Comparison Overview
win.rar GmbH

win.rar GmbH
win.rar GmbH, Berlin, 10117, DE
Last Update: 29/03/2026
win.rar GmbH has been the official distributor of WinRAR and RARLAB products since February 2002 and handles all support, marketing and sales related to WinRAR & rarlab.com. win.rar GmbH is registered in Germany and is represented worldwide by local partners in more tha...

Amazon
2127 7th Ave., Seattle, 98109, US
Last Update: 19/06/2026
Amazon is guided by four principles: customer obsession rather than competitor focus, passion for invention, commitment to operational excellence, and long-term thinking. We are driven by the excitement of building technologies, inventing products, and providing service...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

win.rar GmbH







Amazon






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for win.rar GmbH in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
Amazon has 741.12% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - win.rar GmbH (X = Date, Y = Severity)
win.rar GmbH cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Amazon (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Amazon cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

win.rar GmbH

Amazon
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.