Huemen Design A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
24/04/2026
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for Huemen Design in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Huemen Design in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Huemen Design in 2026.
HDR is an employee-owned design firm specializing in engineering, architecture, environmental and construction services. We’re ranked No. 6 among the world’s design firms and we’re the largest healthcare design firm. Led by the strength of our values and a culture shaped by employee ownership, we network with each other, build on each other’s contributions, and collaborate together to make great things possible. When you join HDR, we give you license to do the same. We help you take charge of your career, giving you multiple growth opportunities along the way. So, what are you waiting for? Come grow with us.
Dar is one of the world’s leading consultancies, providing design, planning, engineering, sustainability consulting, digital solutions and services, project management, and facilities management for buildings, cities, transportation, civil infrastructure, water, and the environment. We are a global community of talented and innovative engineers, planners, economists, architects, sustainability specialists, digital experts, designers, project management specialists, construction management professionals, and multidisciplinary experts. Together, we take on the world’s most exciting and ambitious projects in order to nurture sustainable development, empower and connect communities, create more and better opportunities, and enhance lives. Dar has over 10,000 professionals in 60 offices across the Middle East, Africa, Asia, UK, and Europe. Collectively, our teams have delivered over 4,500 projects, worth more than US$540 billion, for more than 950 clients around the world. Dar is the founding member of Sidara, a global collective of the world’s brightest and best planners, designers, engineers, and consultants who have come together on a shared mission: to advocate for the world as we would for our own home. For us, that means taking on projects with courage and resilience, bravely setting up a home where others won’t go, intertwining ourselves with the communities we create for, and navigating immense complexity and ambiguity to empower our clients, craft solutions for the world’s most critical challenges, and deliver projects that elevate how people live, connect communities, and inspire global impact, all while showcasing and honoring the unique cultures we serve. Dar and its sister companies under the Sidara Collaborative can offer a broad and integrated range of highly specialised and world-class services—from architecture and design, engineering, and project management to digital strategy, sustainability consulting, and energy innovation - under one umbrella.
Latest updates, reports, and threat intel affecting the global network.
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tls_opt_dtls_peer_connection_id_value_get() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_tls.c, which handles getsockopt(SOL_TLS, TLS_DTLS_PEER_CID_VALUE), passed the caller-supplied optval directly to mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() without verifying the buffer was at least MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX (default 32) bytes. mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() copies the peer-negotiated DTLS Connection ID (length 1..MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) into that buffer without a destination-size parameter, so a caller-supplied optlen smaller than the CID causes a write of up to 31 bytes past the buffer end. In CONFIG_USERSPACE builds the getsockopt syscall verifier (z_vrfy_zsock_getsockopt) bounce-buffers the user's optval into a kernel allocation of exactly optlen bytes (k_usermode_alloc_from_copy -> z_thread_malloc), so an unprivileged user thread that passes a small optlen on a connected DTLS socket with Connection ID enabled induces a kernel-heap buffer overflow, with the overflowing content being the remote peer's CID. The defect requires CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID, an established DTLS session with a negotiated peer CID, and (for the kernel-crossing case) CONFIG_USERSPACE. Introduced when the TLS_DTLS_CID option was added (v3.5.0). The fix rejects callers whose optlen is below MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX with -EINVAL.
react18-use is a React 19 use hook shim. Between 2026-05-19 01:07:01 and 2026-05-19 15:20:43, the default branch contained malicious commits 7b79148d1495a2505f9277da295a98cf176f4496 through 7b79148d1495a2505f9277da295a98cf176f4496 that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-19 01:07:01 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity since 2026-05-19 01:07:01, and clean local clones.
The UpdateHub management subsystem (subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c) drives every update operation through a single file-scope ctx structure that holds the CoAP block context, payload buffer, status code, socket, and a one-element poll-fd array fds[1]. Access to ctx was not serialized, and prepare_fds() wrote ctx.fds[ctx.nfds] and incremented ctx.nfds with no bounds check. Two independent paths mutate ctx concurrently: the background autohandler running on the system workqueue, and user-triggered operations reached through the updatehub run shell command, direct API calls, or — since the operations are exposed as syscalls — userspace threads. When a second flow enters prepare_fds() while ctx.nfds is already 1, the write lands one element past the array; by struct layout it overlaps the adjacent ctx.sock/ctx.nfds members. More broadly, the unsynchronized sharing lets two flows interleave connection setup and teardown, double-closing a socket descriptor or scribbling the shared buffers. The result is corruption of the update subsystem's internal state and denial of service of the firmware-update path; the out-of-bounds write is contained within the ctx structure and there is no demonstrated path to memory outside it or to code execution. Triggering requires a local actor able to invoke update operations (or, with CONFIG_USERSPACE, an unprivileged userspace thread) and to win a timing race against the background handler; remote peers cannot control the race timing. The fix serializes the entry points with a mutex and adds a bounds check to prepare_fds().
The UpdateHub over-the-air update client's start_coap_client() in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c leaks the CoAP/DTLS socket descriptor on its connection-setup failure paths. The shared error: cleanup gated socket closing on a ret > 0 flag, but ret was set to -1 immediately after the socket was created, so when zsock_setsockopt() (DTLS) or zsock_connect() subsequently failed the gate was false and cleanup_connection() was never called. The open descriptor in the global ctx.sock was then overwritten by the next attempt, permanently leaking it from the socket / net_context pool until reboot. The failing setup path is reached every time the OTA client tries to contact the UpdateHub server and the connection cannot be established — driven automatically by the periodic autohandler() poll (and on demand via the updatehub_probe()/updatehub_update() API or the updatehub run shell command). The DTLS handshake/connect outcome is influenceable by a network or on-path attacker who drops, resets, or otherwise disrupts traffic to the server, and also fails naturally whenever the server is unreachable. Each failed attempt permanently leaks one descriptor; once the shared socket pool is exhausted, networking degrades device-wide until the device is rebooted, a denial-of-service condition. Severity is low because the leak rate is bounded by the configured OTA poll interval (default once per 24 hours), the effect is gradual and recovered by reboot, and only builds with the UpdateHub client enabled are affected. There is no memory-corruption, information-disclosure, or authentication impact.
Certain web interface components in affected TP-Link Aginet devices do not validate and sanitize user-supplied input properly before passing it to system-level command execution functions. An authenticated adjacent attacker may inject specially crafted input to execute arbitrary operation system commands with elevated privileges. Successful exploitation may allow execution of arbitrary system commands, potentially leading to full device compromise.
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linkedin_id=axa' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
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