Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (JENVAL1777645518)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Jenkins's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Jenkins Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Jenkins breach identified under incident ID JENVAL1777645518.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Jenkins's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/jenkinsio, the number of followers: 16375, the industry type: Information Technology & Services and the number of employees: 38 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 747 and after the incident was 742 with a difference of -5 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Jenkins and their customers.
On 18 March 2026, Valve Corporation disclosed DDoS Botnet issues under the banner "New DDoS Botnet Targets Valve Source Engine Game Servers via Exposed Jenkins Instances".
Security researchers at Darktrace uncovered a sophisticated DDoS botnet exploiting misconfigured Jenkins servers to launch attacks against Valve Source Engine game infrastructure, including Counter-Strike and Team Fortress 2 servers.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Valve Source Engine game servers (Counter-Strike, Team Fortress 2).
In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Blocking TCP port 5444 (C2 communication) and Blocking attacker IP (103[.]177.110.202) at network perimeter, and began remediation that includes Securing Jenkins instances with strong authentication and Restricting public access to Jenkins servers.
The case underscores how Ongoing (research and mitigation recommendations provided), teams are taking away lessons such as Misconfigured Jenkins servers with weak/default credentials are prime targets for DDoS botnets. Cross-platform malware can exploit both Windows and Linux systems, and the gaming industry is increasingly targeted by cybercriminals, and recommending next steps like Block TCP port 5444 and the attacker IP (103[.]177.110.202) at the network perimeter, Secure Jenkins instances with strong authentication and restrict public access and Monitor for unusual process names (e.g., ksoftirqd/0, kworker) and log redirections to /dev/null.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exploiting misconfigured Jenkins servers to launch attacks, and exposed remote code execution (RCE) endpoint and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating scanning for Jenkins instances with weak or default credentials. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: Bash (T1059.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating executes a Bash script to fetch and run a payload from the /tmp directory and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating downloads a disguised system update file on Windows. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malware delivers Windows and Linux variants for persistence and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries (T1547.013) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating manipulating Jenkins environment variables (dontKillMe). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service (T1036.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating renaming itself to mimic legitimate Linux kernel processes (ksoftirqd/0, kworker), Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating redirecting logs to /dev/null to avoid detection, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malware uses double forking to evade detection, and Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot (T1562.009) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ignoring termination signals (SIGTERM) to resist manual shutdowns. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating connects to C2 server (103.177.110.202) for payload delivery and Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating uses TCP port 5444 for C2 communication. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Network Denial of Service (T1498) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating employs UDP floods, TCP push attacks, and HTTP request floods and Direct Network Flood (T1498.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploits Valve Source Engine’s query protocol for DDoS (attack_dayz). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Jenkins Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/jenkinsio/incident/JENVAL1777645518
- Jenkins CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/jenkinsio
- Jenkins Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/jenval1777645518-jenkins-valve-vulnerability-march-2026/
- Jenkins CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/jenkinsio/history
- Jenkins CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://cybersecuritynews.com/new-ddos-malware-exploits-jenkins/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf