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Analyze » Kaspersky » KAS1785414553

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (KAS1785414553)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-18
Company Score Before Incident646 / 1000
Company Score After Incident628 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERKAS1785414553
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORStolen credentials (OpenVPN connection from trusted external partner)
DATA EXPOSEDNA
INCIDENT DATE28/02/2026
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Kaspersky's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Kaspersky Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Kaspersky breach identified under incident ID KAS1785414553.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Kaspersky's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/kaspersky, the number of followers: 565687, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 4603 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 646 and after the incident was 628 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Kaspersky and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "GenieLocker: Toy Ghouls’ Custom Ransomware Targets Russian Industries", has drawn attention.

The Toy Ghouls cybercriminal group (also tracked as Bearlyfy or Labubu) has deployed GenieLocker, a custom ransomware strain designed to encrypt Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi systems.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

Overall, the incident is a reminder of why proactive monitoring and strong governance matter.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating gained initial access via an OpenVPN connection from a trusted external partner, exploiting stolen credentials. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating deployed tools like OpenSSH, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, SOCKS5 proxies, and Mimikatz and System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating used PsExec/PAExec for widespread ransomware deployment. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation (T1098) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating harvest passwords, including attempts to breach KeePassXC vaults and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating openVPN connection from a trusted external partner. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploiting stolen credentials for lateral movement via RDP and SSH. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading (T1036) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating windows variant requires a SHA-256-validated secret argument to execute, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating terminates database, backup, virtualization, and browser processes, and Debugger Evasion (T1622) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating implements anti-debugging checks (e.g., IsDebuggerPresent). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deployed Mimikatz to harvest passwords and Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating attempts to breach KeePassXC vaults. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used SoftPerfect Network Scanner for lateral movement. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating used RDP (Windows) and SSH (Linux) for lateral movement and Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating used SSH for lateral movement and reverse SSH tunnel for C2. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used SOCKS5 proxies for C2 communication and Protocol Tunneling (T1572) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating reverse SSH tunnel facilitated command-and-control communication. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating genieLocker ransomware encrypts files using XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating terminates backup processes to maximize encryption impact. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Valid Accounts (90%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter (80%)
System Services: Service Execution (70%)
Persistence
Account Manipulation (60%)
External Remote Services (80%)
Privilege Escalation
Valid Accounts (90%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading (70%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (80%)
Debugger Evasion (70%)
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping (90%)
Credentials from Password Stores (80%)
Discovery
Network Service Discovery (80%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (90%)
Remote Services: SSH (90%)
Command and Control
Proxy: Internal Proxy (80%)
Protocol Tunneling (90%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (100%)
Inhibit System Recovery (80%)

Sources & References