Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MALDOC1790288742)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Docker, Inc's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Docker, Inc Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Docker, Inc breach identified under incident ID MALDOC1790288742.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Docker, Inc's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/docker, the number of followers: 822123, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 1056 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 772 and after the incident was 768 with a difference of -4 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Docker, Inc and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "New Carbonato Botnet Exploits Exposed Docker Hosts to Deploy AI-Powered Malware", has drawn attention.
A recently discovered botnet malware, Carbonato, is targeting insecure Docker daemons to deploy the Hermes Agent AI framework, granting attackers persistent control over compromised systems.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Docker hosts with exposed APIs, and exposing AI API keys, SSH credentials, access tokens, credit card details (historically linked), with nearly 600,000 (historically linked) records at risk.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Exposed Docker APIs are a significant attack vector; AI-driven malware is increasingly used in cyber operations; persistent malware can spread via worm-like propagation, and recommending next steps like Secure Docker daemons with authentication, monitor for unauthorized API access, detect reverse SSH tunnels and Telegram traffic, and audit for indicators of compromise (e.g., GH0ST persona, CARBONATO_API_KEY).
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including targeting insecure Docker daemons, and unauthenticated API access on port 2375. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Container Administration Command (T1609) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating instructs the Docker daemon to launch a privileged container and Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hermes Agent AI framework executes commands on the victim’s system. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Scheduled Task/Job: Cron (T1053.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deploys cron jobs for persistence, Scheduled Task/Job: Systemd Timers (T1053.006) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deploys systemd timers for persistence, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating installs rc.local and OpenRC hooks for persistence, and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries (T1547.013) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ensures malware remains active after reboots. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Escape to Host (T1611) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating launches a privileged container enabling full access to the underlying system. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating overwrites the default SOUL.md file with a custom GH0ST persona and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating installs an SSH server with the attackers’ key. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvesting SSH credentials and access tokens and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvesting AI API keys and access tokens. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Network Service Discovery (T1046) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scans for Docker hosts with unauthenticated API access on port 2375 and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating aI-driven command loop for harvesting credentials. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating establishes a reverse SSH tunnel for lateral movement and Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating worm-like propagation to other exposed Docker hosts. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating pulling the implant from the Docker registry, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating reports new infections via Telegram, and Protocol Tunneling (T1572) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating establishes a reverse SSH tunnel. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration via Telegram. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating persistent control over compromised systems for AI-driven operations. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Docker, Inc Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/docker/incident/MALDOC1790288742
- Docker, Inc CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/docker
- Docker, Inc Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/maldoc1790288742-docker-malwarebytes-vulnerability-october-2024/
- Docker, Inc CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/docker/history
- Docker, Inc CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-carbonato-malware-uses-ai-agents-to-hijack-exposed-docker-hosts/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf