of DHS)
Industry: intelligence/law enforcement
Location: United States
Entity Name: Unauthorized HSIN Users
Entity Type: government workers (non-intelligence/law enforcement), private sector contractors, foreign government staff
Location: United Statesinternational (foreign nationals)
Size: tens of thousands (439 products accessed 1,525 times; 518 by private sector, 46 by non-US citizens)
Entity Type: critical infrastructure organizations
Location: United StatesAustraliaglobal (targeted warnings)
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Federal Government Agency
Industry: National Security / Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration / Emergency Management
Location: United States (Region 6: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Customers Affected: Federal Employees (FEMA & CBP)
Entity Name: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement / Border Security
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Federal Employees
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Emergency Management
Location: Washington, D.C., USA (HQ); regions including New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana
Size: Large (250,000+ employees across DHS)
Entity Name: Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Border Security
Location: USA
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Federal Department
Industry: National Security
Location: USA
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration / Emergency Management
Location: USA (Region 6: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Entity Name: US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement / Border Security
Location: USA
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration / Emergency Management
Location: USA (regional focus: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)
Size: 250,000+ employees (DHS-wide)
Customers Affected: FEMA and CBP employees (number unspecified)
Entity Name: Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement / Border Security
Location: USA
Customers Affected: CBP employees (number unspecified)
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Federal Department
Industry: National Security
Location: USA
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Customers Affected: Tens of thousands (HSIN users)
Entity Name: Multiple Global Platforms (Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, etc.)
Entity Type: Tech Companies, Social Media, Cloud Providers
Industry: Technology
Location: Global
Size: Fortune 2000
Customers Affected: 184 million users (2025 Breach)
Entity Name: FBI
Entity Type: Law Enforcement
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Entity Name: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Entity Type: Intelligence Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Entity Name: Local Law Enforcement & Intelligence Fusion Centers
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Safety
Location: United States
Size: Varies
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Emergency Management
Location: United States (Region 6: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Entity Name: U.S. Federal Government (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Size: Large (reduced from ~2,500 to <900 employees during shutdown)
Customers Affected: All U.S. critical infrastructure sectors
Entity Name: State and Local Governments (e.g., schools, hospitals, water systems)
Entity Type: Public Sector
Industry: Multiple (Education, Healthcare, Utilities)
Location: United States
Size: Varies
Customers Affected: Millions of U.S. residents reliant on public services
Entity Name: Private-Sector Companies (e.g., Cyber Threat Alliance members)
Entity Type: Corporate
Industry: Multiple (Cybersecurity, Critical Infrastructure)
Location: United States (primarily)
Size: Varies
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Size: 2,540 employees (pre-reductions)
Customers Affected: U.S. Federal Government, State and Local Governments, Critical Infrastructure Operators, Private Sector Partners
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Entity Name: Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED)
Entity Type: Agency Division
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Customers Affected: National and International Partners
Entity Name: Infrastructure Security Division (ISD)
Entity Type: Agency Division
Industry: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Power Grid Operators, Water Treatment Facilities, Chemical Security Facilities
Entity Name: General Public (U.S. Citizens/Residents)
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: United States
Entity Name: Social Security Administration (SSA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration
Location: United States
Entity Name: E-Verify (USCIS & SSA)
Entity Type: Government Service
Industry: Employment Verification
Location: United States
Entity Name: Credit Bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion)
Entity Type: Private Companies
Industry: Financial Services
Location: United States
Entity Name: U.S. Federal Government
Entity Type: government
Industry: public administration
Location: United States
Entity Name: U.S. State Governments
Entity Type: government
Industry: public administration
Location: United States
Entity Name: Personal Contacts of Targeted Officials
Entity Type: individuals
Location: United States (primarily)
Remediation Measures: Notification letters sent to affected individualsAdditional security measures implemented to restrict access to information
Containment Measures: Improved detection and response capabilitiesLocal law enforcement trainingTechnology deployment
Law Enforcement Notified: Yes
Containment Measures: Repositioning CCTVTraining police to handle hazardous drones
Containment Measures: auditing RDP usagedisabling command-line scriptingrestricting PowerShell
Remediation Measures: enforcing strong authentication (e.g., MFA)patching vulnerable systems
Communication Strategy: warnings issued by CISA, FBI, and ACSC
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (internal memo via Brennan Center for Justice)
Third Party Assistance: Brennan Center For Justice (Via Foia Disclosure).
Communication Strategy: Limited (internal memo obtained via FOIA; no public statement detailed)
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: Disconnected Citrix Remote Access Tool (2023-07-16)Enforced Multifactor Authentication
Communication Strategy: Public Statement by DHS Secretary (2023-08-29)Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (DHS IT leadership urgent action)
Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (no explicit confirmation)
Containment Measures: Localization of Breach (mid-July 2025)Network SegmentationAccess Revocation
Remediation Measures: Ongoing as of September 5, 2025Emergency Directive for Federal Network HardeningIdentity Management Reforms
Communication Strategy: Internal FEMA Staff UpdatesPublic Statements by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi NoemMedia Coverage (CNN)
Network Segmentation: Implemented post-breach
Enhanced Monitoring: Yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities)
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access Tool (2025-07-16)Enforcement of Multifactor Authentication (MFA)
Communication Strategy: Public Statement by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem (2025-08-29)Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (DHS Task Force formed)
Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (internal DHS investigation)
Containment Measures: Initial efforts launched mid-July 2023Ongoing remediation as of September 5, 2023
Remediation Measures: Cleanup operation by DHS IT officialsFiring of 24 FEMA IT employees
Communication Strategy: Internal FEMA staff updatesPublic statement by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem (August 29, 2023)
Communication Strategy: FOIA Disclosure (DHS Memo)Media Reports (WIRED)
Network Segmentation: ['Recommended as Corrective Action']
Enhanced Monitoring: Recommended as Corrective Action
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (post-discovery)
Containment Measures: Password resetsMulti-Factor Authentication (MFA) enforcement
Remediation Measures: IT staff overhaulNew security personnel hired
Communication Strategy: Public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss)
Third Party Assistance: Cyber Threat Alliance (Information-Sharing Coordination), Internet Security Alliance (Advocacy For Policy Updates).
Remediation Measures: Sen. Gary Peters' 10-year CISA 2015 reauthorization bill (Protecting America from Cyber Threats Act)House Homeland Security Committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by Rep. Andrew Garbarino)Proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, AI threats)Incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by Internet Security Alliance)
Recovery Measures: Short-term extensions via Continuing Resolution (CR) in House/Senate billsPotential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles
Communication Strategy: Sen. Peters' public warnings about national/economic security risksMedia outreach by Cyber Threat Alliance and Internet Security AllianceHouse Democratic staffer comments on program success in state/local governments
Communication Strategy: Public Warnings by Cybersecurity ExpertsMedia Coverage Highlighting Risks
Third Party Assistance: Identity Protection Services, Credit Monitoring Services.
Containment Measures: SSN Lock via SSA or E-VerifyCredit Freeze via Credit BureausIRS Identity Protection PIN
Remediation Measures: Monitoring financial accountsDark web monitoring (via ID theft protection services)White glove restoration services for identity recovery
Recovery Measures: Unlocking SSN for legitimate use (e.g., employment verification)Temporary lift of credit freeze for authorized credit applications
Communication Strategy: Public advisory via CNET articleSSA and E-Verify user notifications (e.g., lock expiration alerts)
Enhanced Monitoring: Credit monitoringDark web monitoring for compromised PII
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: public service announcement (PSA)awareness campaignreporting via IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center)
Remediation Measures: password changesmulti-factor authentication (MFA) enforcementaccount monitoring
Communication Strategy: FBI PSAmedia outreachdirect warnings to potential targets
Enhanced Monitoring: recommendation for individuals to monitor accounts
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Yes (internal memo via Brennan Center for Justice), , Yes (DHS IT leadership urgent action), , Yes (DHS Task Force formed), Yes (post-discovery), .
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through Brennan Center for Justice (via FOIA disclosure), , Cyber Threat Alliance (information-sharing coordination), Internet Security Alliance (advocacy for policy updates), , Identity Protection Services, Credit Monitoring Services, .
Type of Data Compromised: Personal information
Number of Records Exposed: More than 6,000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Type of Data Compromised: Addresses, Bank account information, Social security numbers
Number of Records Exposed: 2300000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Job titles, Phone numbers, Email addresses
Number of Records Exposed: 29,000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information
Number of Records Exposed: 247167
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: Employee namesSocial Security numbersDates of birthPositionsGradesDuty locations
Type of Data Compromised: Call logs, Recordings, Potential location information
Sensitivity of Data: High
Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive but unclassified intelligence, Investigative leads, Law enforcement tips, Foreign hacking/disinformation reports, Domestic protest analyses, Cybersecurity threat intelligence
Number of Records Exposed: 439 I&A 'products' accessed 1,525 times
Sensitivity of Data: sensitive but unclassified (restricted to HSIN-Intel users)
Type of Data Compromised: Classified/restricted intelligence products, Surveillance data, Cyber threat intelligence, Law enforcement investigations, Domestic protest analysis
Number of Records Exposed: 439 intelligence products (accessed 1,525 times)
Sensitivity of Data: High (National Security Intelligence; Sensitive/Classified)
Data Exfiltration: Unconfirmed (accessed but no evidence of exfiltration in report)
Personally Identifiable Information: Potential (surveillance data may include PII)
Type of Data Compromised: Employee identity data
Sensitivity of Data: High (Federal Employee Information)
Type of Data Compromised: Employee records, Potentially sensitive operational data
Number of Records Exposed: 250,000+ (employees across DHS/FEMA/CBP)
Sensitivity of Data: High (government employee data)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (contradicts initial denial by Secretary Noem)
Personally Identifiable Information: Likely (employee details)
Type of Data Compromised: Federal employee identity data
Sensitivity of Data: High (Government Employee PII)
Type of Data Compromised: Employee data (fema/cbp)
Sensitivity of Data: High (government employee information)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (contradicts initial DHS denial)
Personally Identifiable Information: Likely (employee records)
Type of Data Compromised: Intelligence reports (dhs), User credentials (plain text), Bank account details, Health data, Government portal access
Number of Records Exposed: Undisclosed (DHS), 184 million (2025 Breach)
Sensitivity of Data: High (Intelligence/National Security)Critical (Financial/Health Data)
Data Exfiltration: Likely (2025 Breach)Unconfirmed (DHS)
Data Encryption: ['None (Plain-Text Records in 2025 Breach)']
File Types Exposed: Database RecordsAuthorization URLsCredentials
Personally Identifiable Information: UsernamesPasswordsBank Account DetailsHealth Records
Data Exfiltration: Yes (from FEMA Region 6 servers)
Personally Identifiable Information: Potential (unconfirmed)
Type of Data Compromised: Social security numbers (ssns), Potentially other pii in unrelated breaches
Sensitivity of Data: High (SSNs are critical for financial and employment identity verification)
Personally Identifiable Information: SSNsPotentially names, addresses, or other PII linked to SSNs
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Credentials, Contact lists, Potentially sensitive communications
Sensitivity of Data: high
Data Exfiltration: likely
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Notification letters sent to affected individuals, Additional security measures implemented to restrict access to information, , enforcing strong authentication (e.g., MFA), patching vulnerable systems, , Ongoing as of September 5, 2025, Emergency Directive for Federal Network Hardening, Identity Management Reforms, , Cleanup operation by DHS IT officials, Firing of 24 FEMA IT employees, , IT staff overhaul, New security personnel hired, , Sen. Gary Peters' 10-year CISA 2015 reauthorization bill (Protecting America from Cyber Threats Act), House Homeland Security Committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by Rep. Andrew Garbarino), Proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, AI threats), Incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by Internet Security Alliance), , Monitoring financial accounts, Dark web monitoring (via ID theft protection services), White glove restoration services for identity recovery, , password changes, multi-factor authentication (MFA) enforcement, account monitoring, .
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by improved detection and response capabilities, local law enforcement training, technology deployment, , repositioning cctv, training police to handle hazardous drones, , auditing rdp usage, disabling command-line scripting, restricting powershell, , disconnected citrix remote access tool (2023-07-16), enforced multifactor authentication, , localization of breach (mid-july 2025), network segmentation, access revocation, , disconnection of citrix remote access tool (2025-07-16), enforcement of multifactor authentication (mfa), , initial efforts launched mid-july 2023, ongoing remediation as of september 5, 2023, , password resets, multi-factor authentication (mfa) enforcement, , ssn lock via ssa or e-verify, credit freeze via credit bureaus, irs identity protection pin, , public service announcement (psa), awareness campaign, reporting via ic3 (internet crime complaint center) and .
Ransom Demanded: True
Ransomware Strain: BianLian
Data Exfiltration: True
Data Exfiltration: Yes (separate from ransomware)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (but not ransomware-related)
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Short-term extensions via Continuing Resolution (CR) in House/Senate bills, Potential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles, , Unlocking SSN for legitimate use (e.g., employment verification), Temporary lift of credit freeze for authorized credit applications, .
Legal Actions: Pending Extradition to the US
Regulatory Notifications: CISAFBIACSC warnings issued
Legal Actions: Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Leadership),
Regulations Violated: Potential FISMA (Federal Information Security Modernization Act) Non-Compliance, DHS Internal Security Policies,
Legal Actions: Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others,
Regulatory Notifications: Internal DHS/FEMA ReportsCongressional Oversight (potential open letter)
Legal Actions: Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives),
Regulatory Notifications: Internal DHS Investigation
Legal Actions: Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired),
Regulations Violated: Potential FISMA (DHS), GDPR (if EU citizens affected in 2025 Breach), State Data Breach Laws,
Regulatory Notifications: FOIA Disclosure (DHS)
Regulations Violated: Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015),
Regulatory Notifications: Lapse of FOIA exemptions for shared threat dataLoss of antitrust protections for collaborating companies
Regulatory Notifications: FBI public advisory
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Pending Extradition to the US, Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Leadership), , Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others, , Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives), , Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired), .
Lessons Learned: Ensure that only necessary data is shared with contractors to perform their official duties.
Lessons Learned: Improved countermeasures and preparedness against unmanned aircraft systems are necessary.
Lessons Learned: Urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies are necessary to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
Lessons Learned: RDP remains a high-risk attack vector if not properly secured., Disabling antivirus processes via PowerShell is a common evasion tactic., Initial access brokers play a key role in facilitating ransomware attacks., Shift from encryption to extortion highlights the need for data protection beyond backups.
Lessons Learned: Critical gaps in access controls and platform configuration within high-security government systems; need for stricter auditing of user permissions and real-time monitoring of sensitive data hubs.
Lessons Learned: Critical need for multifactor authentication (MFA) across all systems., Vulnerabilities in third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix) require proactive monitoring., Lateral movement risks in Active Directory highlight the need for segmentation and access controls., Delayed detection (hacker active for ~45 days) underscores gaps in continuous threat monitoring.
Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities in remote access systems (e.g., Citrix) require immediate patching and monitoring., Personnel changes without transparent justification can undermine morale and operational trust., Contradictory public statements (e.g., data exfiltration denials) erode credibility during crises., Federal agencies must prioritize network segmentation and identity management to limit lateral movement.
Lessons Learned: Critical importance of enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) agencywide., Need for robust monitoring of third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix)., Consequences of inadequate access controls in Active Directory., Accountability for IT leadership failures in cybersecurity posture.
Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities in Citrix remote access software require urgent patching, Need for improved network segmentation and lateral movement detection, Political and operational risks of public contradictions in breach disclosures
Lessons Learned: Misconfigurations are systemic failures tied to people, process, and policy—not just technical oversights., Overly permissive IAM policies and lack of segmentation enable broad unauthorized access., Publicly exposed storage buckets/databases with sensitive data create high-risk vectors., Plain-text credential storage exacerbates identity theft and fraud risks., Cloud drift and lack of context in security tools lead to alert fatigue and missed critical issues., Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale.
Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed) must be patched promptly. Transparency in incident reporting is essential to maintain trust. Security preparedness claims must be audited rigorously to prevent misrepresentation.
Lessons Learned: Short-term legislative patches are insufficient for cybersecurity operations requiring long-term certainty., Political objections (e.g., Sen. Rand Paul's conflation of CISA 2015 with the CISA agency) can derail critical cybersecurity measures., Corporate legal teams may hesitate to share threat data without liability protections, even if operational teams support collaboration., State/local cybersecurity grants have tangible impacts on community resilience (e.g., schools, hospitals)., CISA's reduced staffing during shutdowns creates systemic vulnerability to major incidents.
Lessons Learned: Politicization of cybersecurity agencies undermines national defense capabilities., Workforce reductions in critical agencies create exploitable vulnerabilities during high-threat periods., Budget cuts to threat intelligence and infrastructure protection increase systemic risks., Public-private partnerships require stable, well-funded government coordination to be effective.
Lessons Learned: Proactive measures like SSN locks and credit freezes can mitigate identity theft risks., SSN locks are particularly effective against employment fraud but require manual management for legitimate use cases., Layered defenses (e.g., SSN lock + credit freeze + IRS PIN) provide stronger protection., Monitoring services (credit/dark web) add an extra layer of detection for compromised data.
Lessons Learned: AI-powered scams are increasingly sophisticated and can bypass traditional skepticism., Trust-based attacks exploit human psychology, requiring behavioral defenses (e.g., verification habits)., Publicly available data (e.g., LinkedIn, social media) fuels convincing impersonations., Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is critical but must be paired with user education to prevent code-sharing., Proactive communication from authorities can mitigate large-scale campaigns.
Recommendations: Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information.
Recommendations: Repositioning CCTV cameras, Training police on handling hazardous drones, Deploying sensors for drone detectionRepositioning CCTV cameras, Training police on handling hazardous drones, Deploying sensors for drone detectionRepositioning CCTV cameras, Training police on handling hazardous drones, Deploying sensors for drone detection
Recommendations: Improve detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threatsImprove detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threatsImprove detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats
Recommendations: Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.
Recommendations: Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data.Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data.Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data.Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data.
Recommendations: Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.
Recommendations: Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.
Recommendations: Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.
Recommendations: Conduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidentsConduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidentsConduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidents
Recommendations: Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.
Recommendations: Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.
Recommendations: Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.
Recommendations: Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.
Recommendations: Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.
Recommendations: For Organizations: Train employees on recognizing AI-generated scams (e.g., voice artifacts, tone inconsistencies)., Implement strict MFA policies and phishing-resistant authentication methods., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials linked to employees., Establish clear protocols for verifying high-stakes requests (e.g., fund transfers)., Collaborate with law enforcement to share threat intelligence., For Organizations: Train employees on recognizing AI-generated scams (e.g., voice artifacts, tone inconsistencies)., Implement strict MFA policies and phishing-resistant authentication methods., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials linked to employees., Establish clear protocols for verifying high-stakes requests (e.g., fund transfers)., Collaborate with law enforcement to share threat intelligence..
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Ensure that only necessary data is shared with contractors to perform their official duties.Improved countermeasures and preparedness against unmanned aircraft systems are necessary.Urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies are necessary to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.RDP remains a high-risk attack vector if not properly secured.,Disabling antivirus processes via PowerShell is a common evasion tactic.,Initial access brokers play a key role in facilitating ransomware attacks.,Shift from encryption to extortion highlights the need for data protection beyond backups.Critical gaps in access controls and platform configuration within high-security government systems; need for stricter auditing of user permissions and real-time monitoring of sensitive data hubs.Critical need for multifactor authentication (MFA) across all systems.,Vulnerabilities in third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix) require proactive monitoring.,Lateral movement risks in Active Directory highlight the need for segmentation and access controls.,Delayed detection (hacker active for ~45 days) underscores gaps in continuous threat monitoring.Critical vulnerabilities in remote access systems (e.g., Citrix) require immediate patching and monitoring.,Personnel changes without transparent justification can undermine morale and operational trust.,Contradictory public statements (e.g., data exfiltration denials) erode credibility during crises.,Federal agencies must prioritize network segmentation and identity management to limit lateral movement.Critical importance of enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) agencywide.,Need for robust monitoring of third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix).,Consequences of inadequate access controls in Active Directory.,Accountability for IT leadership failures in cybersecurity posture.Critical vulnerabilities in Citrix remote access software require urgent patching,Need for improved network segmentation and lateral movement detection,Political and operational risks of public contradictions in breach disclosuresMisconfigurations are systemic failures tied to people, process, and policy—not just technical oversights.,Overly permissive IAM policies and lack of segmentation enable broad unauthorized access.,Publicly exposed storage buckets/databases with sensitive data create high-risk vectors.,Plain-text credential storage exacerbates identity theft and fraud risks.,Cloud drift and lack of context in security tools lead to alert fatigue and missed critical issues.,Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale.Critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed) must be patched promptly. Transparency in incident reporting is essential to maintain trust. Security preparedness claims must be audited rigorously to prevent misrepresentation.Short-term legislative patches are insufficient for cybersecurity operations requiring long-term certainty.,Political objections (e.g., Sen. Rand Paul's conflation of CISA 2015 with the CISA agency) can derail critical cybersecurity measures.,Corporate legal teams may hesitate to share threat data without liability protections, even if operational teams support collaboration.,State/local cybersecurity grants have tangible impacts on community resilience (e.g., schools, hospitals).,CISA's reduced staffing during shutdowns creates systemic vulnerability to major incidents.Politicization of cybersecurity agencies undermines national defense capabilities.,Workforce reductions in critical agencies create exploitable vulnerabilities during high-threat periods.,Budget cuts to threat intelligence and infrastructure protection increase systemic risks.,Public-private partnerships require stable, well-funded government coordination to be effective.Proactive measures like SSN locks and credit freezes can mitigate identity theft risks.,SSN locks are particularly effective against employment fraud but require manual management for legitimate use cases.,Layered defenses (e.g., SSN lock + credit freeze + IRS PIN) provide stronger protection.,Monitoring services (credit/dark web) add an extra layer of detection for compromised data.AI-powered scams are increasingly sophisticated and can bypass traditional skepticism.,Trust-based attacks exploit human psychology, requiring behavioral defenses (e.g., verification habits).,Publicly available data (e.g., LinkedIn, social media) fuels convincing impersonations.,Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is critical but must be paired with user education to prevent code-sharing.,Proactive communication from authorities can mitigate large-scale campaigns.
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats., Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information. and Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based..
Source: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program
Source: Motherboard
Source: DHS Memo
Source: AFP
Source: WIRED
Source: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (Brennan Center for Justice)
Source: DHS internal memo (obtained via FOIA)
Source: CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware
Source: FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics
Source: ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat
Source: Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023)
Source: WIRED
Source: Brennan Center for Justice (FOIA Obtained DHS Memo)
Source: Bloomberg News
Source: Nextgov/FCW
Source: DHS Public Statement (2023-08-29)
Source: Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN)
Date Accessed: 2025-09-10
Source: DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach)
Date Accessed: 2025-09
Source: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem
Date Accessed: 2025-08-29
Source: AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo)
Date Accessed: 2025-02-11
Source: Bloomberg News
URL: https://www.bloomberg.com
Date Accessed: 2025-09-05
Source: DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem)
Date Accessed: 2025-08-29
Source: CNN
Source: NextGov/FCW
Source: DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023)
Source: WIRED
URL: https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/
Date Accessed: 2023-06-01
Source: Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher)
Date Accessed: 2025-06-01
Source: Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security Vulnerabilities
Source: CrowdStrike - Common Cloud Misconfigurations
URL: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/
Date Accessed: 2023-01-01
Source: SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration Prevention
URL: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/
Source: SecPod - Top 10 Cloud Misconfigurations
URL: https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/
Source: Nextgov
Source: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem
Source: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed
Source: Politico
Source: Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements
Source: Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel)
Source: Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton)
Source: House Homeland Security Committee
Source: ClearanceJobs
Source: SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO)
Source: Social Security Administration (SSA)
URL: https://www.ssa.gov
Source: E-Verify (USCIS)
Source: IRS Identity Protection PIN
URL: https://www.irs.gov/identity-theft-fraud-scams/get-an-identity-protection-pin
Source: FBI Public Service Announcement (PSA)
URL: https://www.ic3.gov
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) ProgramUrl: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware, and Source: Motherboard, and Source: DHS Memo, and Source: AFP, and Source: WIRED, and Source: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (Brennan Center for Justice), and Source: DHS internal memo (obtained via FOIA), and Source: CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware, and Source: FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics, and Source: ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat, and Source: Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023), and Source: WIRED, and Source: Brennan Center for Justice (FOIA Obtained DHS Memo), and Source: Bloomberg News, and Source: Nextgov/FCW, and Source: DHS Public Statement (2023-08-29), and Source: CNNDate Accessed: 2025-09-12, and Source: Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN)Date Accessed: 2025-09-10, and Source: DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach)Date Accessed: 2025-09, and Source: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi NoemDate Accessed: 2025-08-29, and Source: AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo)Url: https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fema-headquarters-is-pictured-in-washington-dc-on-february-news-photo/1238567890Date Accessed: 2025-02-11, and Source: Bloomberg NewsUrl: https://www.bloomberg.comDate Accessed: 2025-09-05, and Source: Nextgov/FCWUrl: https://www.nextgov.comDate Accessed: 2025-09-05, and Source: DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem)Date Accessed: 2025-08-29, and Source: CNN, and Source: NextGov/FCW, and Source: DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023), and Source: WIREDUrl: https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/Date Accessed: 2023-06-01, and Source: Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher)Date Accessed: 2025-06-01, and Source: Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security VulnerabilitiesUrl: https://www.wiz.io/academy/top-cloud-vulnerabilities, and Source: CrowdStrike - Common Cloud MisconfigurationsUrl: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/Date Accessed: 2023-01-01, and Source: SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration PreventionUrl: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/, and Source: SecPod - Top 10 Cloud MisconfigurationsUrl: https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/, and Source: Nextgov, and Source: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem, and Source: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed, and Source: Politico, and Source: Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements, and Source: Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel), and Source: Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton), and Source: House Homeland Security Committee, and Source: ClearanceJobs, and Source: SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO), and Source: CNETUrl: https://www.cnet.com, and Source: Social Security Administration (SSA)Url: https://www.ssa.gov, and Source: E-Verify (USCIS)Url: https://www.e-verify.gov, and Source: IRS Identity Protection PINUrl: https://www.irs.gov/identity-theft-fraud-scams/get-an-identity-protection-pin, and Source: FBI Public Service Announcement (PSA)Url: https://www.ic3.gov.
Investigation Status: Ongoing
Investigation Status: completed (internal DHS inquiry documented in memo)
Investigation Status: ongoing (warnings active as of 2023)
Investigation Status: Internal investigation confirmed via FOIA-disclosed memo; no public update on further actions.
Investigation Status: Completed (DHS Internal Investigation)
Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of September 2025)
Investigation Status: Completed (DHS Internal Investigation)
Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of September 2023)
Investigation Status: ['DHS Internal Inquiry Completed (2023)', '2025 Breach Under Investigation']
Investigation Status: Ongoing (audit findings released, but full scope of breach unclear)
Investigation Status: Ongoing (political/legislative; no technical investigation)
Investigation Status: Ongoing (Political and Operational Review)
Investigation Status: ongoing
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Warnings Issued By Cisa, Fbi, And Acsc, Limited (internal memo obtained via FOIA; no public statement detailed), Public Statement By Dhs Secretary (2023-08-29), Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/Fcw), Internal Fema Staff Updates, Public Statements By Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, Media Coverage (Cnn), Public Statement By Dhs Secretary Kristi Noem (2025-08-29), Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/Fcw), Internal Fema Staff Updates, Public Statement By Dhs Secretary Kristi Noem (August 29, 2023), Foia Disclosure (Dhs Memo), Media Reports (Wired), Public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss), Sen. Peters' Public Warnings About National/Economic Security Risks, Media Outreach By Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance, House Democratic Staffer Comments On Program Success In State/Local Governments, Public Warnings By Cybersecurity Experts, Media Coverage Highlighting Risks, Public Advisory Via Cnet Article, Ssa And E-Verify User Notifications (E.G., Lock Expiration Alerts), Fbi Psa, Media Outreach and Direct Warnings To Potential Targets.
Stakeholder Advisories: Cisa, Fbi, Acsc.
Stakeholder Advisories: Dhs Secretary’S Public Statement, Media Briefings.
Stakeholder Advisories: Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Working Group Reports.
Stakeholder Advisories: Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Task Force Findings.
Stakeholder Advisories: Foia Memo (Dhs), Media Statements.
Customer Advisories: None (DHS)Recommended Password Resets for 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach)
Stakeholder Advisories: Sen. Peters' Warnings To Reporters About National Security Risks., Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance Statements On Information-Sharing Impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican Aide Comments On Cr Extensions., House Democratic Staffer Remarks On State/Local Grant Program Success..
Stakeholder Advisories: Cybersecurity Experts Warn Of Increased Risks Due To Cisa'S Reduced Capacity., Private Sector Partners Advised To Bolster Independent Defenses Amid Government Instability..
Stakeholder Advisories: General Public Advisory On Ssn Locking And Credit Freezing., Employers Using E-Verify May Encounter Locked Ssns During Hiring Processes..
Customer Advisories: Individuals should weigh the inconvenience of locking/unlocking SSNs against the risk of identity theft.Credit freezes do not affect existing credit accounts but require planning for new credit applications.IRS IP PINs must be renewed annually.
Stakeholder Advisories: Fbi Psa Warning Senior Officials And Their Contacts, Recommendations For Public Vigilance.
Customer Advisories: General public alert via mediadirect outreach to potential high-value targets
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Cisa, Fbi, Acsc, Dhs Secretary’S Public Statement, Media Briefings, Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Working Group Reports, Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Task Force Findings, Foia Memo (Dhs), Media Statements, None (Dhs), Recommended Password Resets For 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach), , Sen. Peters' Warnings To Reporters About National Security Risks., Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance Statements On Information-Sharing Impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican Aide Comments On Cr Extensions., House Democratic Staffer Remarks On State/Local Grant Program Success., Cybersecurity Experts Warn Of Increased Risks Due To Cisa'S Reduced Capacity., Private Sector Partners Advised To Bolster Independent Defenses Amid Government Instability., General Public Advisory On Ssn Locking And Credit Freezing., Employers Using E-Verify May Encounter Locked Ssns During Hiring Processes., Individuals Should Weigh The Inconvenience Of Locking/Unlocking Ssns Against The Risk Of Identity Theft., Credit Freezes Do Not Affect Existing Credit Accounts But Require Planning For New Credit Applications., Irs Ip Pins Must Be Renewed Annually., , Fbi Psa Warning Senior Officials And Their Contacts, Recommendations For Public Vigilance, General Public Alert Via Media, Direct Outreach To Potential High-Value Targets and .
Entry Point: Email Account
Entry Point: RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs)
Backdoors Established: ['custom Go-based backdoors', 'remote management software']
High Value Targets: Critical Infrastructure Organizations,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Critical Infrastructure Organizations,
Entry Point: Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials)
Backdoors Established: ['VPN Software Installed (2023-07-14)']
High Value Targets: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema & Cbp Employee Databases,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema & Cbp Employee Databases,
Entry Point: Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor)
Reconnaissance Period: Unknown (likely weeks prior to mid-July 2025)
Backdoors Established: Likely (given lateral movement)
High Value Targets: Fema Employee Data, Cbp Employee Data, Dhs Network Access,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Fema Employee Data, Cbp Employee Data, Dhs Network Access,
Entry Point: Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials)
Backdoors Established: ['Installation of VPN Software for Lateral Movement']
High Value Targets: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema Region 6 Servers,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema Region 6 Servers,
Entry Point: Citrix Remote Access Software
Reconnaissance Period: Unknown (breach lasted 'several weeks' in summer 2023)
High Value Targets: Fema Regional Operations Network, Cbp/Employee Data,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Fema Regional Operations Network, Cbp/Employee Data,
Entry Point: Misconfigured Hsin-Intel Platform (Dhs), Unsecured Database (2025 Breach),
High Value Targets: Intelligence Data (Dhs), User Credentials (2025 Breach),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Intelligence Data (Dhs), User Credentials (2025 Breach),
Entry Point: Citrix System (via stolen credentials)
High Value Targets: FEMA Region 6 servers
Data Sold on Dark Web: FEMA Region 6 servers
Entry Point: Sms/Mms Messages, Voice Calls/Voicemails, Fake Messaging Platforms,
High Value Targets: Senior U.S. Government Officials (Current/Former), Their Personal/Professional Contacts,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Senior U.S. Government Officials (Current/Former), Their Personal/Professional Contacts,
Root Causes: Oversharing of data with a private contractor.
Corrective Actions: Review and tighten data sharing practices.
Root Causes: Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats
Corrective Actions: Improve Detection And Response Capabilities, Enhance Local Law Enforcement Training, Deploy Advanced Technologies To Mitigate Drone Threats,
Root Causes: Misconfiguration Of Hsin-Intel Access Controls (Set To 'Everyone'), Inadequate Access Review Processes,
Root Causes: Weak Or Stolen Rdp Credentials, Lack Of Mfa On Critical Access Points, Unrestricted Use Of Powershell For Scripting, Insufficient Monitoring For Data Exfiltration,
Corrective Actions: Enforce Mfa For All Remote Access., Disable Unnecessary Rdp Exposure To The Internet., Restrict Powershell To Administrative Use Only., Deploy Endpoint Detection And Response (Edr) Tools To Monitor For Malicious Activity., Conduct Regular Audits Of High-Privilege Accounts.,
Root Causes: Programming Error Leading To Misconfigured Access Controls., Inadequate Segmentation Of Sensitive Intelligence Products., Lack Of Real-Time Monitoring For Unauthorized Access Patterns.,
Root Causes: Lack Of Multifactor Authentication (Mfa) For Remote Access., Compromised Credentials In Citrix Remote Desktop Software., Inadequate Monitoring Of Lateral Movement Within The Network., Failure To Segment High-Value Systems (E.G., Active Directory).,
Corrective Actions: Enforced Mfa For Fema Region 6., Disconnected Vulnerable Citrix Remote Access Tool., Terminated It Leadership Responsible For Security Failures., Public Disclosure To Raise Awareness Of Risks.,
Root Causes: Inadequate Security Controls For Remote Access Systems (Citrix)., Failure To Detect Lateral Movement In A Timely Manner., Potential Insider Threats Or Misconfigured Privileges Enabling Deep Access., Organizational Turmoil (E.G., Dismissals, Restructuring) Distracting From Cybersecurity Focus.,
Corrective Actions: Mandatory Network Segmentation And Least-Privilege Access Policies., Continuous Monitoring For Anomalous Activity, Especially In Remote Access Vectors., Review Of Personnel Practices To Align Dismissals With Evidence-Based Accountability., Transparency In Breach Communications To Maintain Public Trust.,
Root Causes: Lack Of Multifactor Authentication (Mfa) Across Fema Systems., Exploitation Of Vulnerable Citrix Remote Access Software., Inadequate Monitoring Of Network Access And Lateral Movement., It Leadership Failures In Cybersecurity Governance.,
Corrective Actions: Enforcement Of Mfa For All Fema Employees., Disconnection Of Compromised Citrix Tools., Termination Of Responsible It Personnel., Public Disclosure Of Cybersecurity Lapses To Drive Accountability.,
Root Causes: Unpatched Citrix Vulnerability, Inadequate Network Monitoring, Lateral Movement Controls Failure, Possible Insider Threats Or Misconfigurations,
Corrective Actions: Personnel Changes (24 It Employees Fired), Dhs Emergency Directive For Federal Agencies To Defend Against Similar Threats,
Root Causes: Overly Permissive Iam Policies ('Everyone' Access)., Lack Of Network Segmentation (Dhs)., Disabled Logging/Missing Alerts (No Detection Of Unauthorized Access)., Human Error In Access Configuration (Hsin-Intel)., Plain-Text Storage Of Credentials (2025 Breach)., Complex Cloud Architectures Without Adequate Governance., Shadow It/Unmonitored Accounts (Potential Factor)., Inadequate Policy-As-Code Enforcement.,
Corrective Actions: Revised Iam Policies With Least-Privilege Principles., Implemented Network Segmentation For Hsin Platforms., Enabled Centralized Logging And Monitoring (Dhs)., Mandated Encryption For Sensitive Data (Post-2025 Breach)., Conducted Staff Training On Secure Cloud Configurations., Deployed Automated Misconfiguration Detection Tools., Established Regular Audits For Public-Facing Resources.,
Root Causes: Failure To Patch Citrixbleed Vulnerability Despite Prior Warnings., Misrepresentation Of Security Preparedness By Fema Staff., Lack Of Centralized It Monitoring To Detect The Breach Earlier.,
Corrective Actions: Termination Of Incompetent Staff (Ciso, Cio, And 22 Others)., Hiring Of New It Security Personnel., Enforcement Of Mfa And Password Resets., Potential Restructuring Of Fema'S Cybersecurity Governance.,
Root Causes: Political Gridlock Preventing Timely Reauthorization Of Critical Cybersecurity Programs., Conflation Of Cisa 2015 (Law) With Cisa (Agency) By Key Senators (E.G., Rand Paul)., Over-Reliance On Short-Term Continuing Resolutions For Long-Term Cybersecurity Needs., Lack Of Clear Legislative Vehicles For Updating Cisa 2015'S Threat Definitions (E.G., Ai, Supply Chain)., Insufficient Contingency Planning For Cisa Operations During Government Shutdowns.,
Corrective Actions: Bipartisan Negotiation To Separate Cisa 2015 Reauthorization From Unrelated Political Disputes., Development Of A Dedicated Legislative Process For Cybersecurity Updates (E.G., 5-Year Review Cycles)., Expansion Of Cisa'S Shutdown-Exempt Staff To Maintain Core Functions., Public-Private Working Groups To Modernize Threat-Sharing Frameworks (E.G., Ai, Systemic Risks)., State/Local Cybersecurity Coalitions To Sustain Grant-Funded Initiatives During Federal Lapses.,
Root Causes: Government Shutdown Leading To Furloughs And Layoffs At Cisa., Political Disputes Redirecting Agency Focus Away From Core Cybersecurity Missions., Budget Cuts Targeting Critical Divisions (E.G., Isd, Sed)., High Attrition Rate (1,000+ Employees Left In 2023)., Perceived Mission Creep (E.G., Misinformation Efforts) Distracting From Cybersecurity Priorities.,
Corrective Actions: Restoration Of Cisa'S Workforce And Budget To Pre-Cut Levels., Depoliticization Of Agency Operations To Refocus On Cybersecurity., Reinstatement Of Eliminated Subdivisions (E.G., Chemical Security)., Stronger Legislative Protections For Cybersecurity Agencies During Government Shutdowns., Increased Transparency In Communicating Risks To Stakeholders.,
Root Causes: Widespread Exposure Of Ssns In Data Breaches Enables Identity Theft., Lack Of Proactive Protections (E.G., Unlocked Ssns, Unfrozen Credit) Leaves Individuals Vulnerable., Social Engineering Tactics (E.G., Phishing) Trick Individuals Into Disclosing Ssns.,
Corrective Actions: Increase Public Awareness Of Ssn Locks And Credit Freezes., Simplify The Process For Locking/Unlocking Ssns (E.G., Extend E-Verify Lock Duration Beyond 1 Year)., Encourage Adoption Of Multi-Factor Authentication For Ssn-Related Services., Advocate For Reduced Reliance On Ssns As Universal Identifiers.,
Root Causes: Over-Reliance On Trust In Digital Communications, Lack Of Widespread Mfa Adoption, Public Exposure Of Personal/Professional Details (E.G., Linkedin, Government Directories), Limited Public Awareness Of Ai-Generated Scam Tactics, Delayed Reporting Of Suspicious Activity,
Corrective Actions: Fbi-Led Awareness Campaigns Targeting High-Risk Groups, Encouragement Of Mfa Adoption And Password Hygiene, Development Of Ai-Detection Tools For Voice/Video Calls, Policy Changes To Limit Public Exposure Of Official Contact Details, Enhanced Collaboration Between Government Agencies And Tech Platforms To Disrupt Scam Infrastructure,
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Brennan Center For Justice (Via Foia Disclosure), , Yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities), Recommended As Corrective Action, , Cyber Threat Alliance (Information-Sharing Coordination), Internet Security Alliance (Advocacy For Policy Updates), , Identity Protection Services, Credit Monitoring Services, , Credit Monitoring, Dark Web Monitoring For Compromised Pii, , Recommendation For Individuals To Monitor Accounts, .
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Review and tighten data sharing practices., Improve Detection And Response Capabilities, Enhance Local Law Enforcement Training, Deploy Advanced Technologies To Mitigate Drone Threats, , Enforce Mfa For All Remote Access., Disable Unnecessary Rdp Exposure To The Internet., Restrict Powershell To Administrative Use Only., Deploy Endpoint Detection And Response (Edr) Tools To Monitor For Malicious Activity., Conduct Regular Audits Of High-Privilege Accounts., , Enforced Mfa For Fema Region 6., Disconnected Vulnerable Citrix Remote Access Tool., Terminated It Leadership Responsible For Security Failures., Public Disclosure To Raise Awareness Of Risks., , Mandatory Network Segmentation And Least-Privilege Access Policies., Continuous Monitoring For Anomalous Activity, Especially In Remote Access Vectors., Review Of Personnel Practices To Align Dismissals With Evidence-Based Accountability., Transparency In Breach Communications To Maintain Public Trust., , Enforcement Of Mfa For All Fema Employees., Disconnection Of Compromised Citrix Tools., Termination Of Responsible It Personnel., Public Disclosure Of Cybersecurity Lapses To Drive Accountability., , Personnel Changes (24 It Employees Fired), Dhs Emergency Directive For Federal Agencies To Defend Against Similar Threats, , Revised Iam Policies With Least-Privilege Principles., Implemented Network Segmentation For Hsin Platforms., Enabled Centralized Logging And Monitoring (Dhs)., Mandated Encryption For Sensitive Data (Post-2025 Breach)., Conducted Staff Training On Secure Cloud Configurations., Deployed Automated Misconfiguration Detection Tools., Established Regular Audits For Public-Facing Resources., , Termination Of Incompetent Staff (Ciso, Cio, And 22 Others)., Hiring Of New It Security Personnel., Enforcement Of Mfa And Password Resets., Potential Restructuring Of Fema'S Cybersecurity Governance., , Bipartisan Negotiation To Separate Cisa 2015 Reauthorization From Unrelated Political Disputes., Development Of A Dedicated Legislative Process For Cybersecurity Updates (E.G., 5-Year Review Cycles)., Expansion Of Cisa'S Shutdown-Exempt Staff To Maintain Core Functions., Public-Private Working Groups To Modernize Threat-Sharing Frameworks (E.G., Ai, Systemic Risks)., State/Local Cybersecurity Coalitions To Sustain Grant-Funded Initiatives During Federal Lapses., , Restoration Of Cisa'S Workforce And Budget To Pre-Cut Levels., Depoliticization Of Agency Operations To Refocus On Cybersecurity., Reinstatement Of Eliminated Subdivisions (E.G., Chemical Security)., Stronger Legislative Protections For Cybersecurity Agencies During Government Shutdowns., Increased Transparency In Communicating Risks To Stakeholders., , Increase Public Awareness Of Ssn Locks And Credit Freezes., Simplify The Process For Locking/Unlocking Ssns (E.G., Extend E-Verify Lock Duration Beyond 1 Year)., Encourage Adoption Of Multi-Factor Authentication For Ssn-Related Services., Advocate For Reduced Reliance On Ssns As Universal Identifiers., , Fbi-Led Awareness Campaigns Targeting High-Risk Groups, Encouragement Of Mfa Adoption And Password Hygiene, Development Of Ai-Detection Tools For Voice/Video Calls, Policy Changes To Limit Public Exposure Of Official Contact Details, Enhanced Collaboration Between Government Agencies And Tech Platforms To Disrupt Scam Infrastructure, .
Last Ransom Demanded: The amount of the last ransom demanded was True.
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Hacker, Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation's Project 2025, Political ClimateTrump Administration, Political Leadership Changes, Extremists, Violent Extremists, Beijing, Unnamed Ransomware Gang, BianLian ransomware group, Unauthorized Government WorkersPrivate Sector EmployeesForeign Nationals, Unknown (suspected advanced hacker group), Unidentified (possibly advanced hacking group), Nation-State ActorsCybercriminalsHacktivistsOpportunistic Hackers and Identity Thieves / Fraudsters.
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2023-06-21.
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2023-10-01.
Most Recent Incident Resolved: The most recent incident resolved was on 2023-05-31.
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were names, birthdates, nationalities, locations, , Addresses, Bank Account Information, Social Security Numbers, , 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees, Information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence, , Employee names, Social Security numbers, Dates of birth, Positions, Grades, Duty locations, , call logs, recordings, potential location information, , law enforcement leads and tips, reports on foreign hacking and disinformation campaigns, analysis of domestic protest movements (e.g., Stop Cop City protests in Atlanta), cybersecurity intelligence (39% of exposed products), media reports praising violent actions against police, , , Surveillance records of American citizens, Foreign hacking/disinformation campaigns, Law enforcement tips, Domestic protest examinations, Cybersecurity intelligence (39% of accessed products), , Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA & CBP), , FEMA Employee Data, CBP Employee Data, , Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA and CBP), , FEMA Employee Data, CBP Employee Data, , Sensitive Intelligence (DHS), 184M User Records (2025 Breach), Plain-Text Credentials (Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), Bank Accounts, Health Platforms, Government Portals, , Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss, but documents suggest exfiltration occurred), Social Security Numbers (SSNs), Potential personally identifiable information (PII) in breaches, , personal information, login credentials, contact lists, potentially sensitive government communications and .
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident were DHS OIG Case Management System and and Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) platform and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) PlatformHomeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Tool and FEMA Computer NetworkDHS Systems (partial)Citrix Remote Access Infrastructure and FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Software and FEMA Computer Network (regional: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)Citrix Remote Access Software and HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach) and Citrix SystemFEMA Region 6 Servers (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas) and Critical Infrastructure (e.g., power grids, water treatment plants)Federal Cyber Defense SystemsThreat Intelligence Sharing Platforms.
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was brennan center for justice (via foia disclosure), , cyber threat alliance (information-sharing coordination), internet security alliance (advocacy for policy updates), , identity protection services, credit monitoring services, .
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Improved detection and response capabilitiesLocal law enforcement trainingTechnology deployment, Repositioning CCTVTraining police to handle hazardous drones, auditing RDP usagedisabling command-line scriptingrestricting PowerShell, Disconnected Citrix Remote Access Tool (2023-07-16)Enforced Multifactor Authentication, Localization of Breach (mid-July 2025)Network SegmentationAccess Revocation, Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access Tool (2025-07-16)Enforcement of Multifactor Authentication (MFA), Initial efforts launched mid-July 2023Ongoing remediation as of September 5, 2023, Password resetsMulti-Factor Authentication (MFA) enforcement, SSN Lock via SSA or E-VerifyCredit Freeze via Credit BureausIRS Identity Protection PIN and public service announcement (PSA)awareness campaignreporting via IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center).
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Bank Account Information, Surveillance records of American citizens, 184M User Records (2025 Breach), Information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence, Bank Accounts, potential location information, Grades, contact lists, Social Security numbers, Social Security Numbers (SSNs), personal information, FEMA Employee Data, CBP Employee Data, Cybersecurity intelligence (39% of accessed products), recordings, Sensitive Intelligence (DHS), Duty locations, law enforcement leads and tips, Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA and CBP), cybersecurity intelligence (39% of exposed products), Plain-Text Credentials (Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), Social Security Numbers, Foreign hacking/disinformation campaigns, reports on foreign hacking and disinformation campaigns, Positions, Dates of birth, potentially sensitive government communications, birthdates, analysis of domestic protest movements (e.g., Stop Cop City protests in Atlanta), nationalities, Potential personally identifiable information (PII) in breaches, login credentials, Addresses, 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees, Domestic protest examinations, Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss, but documents suggest exfiltration occurred), Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA & CBP), call logs, Government Portals, Employee names, media reports praising violent actions against police, Health Platforms, Law enforcement tips, locations and names.
Number of Records Exposed in Most Significant Breach: The number of records exposed in the most significant breach was 184.3M.
Highest Ransom Demanded: The highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident was True.
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Pending Extradition to the US, Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Leadership), , Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others, , Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives), , Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired), .
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Proactive communication from authorities can mitigate large-scale campaigns.
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity., Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Conduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Training police on handling hazardous drones, Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information., Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Improve detection and response capabilities, Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Repositioning CCTV cameras, Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Enhance transparency in public communications about incidents, Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Deploying sensors for drone detection, Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats and Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation..
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023), CrowdStrike - Common Cloud Misconfigurations, Brennan Center for Justice (FOIA Obtained DHS Memo), FBI Public Service Announcement (PSA), US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem, Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel), DHS internal memo (obtained via FOIA), DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem), CNN, WIRED, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed, Politico, FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics, SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration Prevention, CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware, SecPod - Top 10 Cloud Misconfigurations, CNET, IRS Identity Protection PIN, Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements, Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN), Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton), AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo), Nextgov, Bloomberg News, AFP, Nextgov/FCW, Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher), Social Security Administration (SSA), Motherboard, DHS Memo, Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023), Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security Vulnerabilities, ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat, CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program, DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach), ClearanceJobs, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (Brennan Center for Justice), NextGov/FCW, SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO), House Homeland Security Committee, E-Verify (USCIS), DHS Public Statement (2023-08-29) and Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem.
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware, https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fema-headquarters-is-pictured-in-washington-dc-on-february-news-photo/1238567890, https://www.bloomberg.com, https://www.nextgov.com, https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/, https://www.wiz.io/academy/top-cloud-vulnerabilities, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.cnet.com, https://www.ssa.gov, https://www.e-verify.gov, https://www.irs.gov/identity-theft-fraud-scams/get-an-identity-protection-pin, https://www.ic3.gov .
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing.
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was CISA, FBI, ACSC, DHS Secretary’s Public Statement, Media Briefings, Internal FEMA Staff Updates, DHS Working Group Reports, Internal FEMA staff updates, DHS Task Force findings, FOIA Memo (DHS), Media Statements, Sen. Peters' warnings to reporters about national security risks., Cyber Threat Alliance and Internet Security Alliance statements on information-sharing impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican aide comments on CR extensions., House Democratic staffer remarks on state/local grant program success., Cybersecurity experts warn of increased risks due to CISA's reduced capacity., Private sector partners advised to bolster independent defenses amid government instability., General public advisory on SSN locking and credit freezing., Employers using E-Verify may encounter locked SSNs during hiring processes., FBI PSA warning senior officials and their contacts, recommendations for public vigilance, .
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued were an None (DHS)Recommended Password Resets for 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach), Individuals should weigh the inconvenience of locking/unlocking SSNs against the risk of identity theft.Credit freezes do not affect existing credit accounts but require planning for new credit applications.IRS IP PINs must be renewed annually. and General public alert via mediadirect outreach to potential high-value targets.
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an Citrix Remote Access Software, Citrix System (via stolen credentials), Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor), Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials), RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs) and Email Account.
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was Unknown (likely weeks prior to mid-July 2025), Unknown (breach lasted 'several weeks' in summer 2023).
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Oversharing of data with a private contractor., Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats, misconfiguration of HSIN-Intel access controls (set to 'everyone')inadequate access review processes, Weak or stolen RDP credentialsLack of MFA on critical access pointsUnrestricted use of PowerShell for scriptingInsufficient monitoring for data exfiltration, Programming error leading to misconfigured access controls.Inadequate segmentation of sensitive intelligence products.Lack of real-time monitoring for unauthorized access patterns., Lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) for remote access.Compromised credentials in Citrix remote desktop software.Inadequate monitoring of lateral movement within the network.Failure to segment high-value systems (e.g., Active Directory)., Inadequate security controls for remote access systems (Citrix).Failure to detect lateral movement in a timely manner.Potential insider threats or misconfigured privileges enabling deep access.Organizational turmoil (e.g., dismissals, restructuring) distracting from cybersecurity focus., Lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) across FEMA systems.Exploitation of vulnerable Citrix remote access software.Inadequate monitoring of network access and lateral movement.IT leadership failures in cybersecurity governance., Unpatched Citrix vulnerabilityInadequate network monitoringLateral movement controls failurePossible insider threats or misconfigurations, Overly permissive IAM policies ('everyone' access).Lack of network segmentation (DHS).Disabled logging/missing alerts (no detection of unauthorized access).Human error in access configuration (HSIN-Intel).Plain-text storage of credentials (2025 Breach).Complex cloud architectures without adequate governance.Shadow IT/unmonitored accounts (potential factor).Inadequate policy-as-code enforcement., Failure to patch CitrixBleed vulnerability despite prior warnings.Misrepresentation of security preparedness by FEMA staff.Lack of centralized IT monitoring to detect the breach earlier., Political gridlock preventing timely reauthorization of critical cybersecurity programs.Conflation of CISA 2015 (law) with CISA (agency) by key senators (e.g., Rand Paul).Over-reliance on short-term Continuing Resolutions for long-term cybersecurity needs.Lack of clear legislative vehicles for updating CISA 2015's threat definitions (e.g., AI, supply chain).Insufficient contingency planning for CISA operations during government shutdowns., Government shutdown leading to furloughs and layoffs at CISA.Political disputes redirecting agency focus away from core cybersecurity missions.Budget cuts targeting critical divisions (e.g., ISD, SED).High attrition rate (1,000+ employees left in 2023).Perceived mission creep (e.g., misinformation efforts) distracting from cybersecurity priorities., Widespread exposure of SSNs in data breaches enables identity theft.Lack of proactive protections (e.g., unlocked SSNs, unfrozen credit) leaves individuals vulnerable.Social engineering tactics (e.g., phishing) trick individuals into disclosing SSNs., Over-reliance on trust in digital communicationsLack of widespread MFA adoptionPublic exposure of personal/professional details (e.g., LinkedIn, government directories)Limited public awareness of AI-generated scam tacticsDelayed reporting of suspicious activity.
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Review and tighten data sharing practices., Improve detection and response capabilitiesEnhance local law enforcement trainingDeploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats, Enforce MFA for all remote access.Disable unnecessary RDP exposure to the internet.Restrict PowerShell to administrative use only.Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to monitor for malicious activity.Conduct regular audits of high-privilege accounts., Enforced MFA for FEMA Region 6.Disconnected vulnerable Citrix remote access tool.Terminated IT leadership responsible for security failures.Public disclosure to raise awareness of risks., Mandatory network segmentation and least-privilege access policies.Continuous monitoring for anomalous activity, especially in remote access vectors.Review of personnel practices to align dismissals with evidence-based accountability.Transparency in breach communications to maintain public trust., Enforcement of MFA for all FEMA employees.Disconnection of compromised Citrix tools.Termination of responsible IT personnel.Public disclosure of cybersecurity lapses to drive accountability., Personnel changes (24 IT employees fired)DHS emergency directive for federal agencies to defend against similar threats, Revised IAM policies with least-privilege principles.Implemented network segmentation for HSIN platforms.Enabled centralized logging and monitoring (DHS).Mandated encryption for sensitive data (post-2025 Breach).Conducted staff training on secure cloud configurations.Deployed automated misconfiguration detection tools.Established regular audits for public-facing resources., Termination of incompetent staff (CISO, CIO, and 22 others).Hiring of new IT security personnel.Enforcement of MFA and password resets.Potential restructuring of FEMA's cybersecurity governance., Bipartisan negotiation to separate CISA 2015 reauthorization from unrelated political disputes.Development of a dedicated legislative process for cybersecurity updates (e.g., 5-year review cycles).Expansion of CISA's shutdown-exempt staff to maintain core functions.Public-private working groups to modernize threat-sharing frameworks (e.g., AI, systemic risks).State/local cybersecurity coalitions to sustain grant-funded initiatives during federal lapses., Restoration of CISA's workforce and budget to pre-cut levels.Depoliticization of agency operations to refocus on cybersecurity.Reinstatement of eliminated subdivisions (e.g., Chemical Security).Stronger legislative protections for cybersecurity agencies during government shutdowns.Increased transparency in communicating risks to stakeholders., Increase public awareness of SSN locks and credit freezes.Simplify the process for locking/unlocking SSNs (e.g., extend E-Verify lock duration beyond 1 year).Encourage adoption of multi-factor authentication for SSN-related services.Advocate for reduced reliance on SSNs as universal identifiers., FBI-led awareness campaigns targeting high-risk groupsEncouragement of MFA adoption and password hygieneDevelopment of AI-detection tools for voice/video callsPolicy changes to limit public exposure of official contact detailsEnhanced collaboration between government agencies and tech platforms to disrupt scam infrastructure.
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Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to versions 19.2.16, 20.3.14, and 21.0.1, there is a XSRF token leakage via protocol-relative URLs in angular HTTP clients. The vulnerability is a Credential Leak by App Logic that leads to the unauthorized disclosure of the Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF) token to an attacker-controlled domain. Angular's HttpClient has a built-in XSRF protection mechanism that works by checking if a request URL starts with a protocol (http:// or https://) to determine if it is cross-origin. If the URL starts with protocol-relative URL (//), it is incorrectly treated as a same-origin request, and the XSRF token is automatically added to the X-XSRF-TOKEN header. This issue has been patched in versions 19.2.16, 20.3.14, and 21.0.1. A workaround for this issue involves avoiding using protocol-relative URLs (URLs starting with //) in HttpClient requests. All backend communication URLs should be hardcoded as relative paths (starting with a single /) or fully qualified, trusted absolute URLs.
Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. An Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and below enables remote, unauthenticated attackers to craft deep ASN.1 structures that trigger unbounded recursive parsing. This leads to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) via stack exhaustion when parsing untrusted DER inputs. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.2.
Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. An Integer Overflow vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and below enables remote, unauthenticated attackers to craft ASN.1 structures containing OIDs with oversized arcs. These arcs may be decoded as smaller, trusted OIDs due to 32-bit bitwise truncation, enabling the bypass of downstream OID-based security decisions. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.2.
Suricata is a network IDS, IPS and NSM engine developed by the OISF (Open Information Security Foundation) and the Suricata community. Prior to versions 7.0.13 and 8.0.2, working with large buffers in Lua scripts can lead to a stack overflow. Users of Lua rules and output scripts may be affected when working with large buffers. This includes a rule passing a large buffer to a Lua script. This issue has been patched in versions 7.0.13 and 8.0.2. A workaround for this issue involves disabling Lua rules and output scripts, or making sure limits, such as stream.depth.reassembly and HTTP response body limits (response-body-limit), are set to less than half the stack size.
Suricata is a network IDS, IPS and NSM engine developed by the OISF (Open Information Security Foundation) and the Suricata community. In versions from 8.0.0 to before 8.0.2, a NULL dereference can occur when the entropy keyword is used in conjunction with base64_data. This issue has been patched in version 8.0.2. A workaround involves disabling rules that use entropy in conjunction with base64_data.
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