Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (JENVAL1777645518)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Valve corporation's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Valve corporation Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Valve corporation breach identified under incident ID JENVAL1777645518.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Valve corporation's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/valve-corporation, the number of followers: 286133, the industry type: Computer Games and the number of employees: 1730 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 623 and after the incident was 619 with a difference of -4 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Valve corporation and their customers.
On 18 March 2026, Valve Corporation disclosed DDoS Botnet issues under the banner "New DDoS Botnet Targets Valve Source Engine Game Servers via Exposed Jenkins Instances".
Security researchers at Darktrace uncovered a sophisticated DDoS botnet exploiting misconfigured Jenkins servers to launch attacks against Valve Source Engine game infrastructure, including Counter-Strike and Team Fortress 2 servers.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Valve Source Engine game servers (Counter-Strike, Team Fortress 2).
In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Blocking TCP port 5444 (C2 communication) and Blocking attacker IP (103[.]177.110.202) at network perimeter, and began remediation that includes Securing Jenkins instances with strong authentication and Restricting public access to Jenkins servers.
The case underscores how Ongoing (research and mitigation recommendations provided), teams are taking away lessons such as Misconfigured Jenkins servers with weak/default credentials are prime targets for DDoS botnets. Cross-platform malware can exploit both Windows and Linux systems, and the gaming industry is increasingly targeted by cybercriminals, and recommending next steps like Block TCP port 5444 and the attacker IP (103[.]177.110.202) at the network perimeter, Secure Jenkins instances with strong authentication and restrict public access and Monitor for unusual process names (e.g., ksoftirqd/0, kworker) and log redirections to /dev/null.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exploiting misconfigured Jenkins servers to launch attacks, and exposed remote code execution (RCE) endpoint and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating scanning for Jenkins instances with weak or default credentials. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: Bash (T1059.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating executes a Bash script to fetch and run a payload from the /tmp directory and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating downloads a disguised system update file on Windows. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malware ensures persistence by manipulating Jenkins environment variables and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating mimics legitimate Linux kernel processes (ksoftirqd/0, kworker). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service (T1036.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating renaming itself to mimic legitimate Linux kernel processes (ksoftirqd/0, kworker), Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating redirecting logs to /dev/null to avoid detection, Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging (T1562.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating double forking and redirecting logs to /dev/null, and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating malware delivers Windows and Linux variants with disguised payloads. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating uses a Vietnamese-hosted IP (103.177.110.202) for C2 and payload delivery and Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating c2 communication via TCP port 5444. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Network Denial of Service (T1498) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating employs UDP floods, TCP push attacks, and HTTP request floods against Valve Source Engine and Direct Network Flood (T1498.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploits Valve Source Engine’s query protocol for disproportionately large responses. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Valve corporation Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/valve-corporation/incident/JENVAL1777645518
- Valve corporation CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/valve-corporation
- Valve corporation Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/jenval1777645518-jenkins-valve-vulnerability-march-2026/
- Valve corporation CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/valve-corporation/history
- Valve corporation CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://cybersecuritynews.com/new-ddos-malware-exploits-jenkins/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf