Company Details
gnvferries
1,720
48,292
483
gnv.it
0
GNV_1474295
In-progress

GNV Company CyberSecurity Posture
gnv.itGNV operates on 33 maritime routes connecting Italy (including Sardinia and Sicily), Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Spain, France, Albania, and Malta. Destinations include Genoa, Civitavecchia, Naples, Palermo, Termini Imerese, Olbia, Porto Torres, Barcelona, Valencia, Palma de Mallorca, Ibiza, Mahón, Almería, Tunis, Tangier, Algiers, Bejaia, Nador, Sète, Bari, Durrës, and Malta. GNV is also actively engaged in the development of "maritime motorways of the sea", positioning sea transport as a cost-effective alternative to traditional road transport. This innovative approach not only reduces transportation costs but also provides an efficient solution to the environmental challenges associated with heavy lorry traffic on national road networks. 6 domestic lines in SICILY Genova-Palermo Civitavecchia-Palermo Civitavecchia-Termini Imerese Napoli-Palermo Napoli-Termini Imerese Genova-Termini Imerese (freight only) 3 domestic lines in SARDINIA Civitavecchia-Olbia Genova-Olbia Genova-Porto Torres 3 international lines in TUNISIA Genova-Tunisi Civitavecchia-Tunisi Palermo-Tunisi 2 international lines in ALGERIA Sète - Algiers, Sète - Bejaia, 6 international lines in BALEARICS Barcellona-Mahón Barcellona-Palma di Maiorca Palma di Maiorca-Ibiza Palma di Maiorca-Mahón Valencia-Ibiza Valencia-Palma di Maiorca 6 international lines in MAROCCO Genova-Tangeri Sete-Tangeri Sete-Nador Barcellona-Tangeri Barcellona-Nador Genova-Barcellona 1 international line in ALBANIA Bari-Durazzo 2 international lines in MALTA (freight only) Genova-Malta Palermo-Malta
Company Details
gnvferries
1,720
48,292
483
gnv.it
0
GNV_1474295
In-progress
Between 700 and 749

GNV Global Score (TPRM)XXXX

Description: **Russian Military Hackers Suspected in Cyber Intrusion Targeting MSC Ferry** European investigators are examining a suspected cyber intrusion by Russian military hackers targeting a ferry operated by **MSC-Mediterranean Shipping Company SA**, the world’s largest container shipping group. The incident occurred over the weekend in the **southern French port of Sète**, where the vessel—part of MSC’s **Grandi Navi Veloci** unit—was immobilized on **Saturday** as authorities assessed potential risks to operational systems. The ferry resumed its voyage to Algeria on **Sunday** after confirming no critical systems were compromised. The breach attempt, which remains under investigation by **French and Italian officials**, is believed to be linked to **Russia’s GRU military intelligence agency**. Forensic analysis reportedly identified overlaps in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) with previous GRU operations, including those publicly attributed to **Unit 29155** by U.S. agencies like the **FBI and CISA**. No official attribution has been made, and the Kremlin has not responded to requests for comment. The attack targeted the ferry’s **office computer network**, aiming to impersonate legitimate users, but failed to penetrate **operational systems**—such as navigation, propulsion, or the Automatic Identification System (AIS)—due to network segregation and restricted remote access. Investigators noted that while sabotage was averted, the incident underscores vulnerabilities in maritime cybersecurity, particularly the risk of **physical access attacks** for surveillance or long-term infiltration. This is not the first attempt against the vessel. In **November**, a **Raspberry Pi device**—a concealed miniature computer—was discovered connected to a shipboard system in a restricted area, triggering security alerts. A second device, found last week and paired with a **cellular modem** for remote access, was seized for forensic analysis. Authorities suspect a **third device** may still be active on another ship. The incident highlights growing concerns over **cyber threats to global maritime trade**, which carries the majority of world commerce. Disruptions in shipping networks could have cascading effects on supply chains, critical infrastructure, and sensitive military or commercial movements. While this attack was contained, it reflects a broader pattern of **state-sponsored cyber espionage** targeting high-value logistics assets.


GNV has 24.81% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
GNV has 28.21% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
GNV reported 1 incidents this year: 1 cyber attacks, 0 ransomware, 0 vulnerabilities, 0 data breaches, compared to industry peers with at least 1 incident.
GNV cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries

GNV operates on 33 maritime routes connecting Italy (including Sardinia and Sicily), Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Spain, France, Albania, and Malta. Destinations include Genoa, Civitavecchia, Naples, Palermo, Termini Imerese, Olbia, Porto Torres, Barcelona, Valencia, Palma de Mallorca, Ibiza, Mahón, Almería, Tunis, Tangier, Algiers, Bejaia, Nador, Sète, Bari, Durrës, and Malta. GNV is also actively engaged in the development of "maritime motorways of the sea", positioning sea transport as a cost-effective alternative to traditional road transport. This innovative approach not only reduces transportation costs but also provides an efficient solution to the environmental challenges associated with heavy lorry traffic on national road networks. 6 domestic lines in SICILY Genova-Palermo Civitavecchia-Palermo Civitavecchia-Termini Imerese Napoli-Palermo Napoli-Termini Imerese Genova-Termini Imerese (freight only) 3 domestic lines in SARDINIA Civitavecchia-Olbia Genova-Olbia Genova-Porto Torres 3 international lines in TUNISIA Genova-Tunisi Civitavecchia-Tunisi Palermo-Tunisi 2 international lines in ALGERIA Sète - Algiers, Sète - Bejaia, 6 international lines in BALEARICS Barcellona-Mahón Barcellona-Palma di Maiorca Palma di Maiorca-Ibiza Palma di Maiorca-Mahón Valencia-Ibiza Valencia-Palma di Maiorca 6 international lines in MAROCCO Genova-Tangeri Sete-Tangeri Sete-Nador Barcellona-Tangeri Barcellona-Nador Genova-Barcellona 1 international line in ALBANIA Bari-Durazzo 2 international lines in MALTA (freight only) Genova-Malta Palermo-Malta


About Hapag-Lloyd With a fleet of 313 modern container ships and a total transport capacity of 2.5 million TEU, Hapag-Lloyd is one of the world’s leading liner shipping companies. In the Liner Shipping segment, the Company has around 14,000 employees and 400 offices in 140 countries. Hapag-Lloyd has

Anglo-Eastern's rich maritime heritage spans over 50 years of ship management, crew management, cruise & leisure management and technical services. We manage a diverse fleet of vessels worldwide on behalf of our global partners, and uniquely offer both cadet and crew training through our highly rega

Yacht Crew Register has been successfully recruiting professional captains and crew since 1995, and has developed a reputation for confidentiality. We are a private yacht crew agency serving yacht owners and select management companies. We guarantee complete confidentiality of all information entrus
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French prosecutors probe a suspected cyberattack on GNV ferry Fantastic, raising concerns of a possible remote hijack.

Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
The official website of GNV is http://www.gnv.it.
According to Rankiteo, GNV’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 743, reflecting their Moderate security posture.
According to Rankiteo, GNV currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
According to Rankiteo, GNV is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
According to Rankiteo, GNV does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
According to Rankiteo, GNV is not listed as GDPR compliant.
According to Rankiteo, GNV does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
According to Rankiteo, GNV is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
According to Rankiteo,GNV is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
GNV operates primarily in the Maritime Transportation industry.
GNV employs approximately 1,720 people worldwide.
GNV presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
GNV’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 48,292 followers.
GNV is classified under the NAICS code 483, which corresponds to Water Transportation.
Yes, GNV has an official profile on Crunchbase, which can be accessed here: https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/grandi-navi-veloci.
Yes, GNV maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/gnvferries.
As of December 22, 2025, Rankiteo reports that GNV has experienced 1 cybersecurity incidents.
GNV has an estimated 2,135 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack.
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an incident response plan activated with yes, and law enforcement notified with yes (french and italian authorities), and containment measures with removal of raspberry pi devices, forensic analysis, and remediation measures with network segregation, enhanced monitoring, and recovery measures with ferry resumed operations after investigation, and communication strategy with limited public disclosure (spokesperson confirmed intrusion attempt), and network segmentation with pre-existing segregation prevented lateral movement..
Title: Russian Military Hackers Suspected in MSC Ferry Cyber Intrusion
Description: European investigators are probing whether Russian military hackers breached computer systems on a vessel owned by MSC-Mediterranean Shipping Company SA. The ferry was immobilized in the southern French port of Sète as authorities confirmed operational systems were not compromised. The intrusion attempt was detected and neutralized by the company.
Type: Cyber Intrusion
Attack Vector: Physical access via Raspberry Pi devices with cellular modems
Vulnerability Exploited: Insufficient network segmentation between office and operational systems
Threat Actor: GRU (Russian military intelligence agency, possibly Unit 29155)
Motivation: EspionageLong-term surveillance
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Cyber Attack.
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Physical access via Raspberry Pi devices.

Systems Affected: Office computer network
Downtime: Ferry immobilized for less than 24 hours
Operational Impact: No impact on navigation, propulsion, or AIS systems
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential reputational damage due to cybersecurity concerns

Entity Name: MSC-Mediterranean Shipping Company SA (Grandi Navi Veloci unit)
Entity Type: Maritime transport company
Industry: Shipping and logistics
Location: Global (incident occurred in Sète, France)
Size: World's largest container shipping group

Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes
Law Enforcement Notified: Yes (French and Italian authorities)
Containment Measures: Removal of Raspberry Pi devices, forensic analysis
Remediation Measures: Network segregation, enhanced monitoring
Recovery Measures: Ferry resumed operations after investigation
Communication Strategy: Limited public disclosure (spokesperson confirmed intrusion attempt)
Network Segmentation: Pre-existing segregation prevented lateral movement
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Yes.
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Network segregation, enhanced monitoring.
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by removal of raspberry pi devices and forensic analysis.
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Ferry resumed operations after investigation.

Lessons Learned: Importance of physical security for onboard networks, network segmentation, and monitoring for unauthorized devices.

Recommendations: Enhance physical security measures for restricted-access areas on vessels, Improve detection of unauthorized hardware (e.g., Raspberry Pi devices), Strengthen network segmentation between office and operational systems, Conduct regular audits of onboard networks for anomaliesEnhance physical security measures for restricted-access areas on vessels, Improve detection of unauthorized hardware (e.g., Raspberry Pi devices), Strengthen network segmentation between office and operational systems, Conduct regular audits of onboard networks for anomaliesEnhance physical security measures for restricted-access areas on vessels, Improve detection of unauthorized hardware (e.g., Raspberry Pi devices), Strengthen network segmentation between office and operational systems, Conduct regular audits of onboard networks for anomaliesEnhance physical security measures for restricted-access areas on vessels, Improve detection of unauthorized hardware (e.g., Raspberry Pi devices), Strengthen network segmentation between office and operational systems, Conduct regular audits of onboard networks for anomalies
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Importance of physical security for onboard networks, network segmentation, and monitoring for unauthorized devices.

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Le Parisien
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: Bloomberg, and Source: Le Parisien.

Investigation Status: Ongoing
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Limited public disclosure (spokesperson confirmed intrusion attempt).

Entry Point: Physical access via Raspberry Pi devices
Backdoors Established: Cellular modems for remote access
High Value Targets: Office computer network
Data Sold on Dark Web: Office computer network

Root Causes: Physical Security Lapse Allowing Unauthorized Device Installation, Potential Insider Assistance Or Lax Access Controls,
Corrective Actions: Forensic Analysis Of Seized Devices, Review Of Physical And Network Security Protocols,
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Forensic Analysis Of Seized Devices, Review Of Physical And Network Security Protocols, .
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an GRU (Russian military intelligence agency and possibly Unit 29155).
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Removal of Raspberry Pi devices and forensic analysis.
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Importance of physical security for onboard networks, network segmentation, and monitoring for unauthorized devices.
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Strengthen network segmentation between office and operational systems, Conduct regular audits of onboard networks for anomalies, Enhance physical security measures for restricted-access areas on vessels, Improve detection of unauthorized hardware (e.g. and Raspberry Pi devices).
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are Bloomberg and Le Parisien.
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing.
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker was an Physical access via Raspberry Pi devices.
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