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Analyze » Zoho » ZOHWON1776076134

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ZOHWON1776076134)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-14
Company Score Before Incident800 / 1000
Company Score After Incident786 / 1000
Company LinkView Zoho Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERZOHWON1776076134
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORSocial Engineering, Trojanized Software, Phishing
DATA EXPOSEDSensitive military documents, system reconnaissance...
INCIDENT DATE30/11/2025
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Zoho's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Zoho Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Zoho breach identified under incident ID ZOHWON1776076134.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Zoho's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/zoho, the number of followers: 2510974, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 29976 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 800 and after the incident was 786 with a difference of -14 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Zoho and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "APT37 Leverages Facebook, Telegram, and Tampered PDFelement Installer in Targeted Cyber Espionage Campaign", has drawn attention.

North Korea-linked threat group APT37 has launched a sophisticated cyber espionage campaign, abusing Facebook, Telegram, and a trojanized Wondershare PDFelement installer to infiltrate defense-related targets and exfiltrate sensitive data.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing Sensitive military documents, system reconnaissance data, screenshots, files (DOC, XLS, PDF, HWP, M4A, AMR).

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as The campaign highlights the limitations of signature-based defenses and emphasizes the need for behavior-based EDR monitoring, and recommending next steps like Implement behavior-based EDR monitoring for parent-child process chains, unsigned binaries, and anomalous dism.exe activity.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including facebook friend requests...used to identify and vet targets, and shift conversations to Telegram and Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including trojanized Wondershare PDFelement installer, and modified installer lacks valid Wondershare digital signature. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fake PDF viewer executable (modified Wondershare PDFelement installer) and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including shellcode resolves APIs via PEB-based hash routines, and launches dism.exe in suspended state. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating rokRAT malware conducts system reconnaissance (implied persistence). Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection (T1055.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating injects decrypted payload into dism.exe memory using VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (T1027.002) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including xOR-encrypted payload requiring two decryption passes, and stripped MZ/PE headers, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fake PDF viewer executable mimics legitimate Wondershare PDFelement installer, Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta (T1218.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating process injection into signed dism.exe to evade detection, and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating fileless execution and multi-stage payload delivery. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating abuses Zoho WorkDrive’s OAuth2 APIs with hardcoded client IDs, secrets, and refresh tokens. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Local Account (T1087.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating rokRAT malware conducts system reconnaissance and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates files (DOC, XLS, PDF, HWP, M4A, AMR). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Screen Capture (T1113) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating rokRAT captures screenshots and Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates files (DOC, XLS, PDF, HWP, M4A, AMR). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating retrieves second-stage payload from Japanese real estate website (disguised as .jpg), Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating abuses Zoho WorkDrive’s OAuth2 APIs for C2, blending with legitimate traffic, and Data Obfuscation: Protocol Impersonation (T1001.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating payload disguised as .jpg file, XOR-encrypted communication. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates files via Zoho WorkDrive’s OAuth2 APIs and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating abuses Zoho WorkDrive for C2 and data exfiltration. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (90%)
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (90%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (80%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (50%)
Privilege Escalation
Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection (90%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (90%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta (70%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (60%)
Credential Access
Steal Application Access Token (90%)
Discovery
Account Discovery: Local Account (80%)
File and Directory Discovery (90%)
Collection
Screen Capture (90%)
Data from Local System (90%)
Command and Control
Ingress Tool Transfer (90%)
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (90%)
Data Obfuscation: Protocol Impersonation (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (90%)

Sources & References