Comparison Overview
Washington State Auditor's Office

Washington State Auditor's Office
Insurance Building, Capitol Campus, 302 Sid Snyder Avenue SW, Olympia, WA, US, 98504-0021
Last Update: 05/04/2026
The Washington State Auditor’s Office works to promote accountability and transparency in government on behalf of Washingtonians. We conduct a range of audits that include accountability, financial audits, single audits of federal grant spending, and performance audi...

The Singapore Public Service
Singapore, SG
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The Singapore Public Service works with the elected Government and Singaporeans to forge a common vision of Singapore’s future and bring it into reality. We take pride in living out our values of integrity, service and excellence. Follow us for stories on how our pu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Washington State Auditor's Office







The Singapore Public Service






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Washington State Auditor's Office in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for The Singapore Public Service in 2026.
Incident History - Washington State Auditor's Office (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Washington State Auditor's Office cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - The Singapore Public Service (X = Date, Y = Severity)
The Singapore Public Service cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Washington State Auditor's Office

The Singapore Public Service
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). In versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.22 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.15, an attacker with only a GitHub account can plant a JavaScript payload in a craftcms/cms issue title. When a Craft admin uses the CraftSupport widget’s "Give feedback" screen and types a search term that returns the poisoned issue, the payload executes in the admin’s control panel session. No control panel account or elevated privileges are required on the attacker’s side. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.16 and 5.9.23.
Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). In versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.21 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.14, theAssetsController::actionDeleteFolder() only requires the deleteAssets:<volume-uid> permission for the target folder. It never enforces deletePeerAssets:<volume-uid>, even though Assets::deleteFoldersByIds() cascades deletion to every descendant folder and every asset inside, regardless of the uploader's assigned privileges. A low-privilege user who has been granted folder-management rights on a shared volume can therefore destroy assets uploaded by other users (peer assets), bypassing the per-asset peer-permission check that the sibling actionDeleteAsset endpoint correctly applies. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.15 and 5.9.22.
Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). Versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.9.20, and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.17.13 contain an authorization issue in the AssetsController::actionReplaceFile that can delete a source asset without source delete permission by supplying both assetId and sourceAssetId. AssetsController::actionReplaceFile() supports replacing a target asset file using another existing asset as the source. The action loads: assetId -> $assetToReplace and sourceAssetId -> $sourceAsset, then enforces replace permissions using ($assetToReplace ?: $sourceAsset). When both IDs are provided, this expression resolves to the target asset so no permission check is performed against the source asset volume. When both assets are present, Craft copies the source file into the target and then deletes the source asset. There is no deletion check for for the source asset. An authenticated user who can replace files in one volume can delete assets in another volume where they do not have delete permission, as long as they can obtain a sourceAssetId, leading to broken content references and data loss. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.17.14 and 5.9.21.
Description: To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare's Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer's zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. 'issue "letsencrypt.org"' without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare's authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain. Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Transparency logging required by major browsers, and would be visible to CT monitoring. Mitigation: Customers requiring strict RFC 8657 enforcement need to disable Universal SSL on the affected zone. Universal SSL's automatic CAA management and customer-set RFC 8657 accounturi and validationmethods enforcement are mutually exclusive by the nature of the issue, so there is no in-product workaround that preserves both. Certificate Transparency monitoring is recommended for all customers as a general detection control. Credits: David Osipov (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-2713-9242), independent researcher
Out of bounds read and write in Tint in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.46 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)