Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (FORTRI1789410253)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Fortinet's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Fortinet Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Fortinet breach identified under incident ID FORTRI1789410253.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Fortinet's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fortinet, the number of followers: 1310862, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 16380 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 100 and after the incident was 100 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Fortinet and their customers.
On 03 June 2026, 3BB (Triple T Broadband) disclosed Cyber Intrusion issues under the banner "Cyberattack on Thailand’s 3BB Linked to Exploited FortiGate SSL-VPN Vulnerability".
Researchers uncovered an exposed attacker-controlled server containing evidence of a sophisticated intrusion targeting 3BB, a consumer broadband service operated by Triple T Broadband in Thailand.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting FortiGate 60F SSL-VPN, internal servers (e.g., Pentaho, CodeIgniter-based sales portal), 55 internal IPs targeted, and exposing SSH keys, database passwords, SNMP strings, internal credentials.
In response, and began remediation that includes Credential rotation, log preservation, forensic analysis, patching FortiGate SSL-VPN.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Risks of unpatched VPN appliances, need for credential rotation, log preservation, and forensic analysis following breaches, and recommending next steps like Patch FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances immediately, Disable SSL-VPN if patches cannot be applied and Rotate all credentials exposed in the breach.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including exploited a critical FortiGate SSL-VPN vulnerability (CVE-2024-21762), and fortiGate 60F SSL-VPN appliance exposed via mail.3bb.co.th such as 10443. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploit used heap spraying and return-oriented programming (ROP) to establish a reverse shell. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified External Remote Services (T1133) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deployed MeshCentral, an open-source remote-management tool, as a persistent backdoor and Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating several agents ran with root privileges, indicating full administrative control. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deployed Dirty COW and PwnKit exploits for Linux privilege escalation. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating cleanup_target.sh script erased logs and exploitation files and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating cleanup_target.sh preserved MeshCentral while erasing other traces. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating credential-harvesting scripts searched for SSH keys, database passwords, SNMP strings and Brute Force: Password Spraying (T1110.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 55 internal IPs were targeted in SSH brute-force attacks. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Remote System Discovery (T1018) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating 55 internal IPs targeted, artifacts referenced 10.11.x.x addresses and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating scripts tested SQL injection, SSRF, and HTTP request smuggling on agent.3bb.co.th. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating targeted internal servers (Pentaho, CodeIgniter portal) with Ghostcat exploit and Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating sSH brute-force attacks on 55 internal IPs. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating harvested SSH keys, database passwords, SNMP strings, internal credentials. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating meshCentral communicated with www.ayuthayatech.com such as 443 and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating staging server hosted exploitation scripts, privilege-escalation tools. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating potential data exfiltration via MeshCentral backdoor. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Fortinet Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/fortinet/incident/FORTRI1789410253
- Fortinet CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/fortinet
- Fortinet Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/fortri1789410253-fortinet-triple-t-broadband-vulnerability-june-2026/
- Fortinet CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/fortinet/history
- Fortinet CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://cybersecuritynews.com/fortigate-ssl-vpn-vulnerability/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf