Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » Zapier » ZAP0911609112525

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ZAP0911609112525)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-22
Company Score Before Incident767 / 1000
Company Score After Incident745 / 1000
Company LinkView Zapier Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERZAP0911609112525
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORcompromised NPM account, malicious package updates (setup_bun.js), self-propagating worm (bun_environment.js), GitHub exfiltration
DATA EXPOSEDcredentials, secrets
INCIDENT DATE23/11/2025
STATUSongoing (analysis of incomplete payload deployment and exfiltrated data)

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Zapier's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Zapier Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Zapier breach identified under incident ID ZAP0911609112525.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Zapier's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/zapier, the number of followers: 344475, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 1409 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 767 and after the incident was 745 with a difference of -22 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Zapier and their customers.

Zapier recently reported "Supply Chain Attack on Zapier’s NPM Account with Shai Hulud Malware", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

A supply chain attack compromised Zapier’s NPM account, infecting 425 packages with the Shai Hulud malware.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows, Linux and macOS, and exposing credentials and secrets, with nearly 26,300 (GitHub repositories) records at risk.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like audit dependencies, detect staging code (setup_bun.js) and monitor for bun_environment.js, and began remediation that includes rotate compromised credentials, remove affected packages and patch Bun runtime vulnerabilities, while recovery efforts such as restore from clean backups and rebuild development environments continue.

The case underscores how ongoing (analysis of incomplete payload deployment and exfiltrated data), teams are taking away lessons such as Supply chain attacks via package managers (NPM) pose severe risks to downstream users, Dependency trust models require stricter validation (e.g., package signing, provenance checks) and Multi-platform malware (Windows/Linux/macOS) increases attack surface, and recommending next steps like Implement package integrity checks (e.g., npm audit, sigstore), Monitor for indicators of compromise (setup_bun.js, Bun runtime anomalies) and Enforce least-privilege access for CI/CD and development environments, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Audit dependencies for @zapier/mcp-integration, @posthog/nextjs, @asyncapi/cli, @postman/secret-scanner-wasm and Monitor for GitHub repos with 'Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming'.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies (T1195.002) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including compromised Zapier’s NPM account, infecting 425 packages with Shai Hulud malware, and @zapier/mcp-integration receives ~132M monthly downloads. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Event Triggered Execution: .bash_profile and .zshrc (T1546.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including staging code (setup_bun.js) established persistence, leaving systems vulnerable, and manipulating environment variables and Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including setup_bun.js staging code, and malicious package updates (setup_bun.js). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including harvested credentials and exfiltrated them to GitHub repositories, and 26,300+ exposed repos containing leaked credentials and Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including data compromised such as secrets, environment variables, and sensitivity of data such as high (authentication secrets, API keys, tokens). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (T1027.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including self-propagating worm targeting Bun runtime environment, and incomplete payload deployment (missing bun_environment.js) and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (75%), with evidence including some payloads failed to deploy fully (missing bun_environment.js), and staging code established persistence without full payload. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including exfiltrated credentials to GitHub repositories, and 26,300+ exposed repos with description Sha1-Hulud such as The Second Coming. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including enabling lateral movement, unauthorized cloud access, and high value targets such as cloud infrastructure credentials and Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie (T1550.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including harvested credentials, and lateral movement potential in operational_impact. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including self-propagating worm (bun_environment.js), and remote updates via staging code (setup_bun.js). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Endpoint Denial of Service: Application Exhaustion Flood (T1499.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including compromised development pipelines, production environment risks, and worm targeting Windows/Linux/macOS. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Sources & References