Google Cloud Security Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GOO2212622112625)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Google Cloud Security breach identified under incident ID GOO2212622112625.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Google Cloud Security's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/googlecloudsecurity, the number of followers: 50322, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 464 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 100 and after the incident was 100 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Google Cloud Security and their customers.

Google (Gmail Users) recently reported "Aggregated Credential Leak from Infostealer Malware (Misreported as '183 Million Gmail Breach')", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

A large dataset of 183 million credentials, primarily collected via infostealer malware over time, was misreported as a 'Gmail breach.' The credentials were aggregated from malware logs and legacy breaches, not from a compromise of Google's infrastructure.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing 183 million credentials (email:password pairs with domains), Legacy breach data and Fresh infostealer logs, with nearly 183 million records at risk.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, and began remediation that includes Google clarified no breach occurred, Security community emphasized need for continuous credential monitoring and Recommendations for password hygiene (e.g., avoiding reuse), and stakeholders are being briefed through Google's public statement via Cybernews, Technical explainers by Synthient and Cybernews and Blog posts (e.g., Enzoic) on mitigation strategies.

The case underscores how Completed (by Google, Synthient, and independent researchers), teams are taking away lessons such as Headlines about large credential dumps often misrepresent the source (e.g., not a direct breach of the named service), Infostealer malware is a persistent, high-volume threat that harvests credentials from endpoints and Credential reuse across services amplifies risk (e.g., personal email passwords used for corporate logins), and recommending next steps like Implement continuous password monitoring to detect exposed credentials in real time, Integrate credential checks into authentication flows (e.g., block known-compromised passwords) and Enforce password hygiene policies (e.g., no reuse, strong passwords), with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Google's public statement clarifying no breach occurred and Security community advisories on credential monitoring best practices.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating 183 million Gmail credentials from infostealer malware, reused for corporate portals, VPNs, and cloud systems and Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating credentials traded via Telegram Criminal Channels for proxy-based credential-stuffing attacks. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer malware infecting users devices, harvesting stored passwords from browsers, Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating browser-stored credentials exfiltrated via malware logs, and Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials (T1589.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating unique email-password pairs along with the domains where they were used. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating infostealers harvesting stored passwords from browsers and active logins on endpoints. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating credentials exfiltrated via criminal data-sharing channels (primarily Telegram). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating password reuse across services enabling persistent access to corporate/VPN accounts. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools (T1027.005) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating misreporting as a Gmail breach to evade attribution to infostealer operators. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Account Access Removal (T1531) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating potential account takeovers across services (corporate/personal) via credential stuffing and Malicious Account Use (T1659) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating weaponized for credential-stuffing attacks targeting cloud/VPN systems. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.