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Analyze » Google Cloud » GOO1781699328

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GOO1781699328)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-3
Company Score Before Incident778 / 1000
Company Score After Incident775 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERGOO1781699328
Type of Cyber IncidentVulnerability
ATTACK VECTORCloud Storage Bucket Squatting, Unsafe Deserialization
DATA EXPOSEDOAuth tokens, model artifacts, BigQuery...
INCIDENT DATE04/03/2026
STATUSResolved

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Google Cloud's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Google Cloud Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Google Cloud breach identified under incident ID GOO1781699328.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Google Cloud's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/google-cloud, the number of followers: 3097955, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: None employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 778 and after the incident was 775 with a difference of -3 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Google Cloud and their customers.

On 05 March 2026, Google Cloud Vertex AI disclosed Vulnerability Exploitation issues under the banner "Critical 'Pickle in the Middle' Vulnerability in Google Cloud Vertex AI Exposed ML Models to RCE".

Researchers from Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 uncovered a severe vulnerability in Google Cloud’s Vertex AI, dubbed 'Pickle in the Middle,' which enabled attackers to hijack machine learning (ML) model uploads, poison artifacts, and achieve cross-tenant remote code execution (RC...

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Google Cloud Vertex AI, Python SDK (google-cloud-aiplatform), Google Cloud Storage (GCS) buckets, and exposing OAuth tokens, model artifacts, BigQuery metadata, internal infrastructure data.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Randomized bucket naming (UUIDs), explicit bucket ownership verification, and began remediation that includes Patches in SDK versions 1.144.0 and 1.148.0.

The case underscores how Resolved, teams are taking away lessons such as Emerging security risks in AI/ML pipelines due to cloud misconfigurations and model serialization vulnerabilities. Importance of randomized resource naming and explicit ownership verification in cloud services, and recommending next steps like Update to patched SDK versions (1.144.0+), implement integrity checks for ML model artifacts, monitor for unauthorized bucket access, and enforce least-privilege IAM roles.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating flaw in Google Cloud’s Vertex AI Python SDK (google-cloud-aiplatform) and Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating vertex AI’s Model Registry relies on GCS buckets to stage artifacts. Under the Resource Development tactic, the analysis identified Acquire Infrastructure: Cloud Accounts (T1583.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating attacker pre-created buckets in their own project (bucket squatting) and Compromise Infrastructure: Cloud Storage (T1584.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating bucket squatting technique to hijack staging buckets. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating unsafe Python pickle deserialization to execute arbitrary code and Content Injection (T1659) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating replaced legitimate model files with malicious payloads within 2.5s. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles (T1098.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating configured permissive IAM roles on attacker-controlled buckets. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Domain Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification (T1484.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating oAuth token exfiltration from Google-managed service accounts and Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating rCE via pickle deserialization granted broad cloud-platform scope. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Snapshot (T1578.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious model treated as legitimate due to absent integrity checks and Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating predictable bucket naming allowed bucket squatting in attacker’s project. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating oAuth token exfiltration from Google-managed service accounts. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Cloud Service Discovery (T1526) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating access to BigQuery metadata and internal infrastructure data and Account Discovery: Cloud Account (T1087.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating cross-deployment data access and reconnaissance capabilities. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Cloud Storage (T1213.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating model theft and access to BigQuery metadata. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating oAuth tokens and model artifacts exfiltrated via RCE. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating poisoned ML model artifacts deployed as legitimate and Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating cross-tenant RCE undermined tenant isolation in Vertex AI. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (80%)
Exploit Public-Facing Application (70%)
Resource Development
Acquire Infrastructure: Cloud Accounts (90%)
Compromise Infrastructure: Cloud Storage (90%)
Execution
Exploitation for Client Execution (80%)
Content Injection (90%)
Persistence
Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles (70%)
Privilege Escalation
Domain Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification (60%)
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (80%)
Defense Evasion
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Snapshot (70%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Credential Access
Steal Application Access Token (90%)
Discovery
Cloud Service Discovery (80%)
Account Discovery: Cloud Account (70%)
Collection
Data from Cloud Storage (90%)
Exfiltration
Transfer Data to Cloud Account (80%)
Impact
Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation (90%)
Resource Hijacking (80%)

Sources & References