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Analyze » Google Cloud Security » ANTGOOOPE1790576637

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ANTGOOOPE1790576637)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-20
Company Score Before Incident173 / 1000
Company Score After Incident153 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERANTGOOOPE1790576637
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORExposed Docker daemons (unauthenticated access on port 2375)
DATA EXPOSEDAI API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic,...
INCIDENT DATE30/04/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Google Cloud Security's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Google Cloud Security Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Google Cloud Security breach identified under incident ID ANTGOOOPE1790576637.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Google Cloud Security's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/googlecloudsecurity, the number of followers: 64359, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 691 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 173 and after the incident was 153 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Google Cloud Security and their customers.

On 01 August 2026, a cybersecurity incident called "AI-Powered Botnet CARBONATO Targets Exposed Docker Servers to Harvest AI API Keys" came to light.

Security researchers uncovered CARBONATO, an advanced botnet operation that hijacks exposed Docker servers to prioritize the theft of AI API keys from providers like OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Exposed Docker servers, attached networks, Docker bridges, and exposing AI API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google), SSH credentials, tokens, databases, cryptocurrency wallet data (related campaign).

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Exposed Docker APIs are high-value targets for AI-focused botnets. Persistence mechanisms (cron, systemd) and lateral movement via Docker bridges increase attack surface. AI-driven C2 frameworks (e.g., Hermes Agent) enable dynamic command execution, and recommending next steps like Secure Docker daemons with authentication and network restrictions (e.g., disable port 2375 exposure), Monitor for unauthorized Docker API access and IoCs (e.g., C2 IPs: 45[.]79[.]183[.]61, 91[.]99[.]195[.]164) and Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scans for Docker daemons with unauthenticated access on port 2375. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Container Administration Command (T1609) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deploys a privileged container that mounts the host’s filesystem and Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating aI-driven agent executes tasks via Telegram commands. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Scheduled Task/Job: Cron (T1053.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating establishes persistence via cron, Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service (T1543.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating establishes persistence via systemd, and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: RC Scripts (T1547.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating establishes persistence via rc.local and OpenRC. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Escape to Host (T1611) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deploys a privileged container that mounts the host’s filesystem. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating mimics legitimate processes (e.g., naming its container systemd-resolved). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating prioritizes the theft of AI API keys, SSH credentials, tokens. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Network Service Discovery (T1046) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scans attached networks and Docker bridges for exposed Docker APIs. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating opens a reverse SSH tunnel for operator access, Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking (T1563.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating installs an SSH server and adds attacker-controlled keys, and Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating lateral movement via Docker bridges to new hosts. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating deploys implant to new hosts via exposed Docker APIs, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sends Telegram deployment reports with host details, and Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating reverse SSH tunnel for operator access. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration via Telegram deployment reports and LLM gateway. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hijacks exposed Docker servers for AI API key theft. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
Execution
Container Administration Command (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter (80%)
Persistence
Scheduled Task/Job: Cron (90%)
Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service (90%)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: RC Scripts (80%)
Privilege Escalation
Escape to Host (90%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (80%)
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (90%)
Discovery
Network Service Discovery (90%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: SSH (90%)
Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking (70%)
Account Discovery: Domain Account (70%)
Command and Control
Ingress Tool Transfer (80%)
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (90%)
Proxy: Internal Proxy (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Impact
Resource Hijacking (80%)

Sources & References