The Legal Aid Agency Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (THE4221642112625)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the The Legal Aid Agency breach identified under incident ID THE4221642112625.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of The Legal Aid Agency's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-legal-aid-agency, the number of followers: 18588, the industry type: Legal Services and the number of employees: 354 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 753 and after the incident was 607 with a difference of -146 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on The Legal Aid Agency and their customers.

On 16 May 2024, UK Ministry of Justice (MoJ) disclosed data breach and cyberattack issues under the banner "UK Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Agency Data Breach".

The UK Ministry of Justice (MoJ) confirmed that hackers accessed a 'large amount of information' from the Legal Aid Agency’s (LAA) digital services, potentially exposing sensitive personal data of millions of people who applied for legal aid since 2010.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Legal Aid Agency’s online digital services platform, and exposing contact details, addresses and dates of birth, with nearly Millions (exact number undisclosed; applicants from 2010–2024) records at risk.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Immediate investigation launched, Online platform taken offline and Security strengthening, while recovery efforts such as Contingency plans for manual legal aid processing and Multi-agency coordination continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public statements by MoJ and LAA CEO, Direct outreach to affected individuals (planned) and Urgent advisories for applicants (vigilance, password changes, monitoring).

The case underscores how Ongoing (multi-agency investigation by NCSC, NCA, ICO), and recommending next steps like Enhance cybersecurity resilience for digital public services, Implement real-time monitoring for unusual activity and Conduct regular third-party audits of government platforms, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Monitor for suspicious activity (emails, calls, messages), Avoid sharing personal details without verification and Change passwords for legal aid accounts and linked platforms.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including hackers accessed a large volume of sensitive personal data from the LAA’s **digital services**, and online platform taken offline to contain the threat and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating legal Aid Agency’s **online digital services platform** (potential abuse of legitimate user accounts). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including threat actors accessing and downloading personal data, including **contact details, national ID numbers, criminal records**, and large amount of information from the LAA’s digital services. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including accessing and **downloading personal data**, and data exfiltration such as true. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (10%), supported by evidence indicating platform taken offline (no explicit ransomware, but operational disruption) and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating lAA took its **online platform offline** to contain the threat (prolonged downtime). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating breach was first identified on April 23, 2024, and escalated significantly (delayed detection suggests possible log tampering). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating advisories for applicants such as **change passwords** for legal aid accounts (implies potential credential theft). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.