LAA
Company Details
Linkedin ID:
the-legal-aid-agency
Employees number:
354
Number of followers:
18,588
NAICS:
5411
Industry Type:
Homepage:
justice.gov.uk
IP Addresses:
0
Company ID:
THE_1520505
Scan Status:
In-progress
The Legal Aid Agency Company CyberSecurity Posture
justice.gov.uk
The Legal Aid Agency provides both civil and criminal legal aid and advice in England and Wales. Our work is essential to the fair, effective and efficient operation of the civil and criminal justice systems. We are a delivery organisation which commissions and procures legal aid services from providers (solicitors, barristers and the not-for-profit sector). The Legal Aid Agency is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice. It came into existence on 1 April 2013 following the abolition of the Legal Services Commission as a result of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012. The Act created the new statutory office of the Director of Legal Casework. The Director will take decisions on the funding of individual cases. Processes have been put in place to ensure the Legal Aid Agency is able to demonstrate independence of decision-making. There will be an annual report published about these decisions.
The Legal Aid Agency A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
LAA Risk Score (AI oriented)Between 750 and 799
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LAA Company CyberSecurity News & History
Past Incidents
5
Attack Types
2
UK Legal Aid Agency
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with customers data leaks
Description: The UK Legal Aid Agency suffered a major cyberattack, resulting in the theft of significant sensitive data, including criminal records dating back to 2010. The attack is believed to have stolen a substantial amount of data, potentially affecting 2.1 million records. The stolen data includes highly sensitive personal details of legal aid applicants, such as contact information, dates of birth, national identification numbers, criminal histories, employment statuses, and financial data. The attack also compromised information related to barristers, solicitors, and various organizations working with the Legal Aid Agency. As a result, the agency's online digital services have been taken offline.
Legal Aid Agency (Ministry of Justice, UK)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: Hackers breached the **Legal Aid Agency’s online platform**, accessing and exfiltrating a **massive trove of sensitive personal data** from over **2 million legal aid applicants** (2010–present) in England and Wales. The compromised data includes **full names, contact details, dates of birth, national ID numbers, criminal histories, employment status, and financial records** (debts, payments, contributions). The attackers, engaged in **data extortion**, threatened to **publish the data online**, posing severe risks to vulnerable individuals—such as domestic violence survivors whose safety depends on confidentiality. Despite a **legal injunction** against distribution, the anonymity of the hackers (likely operating from hostile jurisdictions) renders enforcement ineffective. The agency **shut down its online service** to contain the breach, disrupting critical public legal services. The incident underscores systemic vulnerabilities in **non-CNI public services**, where data leaks can have **life-threatening consequences** (e.g., exposed addresses enabling physical harm).
Legal Aid Agency (LAA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The UK Ministry of Justice (MoJ) confirmed that hackers accessed a **large volume of sensitive personal data** from the **Legal Aid Agency’s (LAA) digital services**, potentially exposing records of **millions of applicants** since 2010. Compromised data includes **contact details, national ID numbers, criminal records, employment status, and financial information** (debts, payments, contributions). The breach was detected on **April 23**, but its full scale—spanning **14 years of legal aid applications**—was only realized on **May 16**. The attack forced the LAA to **shut down its online platform**, disrupting legal aid services for vulnerable individuals (e.g., those facing criminal charges, debt, or family disputes). Authorities, including the **NCSC, NCA, and ICO**, are investigating, while affected users are warned of **fraud, identity theft, and phishing risks**. The breach raises concerns over **UK public sector cybersecurity resilience** and potential **regulatory/legal repercussions** for data protection failures.
Ministry of Justice (UK)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: A report by NordPass and NordStellar revealed that **3,014 passwords** belonging to UK civil servants—including those from the **Ministry of Justice (MoJ)**—were exposed on the dark web. The MoJ was the **most affected institution**, with **36 unique exposed passwords**, many of which were **weak, reused, or easily guessable** (e.g., *'12345678'* or *'password'*). The breach stemmed from poor cyber hygiene, including password recycling across accounts and failure to enforce strong authentication policies. The exposure poses **significant risks** not only to the MoJ’s internal operations but also to **national security**, as compromised credentials could enable unauthorized access to sensitive government systems. Civil servants’ accounts, if hijacked, might facilitate **phishing attacks, data leaks, or lateral movement into broader public infrastructure**. The incident underscores systemic vulnerabilities in **public-sector cybersecurity**, where weak password practices jeopardize both **employee data and citizen trust**. While no direct data theft was confirmed, the **potential for escalation**—such as targeted attacks on justice systems or exploitation of administrative privileges—remains high. The report urges **mandatory password managers, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and regular credential rotation** to mitigate future risks.
Ministry of Justice UK
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: The employee’s sensitive personal data of UK Ministry of Justice was compromised in an unauthorized access gained to the servers of Justice Academy, an online learning platform used by MoJ. The compromised information includes full name, staff identification information, email address, national insurance number, and details of where they work and with which department or agency. MoJ has reported about 2,152 data breaches and several cyber incidents in the 12 months.
LAA Company Scoring based on AI Models
Cyber Incidents Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
A.I Risk Score Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
Underwriter Stats for LAA
Incidents vs Legal Services Industry Average (This Year)
No incidents recorded for The Legal Aid Agency in 2025.
Incidents vs All-Companies Average (This Year)
No incidents recorded for The Legal Aid Agency in 2025.
Incident Types LAA vs Legal Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for The Legal Aid Agency in 2025.
Incident History — LAA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
LAA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
LAA Company Subsidiaries
The Legal Aid Agency provides both civil and criminal legal aid and advice in England and Wales. Our work is essential to the fair, effective and efficient operation of the civil and criminal justice systems. We are a delivery organisation which commissions and procures legal aid services from providers (solicitors, barristers and the not-for-profit sector). The Legal Aid Agency is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice. It came into existence on 1 April 2013 following the abolition of the Legal Services Commission as a result of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012. The Act created the new statutory office of the Director of Legal Casework. The Director will take decisions on the funding of individual cases. Processes have been put in place to ensure the Legal Aid Agency is able to demonstrate independence of decision-making. There will be an annual report published about these decisions.
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Cyber
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Frequently Asked Questions
Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
LAA CyberSecurity History Information
Official Website of The Legal Aid Agency
The official website of The Legal Aid Agency is http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/laa.
The Legal Aid Agency’s AI-Generated Cybersecurity Score
According to Rankiteo, The Legal Aid Agency’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 754, reflecting their Fair security posture.
How many security badges does The Legal Aid Agency’ have ?
According to Rankiteo, The Legal Aid Agency currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
Does The Legal Aid Agency have SOC 2 Type 1 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, The Legal Aid Agency is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
Does The Legal Aid Agency have SOC 2 Type 2 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, The Legal Aid Agency does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
Does The Legal Aid Agency comply with GDPR ?
According to Rankiteo, The Legal Aid Agency is not listed as GDPR compliant.
Does The Legal Aid Agency have PCI DSS certification ?
According to Rankiteo, The Legal Aid Agency does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
Does The Legal Aid Agency comply with HIPAA ?
According to Rankiteo, The Legal Aid Agency is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
Does The Legal Aid Agency have ISO 27001 certification ?
According to Rankiteo,The Legal Aid Agency is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Industry Classification of The Legal Aid Agency
The Legal Aid Agency operates primarily in the Legal Services industry.
Number of Employees at The Legal Aid Agency
The Legal Aid Agency employs approximately 354 people worldwide.
Subsidiaries Owned by The Legal Aid Agency
The Legal Aid Agency presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
The Legal Aid Agency’s LinkedIn Followers
The Legal Aid Agency’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 18,588 followers.
NAICS Classification of The Legal Aid Agency
The Legal Aid Agency is classified under the NAICS code 5411, which corresponds to Legal Services.
The Legal Aid Agency’s Presence on Crunchbase
No, The Legal Aid Agency does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
The Legal Aid Agency’s Presence on LinkedIn
Yes, The Legal Aid Agency maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-legal-aid-agency.
Cybersecurity Incidents Involving The Legal Aid Agency
As of November 30, 2025, Rankiteo reports that The Legal Aid Agency has experienced 5 cybersecurity incidents.
Number of Peer and Competitor Companies
The Legal Aid Agency has an estimated 7,389 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
What types of cybersecurity incidents have occurred at The Legal Aid Agency ?
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Breach and Cyber Attack.
How does The Legal Aid Agency detect and respond to cybersecurity incidents ?
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an third party assistance with nordpass, third party assistance with nordstellar (research and disclosure), and remediation measures with urged adoption of strong, unique passwords; regular password rotation, and communication strategy with public report by nordpass/nordstellar; media coverage (e.g., techradar), and incident response plan activated with yes (moj and legal aid agency working with ncsc and nca), and third party assistance with national cyber security centre (ncsc), third party assistance with national crime agency (nca), and law enforcement notified with yes (nca involved), and containment measures with legal injunction against data distribution, containment measures with online service taken offline, and remediation measures with bolstering security of systems with ncsc support, and communication strategy with public disclosure via moj statement, communication strategy with apology from legal aid agency ceo jane harbottle, communication strategy with warnings to law firms about compromised financial data, and enhanced monitoring with likely (implied by 'bolstering security' but not explicitly stated), and and third party assistance with national cyber security centre (ncsc), third party assistance with national crime agency (nca), third party assistance with information commissioner’s office (ico), and and containment measures with immediate investigation launched, containment measures with online platform taken offline, containment measures with security strengthening, and recovery measures with contingency plans for manual legal aid processing, recovery measures with multi-agency coordination, and communication strategy with public statements by moj and laa ceo, communication strategy with direct outreach to affected individuals (planned), communication strategy with urgent advisories for applicants (vigilance, password changes, monitoring), and enhanced monitoring with strengthened security post-detection..
Incident Details
Can you provide details on each incident ?
Title: Unauthorized Access to UK Ministry of Justice Servers
Description: The employee’s sensitive personal data of UK Ministry of Justice was compromised in an unauthorized access gained to the servers of Justice Academy, an online learning platform used by MoJ. The compromised information includes full name, staff identification information, email address, national insurance number, and details of where they work and with which department or agency.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Unauthorized Access
Title: UK Legal Aid Agency Cyberattack
Description: The UK Legal Aid Agency suffered a major cyberattack, resulting in the theft of significant sensitive data, including criminal records dating back to 2010. The attack is believed to have stolen a substantial amount of data, potentially affecting 2.1 million records. The stolen data includes highly sensitive personal details of legal aid applicants, such as contact information, dates of birth, national identification numbers, criminal histories, employment statuses, and financial data. The attack also compromised information related to barristers, solicitors, and various organizations working with the Legal Aid Agency. As a result, the agency's online digital services have been taken offline.
Type: Data Breach
Title: Exposure of Over 3,000 UK Civil Servant Passwords on the Dark Web
Description: Hundreds of civil servants in the UK had their business passwords exposed on the dark web, posing risks to public institutions and national interests. The Ministry of Justice was the most affected. The incident highlights poor password hygiene, with many passwords being weak and reused across accounts. NordPass and NordStellar conducted the research, cross-referencing over 5,500 organizations across six countries, identifying 3,014 exposed passwords linked to UK civil servants.
Type: data breach
Attack Vector: dark web exposureweak/reused passwords
Vulnerability Exploited: Poor password hygiene (weak, reused, or easily guessable passwords)
Title: Data Breach at UK Ministry of Justice's Legal Aid Agency
Description: Hackers accessed a large amount of personal and sensitive information from individuals who applied for legal aid in England and Wales via the Legal Aid Agency’s online platform since 2010. The breach potentially exposed data of over 2 million people, including criminal histories, financial details, and personally identifiable information (PII). The hackers threatened to publish the data online, posing significant risks to vulnerable individuals, including victims of domestic violence. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) secured a legal injunction against the distribution of the data, but its effectiveness remains uncertain. The Legal Aid Agency took its online service offline as a precautionary measure.
Date Detected: 2024-04-23
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-05-20
Type: Data Breach
Motivation: Financial GainData Extortion
Title: UK Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Agency Data Breach
Description: The UK Ministry of Justice (MoJ) confirmed that hackers accessed a 'large amount of information' from the Legal Aid Agency’s (LAA) digital services, potentially exposing sensitive personal data of millions of people who applied for legal aid since 2010. The breach was first identified on April 23, 2024, and escalated significantly, with threat actors accessing and downloading personal data, including contact details, national ID numbers, criminal records, employment status, and financial data. The LAA took its online platform offline to contain the threat, and a multi-agency response involving the NCSC, NCA, and ICO is underway.
Date Detected: 2024-04-23
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-05-16
Type: data breach
What are the most common types of attacks the company has faced ?
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Breach.
How does the company identify the attack vectors used in incidents ?
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Dark web (exposed credentials).
Impact of the Incidents
What was the impact of each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach MIN164115322
Data Compromised: Full name, Staff identification information, Email address, National insurance number, Work details, Department or agency details
Systems Affected: Justice Academy servers
Incident : Data Breach THE858052025
Data Compromised: Contact information, Dates of birth, National identification numbers, Criminal histories, Employment statuses, Financial data, Information related to barristers, solicitors, and various organizations
Systems Affected: online digital services
Downtime: online digital services have been taken offline
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Data Compromised: Passwords (3,014 unique exposures)
Operational Impact: Potential unauthorized access to public institution systems, risk to national strategic interests
Brand Reputation Impact: Negative perception of public sector cybersecurity practices
Identity Theft Risk: High (due to reused passwords across accounts)
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Data Compromised: Contact details (names, addresses), Dates of birth, National id numbers, Criminal history, Employment status, Financial data (contribution amounts, debts, payments)
Systems Affected: Legal Aid Agency’s online platform
Downtime: Legal Aid Agency’s online service taken offline (duration unspecified)
Operational Impact: Disruption to legal aid application processing; potential long-term reputational and operational damage to the Legal Aid Agency and MoJ
Customer Complaints: Expected (specific numbers not provided)
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe (public trust in MoJ and Legal Aid Agency undermined, particularly among vulnerable populations)
Legal Liabilities: Potential lawsuits from affected individuals; regulatory scrutiny over data protection failures
Identity Theft Risk: High (due to exposure of PII and financial data)
Payment Information Risk: High (financial data such as debts and payments compromised)
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Data Compromised: Contact details, Addresses, Dates of birth, National id numbers, Criminal history, Employment status, Financial data (contribution amounts, debts, payments)
Systems Affected: Legal Aid Agency’s online digital services platform
Downtime: Ongoing (platform taken offline as of disclosure)
Operational Impact: Legal aid providers unable to log work or receive payments via digital platform; contingency plans implemented for manual processing
Brand Reputation Impact: High (loss of trust in government digital services, particularly for vulnerable populations)
Legal Liabilities: Potential regulatory action (ICO investigation), legal proceedings for data protection violations
Identity Theft Risk: High (exposure of national ID numbers, financial data, and criminal records)
Payment Information Risk: Moderate (financial data such as debts and payments exposed)
What types of data are most commonly compromised in incidents ?
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Personal Information, , Contact Information, Dates Of Birth, National Identification Numbers, Criminal Histories, Employment Statuses, Financial Data, Information Related To Barristers, Solicitors, And Various Organizations, , Passwords/Credentials, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Criminal History, Financial Data, Employment Status, National Id Numbers, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Criminal Records, Financial Data, Employment Status and .
Which entities were affected by each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach MIN164115322
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Justice
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Government
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach THE858052025
Entity Name: UK Legal Aid Agency
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Legal
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: 2.1 million records
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Entity Name: Ministry of Justice (UK)
Entity Type: Government Ministry
Industry: Public Administration / Justice
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Entity Name: Ministry of Defence (UK)
Entity Type: Government Ministry
Industry: Defense
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Entity Name: Aberdeen City Council
Entity Type: Local Government
Industry: Public Administration
Location: Aberdeen, Scotland, UK
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Entity Name: Department for Work and Pensions (UK)
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: Social Services
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Entity Name: National and Federal Parliaments (UK)
Entity Type: Legislative Body
Industry: Government
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Entity Name: Local and Regional Governments (UK)
Entity Type: Public Institutions
Industry: Government
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Entity Name: Municipalities (UK)
Entity Type: Local Government
Industry: Public Administration
Location: United Kingdom
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Entity Name: Ministry of Justice (MoJ), UK
Entity Type: Government Ministry
Industry: Public Sector / Legal Services
Location: United Kingdom (England and Wales)
Customers Affected: Potentially over 2 million legal aid applicants since 2010
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Entity Name: Legal Aid Agency
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Legal Services
Location: United Kingdom (England and Wales)
Customers Affected: Potentially over 2 million legal aid applicants since 2010
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Entity Name: Legal aid applicants (individuals)
Entity Type: General Public
Location: United Kingdom (England and Wales)
Customers Affected: Potentially over 2 million
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Entity Name: Law firms, non-profits, and barristers (legal aid providers)
Entity Type: Private Sector, Non-Profit
Industry: Legal Services
Location: United Kingdom (England and Wales)
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Entity Name: UK Ministry of Justice (MoJ)
Entity Type: Government Ministry
Industry: Public Sector / Justice
Location: United Kingdom (England and Wales)
Customers Affected: Millions (all individuals who applied for legal aid online between 2010–2024)
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Entity Name: Legal Aid Agency (LAA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Legal Services
Location: United Kingdom
Customers Affected: Millions (applicants from 2010–2024)
Response to the Incidents
What measures were taken in response to each incident ?
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Third Party Assistance: Nordpass, Nordstellar (Research And Disclosure).
Remediation Measures: Urged adoption of strong, unique passwords; regular password rotation
Communication Strategy: Public report by NordPass/NordStellar; media coverage (e.g., TechRadar)
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (MoJ and Legal Aid Agency working with NCSC and NCA)
Third Party Assistance: National Cyber Security Centre (Ncsc), National Crime Agency (Nca).
Law Enforcement Notified: Yes (NCA involved)
Containment Measures: Legal injunction against data distributionOnline service taken offline
Remediation Measures: Bolstering security of systems with NCSC support
Communication Strategy: Public disclosure via MoJ statementApology from Legal Aid Agency CEO Jane HarbottleWarnings to law firms about compromised financial data
Enhanced Monitoring: Likely (implied by 'bolstering security' but not explicitly stated)
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Third Party Assistance: National Cyber Security Centre (Ncsc), National Crime Agency (Nca), Information Commissioner’S Office (Ico).
Containment Measures: Immediate investigation launchedOnline platform taken offlineSecurity strengthening
Recovery Measures: Contingency plans for manual legal aid processingMulti-agency coordination
Communication Strategy: Public statements by MoJ and LAA CEODirect outreach to affected individuals (planned)Urgent advisories for applicants (vigilance, password changes, monitoring)
Enhanced Monitoring: Strengthened security post-detection
What is the company's incident response plan?
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Yes (MoJ and Legal Aid Agency working with NCSC and NCA), .
How does the company involve third-party assistance in incident response ?
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through NordPass, NordStellar (research and disclosure), , National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), National Crime Agency (NCA), , National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), National Crime Agency (NCA), Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), .
Data Breach Information
What type of data was compromised in each breach ?
Incident : Data Breach MIN164115322
Type of Data Compromised: Personal information
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: full namestaff identification informationemail addressnational insurance numberwork detailsdepartment or agency details
Incident : Data Breach THE858052025
Type of Data Compromised: Contact information, Dates of birth, National identification numbers, Criminal histories, Employment statuses, Financial data, Information related to barristers, solicitors, and various organizations
Number of Records Exposed: 2.1 million
Sensitivity of Data: highly sensitive
Personally Identifiable Information: contact informationdates of birthnational identification numbers
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Type of Data Compromised: Passwords/credentials
Number of Records Exposed: 3014
Sensitivity of Data: High (government/ civil servant credentials)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (exposed on dark web)
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Criminal history, Financial data, Employment status, National id numbers
Number of Records Exposed: Over 2 million (claimed by hackers; MoJ did not confirm exact number)
Sensitivity of Data: High (includes criminal histories, financial details, and PII of vulnerable individuals)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (hackers downloaded significant amounts of data)
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesAddressesDates of birthNational ID numbersFinancial details (contributions, debts, payments)
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Criminal records, Financial data, Employment status
Number of Records Exposed: Millions (exact number undisclosed; applicants from 2010–2024)
Sensitivity of Data: High (includes national ID numbers, criminal history, financial details)
Personally Identifiable Information: namescontact detailsaddressesdates of birthnational ID numbers
What measures does the company take to prevent data exfiltration ?
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Urged adoption of strong, unique passwords; regular password rotation, , Bolstering security of systems with NCSC support, .
How does the company handle incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) ?
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by legal injunction against data distribution, online service taken offline, , immediate investigation launched, online platform taken offline, security strengthening and .
Ransomware Information
Was ransomware involved in any of the incidents ?
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Data Exfiltration: Yes (data extortion incident)
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Data Exfiltration: True
How does the company recover data encrypted by ransomware ?
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Contingency plans for manual legal aid processing, Multi-agency coordination, .
Regulatory Compliance
Were there any regulatory violations and fines imposed for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR, Data Protection Act 2018 (likely),
Legal Actions: Legal injunction secured against data distribution,
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Regulations Violated: UK GDPR, Data Protection Act 2018 (potential),
Legal Actions: Pending (ICO investigation ongoing)
Regulatory Notifications: Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) notified
How does the company ensure compliance with regulatory requirements ?
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Legal injunction secured against data distribution, , Pending (ICO investigation ongoing).
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What lessons were learned from each incident ?
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Lessons Learned: Poor password hygiene (weak, reused passwords) remains a critical vulnerability in both public and private sectors., Exposed credentials of civil servants pose risks to national security and public trust., Cross-organizational password reuse exacerbates exposure risks.
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Lessons Learned: Vulnerabilities in public sector digital services can have severe consequences for marginalized populations., Legal injunctions may be ineffective against anonymous, jurisdictionally hostile threat actors., Critical public services (e.g., legal aid) may lack the same resilience as traditional critical national infrastructure (CNI)., Proactive law enforcement capabilities are needed to target high-risk data breaches selectively.
What recommendations were made to prevent future incidents ?
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Recommendations: Enforce strong, unique password policies across all public sector accounts., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for sensitive systems., Regularly audit and rotate passwords, especially for high-value targets (e.g., government employees)., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials proactively., Educate employees on cyber hygiene and risks of password reuse.Enforce strong, unique password policies across all public sector accounts., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for sensitive systems., Regularly audit and rotate passwords, especially for high-value targets (e.g., government employees)., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials proactively., Educate employees on cyber hygiene and risks of password reuse.Enforce strong, unique password policies across all public sector accounts., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for sensitive systems., Regularly audit and rotate passwords, especially for high-value targets (e.g., government employees)., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials proactively., Educate employees on cyber hygiene and risks of password reuse.Enforce strong, unique password policies across all public sector accounts., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for sensitive systems., Regularly audit and rotate passwords, especially for high-value targets (e.g., government employees)., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials proactively., Educate employees on cyber hygiene and risks of password reuse.Enforce strong, unique password policies across all public sector accounts., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for sensitive systems., Regularly audit and rotate passwords, especially for high-value targets (e.g., government employees)., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials proactively., Educate employees on cyber hygiene and risks of password reuse.
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Recommendations: Enhance cybersecurity measures for public-facing digital services, particularly those handling sensitive data., Prioritize protection of public services alongside traditional CNI in national cybersecurity strategies., Improve incident response coordination between government agencies (e.g., MoJ, NCSC, NCA)., Provide support (e.g., credit monitoring, identity theft protection) to affected individuals, especially vulnerable groups., Conduct a thorough review of the Legal Aid Agency’s data protection practices and third-party risk management.Enhance cybersecurity measures for public-facing digital services, particularly those handling sensitive data., Prioritize protection of public services alongside traditional CNI in national cybersecurity strategies., Improve incident response coordination between government agencies (e.g., MoJ, NCSC, NCA)., Provide support (e.g., credit monitoring, identity theft protection) to affected individuals, especially vulnerable groups., Conduct a thorough review of the Legal Aid Agency’s data protection practices and third-party risk management.Enhance cybersecurity measures for public-facing digital services, particularly those handling sensitive data., Prioritize protection of public services alongside traditional CNI in national cybersecurity strategies., Improve incident response coordination between government agencies (e.g., MoJ, NCSC, NCA)., Provide support (e.g., credit monitoring, identity theft protection) to affected individuals, especially vulnerable groups., Conduct a thorough review of the Legal Aid Agency’s data protection practices and third-party risk management.Enhance cybersecurity measures for public-facing digital services, particularly those handling sensitive data., Prioritize protection of public services alongside traditional CNI in national cybersecurity strategies., Improve incident response coordination between government agencies (e.g., MoJ, NCSC, NCA)., Provide support (e.g., credit monitoring, identity theft protection) to affected individuals, especially vulnerable groups., Conduct a thorough review of the Legal Aid Agency’s data protection practices and third-party risk management.Enhance cybersecurity measures for public-facing digital services, particularly those handling sensitive data., Prioritize protection of public services alongside traditional CNI in national cybersecurity strategies., Improve incident response coordination between government agencies (e.g., MoJ, NCSC, NCA)., Provide support (e.g., credit monitoring, identity theft protection) to affected individuals, especially vulnerable groups., Conduct a thorough review of the Legal Aid Agency’s data protection practices and third-party risk management.
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Recommendations: Enhance cybersecurity resilience for digital public services, Implement real-time monitoring for unusual activity, Conduct regular third-party audits of government platforms, Improve transparency and communication during incidents, Provide long-term support for affected vulnerable individualsEnhance cybersecurity resilience for digital public services, Implement real-time monitoring for unusual activity, Conduct regular third-party audits of government platforms, Improve transparency and communication during incidents, Provide long-term support for affected vulnerable individualsEnhance cybersecurity resilience for digital public services, Implement real-time monitoring for unusual activity, Conduct regular third-party audits of government platforms, Improve transparency and communication during incidents, Provide long-term support for affected vulnerable individualsEnhance cybersecurity resilience for digital public services, Implement real-time monitoring for unusual activity, Conduct regular third-party audits of government platforms, Improve transparency and communication during incidents, Provide long-term support for affected vulnerable individualsEnhance cybersecurity resilience for digital public services, Implement real-time monitoring for unusual activity, Conduct regular third-party audits of government platforms, Improve transparency and communication during incidents, Provide long-term support for affected vulnerable individuals
What are the key lessons learned from past incidents ?
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Poor password hygiene (weak, reused passwords) remains a critical vulnerability in both public and private sectors.,Exposed credentials of civil servants pose risks to national security and public trust.,Cross-organizational password reuse exacerbates exposure risks.Vulnerabilities in public sector digital services can have severe consequences for marginalized populations.,Legal injunctions may be ineffective against anonymous, jurisdictionally hostile threat actors.,Critical public services (e.g., legal aid) may lack the same resilience as traditional critical national infrastructure (CNI).,Proactive law enforcement capabilities are needed to target high-risk data breaches selectively.
What recommendations has the company implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Enhance cybersecurity resilience for digital public services, Prioritize protection of public services alongside traditional CNI in national cybersecurity strategies., Implement real-time monitoring for unusual activity, Improve incident response coordination between government agencies (e.g., MoJ, NCSC, NCA)., Enhance cybersecurity measures for public-facing digital services, particularly those handling sensitive data., Conduct a thorough review of the Legal Aid Agency’s data protection practices and third-party risk management., Provide support (e.g., credit monitoring, identity theft protection) to affected individuals, especially vulnerable groups., Provide long-term support for affected vulnerable individuals, Conduct regular third-party audits of government platforms and Improve transparency and communication during incidents.
References
Where can I find more information about each incident ?
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Source: NordPass & NordStellar Report
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Source: Sky News
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Source: Ministry of Justice (MoJ) public statement
Date Accessed: 2024-05-20
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Source: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) - Gareth Mott
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Source: Law Society of England and Wales - Richard Atkinson
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Source: UK Ministry of Justice Public Statement
Date Accessed: 2024-05-16
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Source: Legal Aid Agency CEO Jane Harbottle’s Address
Date Accessed: 2024-05-16
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Source: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Advisory
Date Accessed: 2024-05
Where can stakeholders find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: NordPass & NordStellar Report, and Source: TechRadar ProUrl: https://www.techradar.com, and Source: Sky News, and Source: Ministry of Justice (MoJ) public statementDate Accessed: 2024-05-20, and Source: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) - Gareth Mott, and Source: Law Society of England and Wales - Richard Atkinson, and Source: UK Ministry of Justice Public StatementDate Accessed: 2024-05-16, and Source: Legal Aid Agency CEO Jane Harbottle’s AddressDate Accessed: 2024-05-16, and Source: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) AdvisoryDate Accessed: 2024-05.
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the investigation for each incident ?
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Investigation Status: Completed (by NordPass/NordStellar)
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Investigation Status: Ongoing (NCA, NCSC, and MoJ collaborating)
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Investigation Status: Ongoing (multi-agency investigation by NCSC, NCA, ICO)
How does the company communicate the status of incident investigations to stakeholders ?
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Public Report By Nordpass/Nordstellar; Media Coverage (E.G., Techradar), Public Disclosure Via Moj Statement, Apology From Legal Aid Agency Ceo Jane Harbottle, Warnings To Law Firms About Compromised Financial Data, Public Statements By Moj And Laa Ceo, Direct Outreach To Affected Individuals (Planned), Urgent Advisories For Applicants (Vigilance, Password Changes and Monitoring).
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
Were there any advisories issued to stakeholders or customers for each incident ?
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Stakeholder Advisories: Public Report Urging Improved Cyber Hygiene.
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Stakeholder Advisories: Warnings Issued To Law Firms About Compromised Financial Data., Public Apology And Updates From Legal Aid Agency Ceo Jane Harbottle..
Customer Advisories: MoJ statement acknowledging the breach and potential impact on legal aid applicants.Recommendations for affected individuals to monitor for identity theft or fraud (implied but not explicitly detailed).
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Stakeholder Advisories: Monitor For Suspicious Activity (Emails, Calls, Messages), Avoid Sharing Personal Details Without Verification, Change Passwords For Legal Aid Accounts And Linked Platforms, Check Bank Accounts And Credit Reports For Fraud.
Customer Advisories: Vulnerable individuals (e.g., those with criminal charges, debt, or family disputes) urged to take precautionsDirect outreach to affected applicants planned by MoJ/LAAContingency support for legal aid access during system downtime
What advisories does the company provide to stakeholders and customers following an incident ?
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Public Report Urging Improved Cyber Hygiene, Warnings Issued To Law Firms About Compromised Financial Data., Public Apology And Updates From Legal Aid Agency Ceo Jane Harbottle., Moj Statement Acknowledging The Breach And Potential Impact On Legal Aid Applicants., Recommendations For Affected Individuals To Monitor For Identity Theft Or Fraud (Implied But Not Explicitly Detailed)., , Monitor For Suspicious Activity (Emails, Calls, Messages), Avoid Sharing Personal Details Without Verification, Change Passwords For Legal Aid Accounts And Linked Platforms, Check Bank Accounts And Credit Reports For Fraud, Vulnerable Individuals (E.G., Those With Criminal Charges, Debt, Or Family Disputes) Urged To Take Precautions, Direct Outreach To Affected Applicants Planned By Moj/Laa, Contingency Support For Legal Aid Access During System Downtime and .
Initial Access Broker
How did the initial access broker gain entry for each incident ?
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Entry Point: Dark web (exposed credentials)
High Value Targets: Ministry Of Justice, Ministry Of Defence, Department For Work And Pensions,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Ministry Of Justice, Ministry Of Defence, Department For Work And Pensions,
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
High Value Targets: Legal Aid Applicant Data (Including Criminal Histories And Financial Details),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Legal Aid Applicant Data (Including Criminal Histories And Financial Details),
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
High Value Targets: Legal Aid Applicants' Pii And Financial/Criminal Records,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Legal Aid Applicants' Pii And Financial/Criminal Records,
Post-Incident Analysis
What were the root causes and corrective actions taken for each incident ?
Incident : data breach UK-0592305101625
Root Causes: Weak Password Policies (E.G., Passwords Like '12345678' Or 'Password')., Password Reuse Across Multiple Accounts/Services., Lack Of Proactive Monitoring For Credential Exposure.,
Corrective Actions: Public Awareness Campaign On Password Hygiene., Recommendations For Password Managers And Mfa Adoption.,
Incident : Data Breach THE31101331112625
Corrective Actions: Online Service Taken Offline To Prevent Further Access., Security Enhancements Implemented With Ncsc Support., Legal Injunction Secured To Deter Data Distribution.,
Incident : data breach THE4221642112625
Corrective Actions: Platform Taken Offline, Security Bolstered With Ncsc Assistance, Multi-Agency Review Of Digital Service Resilience,
What is the company's process for conducting post-incident analysis ?
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Nordpass, Nordstellar (Research And Disclosure), , National Cyber Security Centre (Ncsc), National Crime Agency (Nca), , Likely (implied by 'bolstering security' but not explicitly stated), National Cyber Security Centre (Ncsc), National Crime Agency (Nca), Information Commissioner’S Office (Ico), , Strengthened security post-detection.
What corrective actions has the company taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Public Awareness Campaign On Password Hygiene., Recommendations For Password Managers And Mfa Adoption., , Online Service Taken Offline To Prevent Further Access., Security Enhancements Implemented With Ncsc Support., Legal Injunction Secured To Deter Data Distribution., , Platform Taken Offline, Security Bolstered With Ncsc Assistance, Multi-Agency Review Of Digital Service Resilience, .
Additional Questions
Incident Details
What was the most recent incident detected ?
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2024-04-23.
What was the most recent incident publicly disclosed ?
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2024-05-16.
Impact of the Incidents
What was the most significant data compromised in an incident ?
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were full name, staff identification information, email address, national insurance number, work details, department or agency details, , contact information, dates of birth, national identification numbers, criminal histories, employment statuses, financial data, information related to barristers, solicitors, and various organizations, , passwords (3,014 unique exposures), , Contact details (names, addresses), Dates of birth, National ID numbers, Criminal history, Employment status, Financial data (contribution amounts, debts, payments), , contact details, addresses, dates of birth, national ID numbers, criminal history, employment status, financial data (contribution amounts, debts, payments) and .
What was the most significant system affected in an incident ?
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident was Justice Academy servers and and Legal Aid Agency’s online platform and Legal Aid Agency’s online digital services platform.
Response to the Incidents
What third-party assistance was involved in the most recent incident ?
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was nordpass, nordstellar (research and disclosure), , national cyber security centre (ncsc), national crime agency (nca), , national cyber security centre (ncsc), national crime agency (nca), information commissioner’s office (ico), .
What containment measures were taken in the most recent incident ?
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Legal injunction against data distributionOnline service taken offline and Immediate investigation launchedOnline platform taken offlineSecurity strengthening.
Data Breach Information
What was the most sensitive data compromised in a breach ?
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were criminal history, work details, dates of birth, contact details, employment status, criminal histories, employment statuses, information related to barristers, solicitors, and various organizations, Criminal history, Dates of birth, email address, National ID numbers, financial data, passwords (3,014 unique exposures), national ID numbers, staff identification information, addresses, Contact details (names, addresses), department or agency details, Financial data (contribution amounts, debts, payments), Employment status, national insurance number, full name, national identification numbers, contact information, financial data (contribution amounts, debts and payments).
What was the number of records exposed in the most significant breach ?
Number of Records Exposed in Most Significant Breach: The number of records exposed in the most significant breach was 4.1M.
Regulatory Compliance
What was the most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation ?
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Legal injunction secured against data distribution, , Pending (ICO investigation ongoing).
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What was the most significant lesson learned from past incidents ?
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Proactive law enforcement capabilities are needed to target high-risk data breaches selectively.
What was the most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Regularly audit and rotate passwords, especially for high-value targets (e.g., government employees)., Enhance cybersecurity resilience for digital public services, Prioritize protection of public services alongside traditional CNI in national cybersecurity strategies., Implement real-time monitoring for unusual activity, Enforce strong, unique password policies across all public sector accounts., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials proactively., Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for sensitive systems., Improve incident response coordination between government agencies (e.g., MoJ, NCSC, NCA)., Enhance cybersecurity measures for public-facing digital services, particularly those handling sensitive data., Conduct a thorough review of the Legal Aid Agency’s data protection practices and third-party risk management., Provide support (e.g., credit monitoring, identity theft protection) to affected individuals, especially vulnerable groups., Provide long-term support for affected vulnerable individuals, Conduct regular third-party audits of government platforms, Educate employees on cyber hygiene and risks of password reuse. and Improve transparency and communication during incidents.
References
What is the most recent source of information about an incident ?
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are Legal Aid Agency CEO Jane Harbottle’s Address, TechRadar Pro, National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Advisory, Ministry of Justice (MoJ) public statement, Law Society of England and Wales - Richard Atkinson, Sky News, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) - Gareth Mott, NordPass & NordStellar Report and UK Ministry of Justice Public Statement.
What is the most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.techradar.com .
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the most recent investigation ?
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Completed (by NordPass/NordStellar).
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
What was the most recent stakeholder advisory issued ?
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was Public report urging improved cyber hygiene, Warnings issued to law firms about compromised financial data., Public apology and updates from Legal Aid Agency CEO Jane Harbottle., Monitor for suspicious activity (emails, calls, messages), Avoid sharing personal details without verification, Change passwords for legal aid accounts and linked platforms, Check bank accounts and credit reports for fraud, .
What was the most recent customer advisory issued ?
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued were an MoJ statement acknowledging the breach and potential impact on legal aid applicants.Recommendations for affected individuals to monitor for identity theft or fraud (implied but not explicitly detailed)., Vulnerable individuals (e.g., those with criminal charges, debt and or family disputes) urged to take precautionsDirect outreach to affected applicants planned by MoJ/LAAContingency support for legal aid access during system downtime.
Initial Access Broker
What was the most recent entry point used by an initial access broker ?
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker was an Dark web (exposed credentials).
Post-Incident Analysis
What was the most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Weak password policies (e.g., passwords like '12345678' or 'password').Password reuse across multiple accounts/services.Lack of proactive monitoring for credential exposure..
What was the most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Public awareness campaign on password hygiene.Recommendations for password managers and MFA adoption., Online service taken offline to prevent further access.Security enhancements implemented with NCSC support.Legal injunction secured to deter data distribution., Platform taken offlineSecurity bolstered with NCSC assistanceMulti-agency review of digital service resilience.
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Latest Global CVEs (Not Company-Specific)
Description
A vulnerability was determined in motogadget mo.lock Ignition Lock up to 20251125. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the component NFC Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to use of hard-coded cryptographic key . The physical device can be targeted for the attack. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 1.2
Severity: HIGH
AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
cvss3
Base: 2.0
Severity: HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
cvss4
Base: 1.0
Severity: HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the interview attachment retrieval endpoint in the Recruitment module serves files based solely on an authenticated session and user-supplied identifiers, without verifying whether the requester has permission to access the associated interview record. Because the server does not perform any recruitment-level authorization checks, an ESS-level user with no access to recruitment workflows can directly request interview attachment URLs and receive the corresponding files. This exposes confidential interview documents—including candidate CVs, evaluations, and supporting files—to unauthorized users. The issue arises from relying on predictable object identifiers and session presence rather than validating the user’s association with the relevant recruitment process. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 5.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the application’s recruitment attachment retrieval endpoint does not enforce the required authorization checks before serving candidate files. Even users restricted to ESS-level access, who have no permission to view the Recruitment module, can directly access candidate attachment URLs. When an authenticated request is made to the attachment endpoint, the system validates the session but does not confirm that the requesting user has the necessary recruitment permissions. As a result, any authenticated user can download CVs and other uploaded documents for arbitrary candidates by issuing direct requests to the attachment endpoint, leading to unauthorized exposure of sensitive applicant data. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 5.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the application does not invalidate existing sessions when a user is disabled or when a password change occurs, allowing active session cookies to remain valid indefinitely. As a result, a disabled user, or an attacker using a compromised account, can continue to access protected pages and perform operations as long as a prior session remains active. Because the server performs no session revocation or session-store cleanup during these critical state changes, disabling an account or updating credentials has no effect on already-established sessions. This makes administrative disable actions ineffective and allows unauthorized users to retain full access even after an account is closed or a password is reset, exposing the system to prolonged unauthorized use and significantly increasing the impact of account takeover scenarios. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 8.7
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the password reset workflow does not enforce that the username submitted in the final reset request matches the account for which the reset process was originally initiated. After obtaining a valid reset link for any account they can receive email for, an attacker can alter the username parameter in the final reset request to target a different user. Because the system accepts the supplied username without verification, the attacker can set a new password for any chosen account, including privileged accounts, resulting in full account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 8.7
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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RapidWhat Do We Measure ?
Incident
Finding
Grade
Digital Assets
Every week, Rankiteo analyzes billions of signals to give organizations a sharper, faster view of emerging risks. With deeper, more actionable intelligence at their fingertips, security teams can outpace threat actors, respond instantly to Zero-Day attacks, and dramatically shrink their risk exposure window.
These are some of the factors we use to calculate the overall score:
Network Security
Identify exposed access points, detect misconfigured SSL certificates, and uncover vulnerabilities across the network infrastructure.
SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)
Gain visibility into the software components used within an organization to detect vulnerabilities, manage risk, and ensure supply chain security.
CMDB (Configuration Management Database)
Monitor and manage all IT assets and their configurations to ensure accurate, real-time visibility across the company's technology environment.
Threat Intelligence
Leverage real-time insights on active threats, malware campaigns, and emerging vulnerabilities to proactively defend against evolving cyberattacks.
Rankiteo is a unified scoring and risk platform that analyzes billions of signals weekly to help organizations gain faster, more actionable insights into emerging threats. Empowering teams to outpace adversaries and reduce exposure.
