Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » Ledger » METLED1PACOIOPE1778262200

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (METLED1PACOIOPE1778262200)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-20
Company Score Before Incident528 / 1000
Company Score After Incident508 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERMETLED1PACOIOPE1778262200
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORMalicious installer (typosquat domain)
DATA EXPOSEDCrypto wallet credentials, password manager...
INCIDENT DATE31/01/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Ledger's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Ledger Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Ledger breach identified under incident ID METLED1PACOIOPE1778262200.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Ledger's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ledgerhq, the number of followers: 87518, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 777 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 528 and after the incident was 508 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Ledger and their customers.

On 01 February 2026, a cybersecurity incident called "Hologram Infostealer Campaign Targets Crypto Wallets and Password Managers via Fake OpenClaw Installer" came to light.

A sophisticated infostealer campaign, dubbed 'Hologram,' has been active since at least February 2026, targeting sensitive data stored in 250+ browser extensions tied to crypto wallets and password managers.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows systems with targeted browser extensions, and exposing Crypto wallet credentials, password manager data, personally identifiable information.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The campaign highlights the growing sophistication of infostealers, particularly in crypto and credential theft, and the use of evasive techniques like Rust-based malware, dynamic targeting, and Telegram-based C2 rotation, and recommending next steps like Avoid downloading software from untrusted sources or typosquat domains, Monitor for suspicious registry modifications and scheduled tasks and Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to detect anti-analysis behaviors.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fake installer for OpenClaw hosted on typosquat domain (openclaw-installer.com) and Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating victims download OpenClaw_x64.7z from convincing typosquat domain. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating victims download and execute OpenClaw_x64.7z Rust-based executable and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating malware disables Windows Defender and opens firewall ports. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating registry autoruns (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit), Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scheduled tasks used for persistence, and Browser Extensions (T1176) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating targets 250+ browser extensions tied to crypto wallets and password managers. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 130MB Rust-based executable padded with fake documentation to evade AV scans, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (T1497) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scans for VM BIOS strings, waits for real mouse movement to bypass sandboxes, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating disables Windows Defender during execution, and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating infrastructure rotation observed, domains/IPs changed before publication. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating targets 201 crypto wallets and 49 password managers (e.g., MetaMask, 1Password) and Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating targets browser extensions tied to crypto wallets and password managers. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating steals crypto wallet credentials, password manager data, PII from local systems and Automated Collection (T1119) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dynamic targeting list covers 250+ browser extensions, remotely updatable. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Web Service (T1102) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating c2 servers retrieved from Telegram channel descriptions, uses Hookdeck for relay, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating data routed through Hookdeck (legitimate webhook relay service), and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating downloads six modular components from Azure DevOps repository. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating victim data (usernames, IPs, timestamps) exfiltrated via C2 infrastructure and Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating data routed through Hookdeck (webhook relay service). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (90%)
Drive-by Compromise (70%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (60%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (90%)
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (90%)
Browser Extensions (80%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (90%)
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (90%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (90%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (70%)
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores (90%)
Steal Web Session Cookie (80%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Automated Collection (80%)
Command and Control
Web Service (90%)
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (90%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service (80%)