UCG
Company Details
Linkedin ID:
uscoastguard
Website:
Employees number:
31,602
Number of followers:
125,220
NAICS:
92811
Industry Type:
Homepage:
uscg.mil
IP Addresses:
0
Company ID:
U.S_2627614
Scan Status:
In-progress
U.S. Coast Guard Company CyberSecurity Posture
uscg.mil
The mission of the U.S. Coast Guard is to protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic interests — along the coast and our coastal borders, in the nation's ports and waterways, in international waters, or in any maritime region as required to support national security. As one of the six branches of the Armed Forces, the U.S. Coast Guard is vital to our nation's safety and security. U.S. Coast Guard personnel are the backbone of America’s maritime security. The U.S. Coast Guard employs a topnotch civilian workforce, with more than 7,000 positions in nearly 100 locations nationwide. Search for Jobs and Internships at USAJobs.gov.
U.S. Coast Guard A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
UCG Risk Score (AI oriented)Between 750 and 799
UCG
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UCG
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UCG Company CyberSecurity News & History
Past Incidents
27
Attack Types
5
CISA
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faced a tumultuous period marked by significant breaches, including the Salt Typhoon espionage campaign linked to Beijing, which compromised American telecoms, collecting sensitive data such as call logs, recordings, and potential location information. The largest hack in US telecom history occurred under the leadership of Jen Easterly, who was not asked to stay post-Inauguration Day. Her departure coincided with demands for CISA to become 'smaller' and 'more nimble' and the dismissal of the Cyber Safety Review Board members who were investigating the breaches, potentially jeopardizing the agency’s future and national cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: The lapse of the **Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015)** and the **State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program**, combined with a **staffing reduction to under 900 employees** (from ~2,500) due to government funding expiration, has left CISA critically under-resourced. Without liability protections for private-sector threat-sharing, companies may hesitate to report cyber threats, increasing systemic vulnerabilities. The absence of grant funding further weakens state/local defenses (e.g., hospitals, schools, water systems), raising risks of cascading disruptions. Experts warn of **potential major cyberattacks** during this period, with CISA lacking sufficient personnel to respond effectively. Legal uncertainties (e.g., antitrust exposure, FOIA disclosures) and reduced real-time intelligence-sharing exacerbate the threat landscape, particularly for critical infrastructure. Senators and industry leaders emphasize the urgency of reauthorization, citing risks to **national/economic security**, but partisan delays persist.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: The U.S. government shutdown has severely weakened **CISA**, the nation’s leading civilian cybersecurity agency, by furloughing **65% of its 2,540-strong workforce** (1,651 employees) and issuing **Reductions in Force (RIF) notices** that may lead to permanent layoffs. Critical divisions like the **Infrastructure Security Division (ISD)**, responsible for protecting power grids, water treatment plants, and chemical facilities, face deep cuts—including the elimination of the **Chemical Security subdivision**, which secured high-risk chemical sites from cyber-physical threats. The **Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED)**, which coordinates national and international cybersecurity partnerships, is also targeted. Experts warn that this reduction—amid rising **nation-state cyber threats, ransomware, and misinformation campaigns**—creates exploitable blind spots, crippling the U.S. government’s ability to **detect, respond, and recover** from attacks. The shutdown and political redirection of CISA’s mission (e.g., accusations of censorship) further destabilize its operational capacity, leaving **critical infrastructure (energy, water, chemical sectors) vulnerable to cyberattacks** that could disrupt essential services or trigger cascading failures. The long-term impact includes **eroded national resilience**, increased risk of **state-sponsored espionage or sabotage**, and potential **physical harm** if industrial control systems (e.g., power grids, water treatment) are compromised.
CISA
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: As a relatively new and essential cyber-security component of the DHS, CISA faces a significant potential setback. With changing political climates and Trump’s apparent intentions to reshape the agency, its core missions of protecting government systems and supporting private and nonprofit entities could be compromised. Employees fear that reduced corporate oversight and a possible dismantling or repurposing of the agency may impair its ability to safeguard against cyber threats, potentially weakening national cybersecurity infrastructure. There is a palpable fear among the staff of a decline in efficacy and a change in direction that could pose threats not just to the agency's mandate but also to the broader security landscape.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: CISA faces potential undermining from elements within the Heritage Foundation who seek to scale back its operations, especially concerning its role in mitigating misinformation online. This approach could significantly weaken the agency, impacting its principal cybersecurity functions and potentially affecting its efforts to combat foreign propaganda. If the 2024 election leads to an administration aligning with the Project 2025 playbook, CISA could experience reduced effectiveness or an existential crisis. Such a shift could have far-reaching consequences for national cybersecurity and the protection against online falsehoods that threaten societal stability.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack limited on finance or reputation
Description: In order to assist critical infrastructure organizations in thwarting ransomware gang attacks, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released new information detailing security flaws and configuration errors that ransomware gangs have exploited. This information was made public by CISA as part of the Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) program, and said that it would notify critical infrastructure organizations of any ransomware-vulnerable devices found on its network. Since its launch, CISA's RVWP has found and exchanged information about more than 800 susceptible systems with internet-accessible flaws regularly targeted by various ransomware activities. The U.S. cybersecurity agency has also released a dedicated website, StopRansomware.gov, which acts as the focal point for CISA's initiative to give defenders all the information they need to anticipate and neutralize ransomware assaults.
Critical Infrastructure Organizations (as warned by CISA, FBI, and ACSC)
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: In January 2023, the **BianLian ransomware group** shifted its tactics from encrypting files to **data theft-based extortion**, leveraging stolen **Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials**—often obtained via phishing or initial access brokers. The group deployed **custom Go-based backdoors**, remote management tools, and credential-harvesting utilities to infiltrate networks undetected. Once inside, they exfiltrated sensitive data and threatened to publish it on a **leak site**, demanding ransom payments in cryptocurrency. To evade security measures, BianLian **disabled antivirus processes** using PowerShell and Windows Command Shell, escalating risks for targeted organizations. The attack posed severe threats to **critical infrastructure sectors**, prompting warnings from **CISA, FBI, and ACSC**. Victim organizations faced potential **operational disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage**, with stolen data ranging from **employee records to proprietary business information**. While no specific company was named, the group’s focus on **high-value targets**—such as healthcare, energy, or government-adjacent entities—suggested systemic risks. Mitigations included **auditing RDP access, restricting PowerShell, and enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA)**, but the breach’s scale and sophistication highlighted vulnerabilities in defensive postures.
CISA
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), created in 2018, faces uncertain times as the return of former President Trump could significantly alter its function and direction. Trump's promises to reduce government spending and oversight have CISA staffers concerned about the potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives and a shift in focus toward immigration enforcement. The agency, which has a reputation for bipartisanship and was involved in election security and countering online misinformation, now finds itself at odds with Republican claims of censorship and surveillance. The fear of policy reversal and mission compromise looms among the employees, who remain dedicated to protecting national cyber infrastructure.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: Amid rising cyber threats, the Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 proposes to significantly reduce the scope of CISA, which could undermine the agency's ability to protect against cyber attacks and misinformation. This move aligns with former President Trump's agenda and his critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation. If implemented, CISA's counter-misinformation efforts would be halted, its relationship with social media firms would change, and its cyber defense responsibilities could be redistributed to military and intelligence agencies. As a result, the United States could face an increased risk of cyber threats that can disrupt societal stability, influence elections, or compromise sensitive information.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: A misconfigured data hub within the **DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)** exposed sensitive national security information to thousands of unauthorized users—including government workers, private-sector employees, and foreign nationals—over a **two-month period (March–May 2023)**. The breach stemmed from a **programming error**, allowing improper access to **439 I&A products**, which were accessed **1,525 times** without authorization. Among these, **518 accesses were from the private sector**, and **46 were by non-American citizens**, primarily targeting **cybersecurity intel** (39% of accessed data), including details on **foreign hacking campaigns, state-sponsored hacker groups, and domestic protest surveillance**. The exposed records included **surveillance data on American citizens**, law enforcement investigations, and **foreign disinformation operations**, raising concerns about the integrity of the **Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)**, which DHS markets as a secure platform for critical national security sharing. While the memo confirmed some records were accessed, it **lacked an impact assessment** on affected agencies, leaving uncertainties about broader operational or intelligence compromises. The incident underscores systemic vulnerabilities in handling **classified intelligence**, with potential repercussions for **national security, diplomatic relations, and public trust** in government cybersecurity protocols.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: A hacker infiltrated FEMA’s computer networks via compromised Citrix remote desktop credentials, maintaining unauthorized access from **June 22 to August 5, 2024**. The breach targeted **FEMA Region 6** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and involved the theft of **employee identity data** from FEMA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The attacker exploited weak security controls, including the absence of **multifactor authentication (MFA)**, to move laterally across the network, install VPN software, and exfiltrate data from **Active Directory**.The incident led to the termination of **24 FEMA employees**, including IT executives, after an investigation revealed systemic failures in cybersecurity protocols. While initial statements claimed no sensitive data was stolen, a DHS internal review confirmed the theft of **federal employee identity information**. The breach underscored vulnerabilities in government cybersecurity, compounded by a separate disclosure of hackers exploiting **Cisco firewall devices** in U.S. agencies, though no direct link to the FEMA attack was established.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: A hacker infiltrated FEMA’s computer networks via compromised credentials in Citrix Systems’ remote desktop software, gaining unauthorized access for nearly two months (June 22 to August 5). The breach targeted **FEMA Region 6** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and compromised **employee identity data** from both FEMA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), another DHS component. The attacker exploited weak security measures, including the absence of **multifactor authentication (MFA)**, to move laterally across the network, install VPN software, and exfiltrate data from **Microsoft Active Directory**, which manages access controls. The incident led to the termination of **two dozen FEMA employees**, including IT executives, after DHS Secretary Kristi Noem cited systemic failures like agencywide MFA gaps and 'incompetence' in cybersecurity protocols. While initial statements claimed no sensitive citizen data was stolen, investigations confirmed the theft of **federal employee identity information**. The breach underscored vulnerabilities in critical government infrastructure, though officials asserted no direct harm to American citizens occurred. The attack’s duration and depth raised concerns about persistent threats to federal agencies, compounded by a separate disclosure of hackers exploiting **Cisco firewall devices** in U.S. government systems around the same period.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: A large-scale cyber breach targeted FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) over several weeks, compromising its network and exposing sensitive employee data from both FEMA and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The attacker exploited vulnerabilities in **Citrix remote access software**, gaining deep access across regions including New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. While initial claims by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem stated *no sensitive data was extracted*, internal documents later confirmed the theft of **FEMA and CBP employee data**, affecting over **250,000 employees** and raising concerns about DHS’s cybersecurity capabilities. The breach led to the dismissal of **20 FEMA IT workers**, including senior leaders, accused of security failures. Remediation efforts spanned months, with DHS and FEMA struggling to contain the intrusion until at least September 2025. The attack underscored systemic vulnerabilities in federal network defenses, prompting emergency directives to strengthen protections against advanced hacker groups. The incident remains under investigation, with no confirmed attribution or link to broader espionage campaigns.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: An unidentified hacker executed a **months-long breach** targeting FEMA’s computer network, compromising sensitive data of **Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and FEMA employees** across a region spanning New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. The attacker exploited vulnerabilities in **Citrix remote-access software**, gaining deep access to operational systems. Despite initial containment efforts by DHS in mid-July, remediation extended into September, with confirmations that **employee data was stolen**, contradicting earlier official denials. The breach led to the firing of **24 FEMA IT staff**, including top executives, amid accusations of 'severe security lapses.' The incident exposed systemic weaknesses in DHS’s cybersecurity posture, raising concerns about the protection of **over 250,000 employees’ information** and potential broader threats to national security. The attacker’s identity and motives remain unknown, though the prolonged intrusion suggests targeted espionage or data exfiltration for malicious use.
FEMA
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with customers data leaks
Description: FEMA stated that they mistakenly exposed the personal information, including addresses and bank account information, of 2.3 million disaster victims. The breach occurred because FEMA did not ensure a private contractor only received the information it required to perform its official duties. The victims affected include survivors of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the 2017 California wildfires. The report found FEMA's failure to protect their data put them at risk of identity theft and fraud. According to the report, some of the data collected, such as addresses and Social Security numbers, were necessary to give aid. but other information, like electronic bank account information, was not considered necessary.
US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: FEMA suffered a cyberattack in **June 2024** where threat actors exploited **CitrixBleed 2 (CVSS 9.3)** via stolen credentials to breach its **Citrix Netscaler ADC/Gateway**, bypassing MFA. Attackers exfiltrated data from **Region 6 servers** (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas), including sensitive government and citizen information. The breach remained undetected until **July**, despite prior CISA warnings about active exploitation. FEMA initially denied data loss but later evidence confirmed unauthorized uploads. The incident led to the **termination of the CISO, CIO, and 22 staff** for negligence, including falsified security audits. Remediation included forced password resets, MFA enforcement, and a complete IT overhaul. The attack exposed systemic failures in patch management and incident response, risking **national security data, emergency response capabilities, and public trust** in a critical federal agency.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with customers data leaks
Description: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement accidentally exposed the names, birthdates, nationalities and locations of more than 6,000 immigrants who claimed to be fleeing torture and persecution to its website. The unprecedented data dump exposed the immigrants to retaliation from the very individuals, gangs and governments they fled, attorneys for people who have sought protection in the U.S
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: DHS had a privacy incident that resulted in the exposure of information for 247,167 active and retired federal employees. The database utilised by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and kept in the Department of Homeland Security OIG Case Management System was compromised by a data breach. Employee names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, jobs, grades, and duty locations are among the data that has been made public. In addition to putting additional security measures in place to restrict access to this kind of information, the Department of Homeland Security notified those who were impacted through notification letters.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: In March–May 2023, a misconfigured **DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN-Intel)** platform exposed **sensitive but unclassified intelligence data**—including investigative leads shared with the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, and local law enforcement—to **tens of thousands of unauthorized users**. The access controls were incorrectly set to 'everyone,' granting visibility to **non-intelligence government workers (e.g., disaster response teams), private contractors, and foreign government personnel**. The breach stemmed from **poor access management and lack of segmentation**, highlighting systemic failures in cloud security governance. While no classified data was compromised, the exposure risked operational security, counterterrorism efforts, and trust in interagency intelligence-sharing. The incident underscored how **human error and process gaps**—rather than sophisticated cyberattacks—remain a dominant cause of high-impact breaches in critical infrastructure.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: A misconfiguration in the **Homeland Security Information Network-Intel (HSIN-Intel)**—an internal DHS platform used to share **sensitive but unclassified intelligence**—exposed restricted data to **tens of thousands of unauthorized users** between **March and May 2023**. The breach allowed access to **439 intelligence products**, improperly viewed **1,525 times**, including by **518 private-sector contractors and 46 foreign nationals**. Exposed data included **law enforcement leads, domestic protest analysis (e.g., Stop Cop City protests), foreign hacking reports, and disinformation campaigns**, with **39% of accessed materials related to cybersecurity threats** (e.g., state-sponsored hacking). While some unauthorized US users *could* have requested access, the incident revealed systemic failures in **access controls**, raising concerns over **national security risks** and the DHS’s ability to safeguard sensitive intelligence shared with agencies like the **FBI and National Counterterrorism Center**. The leak underscored vulnerabilities in handling **domestic surveillance data**, potentially compromising **counterterrorism operations, protest monitoring, and foreign cyber threat intelligence**.
Department of Homeland Security
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: The DHS has identified a growing threat from commercial drones being weaponized by violent extremists in the US. Although technological capabilities are advancing, state and local law enforcement lack the authority and means to effectively counter this new form of aerial menace. Despite efforts to enhance detection and response, including repositioning CCTV and training police to handle hazardous drones, the accessibility of advanced evasion technologies complicates tracking and neutralization efforts. Reports of uncorroborated drone sightings have increased public concern, prompting the DHS to seek expanded legislative counter-drone authorities.
Department of Homeland Security
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: The DHS memo highlighted the vulnerability of US cities to weaponized drones, with extremists potentially modifying drones to carry threats like explosives and chemicals. Despite observing nefarious drone activities, local authorities often lack the authority to intervene. To combat this, the DHS has recommended repositioning CCTV cameras, training police on handling hazardous drones, and deploying sensors for drone detection. The rising threat emphasizes the need for improved countermeasures and preparedness against unmanned aircraft systems.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Data Leak
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: A Department of Justice employee's email account was compromised by a hacker, who took 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees. Delving deeper into the archive, one finds information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence. Motherboard claims that a hacker gained access to a Department of Justice employee's email account. As evidence, the hacker used the hacked account to send the email directly to Motherboard contributor Joseph Cox. The apparent job titles, names, phone numbers, and email addresses of over 9,000 purported Department of Homeland Security (DHS) workers and over 20,000 purported FBI employees.
US Federal Agencies
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization's existence
Description: Daniil Kasatkin, a 26-year-old Russian professional basketball player, was arrested at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris on June 21, 2023, for his alleged involvement in a ransomware gang that operated between 2020 and 2022. The gang is accused of targeting around 900 organizations, including two US federal agencies. Kasatkin is facing charges of 'conspiracy to commit computer fraud' and 'computer fraud conspiracy.' His lawyers deny the allegations, claiming he is not tech-savvy and was unaware of any unlawful activities. The US has not yet released any statements or evidence regarding the crimes.
Department of Homeland Security
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could injure or kill people
Description: The DHS encountered growing threats from commercial drones being modified to carry hazardous payloads, impacting national security. Attempted mitigations include improved detection and response capabilities through local law enforcement training and technology deployment. These clandestine drone activities pose a significant risk, requiring urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
United States Federal Government (FBI Warning Context)
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The FBI issued a public warning about a sophisticated **smishing (SMS phishing) and vishing (voice phishing) campaign** targeting **current/former senior U.S. government officials and their contacts** since April 2025. Malicious actors impersonate high-ranking officials using **AI-generated voice cloning** and fraudulent text messages to deceive victims into revealing **sensitive personal data, login credentials, or financial information**. The attack exploits **trust in authoritative figures**, leveraging publicly available data (e.g., job titles, photos) to craft convincing lures. Victims are tricked into clicking malicious links, downloading malware, or granting access to accounts under false pretenses (e.g., switching to a 'secure' messaging platform).The stolen credentials risk **further impersonation, disinformation campaigns, or financial fraud**, with potential cascading effects on **national security** if government communications or networks are compromised. While no large-scale data breach has been confirmed, the campaign’s **targeted nature**—focusing on high-profile individuals—poses a severe risk of **credential harvesting, identity theft, and unauthorized access to classified or sensitive systems**. The FBI emphasizes the threat’s **evolving sophistication**, combining **social engineering with AI-driven deception** to bypass traditional defenses.
US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) / Social Security Administration (SSA)
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with customers data leaks
Description: The article highlights systemic vulnerabilities in the **E-Verify system** (administered jointly by USCIS and SSA), where **Social Security Numbers (SSNs)**—critical for employment verification, credit applications, and government benefits—are at risk of exploitation in **identity theft schemes**. While the article promotes proactive measures like SSN locks and credit freezes, it implicitly reveals that **unauthorized access to SSNs via data breaches or phishing** could enable criminals to impersonate individuals for fraudulent employment, tax refunds, or benefit claims.The **E-Verify Self Lock feature**, though a protective tool, underscores a reactive approach to a persistent threat: **leaked or misused SSNs** due to inadequate safeguards in government databases or third-party breaches. The reliance on manual locks (expiring annually) and credit freezes suggests **gaps in automated, real-time fraud detection**, leaving individuals responsible for mitigating risks. The potential for **large-scale SSN exposure**—whether through insider threats, system exploits, or external attacks—poses a **direct risk to financial stability and public trust** in federal identity verification infrastructure.The article’s emphasis on **post-breach mitigation** (e.g., IRS identity protection PINs) rather than prevention implies that **SSN-related breaches are frequent enough to warrant systemic warnings**, signaling a **high-stakes vulnerability** in a foundational component of U.S. identity management.
UCG Company Scoring based on AI Models
Cyber Incidents Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
A.I Risk Score Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
Underwriter Stats for UCG
Incidents vs Armed Forces Industry Average (This Year)
No incidents recorded for U.S. Coast Guard in 2025.
Incidents vs All-Companies Average (This Year)
No incidents recorded for U.S. Coast Guard in 2025.
Incident Types UCG vs Armed Forces Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for U.S. Coast Guard in 2025.
Incident History — UCG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
UCG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
UCG Company Subsidiaries
The mission of the U.S. Coast Guard is to protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic interests — along the coast and our coastal borders, in the nation's ports and waterways, in international waters, or in any maritime region as required to support national security. As one of the six branches of the Armed Forces, the U.S. Coast Guard is vital to our nation's safety and security. U.S. Coast Guard personnel are the backbone of America’s maritime security. The U.S. Coast Guard employs a topnotch civilian workforce, with more than 7,000 positions in nearly 100 locations nationwide. Search for Jobs and Internships at USAJobs.gov.
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UCG CyberSecurity News
October 27, 2025 07:00 AM
Trump nominates cyber expert for Coast Guard commandant
Although the Coast Guard falls under DHS, it is considered a U.S. military service and part of the joint force. By Jon Harper.
October 27, 2025 07:00 AM
CSIS: USCG poised for 'generational change' in maritime cybersecurity with new tools, $25B funding
The final rule requires cyber incident response plans, cybersecurity drills, and designation of a cybersecurity officer, among other measures.
October 24, 2025 07:00 AM
Understanding the Coast Guard’s Cybersecurity Rule
On January 17, 2025, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) issued its Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System rule, creating the first...
October 24, 2025 07:00 AM
Ransomwar Tops Maritime Cyber Risks, Role-based Training a Priority
Maritime operations run on tight schedules and thin margins, and as ships, terminals and supply chains connect systems for visibility and...
October 23, 2025 07:00 AM
The U.S. Coast Guard and the Future of Maritime Cybersecurity
The historic $25 billion investment in the service, expanded USCG cyber authorities, and FD 2028's targeted actions augur well for maritime...
October 01, 2025 07:00 AM
OneOmega Wins $160M U.S. Coast Guard IDIQ
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September 22, 2025 07:00 AM
Coast Guard cyber overreach
I was surprised that the Coast Guard's Final Rule on Cybersecurity went into effect on July 16. After many months of public comments and...
September 16, 2025 07:00 AM
- Cyprus Shipping News
From left, Lee Jeoung-sun, head of the Basic Design Department at Hanwha Ocean; Joshua Divin, senior vice president for global marine...
September 10, 2025 07:00 AM
New Coast Guard Cyber Rules Take Hold Across U.S. Maritime Industry
In July 2025, new U.S. Coast Guard cybersecurity regulations went into effect. These regulations follow high-profile incidents,...
Frequently Asked Questions
Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
UCG CyberSecurity History Information
Official Website of U.S. Coast Guard
The official website of U.S. Coast Guard is http://www.uscg.mil.
U.S. Coast Guard’s AI-Generated Cybersecurity Score
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Coast Guard’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 780, reflecting their Fair security posture.
How many security badges does U.S. Coast Guard’ have ?
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Coast Guard currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
Does U.S. Coast Guard have SOC 2 Type 1 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Coast Guard is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
Does U.S. Coast Guard have SOC 2 Type 2 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Coast Guard does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
Does U.S. Coast Guard comply with GDPR ?
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Coast Guard is not listed as GDPR compliant.
Does U.S. Coast Guard have PCI DSS certification ?
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Coast Guard does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
Does U.S. Coast Guard comply with HIPAA ?
According to Rankiteo, U.S. Coast Guard is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
Does U.S. Coast Guard have ISO 27001 certification ?
According to Rankiteo,U.S. Coast Guard is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Industry Classification of U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Coast Guard operates primarily in the Armed Forces industry.
Number of Employees at U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Coast Guard employs approximately 31,602 people worldwide.
Subsidiaries Owned by U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Coast Guard presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
U.S. Coast Guard’s LinkedIn Followers
U.S. Coast Guard’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 125,220 followers.
NAICS Classification of U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Coast Guard is classified under the NAICS code 92811, which corresponds to National Security.
U.S. Coast Guard’s Presence on Crunchbase
No, U.S. Coast Guard does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
U.S. Coast Guard’s Presence on LinkedIn
Yes, U.S. Coast Guard maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/uscoastguard.
Cybersecurity Incidents Involving U.S. Coast Guard
As of November 27, 2025, Rankiteo reports that U.S. Coast Guard has experienced 27 cybersecurity incidents.
Number of Peer and Competitor Companies
U.S. Coast Guard has an estimated 779 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
What types of cybersecurity incidents have occurred at U.S. Coast Guard ?
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Breach, Cyber Attack, Ransomware, Vulnerability and Data Leak.
How does U.S. Coast Guard detect and respond to cybersecurity incidents ?
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an remediation measures with notification letters sent to affected individuals, remediation measures with additional security measures implemented to restrict access to information, and containment measures with improved detection and response capabilities, containment measures with local law enforcement training, containment measures with technology deployment, and law enforcement notified with yes, and containment measures with repositioning cctv, containment measures with training police to handle hazardous drones, and and and containment measures with auditing rdp usage, containment measures with disabling command-line scripting, containment measures with restricting powershell, and remediation measures with enforcing strong authentication (e.g., mfa), remediation measures with patching vulnerable systems, and communication strategy with warnings issued by cisa, fbi, and acsc, and incident response plan activated with yes (internal memo via brennan center for justice), and third party assistance with brennan center for justice (via foia disclosure), and communication strategy with limited (internal memo obtained via foia; no public statement detailed), and and and containment measures with disconnected citrix remote access tool (2023-07-16), containment measures with enforced multifactor authentication, and communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary (2023-08-29), communication strategy with media disclosures (bloomberg, nextgov/fcw), and incident response plan activated with yes (dhs it leadership urgent action), and law enforcement notified with likely (no explicit confirmation), and containment measures with localization of breach (mid-july 2025), containment measures with network segmentation, containment measures with access revocation, and remediation measures with ongoing as of september 5, 2025, remediation measures with emergency directive for federal network hardening, remediation measures with identity management reforms, and communication strategy with internal fema staff updates, communication strategy with public statements by homeland security secretary kristi noem, communication strategy with media coverage (cnn), and network segmentation with implemented post-breach, and enhanced monitoring with yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities), and and and containment measures with disconnection of citrix remote access tool (2025-07-16), containment measures with enforcement of multifactor authentication (mfa), and communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary kristi noem (2025-08-29), communication strategy with media disclosures (bloomberg, nextgov/fcw), and incident response plan activated with yes (dhs task force formed), and law enforcement notified with likely (internal dhs investigation), and containment measures with initial efforts launched mid-july 2023, containment measures with ongoing remediation as of september 5, 2023, and remediation measures with cleanup operation by dhs it officials, remediation measures with firing of 24 fema it employees, and communication strategy with internal fema staff updates, communication strategy with public statement by dhs secretary kristi noem (august 29, 2023), and communication strategy with foia disclosure (dhs memo), communication strategy with media reports (wired), and network segmentation with recommended as corrective action, and enhanced monitoring with recommended as corrective action, and incident response plan activated with yes (post-discovery), and containment measures with password resets, containment measures with multi-factor authentication (mfa) enforcement, and remediation measures with it staff overhaul, remediation measures with new security personnel hired, and communication strategy with public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss), and third party assistance with cyber threat alliance (information-sharing coordination), third party assistance with internet security alliance (advocacy for policy updates), and remediation measures with sen. gary peters' 10-year cisa 2015 reauthorization bill (protecting america from cyber threats act), remediation measures with house homeland security committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by rep. andrew garbarino), remediation measures with proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, ai threats), remediation measures with incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by internet security alliance), and recovery measures with short-term extensions via continuing resolution (cr) in house/senate bills, recovery measures with potential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles, and communication strategy with sen. peters' public warnings about national/economic security risks, communication strategy with media outreach by cyber threat alliance and internet security alliance, communication strategy with house democratic staffer comments on program success in state/local governments, and communication strategy with public warnings by cybersecurity experts, communication strategy with media coverage highlighting risks, and third party assistance with identity protection services, third party assistance with credit monitoring services, and containment measures with ssn lock via ssa or e-verify, containment measures with credit freeze via credit bureaus, containment measures with irs identity protection pin, and remediation measures with monitoring financial accounts, remediation measures with dark web monitoring (via id theft protection services), remediation measures with white glove restoration services for identity recovery, and recovery measures with unlocking ssn for legitimate use (e.g., employment verification), recovery measures with temporary lift of credit freeze for authorized credit applications, and communication strategy with public advisory via cnet article, communication strategy with ssa and e-verify user notifications (e.g., lock expiration alerts), and enhanced monitoring with credit monitoring, enhanced monitoring with dark web monitoring for compromised pii, and and and containment measures with public service announcement (psa), containment measures with awareness campaign, containment measures with reporting via ic3 (internet crime complaint center), and remediation measures with password changes, remediation measures with multi-factor authentication (mfa) enforcement, remediation measures with account monitoring, and communication strategy with fbi psa, communication strategy with media outreach, communication strategy with direct warnings to potential targets, and enhanced monitoring with recommendation for individuals to monitor accounts..
Incident Details
Can you provide details on each incident ?
Title: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Data Exposure
Description: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement accidentally exposed the names, birthdates, nationalities and locations of more than 6,000 immigrants who claimed to be fleeing torture and persecution to its website. The unprecedented data dump exposed the immigrants to retaliation from the very individuals, gangs and governments they fled.
Type: Data Exposure
Attack Vector: Website Data Leak
Title: FEMA Data Breach
Description: FEMA mistakenly exposed the personal information, including addresses and bank account information, of 2.3 million disaster victims due to oversharing with a private contractor.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Oversharing of Data
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Data Handling
Title: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program
Description: CISA released new information detailing security flaws and configuration errors exploited by ransomware gangs to assist critical infrastructure organizations in thwarting ransomware attacks.
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Vulnerability ExploitationConfiguration Errors
Vulnerability Exploited: Internet-accessible flaws
Motivation: Ransomware
Title: Department of Justice Email Account Compromise
Description: A Department of Justice employee's email account was compromised by a hacker, who took 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees. The data included information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence.
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Email Compromise
Threat Actor: Hacker
Motivation: Data Theft
Title: DHS Data Breach Incident
Description: A privacy incident at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) resulted in the exposure of information for 247,167 active and retired federal employees. The compromised data includes employee names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, positions, grades, and duty locations. The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Case Management System was affected.
Type: Data Breach
Title: Potential Undermining of CISA by Heritage Foundation
Description: CISA faces potential undermining from elements within the Heritage Foundation who seek to scale back its operations, especially concerning its role in mitigating misinformation online. This approach could significantly weaken the agency, impacting its principal cybersecurity functions and potentially affecting its efforts to combat foreign propaganda. If the 2024 election leads to an administration aligning with the Project 2025 playbook, CISA could experience reduced effectiveness or an existential crisis. Such a shift could have far-reaching consequences for national cybersecurity and the protection against online falsehoods that threaten societal stability.
Type: Operational Undermining
Attack Vector: Political Influence
Threat Actor: Heritage Foundation
Motivation: Political
Title: Proposed Reduction of CISA's Scope by Heritage Foundation's Project 2025
Description: The Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 proposes to significantly reduce the scope of CISA, which could undermine the agency's ability to protect against cyber attacks and misinformation. This move aligns with former President Trump's agenda and his critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation. If implemented, CISA's counter-misinformation efforts would be halted, its relationship with social media firms would change, and its cyber defense responsibilities could be redistributed to military and intelligence agencies. As a result, the United States could face an increased risk of cyber threats that can disrupt societal stability, influence elections, or compromise sensitive information.
Type: Policy Change
Threat Actor: Heritage Foundation's Project 2025
Motivation: Align with former President Trump's agenda and critique of CISA's role in debunking electoral misinformation.
Title: Potential Setback in CISA's Cybersecurity Operations
Description: As a relatively new and essential cyber-security component of the DHS, CISA faces a significant potential setback. With changing political climates and Trump’s apparent intentions to reshape the agency, its core missions of protecting government systems and supporting private and nonprofit entities could be compromised. Employees fear that reduced corporate oversight and a possible dismantling or repurposing of the agency may impair its ability to safeguard against cyber threats, potentially weakening national cybersecurity infrastructure. There is a palpable fear among the staff of a decline in efficacy and a change in direction that could pose threats not just to the agency's mandate but also to the broader security landscape.
Type: Organizational Change Impacting Cybersecurity
Threat Actor: Political ClimateTrump Administration
Motivation: Reshaping AgencyReduced Corporate Oversight
Title: Potential Policy Reversal and Mission Compromise at CISA
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), created in 2018, faces uncertain times as the return of former President Trump could significantly alter its function and direction. Trump's promises to reduce government spending and oversight have CISA staffers concerned about the potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives and a shift in focus toward immigration enforcement. The agency, which has a reputation for bipartisanship and was involved in election security and countering online misinformation, now finds itself at odds with Republican claims of censorship and surveillance. The fear of policy reversal and mission compromise looms among the employees, who remain dedicated to protecting national cyber infrastructure.
Type: Policy and Mission Compromise
Threat Actor: Political Leadership Changes
Motivation: Reduction in government spending and oversight, shift in focus toward immigration enforcement
Title: Weaponized Drones Threat to US Cities
Description: The DHS memo highlighted the vulnerability of US cities to weaponized drones, with extremists potentially modifying drones to carry threats like explosives and chemicals. Despite observing nefarious drone activities, local authorities often lack the authority to intervene. To combat this, the DHS has recommended repositioning CCTV cameras, training police on handling hazardous drones, and deploying sensors for drone detection. The rising threat emphasizes the need for improved countermeasures and preparedness against unmanned aircraft systems.
Type: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Threat
Attack Vector: Weaponized Drones
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of local authority to intervene with nefarious drone activities
Threat Actor: Extremists
Motivation: To cause harm or disruption using weaponized drones
Title: Commercial Drone Threats to National Security
Description: The DHS encountered growing threats from commercial drones being modified to carry hazardous payloads, impacting national security. Attempted mitigations include improved detection and response capabilities through local law enforcement training and technology deployment. These clandestine drone activities pose a significant risk, requiring urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
Type: Physical Security Threat
Attack Vector: Modified Commercial Drones
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats
Motivation: Impact national security and critical infrastructure
Title: Weaponized Drones Threat by Violent Extremists
Description: The DHS has identified a growing threat from commercial drones being weaponized by violent extremists in the US. Although technological capabilities are advancing, state and local law enforcement lack the authority and means to effectively counter this new form of aerial menace. Despite efforts to enhance detection and response, including repositioning CCTV and training police to handle hazardous drones, the accessibility of advanced evasion technologies complicates tracking and neutralization efforts. Reports of uncorroborated drone sightings have increased public concern, prompting the DHS to seek expanded legislative counter-drone authorities.
Type: Weaponized Drones
Attack Vector: Drones
Threat Actor: Violent Extremists
Motivation: Terrorism
Title: Salt Typhoon Espionage Campaign
Description: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faced a tumultuous period marked by significant breaches, including the Salt Typhoon espionage campaign linked to Beijing, which compromised American telecoms, collecting sensitive data such as call logs, recordings, and potential location information. The largest hack in US telecom history occurred under the leadership of Jen Easterly, who was not asked to stay post-Inauguration Day. Her departure coincided with demands for CISA to become 'smaller' and 'more nimble' and the dismissal of the Cyber Safety Review Board members who were investigating the breaches, potentially jeopardizing the agency’s future and national cybersecurity.
Type: Espionage Campaign
Attack Vector: Unknown
Threat Actor: Beijing
Motivation: Espionage
Title: Russian Basketball Player Arrested for Ransomware Negotiation
Description: Daniil Kasatkin, a professional basketball player, was arrested in France for allegedly acting as a negotiator for a ransomware gang that targeted around 900 organizations, including two US federal agencies.
Date Detected: 2023-06-21
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Ransomware Negotiation
Threat Actor: Unnamed Ransomware Gang
Motivation: Financial Gain
Title: DHS Intelligence Data Leak via Misconfigured HSIN-Intel Platform
Description: An internal DHS memo obtained via a FOIA request revealed that from March to May 2023, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) misconfigured its Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) platform, exposing restricted intelligence information to tens of thousands of unauthorized users, including US government workers (e.g., disaster response), private sector contractors, and foreign nationals. The leak involved 439 I&A 'products' accessed 1,525 times, with 518 accesses by private sector users and 46 by non-US citizens. Exposed data included law enforcement leads, reports on foreign hacking/disinformation, and analyses of domestic protests (e.g., Stop Cop City). Nearly 40% of improperly accessed materials pertained to cybersecurity threats like state-sponsored hacking.
Type: data leak
Attack Vector: misconfigured access controls (platform set to 'everyone' instead of restricted HSIN-Intel users)
Vulnerability Exploited: improper access control configuration
Title: BianLian Ransomware Group Shifts to Data Theft-Based Extortion (2023)
Description: In January 2023, the BianLian ransomware group transitioned from file encryption to data theft-based extortion after a decryption tool was released by Avast. The group, active since June 2022, gains network access via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, often obtained through phishing or initial access brokers. They deploy custom Go-based backdoors, remote management software, and tools for reconnaissance and credential harvesting. BianLian threatens to publish exfiltrated data on a leak site and demands ransom in cryptocurrency. To evade detection, they disable antivirus processes using PowerShell and Windows Command Shell. Warnings have been issued by CISA, FBI, and ACSC to critical infrastructure organizations. Mitigations include auditing RDP usage, restricting PowerShell, and enforcing strong authentication.
Date Detected: 2022-06
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-01
Type: ransomware
Attack Vector: Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) exploitationphishinginitial access brokers (IAB)custom Go-based backdoorsremote management software
Vulnerability Exploited: weak RDP credentialslack of multi-factor authentication (MFA)unrestricted PowerShell usagedisabled antivirus processes
Threat Actor: BianLian ransomware group
Motivation: financial gaindata extortion
Title: DHS Data Hub Misconfiguration Exposes National Security Information
Description: A misconfigured platform within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) exposed a data hub, allowing thousands of unauthorized users—including government/private sector workers and foreign nationals—to access sensitive national security intelligence. The exposure lasted two months (March–May 2023) and involved 439 inappropriately accessed intelligence products (1,525 total unauthorized accesses), with 518 from the private sector and 46 from non-American citizens. Exposed data included surveillance records, foreign hacking campaigns, law enforcement tips, and domestic protest analyses. The breach stemmed from a programming error in the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) platform, raising concerns about DHS's information security practices.
Date Resolved: 2023-05-31
Type: Data Exposure
Attack Vector: Misconfigured Platform (Programming Error)
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Access Controls / Platform Misconfiguration
Threat Actor: Unauthorized Government WorkersPrivate Sector EmployeesForeign Nationals
Motivation: Opportunistic AccessEspionage (Potential)Information Gathering
Title: FEMA Network Breach via Compromised Citrix Remote Desktop Credentials
Description: A hacker gained unauthorized access to FEMA's computer networks for several months in 2023, exploiting compromised credentials in Citrix Systems Inc.’s remote desktop software. The intruder breached FEMA’s Region 6 (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) and stole identity data of FEMA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees. The breach was detected on **July 7**, with the hacker active from **June 22 to August 5**. FEMA disconnected the Citrix tool on **July 16** and enforced multifactor authentication (MFA). DHS Secretary Kristi Noem fired 24 FEMA employees, including IT executives, citing 'agencywide lack of MFA' and incompetence. While initially claimed that no sensitive data or citizen data was stolen, DHS later confirmed federal employee identity data was exfiltrated.
Date Detected: 2023-07-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-08-29
Date Resolved: 2023-08-05
Type: Unauthorized Access
Attack Vector: Compromised CredentialsCitrix Remote Desktop ExploitationLateral Movement via VPN SoftwareActive Directory Access
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Multifactor Authentication (MFA)Citrix Remote Desktop Software Vulnerability
Title: FEMA and CBP Data Breach (2025)
Description: An unknown hacker carried out a large-scale breach affecting FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) and CBP (Customs and Border Protection) employees, leading to the exposure of sensitive data. The incident lasted several weeks, spanning regions from New Mexico to Texas and Louisiana, and required urgent action by DHS IT leadership. The attacker exploited Citrix software used by a government contractor for remote network access, bypassing FEMA’s digital defenses. Approximately 250,000 employees' data was at risk, and about twenty FEMA IT workers were dismissed for alleged 'serious security failures.' While initial claims suggested no sensitive data was exfiltrated, internal documents later confirmed the theft of FEMA and CBP employee data. The investigation remains ongoing, with no confirmed link to broader espionage campaigns.
Date Detected: 2025-07-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Exploitation of Citrix Remote Access SoftwareLateral MovementPrivilege Escalation
Vulnerability Exploited: Misconfigured Remote Access SystemsInsufficient Identity ManagementLack of Network Segmentation
Threat Actor: Unknown (suspected advanced hacker group)
Motivation: EspionageData TheftPotential Sabotage
Title: FEMA and Customs and Border Protection Staff Data Breach
Description: A hacker gained unauthorized access to FEMA's computer networks for several months in 2025, stealing employee data from FEMA and US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The breach was facilitated via compromised credentials in Citrix Systems Inc.’s remote desktop software, affecting FEMA’s Region 6 (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas). The intruder accessed Active Directory and exfiltrated federal employee identity data. FEMA disconnected the compromised Citrix tool and enforced multifactor authentication (MFA) post-breach. The incident led to the termination of 24 FEMA employees, including IT executives, due to alleged incompetence and lack of agencywide MFA.
Date Detected: 2025-07-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Compromised CredentialsExploitation of Citrix Remote Desktop SoftwareLateral Movement via VPN Software
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of Multifactor Authentication (MFA)Weak Access Controls in Citrix SystemsUnsecured Active Directory
Title: Widespread Breach of FEMA and CBP Employee Data via Citrix Vulnerability
Description: An unidentified hacker stole sensitive data from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) employees in a months-long breach (summer 2023). The attacker exploited a Citrix software vulnerability to gain deep access to FEMA's network, which handles operations across New Mexico, Texas, and Louisiana. The breach led to the firing of 24 FEMA IT employees, including top executives, due to 'severe lapses in security.' Initial claims by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem that no sensitive data was extracted were contradicted by internal documents confirming the theft of employee data. Containment efforts spanned from mid-July to at least September 5, 2023.
Date Detected: 2023-07-mid
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Exploitation of Citrix Remote Access SoftwareLateral Movement within Network
Vulnerability Exploited: Citrix Software Vulnerability (specific CVE unidentified)
Threat Actor: Unidentified (possibly advanced hacking group)
Motivation: EspionageData Theft
Title: DHS Data Hub Misconfiguration Exposes Sensitive Intelligence to Unauthorized Users
Description: An internal DHS memo obtained via FOIA revealed that from March to May 2023, a DHS online platform (HSIN-Intel) used to share sensitive but unclassified intelligence was misconfigured, granting access to 'everyone' instead of only authorized users. This exposed restricted intelligence to tens of thousands of unauthorized users, including non-intelligence government workers, private contractors, and foreign government staff. The incident highlights systemic failures in cloud security, including misconfigurations tied to overly permissive IAM policies, lack of segmentation, and poor access management. Additionally, a separate 2025 breach exposed 184 million plain-text user records (including credentials for Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), emphasizing the broader crisis of cloud misconfigurations driven by human error, lack of expertise, and poor governance.
Date Detected: 2023-05-01
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-06-01
Type: Data Exposure
Attack Vector: Misconfigured Access ControlsOverly Permissive IAM PoliciesPublicly Exposed Storage
Vulnerability Exploited: Improper Public Access ConfigurationLack of SegmentationDisabled LoggingMissing Alerts
Title: FEMA Cybersecurity Breach and Staff Terminations Due to CitrixBleed Exploitation
Description: The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) terminated its CISO, CIO, and 22 other staff after an audit revealed serious security failures, including a breach in June 2024 where attackers exploited the CitrixBleed vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966) to access FEMA's Region 6 servers (covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas). The breach was discovered in July 2024, despite warnings about the vulnerability being issued as early as June. FEMA initially denied data loss, but evidence suggests otherwise. The incident led to a complete overhaul of FEMA's IT department, with new staff hired to address lax security practices. The attack involved stolen credentials to access a Citrix system, followed by data exfiltration from regional servers.
Date Detected: 2024-07
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-08-29
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Stolen CredentialsExploitation of CitrixBleed Vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966)
Vulnerability Exploited: CitrixBleed (CVE-2023-4966) - CVSS 9.3 in Netscaler ADC and Gateway (Session Token Theft, MFA Bypass)
Title: Lapse of Federal Cybersecurity Programs Increases Vulnerability to Cyberattacks
Description: The expiration of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015) and the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, combined with reduced staffing at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) due to a government funding lapse, has heightened concerns about the U.S.'s vulnerability to cyberattacks. The lapse removes liability protections for companies sharing cyber-threat information, discouraging collaboration and leaving critical infrastructure at risk. Key stakeholders, including Sen. Gary Peters, have warned of potential national and economic security risks, while efforts to reauthorize the programs face political hurdles. The reduced CISA workforce may also limit the agency's ability to respond effectively to a major incident.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-10-01
Type: Policy/Regulatory Failure
Vulnerability Exploited: Lapse of CISA 2015 liability protectionsReduced CISA staffing (from ~2,500 to <900)Expiration of State and Local Cybersecurity Grant ProgramLack of real-time threat-sharing incentives
Title: Potential Cybersecurity Risks Due to CISA Downsizing Amid Government Shutdown
Description: As the U.S. government shutdown continues, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) faces significant workforce reductions, budget cuts, and potential permanent downsizing. This creates heightened cybersecurity risks, as CISA—responsible for coordinating national cyber defense, protecting critical infrastructure, and combating threats from hackers, cybercriminals, and nation-states—operates with reduced capacity. Over 1,000 employees have already left CISA this year, with further Reductions in Force (RIFs) underway. Key divisions like the Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED) and Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) are targeted, raising concerns about blind spots in threat detection, response, and recovery. Political disputes and misinformation-related controversies have also contributed to the agency's challenges, despite its critical role in national defense.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2023-10-01
Type: Operational Risk
Vulnerability Exploited: Reduced Workforce CapacityBudget ConstraintsPolitical DistractionsDelayed Threat Response
Threat Actor: Nation-State ActorsCybercriminalsHacktivistsOpportunistic Hackers
Motivation: Exploit Government VulnerabilitiesDisrupt Critical InfrastructureLeverage Political InstabilityCapitalize on Reduced Oversight
Title: Social Security Number (SSN) Lock and Credit Freeze Advisory for Identity Theft Prevention
Description: The article discusses the importance of locking your Social Security Number (SSN) and freezing credit to prevent identity theft, particularly employment fraud and unauthorized credit account openings. It outlines two methods to lock an SSN: contacting the Social Security Administration (SSA) or using the E-Verify Self Lock feature. The article also highlights the differences between SSN locks and credit freezes, their limitations, and additional protective measures like IRS Identity Protection PINs and credit monitoring services.
Type: Identity Theft Prevention Advisory
Threat Actor: Identity Thieves / Fraudsters
Motivation: Financial Gain (e.g., unauthorized loans, employment fraud, government benefits fraud)
Title: FBI Warns of AI-Powered Smishing and Vishing Scams Targeting U.S. Government Officials
Description: The FBI has disclosed a coordinated campaign involving smishing (malicious text messages) and vishing (AI-generated voice messages) targeting senior U.S. government officials (current/former) and their contacts since April 2025. Attackers impersonate trusted figures to harvest credentials, spread disinformation, or commit fraud. The scams exploit AI voice cloning, publicly available data, and trust-based manipulation. Victims are tricked into revealing sensitive information or granting account access via fake messaging platforms or malicious links.
Date Detected: 2025-04
Type: social engineering
Attack Vector: SMS/MMS (smishing)voice calls/voicemails (vishing)AI-generated audiomalicious linksfake messaging platformstrust exploitation
Vulnerability Exploited: human trustlack of multi-factor authentication (MFA)publicly available personal data (e.g., photos, job titles)AI voice cloning limitationsurgency/authority manipulation
Motivation: financial gaincredential harvestingdisinformationespionagefraudnetwork infiltration
What are the most common types of attacks the company has faced ?
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Breach.
How does the company identify the attack vectors used in incidents ?
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Email Account, RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs), Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials), Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor), Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials), Citrix Remote Access Software, Misconfigured HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach), Citrix System (via stolen credentials) and SMS/MMS messagesvoice calls/voicemailsfake messaging platforms.
Impact of the Incidents
What was the impact of each incident ?
Incident : Data Exposure USI233311222
Data Compromised: Names, Birthdates, Nationalities, Locations
Incident : Data Breach FEM74612323
Data Compromised: Addresses, Bank account information, Social security numbers
Identity Theft Risk: High
Payment Information Risk: High
Incident : Ransomware CYB2047151023
Systems Affected: More than 800 susceptible systems
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Data Compromised: 200gb of data, including records of 20,000 fbi workers and 9,000 dhs employees, Information about dhs security experts, programme analysts, it, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence
Brand Reputation Impact: High
Identity Theft Risk: High
Incident : Data Breach USD331181223
Data Compromised: Employee names, Social security numbers, Dates of birth, Positions, Grades, Duty locations
Systems Affected: DHS OIG Case Management System
Incident : Operational Undermining CIS000080624
Operational Impact: Reduced effectiveness or existential crisis
Incident : Organizational Change Impacting Cybersecurity CIS000122124
Systems Affected: Government Systems
Operational Impact: Potential Decline in Efficacy
Brand Reputation Impact: Weakening National Cybersecurity Infrastructure
Incident : Policy and Mission Compromise CIS000122224
Operational Impact: Potential dismantling of cybersecurity initiatives
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Operational Impact: High
Incident : Espionage Campaign CIS001012825
Data Compromised: Call logs, Recordings, Potential location information
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Data Compromised: Law enforcement leads and tips, Reports on foreign hacking and disinformation campaigns, Analysis of domestic protest movements (e.g., stop cop city protests in atlanta), Cybersecurity intelligence (39% of exposed products), Media reports praising violent actions against police
Systems Affected: Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) platform
Operational Impact: exposure of sensitive but unclassified intelligence to unauthorized parties, undermining trust in DHS information security
Brand Reputation Impact: eroded public and stakeholder trust in DHS's ability to secure sensitive intelligence data
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Brand Reputation Impact: high (due to public leak threats and warnings from CISA/FBI/ACSC)
Identity Theft Risk: potential (if PII was exfiltrated)
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Data Compromised: Surveillance records of american citizens, Foreign hacking/disinformation campaigns, Law enforcement tips, Domestic protest examinations, Cybersecurity intelligence (39% of accessed products)
Systems Affected: DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) PlatformHomeland Security Information Network (HSIN)
Operational Impact: Loss of trust among agencies sharing information via the hub; potential compromise of sensitive intelligence operations
Brand Reputation Impact: Significant reputational damage to DHS's claims of secure information handling; erosion of confidence in HSIN's security
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Data Compromised: Federal employee identity data (fema & cbp)
Systems Affected: FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Tool
Downtime: {'start': '2023-06-22', 'end': '2023-08-05', 'description': 'Hacker present in network for ~45 days; Citrix tool disconnected on 2023-07-16.'}
Operational Impact: Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access ToolEnforcement of Multifactor AuthenticationFiring of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives)
Brand Reputation Impact: Public Disclosure of IT Leadership FailuresMedia Coverage (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (Federal Employee Data Stolen)']
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Data Compromised: Fema employee data, Cbp employee data
Systems Affected: FEMA Computer NetworkDHS Systems (partial)Citrix Remote Access Infrastructure
Downtime: Several weeks (from at least mid-July to September 2025)
Operational Impact: Disruption of DHS/FEMA OperationsPersonnel Dismissals (20 IT workers)Administrative Leave for Additional StaffEmergency Directives Issued for Federal Network Hardening
Brand Reputation Impact: Public Scrutiny of FEMA/DHS CybersecurityPolitical Controversy Over Agency RestructuringLoss of Trust in Federal Data Protection
Identity Theft Risk: High (for 250,000+ employees)
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Data Compromised: Federal employee identity data (fema and cbp)
Systems Affected: FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Software
Operational Impact: Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access ToolEnforcement of MFATermination of 24 Employees (Including IT Executives)
Brand Reputation Impact: Public Disclosure of Cyber LapsesTermination of Senior IT StaffMedia Coverage (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Identity Theft Risk: ['Federal Employee Data (Potential Risk)']
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Data Compromised: Fema employee data, Cbp employee data
Systems Affected: FEMA Computer Network (regional: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)Citrix Remote Access Software
Downtime: At least 7+ weeks (mid-July to September 5, 2023)
Operational Impact: Urgent cleanup operation by DHS IT officialsDisruption to FEMA/CBP operationsFiring of 24 IT employees (including top executives)
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of trust in DHS/FEMA cybersecurity capabilitiesControversy over employee firings and political motivations
Identity Theft Risk: High (employee data stolen)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Data Compromised: Sensitive intelligence (dhs), 184m user records (2025 breach), Plain-text credentials (apple, google, meta, etc.), Bank accounts, Health platforms, Government portals
Systems Affected: HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach)
Operational Impact: Unauthorized Access to Restricted IntelligenceIncreased Risk of Identity Theft/Phishing (2025 Breach)Credential Stuffing Attacks
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Trust in DHS/Federal AgenciesReputation Damage for Affected Platforms (Apple, Google, etc.)
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (184M Records Exposed in Plain Text)']
Payment Information Risk: ['High (Bank Account Details Exposed in 2025 Breach)']
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Data Compromised: Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss, but documents suggest exfiltration occurred)
Systems Affected: Citrix SystemFEMA Region 6 Servers (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Operational Impact: Major IT staff overhaul, including termination of CISO, CIO, and 22 others; new security measures implemented (password resets, MFA enforcement)
Brand Reputation Impact: High (public disclosure of security failures, terminations, and misleading claims)
Identity Theft Risk: Potential (if PII was exfiltrated)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Operational Impact: Reduced federal cybersecurity response capabilityDiscouraged private-sector information sharingIncreased legal/regulatory risks for companies sharing threat dataPotential delays in state/local government cybersecurity improvements
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of public trust in federal cybersecurity preparednessPerception of political dysfunction hindering cyber defense
Legal Liabilities: Loss of antitrust protections for threat-sharing companiesRisk of FOIA-disclosure of shared threat dataPotential regulatory fines for companies sharing information without protections
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Systems Affected: Critical Infrastructure (e.g., power grids, water treatment plants)Federal Cyber Defense SystemsThreat Intelligence Sharing Platforms
Operational Impact: Reduced Threat Detection CapabilitiesDelayed Incident ResponseWeakened Partnership CoordinationIncreased Risk of Successful Cyber Attacks
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of Public Trust in Government CybersecurityPerception of Political Interference in National Security
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Data Compromised: Social security numbers (ssns), Potential personally identifiable information (pii) in breaches
Identity Theft Risk: High (employment fraud, tax fraud, credit account fraud)
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Data Compromised: Personal information, Login credentials, Contact lists, Potentially sensitive government communications
Brand Reputation Impact: potential erosion of trust in government communicationsreputational damage to impersonated officials
Identity Theft Risk: high
Payment Information Risk: high
What types of data are most commonly compromised in incidents ?
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Personal Information, , Addresses, Bank Account Information, Social Security Numbers, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Job Titles, Phone Numbers, Email Addresses, , Personally Identifiable Information, , Call Logs, Recordings, Potential Location Information, , Sensitive But Unclassified Intelligence, Investigative Leads, Law Enforcement Tips, Foreign Hacking/Disinformation Reports, Domestic Protest Analyses, Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence, , Classified/Restricted Intelligence Products, Surveillance Data, Cyber Threat Intelligence, Law Enforcement Investigations, Domestic Protest Analysis, , Employee Identity Data, , Employee Records, Potentially Sensitive Operational Data, , Federal Employee Identity Data, , Employee Data (Fema/Cbp), , Intelligence Reports (Dhs), User Credentials (Plain Text), Bank Account Details, Health Data, Government Portal Access, , Social Security Numbers (Ssns), Potentially Other Pii In Unrelated Breaches, , Personal Identifiable Information (Pii), Credentials, Contact Lists, Potentially Sensitive Communications and .
Which entities were affected by each incident ?
Incident : Data Exposure USI233311222
Entity Name: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Government
Location: United States
Customers Affected: More than 6,000 immigrants
Incident : Data Breach FEM74612323
Entity Name: FEMA
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United States
Customers Affected: 2300000
Incident : Ransomware CYB2047151023
Entity Type: Critical Infrastructure Organizations
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Entity Name: Department of Justice
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Entity Name: FBI
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Breach USD331181223
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Government
Size: Large
Incident : Operational Undermining CIS000080624
Entity Name: CISA
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Incident : Policy Change CIS005080624
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Incident : Organizational Change Impacting Cybersecurity CIS000122124
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Incident : Policy and Mission Compromise CIS000122224
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Incident : Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Threat US-000122324
Entity Type: US Cities
Industry: Public Safety
Location: United States
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Incident : Weaponized Drones US-001011225
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Organization
Industry: Security
Location: United States
Incident : Espionage Campaign CIS001012825
Entity Name: American Telecoms
Entity Type: Telecommunications
Industry: Telecommunications
Location: United States
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Entity Type: Organization
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: federal government agency
Industry: national security/homeland security
Location: United States
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Entity Name: DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
Entity Type: intelligence agency (subdivision of DHS)
Industry: intelligence/law enforcement
Location: United States
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Entity Name: Unauthorized HSIN Users
Entity Type: government workers (non-intelligence/law enforcement), private sector contractors, foreign government staff
Location: United Statesinternational (foreign nationals)
Size: tens of thousands (439 products accessed 1,525 times; 518 by private sector, 46 by non-US citizens)
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Entity Type: critical infrastructure organizations
Location: United StatesAustraliaglobal (targeted warnings)
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Federal Government Agency
Industry: National Security / Law Enforcement
Location: United States
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration / Emergency Management
Location: United States (Region 6: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Customers Affected: Federal Employees (FEMA & CBP)
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Entity Name: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement / Border Security
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Federal Employees
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Emergency Management
Location: Washington, D.C., USA (HQ); regions including New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana
Size: Large (250,000+ employees across DHS)
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Entity Name: Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Border Security
Location: USA
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Federal Department
Industry: National Security
Location: USA
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration / Emergency Management
Location: USA (Region 6: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Entity Name: US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement / Border Security
Location: USA
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration / Emergency Management
Location: USA (regional focus: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)
Size: 250,000+ employees (DHS-wide)
Customers Affected: FEMA and CBP employees (number unspecified)
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Entity Name: Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Law Enforcement / Border Security
Location: USA
Customers Affected: CBP employees (number unspecified)
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Entity Name: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Federal Department
Industry: National Security
Location: USA
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Customers Affected: Tens of thousands (HSIN users)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: Multiple Global Platforms (Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, etc.)
Entity Type: Tech Companies, Social Media, Cloud Providers
Industry: Technology
Location: Global
Size: Fortune 2000
Customers Affected: 184 million users (2025 Breach)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: FBI
Entity Type: Law Enforcement
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Entity Type: Intelligence Agency
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Size: Large
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entity Name: Local Law Enforcement & Intelligence Fusion Centers
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Safety
Location: United States
Size: Varies
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Entity Name: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Emergency Management
Location: United States (Region 6: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Entity Name: U.S. Federal Government (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Size: Large (reduced from ~2,500 to <900 employees during shutdown)
Customers Affected: All U.S. critical infrastructure sectors
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Entity Name: State and Local Governments (e.g., schools, hospitals, water systems)
Entity Type: Public Sector
Industry: Multiple (Education, Healthcare, Utilities)
Location: United States
Size: Varies
Customers Affected: Millions of U.S. residents reliant on public services
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Entity Name: Private-Sector Companies (e.g., Cyber Threat Alliance members)
Entity Type: Corporate
Industry: Multiple (Cybersecurity, Critical Infrastructure)
Location: United States (primarily)
Size: Varies
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Entity Name: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Size: 2,540 employees (pre-reductions)
Customers Affected: U.S. Federal Government, State and Local Governments, Critical Infrastructure Operators, Private Sector Partners
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Entity Type: Government Department
Industry: National Security
Location: United States
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Entity Name: Stakeholder Engagement Division (SED)
Entity Type: Agency Division
Industry: Cybersecurity
Location: United States
Customers Affected: National and International Partners
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Entity Name: Infrastructure Security Division (ISD)
Entity Type: Agency Division
Industry: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Power Grid Operators, Water Treatment Facilities, Chemical Security Facilities
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Entity Name: General Public (U.S. Citizens/Residents)
Entity Type: Individuals
Location: United States
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Entity Name: Social Security Administration (SSA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Administration
Location: United States
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Entity Name: E-Verify (USCIS & SSA)
Entity Type: Government Service
Industry: Employment Verification
Location: United States
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Entity Name: Credit Bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion)
Entity Type: Private Companies
Industry: Financial Services
Location: United States
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Entity Name: U.S. Federal Government
Entity Type: government
Industry: public administration
Location: United States
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Entity Name: U.S. State Governments
Entity Type: government
Industry: public administration
Location: United States
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Entity Name: Personal Contacts of Targeted Officials
Entity Type: individuals
Location: United States (primarily)
Response to the Incidents
What measures were taken in response to each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach USD331181223
Remediation Measures: Notification letters sent to affected individualsAdditional security measures implemented to restrict access to information
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Containment Measures: Improved detection and response capabilitiesLocal law enforcement trainingTechnology deployment
Incident : Weaponized Drones US-001011225
Law Enforcement Notified: Yes
Containment Measures: Repositioning CCTVTraining police to handle hazardous drones
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Containment Measures: auditing RDP usagedisabling command-line scriptingrestricting PowerShell
Remediation Measures: enforcing strong authentication (e.g., MFA)patching vulnerable systems
Communication Strategy: warnings issued by CISA, FBI, and ACSC
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (internal memo via Brennan Center for Justice)
Third Party Assistance: Brennan Center For Justice (Via Foia Disclosure).
Communication Strategy: Limited (internal memo obtained via FOIA; no public statement detailed)
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: Disconnected Citrix Remote Access Tool (2023-07-16)Enforced Multifactor Authentication
Communication Strategy: Public Statement by DHS Secretary (2023-08-29)Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (DHS IT leadership urgent action)
Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (no explicit confirmation)
Containment Measures: Localization of Breach (mid-July 2025)Network SegmentationAccess Revocation
Remediation Measures: Ongoing as of September 5, 2025Emergency Directive for Federal Network HardeningIdentity Management Reforms
Communication Strategy: Internal FEMA Staff UpdatesPublic Statements by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi NoemMedia Coverage (CNN)
Network Segmentation: Implemented post-breach
Enhanced Monitoring: Yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities)
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access Tool (2025-07-16)Enforcement of Multifactor Authentication (MFA)
Communication Strategy: Public Statement by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem (2025-08-29)Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/FCW)
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (DHS Task Force formed)
Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (internal DHS investigation)
Containment Measures: Initial efforts launched mid-July 2023Ongoing remediation as of September 5, 2023
Remediation Measures: Cleanup operation by DHS IT officialsFiring of 24 FEMA IT employees
Communication Strategy: Internal FEMA staff updatesPublic statement by DHS Secretary Kristi Noem (August 29, 2023)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Communication Strategy: FOIA Disclosure (DHS Memo)Media Reports (WIRED)
Network Segmentation: ['Recommended as Corrective Action']
Enhanced Monitoring: Recommended as Corrective Action
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (post-discovery)
Containment Measures: Password resetsMulti-Factor Authentication (MFA) enforcement
Remediation Measures: IT staff overhaulNew security personnel hired
Communication Strategy: Public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Third Party Assistance: Cyber Threat Alliance (Information-Sharing Coordination), Internet Security Alliance (Advocacy For Policy Updates).
Remediation Measures: Sen. Gary Peters' 10-year CISA 2015 reauthorization bill (Protecting America from Cyber Threats Act)House Homeland Security Committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by Rep. Andrew Garbarino)Proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, AI threats)Incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by Internet Security Alliance)
Recovery Measures: Short-term extensions via Continuing Resolution (CR) in House/Senate billsPotential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles
Communication Strategy: Sen. Peters' public warnings about national/economic security risksMedia outreach by Cyber Threat Alliance and Internet Security AllianceHouse Democratic staffer comments on program success in state/local governments
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Communication Strategy: Public Warnings by Cybersecurity ExpertsMedia Coverage Highlighting Risks
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Third Party Assistance: Identity Protection Services, Credit Monitoring Services.
Containment Measures: SSN Lock via SSA or E-VerifyCredit Freeze via Credit BureausIRS Identity Protection PIN
Remediation Measures: Monitoring financial accountsDark web monitoring (via ID theft protection services)White glove restoration services for identity recovery
Recovery Measures: Unlocking SSN for legitimate use (e.g., employment verification)Temporary lift of credit freeze for authorized credit applications
Communication Strategy: Public advisory via CNET articleSSA and E-Verify user notifications (e.g., lock expiration alerts)
Enhanced Monitoring: Credit monitoringDark web monitoring for compromised PII
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: public service announcement (PSA)awareness campaignreporting via IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center)
Remediation Measures: password changesmulti-factor authentication (MFA) enforcementaccount monitoring
Communication Strategy: FBI PSAmedia outreachdirect warnings to potential targets
Enhanced Monitoring: recommendation for individuals to monitor accounts
What is the company's incident response plan?
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Yes (internal memo via Brennan Center for Justice), , Yes (DHS IT leadership urgent action), , Yes (DHS Task Force formed), Yes (post-discovery), .
How does the company involve third-party assistance in incident response ?
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through Brennan Center for Justice (via FOIA disclosure), , Cyber Threat Alliance (information-sharing coordination), Internet Security Alliance (advocacy for policy updates), , Identity Protection Services, Credit Monitoring Services, .
Data Breach Information
What type of data was compromised in each breach ?
Incident : Data Exposure USI233311222
Type of Data Compromised: Personal information
Number of Records Exposed: More than 6,000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Incident : Data Breach FEM74612323
Type of Data Compromised: Addresses, Bank account information, Social security numbers
Number of Records Exposed: 2300000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Job titles, Phone numbers, Email addresses
Number of Records Exposed: 29,000
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes
Incident : Data Breach USD331181223
Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information
Number of Records Exposed: 247167
Sensitivity of Data: High
Personally Identifiable Information: Employee namesSocial Security numbersDates of birthPositionsGradesDuty locations
Incident : Espionage Campaign CIS001012825
Type of Data Compromised: Call logs, Recordings, Potential location information
Sensitivity of Data: High
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive but unclassified intelligence, Investigative leads, Law enforcement tips, Foreign hacking/disinformation reports, Domestic protest analyses, Cybersecurity threat intelligence
Number of Records Exposed: 439 I&A 'products' accessed 1,525 times
Sensitivity of Data: sensitive but unclassified (restricted to HSIN-Intel users)
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Type of Data Compromised: Classified/restricted intelligence products, Surveillance data, Cyber threat intelligence, Law enforcement investigations, Domestic protest analysis
Number of Records Exposed: 439 intelligence products (accessed 1,525 times)
Sensitivity of Data: High (National Security Intelligence; Sensitive/Classified)
Data Exfiltration: Unconfirmed (accessed but no evidence of exfiltration in report)
Personally Identifiable Information: Potential (surveillance data may include PII)
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Type of Data Compromised: Employee identity data
Sensitivity of Data: High (Federal Employee Information)
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Type of Data Compromised: Employee records, Potentially sensitive operational data
Number of Records Exposed: 250,000+ (employees across DHS/FEMA/CBP)
Sensitivity of Data: High (government employee data)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (contradicts initial denial by Secretary Noem)
Personally Identifiable Information: Likely (employee details)
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Type of Data Compromised: Federal employee identity data
Sensitivity of Data: High (Government Employee PII)
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Type of Data Compromised: Employee data (fema/cbp)
Sensitivity of Data: High (government employee information)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (contradicts initial DHS denial)
Personally Identifiable Information: Likely (employee records)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Type of Data Compromised: Intelligence reports (dhs), User credentials (plain text), Bank account details, Health data, Government portal access
Number of Records Exposed: Undisclosed (DHS), 184 million (2025 Breach)
Sensitivity of Data: High (Intelligence/National Security)Critical (Financial/Health Data)
Data Exfiltration: Likely (2025 Breach)Unconfirmed (DHS)
Data Encryption: ['None (Plain-Text Records in 2025 Breach)']
File Types Exposed: Database RecordsAuthorization URLsCredentials
Personally Identifiable Information: UsernamesPasswordsBank Account DetailsHealth Records
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Data Exfiltration: Yes (from FEMA Region 6 servers)
Personally Identifiable Information: Potential (unconfirmed)
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Type of Data Compromised: Social security numbers (ssns), Potentially other pii in unrelated breaches
Sensitivity of Data: High (SSNs are critical for financial and employment identity verification)
Personally Identifiable Information: SSNsPotentially names, addresses, or other PII linked to SSNs
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Type of Data Compromised: Personal identifiable information (pii), Credentials, Contact lists, Potentially sensitive communications
Sensitivity of Data: high
Data Exfiltration: likely
What measures does the company take to prevent data exfiltration ?
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Notification letters sent to affected individuals, Additional security measures implemented to restrict access to information, , enforcing strong authentication (e.g., MFA), patching vulnerable systems, , Ongoing as of September 5, 2025, Emergency Directive for Federal Network Hardening, Identity Management Reforms, , Cleanup operation by DHS IT officials, Firing of 24 FEMA IT employees, , IT staff overhaul, New security personnel hired, , Sen. Gary Peters' 10-year CISA 2015 reauthorization bill (Protecting America from Cyber Threats Act), House Homeland Security Committee's 10-year extension bill (sponsored by Rep. Andrew Garbarino), Proposed updates to cyber-threat indicator definitions (e.g., supply chain, AI threats), Incentives for sharing single-point-of-failure data (proposed by Internet Security Alliance), , Monitoring financial accounts, Dark web monitoring (via ID theft protection services), White glove restoration services for identity recovery, , password changes, multi-factor authentication (MFA) enforcement, account monitoring, .
How does the company handle incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) ?
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by improved detection and response capabilities, local law enforcement training, technology deployment, , repositioning cctv, training police to handle hazardous drones, , auditing rdp usage, disabling command-line scripting, restricting powershell, , disconnected citrix remote access tool (2023-07-16), enforced multifactor authentication, , localization of breach (mid-july 2025), network segmentation, access revocation, , disconnection of citrix remote access tool (2025-07-16), enforcement of multifactor authentication (mfa), , initial efforts launched mid-july 2023, ongoing remediation as of september 5, 2023, , password resets, multi-factor authentication (mfa) enforcement, , ssn lock via ssa or e-verify, credit freeze via credit bureaus, irs identity protection pin, , public service announcement (psa), awareness campaign, reporting via ic3 (internet crime complaint center) and .
Ransomware Information
Was ransomware involved in any of the incidents ?
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Ransom Demanded: True
Ransomware Strain: BianLian
Data Exfiltration: True
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Data Exfiltration: Yes (separate from ransomware)
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Data Exfiltration: Yes (but not ransomware-related)
How does the company recover data encrypted by ransomware ?
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Short-term extensions via Continuing Resolution (CR) in House/Senate bills, Potential inclusion in larger legislative vehicles, , Unlocking SSN for legitimate use (e.g., employment verification), Temporary lift of credit freeze for authorized credit applications, .
Regulatory Compliance
Were there any regulatory violations and fines imposed for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Legal Actions: Pending Extradition to the US
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Regulatory Notifications: CISAFBIACSC warnings issued
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Legal Actions: Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Leadership),
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Regulations Violated: Potential FISMA (Federal Information Security Modernization Act) Non-Compliance, DHS Internal Security Policies,
Legal Actions: Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others,
Regulatory Notifications: Internal DHS/FEMA ReportsCongressional Oversight (potential open letter)
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Legal Actions: Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives),
Regulatory Notifications: Internal DHS Investigation
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Legal Actions: Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired),
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Regulations Violated: Potential FISMA (DHS), GDPR (if EU citizens affected in 2025 Breach), State Data Breach Laws,
Regulatory Notifications: FOIA Disclosure (DHS)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Regulations Violated: Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA 2015),
Regulatory Notifications: Lapse of FOIA exemptions for shared threat dataLoss of antitrust protections for collaborating companies
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Regulatory Notifications: FBI public advisory
How does the company ensure compliance with regulatory requirements ?
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Pending Extradition to the US, Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Leadership), , Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others, , Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives), , Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired), .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What lessons were learned from each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach FEM74612323
Lessons Learned: Ensure that only necessary data is shared with contractors to perform their official duties.
Incident : Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Threat US-000122324
Lessons Learned: Improved countermeasures and preparedness against unmanned aircraft systems are necessary.
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Lessons Learned: Urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies are necessary to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Lessons Learned: RDP remains a high-risk attack vector if not properly secured., Disabling antivirus processes via PowerShell is a common evasion tactic., Initial access brokers play a key role in facilitating ransomware attacks., Shift from encryption to extortion highlights the need for data protection beyond backups.
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Lessons Learned: Critical gaps in access controls and platform configuration within high-security government systems; need for stricter auditing of user permissions and real-time monitoring of sensitive data hubs.
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Lessons Learned: Critical need for multifactor authentication (MFA) across all systems., Vulnerabilities in third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix) require proactive monitoring., Lateral movement risks in Active Directory highlight the need for segmentation and access controls., Delayed detection (hacker active for ~45 days) underscores gaps in continuous threat monitoring.
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities in remote access systems (e.g., Citrix) require immediate patching and monitoring., Personnel changes without transparent justification can undermine morale and operational trust., Contradictory public statements (e.g., data exfiltration denials) erode credibility during crises., Federal agencies must prioritize network segmentation and identity management to limit lateral movement.
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Lessons Learned: Critical importance of enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) agencywide., Need for robust monitoring of third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix)., Consequences of inadequate access controls in Active Directory., Accountability for IT leadership failures in cybersecurity posture.
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities in Citrix remote access software require urgent patching, Need for improved network segmentation and lateral movement detection, Political and operational risks of public contradictions in breach disclosures
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Lessons Learned: Misconfigurations are systemic failures tied to people, process, and policy—not just technical oversights., Overly permissive IAM policies and lack of segmentation enable broad unauthorized access., Publicly exposed storage buckets/databases with sensitive data create high-risk vectors., Plain-text credential storage exacerbates identity theft and fraud risks., Cloud drift and lack of context in security tools lead to alert fatigue and missed critical issues., Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale.
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed) must be patched promptly. Transparency in incident reporting is essential to maintain trust. Security preparedness claims must be audited rigorously to prevent misrepresentation.
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Lessons Learned: Short-term legislative patches are insufficient for cybersecurity operations requiring long-term certainty., Political objections (e.g., Sen. Rand Paul's conflation of CISA 2015 with the CISA agency) can derail critical cybersecurity measures., Corporate legal teams may hesitate to share threat data without liability protections, even if operational teams support collaboration., State/local cybersecurity grants have tangible impacts on community resilience (e.g., schools, hospitals)., CISA's reduced staffing during shutdowns creates systemic vulnerability to major incidents.
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Lessons Learned: Politicization of cybersecurity agencies undermines national defense capabilities., Workforce reductions in critical agencies create exploitable vulnerabilities during high-threat periods., Budget cuts to threat intelligence and infrastructure protection increase systemic risks., Public-private partnerships require stable, well-funded government coordination to be effective.
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Lessons Learned: Proactive measures like SSN locks and credit freezes can mitigate identity theft risks., SSN locks are particularly effective against employment fraud but require manual management for legitimate use cases., Layered defenses (e.g., SSN lock + credit freeze + IRS PIN) provide stronger protection., Monitoring services (credit/dark web) add an extra layer of detection for compromised data.
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Lessons Learned: AI-powered scams are increasingly sophisticated and can bypass traditional skepticism., Trust-based attacks exploit human psychology, requiring behavioral defenses (e.g., verification habits)., Publicly available data (e.g., LinkedIn, social media) fuels convincing impersonations., Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is critical but must be paired with user education to prevent code-sharing., Proactive communication from authorities can mitigate large-scale campaigns.
What recommendations were made to prevent future incidents ?
Incident : Data Breach FEM74612323
Recommendations: Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information.
Incident : Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Threat US-000122324
Recommendations: Repositioning CCTV cameras, Training police on handling hazardous drones, Deploying sensors for drone detectionRepositioning CCTV cameras, Training police on handling hazardous drones, Deploying sensors for drone detectionRepositioning CCTV cameras, Training police on handling hazardous drones, Deploying sensors for drone detection
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Recommendations: Improve detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threatsImprove detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threatsImprove detection and response capabilities, Enhance local law enforcement training, Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Recommendations: Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Regularly update and patch remote management software., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft.
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Recommendations: Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data.Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data.Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data.Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data.
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Recommendations: Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches.
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Recommendations: Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats.
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Recommendations: Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff.
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Recommendations: Conduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidentsConduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidentsConduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Enhance transparency in public communications about incidents
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Recommendations: Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls.
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Recommendations: Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices.
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Recommendations: Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation.
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Recommendations: Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity.
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Recommendations: Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity.
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Recommendations: For Organizations: Train employees on recognizing AI-generated scams (e.g., voice artifacts, tone inconsistencies)., Implement strict MFA policies and phishing-resistant authentication methods., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials linked to employees., Establish clear protocols for verifying high-stakes requests (e.g., fund transfers)., Collaborate with law enforcement to share threat intelligence., For Organizations: Train employees on recognizing AI-generated scams (e.g., voice artifacts, tone inconsistencies)., Implement strict MFA policies and phishing-resistant authentication methods., Monitor dark web for exposed credentials linked to employees., Establish clear protocols for verifying high-stakes requests (e.g., fund transfers)., Collaborate with law enforcement to share threat intelligence..
What are the key lessons learned from past incidents ?
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Ensure that only necessary data is shared with contractors to perform their official duties.Improved countermeasures and preparedness against unmanned aircraft systems are necessary.Urgent action and cooperation between federal and local agencies are necessary to ensure public safety and preserve critical infrastructure.RDP remains a high-risk attack vector if not properly secured.,Disabling antivirus processes via PowerShell is a common evasion tactic.,Initial access brokers play a key role in facilitating ransomware attacks.,Shift from encryption to extortion highlights the need for data protection beyond backups.Critical gaps in access controls and platform configuration within high-security government systems; need for stricter auditing of user permissions and real-time monitoring of sensitive data hubs.Critical need for multifactor authentication (MFA) across all systems.,Vulnerabilities in third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix) require proactive monitoring.,Lateral movement risks in Active Directory highlight the need for segmentation and access controls.,Delayed detection (hacker active for ~45 days) underscores gaps in continuous threat monitoring.Critical vulnerabilities in remote access systems (e.g., Citrix) require immediate patching and monitoring.,Personnel changes without transparent justification can undermine morale and operational trust.,Contradictory public statements (e.g., data exfiltration denials) erode credibility during crises.,Federal agencies must prioritize network segmentation and identity management to limit lateral movement.Critical importance of enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) agencywide.,Need for robust monitoring of third-party remote access tools (e.g., Citrix).,Consequences of inadequate access controls in Active Directory.,Accountability for IT leadership failures in cybersecurity posture.Critical vulnerabilities in Citrix remote access software require urgent patching,Need for improved network segmentation and lateral movement detection,Political and operational risks of public contradictions in breach disclosuresMisconfigurations are systemic failures tied to people, process, and policy—not just technical oversights.,Overly permissive IAM policies and lack of segmentation enable broad unauthorized access.,Publicly exposed storage buckets/databases with sensitive data create high-risk vectors.,Plain-text credential storage exacerbates identity theft and fraud risks.,Cloud drift and lack of context in security tools lead to alert fatigue and missed critical issues.,Developer workflows (e.g., CI/CD pipelines) can propagate misconfigurations at scale.Critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed) must be patched promptly. Transparency in incident reporting is essential to maintain trust. Security preparedness claims must be audited rigorously to prevent misrepresentation.Short-term legislative patches are insufficient for cybersecurity operations requiring long-term certainty.,Political objections (e.g., Sen. Rand Paul's conflation of CISA 2015 with the CISA agency) can derail critical cybersecurity measures.,Corporate legal teams may hesitate to share threat data without liability protections, even if operational teams support collaboration.,State/local cybersecurity grants have tangible impacts on community resilience (e.g., schools, hospitals).,CISA's reduced staffing during shutdowns creates systemic vulnerability to major incidents.Politicization of cybersecurity agencies undermines national defense capabilities.,Workforce reductions in critical agencies create exploitable vulnerabilities during high-threat periods.,Budget cuts to threat intelligence and infrastructure protection increase systemic risks.,Public-private partnerships require stable, well-funded government coordination to be effective.Proactive measures like SSN locks and credit freezes can mitigate identity theft risks.,SSN locks are particularly effective against employment fraud but require manual management for legitimate use cases.,Layered defenses (e.g., SSN lock + credit freeze + IRS PIN) provide stronger protection.,Monitoring services (credit/dark web) add an extra layer of detection for compromised data.AI-powered scams are increasingly sophisticated and can bypass traditional skepticism.,Trust-based attacks exploit human psychology, requiring behavioral defenses (e.g., verification habits).,Publicly available data (e.g., LinkedIn, social media) fuels convincing impersonations.,Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is critical but must be paired with user education to prevent code-sharing.,Proactive communication from authorities can mitigate large-scale campaigns.
What recommendations has the company implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information. and Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based..
References
Where can I find more information about each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware CYB2047151023
Source: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Source: Motherboard
Incident : Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Threat US-000122324
Source: DHS Memo
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Source: AFP
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Source: WIRED
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Source: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (Brennan Center for Justice)
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Source: DHS internal memo (obtained via FOIA)
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Source: CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Source: FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Source: ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Source: Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023)
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Source: WIRED
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Source: Brennan Center for Justice (FOIA Obtained DHS Memo)
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Source: Bloomberg News
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Source: Nextgov/FCW
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Source: DHS Public Statement (2023-08-29)
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Source: Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN)
Date Accessed: 2025-09-10
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Source: DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach)
Date Accessed: 2025-09
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Source: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem
Date Accessed: 2025-08-29
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Source: AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo)
Date Accessed: 2025-02-11
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Source: Bloomberg News
URL: https://www.bloomberg.com
Date Accessed: 2025-09-05
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Source: DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem)
Date Accessed: 2025-08-29
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Source: CNN
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Source: NextGov/FCW
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Source: DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: WIRED
URL: https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/
Date Accessed: 2023-06-01
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher)
Date Accessed: 2025-06-01
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security Vulnerabilities
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: CrowdStrike - Common Cloud Misconfigurations
URL: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/
Date Accessed: 2023-01-01
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration Prevention
URL: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Source: SecPod - Top 10 Cloud Misconfigurations
URL: https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Source: Nextgov
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Source: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Source: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: Politico
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Source: House Homeland Security Committee
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Source: ClearanceJobs
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Source: SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO)
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Source: Social Security Administration (SSA)
URL: https://www.ssa.gov
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Source: E-Verify (USCIS)
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Source: IRS Identity Protection PIN
URL: https://www.irs.gov/identity-theft-fraud-scams/get-an-identity-protection-pin
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Source: FBI Public Service Announcement (PSA)
URL: https://www.ic3.gov
Where can stakeholders find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) ProgramUrl: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware, and Source: Motherboard, and Source: DHS Memo, and Source: AFP, and Source: WIRED, and Source: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (Brennan Center for Justice), and Source: DHS internal memo (obtained via FOIA), and Source: CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware, and Source: FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics, and Source: ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat, and Source: Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023), and Source: WIRED, and Source: Brennan Center for Justice (FOIA Obtained DHS Memo), and Source: Bloomberg News, and Source: Nextgov/FCW, and Source: DHS Public Statement (2023-08-29), and Source: CNNDate Accessed: 2025-09-12, and Source: Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN)Date Accessed: 2025-09-10, and Source: DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach)Date Accessed: 2025-09, and Source: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi NoemDate Accessed: 2025-08-29, and Source: AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo)Url: https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fema-headquarters-is-pictured-in-washington-dc-on-february-news-photo/1238567890Date Accessed: 2025-02-11, and Source: Bloomberg NewsUrl: https://www.bloomberg.comDate Accessed: 2025-09-05, and Source: Nextgov/FCWUrl: https://www.nextgov.comDate Accessed: 2025-09-05, and Source: DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem)Date Accessed: 2025-08-29, and Source: CNN, and Source: NextGov/FCW, and Source: DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023), and Source: WIREDUrl: https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/Date Accessed: 2023-06-01, and Source: Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher)Date Accessed: 2025-06-01, and Source: Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security VulnerabilitiesUrl: https://www.wiz.io/academy/top-cloud-vulnerabilities, and Source: CrowdStrike - Common Cloud MisconfigurationsUrl: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/Date Accessed: 2023-01-01, and Source: SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration PreventionUrl: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/, and Source: SecPod - Top 10 Cloud MisconfigurationsUrl: https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/, and Source: Nextgov, and Source: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem, and Source: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed, and Source: Politico, and Source: Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements, and Source: Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel), and Source: Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton), and Source: House Homeland Security Committee, and Source: ClearanceJobs, and Source: SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO), and Source: CNETUrl: https://www.cnet.com, and Source: Social Security Administration (SSA)Url: https://www.ssa.gov, and Source: E-Verify (USCIS)Url: https://www.e-verify.gov, and Source: IRS Identity Protection PINUrl: https://www.irs.gov/identity-theft-fraud-scams/get-an-identity-protection-pin, and Source: FBI Public Service Announcement (PSA)Url: https://www.ic3.gov.
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the investigation for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware US-341071125
Investigation Status: Ongoing
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Investigation Status: completed (internal DHS inquiry documented in memo)
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Investigation Status: ongoing (warnings active as of 2023)
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Investigation Status: Internal investigation confirmed via FOIA-disclosed memo; no public update on further actions.
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Investigation Status: Completed (DHS Internal Investigation)
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of September 2025)
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Investigation Status: Completed (DHS Internal Investigation)
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of September 2023)
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Investigation Status: ['DHS Internal Inquiry Completed (2023)', '2025 Breach Under Investigation']
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Investigation Status: Ongoing (audit findings released, but full scope of breach unclear)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Investigation Status: Ongoing (political/legislative; no technical investigation)
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (Political and Operational Review)
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Investigation Status: ongoing
How does the company communicate the status of incident investigations to stakeholders ?
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Warnings Issued By Cisa, Fbi, And Acsc, Limited (internal memo obtained via FOIA; no public statement detailed), Public Statement By Dhs Secretary (2023-08-29), Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/Fcw), Internal Fema Staff Updates, Public Statements By Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, Media Coverage (Cnn), Public Statement By Dhs Secretary Kristi Noem (2025-08-29), Media Disclosures (Bloomberg, Nextgov/Fcw), Internal Fema Staff Updates, Public Statement By Dhs Secretary Kristi Noem (August 29, 2023), Foia Disclosure (Dhs Memo), Media Reports (Wired), Public disclosure of terminations (but initially denied data loss), Sen. Peters' Public Warnings About National/Economic Security Risks, Media Outreach By Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance, House Democratic Staffer Comments On Program Success In State/Local Governments, Public Warnings By Cybersecurity Experts, Media Coverage Highlighting Risks, Public Advisory Via Cnet Article, Ssa And E-Verify User Notifications (E.G., Lock Expiration Alerts), Fbi Psa, Media Outreach and Direct Warnings To Potential Targets.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
Were there any advisories issued to stakeholders or customers for each incident ?
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Stakeholder Advisories: Cisa, Fbi, Acsc.
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Stakeholder Advisories: Dhs Secretary’S Public Statement, Media Briefings.
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Stakeholder Advisories: Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Working Group Reports.
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Stakeholder Advisories: Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Task Force Findings.
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Stakeholder Advisories: Foia Memo (Dhs), Media Statements.
Customer Advisories: None (DHS)Recommended Password Resets for 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach)
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Stakeholder Advisories: Sen. Peters' Warnings To Reporters About National Security Risks., Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance Statements On Information-Sharing Impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican Aide Comments On Cr Extensions., House Democratic Staffer Remarks On State/Local Grant Program Success..
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Stakeholder Advisories: Cybersecurity Experts Warn Of Increased Risks Due To Cisa'S Reduced Capacity., Private Sector Partners Advised To Bolster Independent Defenses Amid Government Instability..
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Stakeholder Advisories: General Public Advisory On Ssn Locking And Credit Freezing., Employers Using E-Verify May Encounter Locked Ssns During Hiring Processes..
Customer Advisories: Individuals should weigh the inconvenience of locking/unlocking SSNs against the risk of identity theft.Credit freezes do not affect existing credit accounts but require planning for new credit applications.IRS IP PINs must be renewed annually.
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Stakeholder Advisories: Fbi Psa Warning Senior Officials And Their Contacts, Recommendations For Public Vigilance.
Customer Advisories: General public alert via mediadirect outreach to potential high-value targets
What advisories does the company provide to stakeholders and customers following an incident ?
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Cisa, Fbi, Acsc, Dhs Secretary’S Public Statement, Media Briefings, Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Working Group Reports, Internal Fema Staff Updates, Dhs Task Force Findings, Foia Memo (Dhs), Media Statements, None (Dhs), Recommended Password Resets For 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach), , Sen. Peters' Warnings To Reporters About National Security Risks., Cyber Threat Alliance And Internet Security Alliance Statements On Information-Sharing Impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican Aide Comments On Cr Extensions., House Democratic Staffer Remarks On State/Local Grant Program Success., Cybersecurity Experts Warn Of Increased Risks Due To Cisa'S Reduced Capacity., Private Sector Partners Advised To Bolster Independent Defenses Amid Government Instability., General Public Advisory On Ssn Locking And Credit Freezing., Employers Using E-Verify May Encounter Locked Ssns During Hiring Processes., Individuals Should Weigh The Inconvenience Of Locking/Unlocking Ssns Against The Risk Of Identity Theft., Credit Freezes Do Not Affect Existing Credit Accounts But Require Planning For New Credit Applications., Irs Ip Pins Must Be Renewed Annually., , Fbi Psa Warning Senior Officials And Their Contacts, Recommendations For Public Vigilance, General Public Alert Via Media, Direct Outreach To Potential High-Value Targets and .
Initial Access Broker
How did the initial access broker gain entry for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach USD181261023
Entry Point: Email Account
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Entry Point: RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs)
Backdoors Established: ['custom Go-based backdoors', 'remote management software']
High Value Targets: Critical Infrastructure Organizations,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Critical Infrastructure Organizations,
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Entry Point: Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials)
Backdoors Established: ['VPN Software Installed (2023-07-14)']
High Value Targets: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema & Cbp Employee Databases,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema & Cbp Employee Databases,
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Entry Point: Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor)
Reconnaissance Period: Unknown (likely weeks prior to mid-July 2025)
Backdoors Established: Likely (given lateral movement)
High Value Targets: Fema Employee Data, Cbp Employee Data, Dhs Network Access,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Fema Employee Data, Cbp Employee Data, Dhs Network Access,
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Entry Point: Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials)
Backdoors Established: ['Installation of VPN Software for Lateral Movement']
High Value Targets: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema Region 6 Servers,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Microsoft Active Directory, Fema Region 6 Servers,
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Entry Point: Citrix Remote Access Software
Reconnaissance Period: Unknown (breach lasted 'several weeks' in summer 2023)
High Value Targets: Fema Regional Operations Network, Cbp/Employee Data,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Fema Regional Operations Network, Cbp/Employee Data,
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Entry Point: Misconfigured Hsin-Intel Platform (Dhs), Unsecured Database (2025 Breach),
High Value Targets: Intelligence Data (Dhs), User Credentials (2025 Breach),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Intelligence Data (Dhs), User Credentials (2025 Breach),
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Entry Point: Citrix System (via stolen credentials)
High Value Targets: FEMA Region 6 servers
Data Sold on Dark Web: FEMA Region 6 servers
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Entry Point: Sms/Mms Messages, Voice Calls/Voicemails, Fake Messaging Platforms,
High Value Targets: Senior U.S. Government Officials (Current/Former), Their Personal/Professional Contacts,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Senior U.S. Government Officials (Current/Former), Their Personal/Professional Contacts,
Post-Incident Analysis
What were the root causes and corrective actions taken for each incident ?
Incident : Data Breach FEM74612323
Root Causes: Oversharing of data with a private contractor.
Corrective Actions: Review and tighten data sharing practices.
Incident : Physical Security Threat US-001010525
Root Causes: Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats
Corrective Actions: Improve Detection And Response Capabilities, Enhance Local Law Enforcement Training, Deploy Advanced Technologies To Mitigate Drone Threats,
Incident : data leak US-4992949091625
Root Causes: Misconfiguration Of Hsin-Intel Access Controls (Set To 'Everyone'), Inadequate Access Review Processes,
Incident : ransomware CIS427092125
Root Causes: Weak Or Stolen Rdp Credentials, Lack Of Mfa On Critical Access Points, Unrestricted Use Of Powershell For Scripting, Insufficient Monitoring For Data Exfiltration,
Corrective Actions: Enforce Mfa For All Remote Access., Disable Unnecessary Rdp Exposure To The Internet., Restrict Powershell To Administrative Use Only., Deploy Endpoint Detection And Response (Edr) Tools To Monitor For Malicious Activity., Conduct Regular Audits Of High-Privilege Accounts.,
Incident : Data Exposure DEP1903119092325
Root Causes: Programming Error Leading To Misconfigured Access Controls., Inadequate Segmentation Of Sensitive Intelligence Products., Lack Of Real-Time Monitoring For Unauthorized Access Patterns.,
Incident : Unauthorized Access FEM3092330093025
Root Causes: Lack Of Multifactor Authentication (Mfa) For Remote Access., Compromised Credentials In Citrix Remote Desktop Software., Inadequate Monitoring Of Lateral Movement Within The Network., Failure To Segment High-Value Systems (E.G., Active Directory).,
Corrective Actions: Enforced Mfa For Fema Region 6., Disconnected Vulnerable Citrix Remote Access Tool., Terminated It Leadership Responsible For Security Failures., Public Disclosure To Raise Awareness Of Risks.,
Incident : Data Breach FEM3192931093025
Root Causes: Inadequate Security Controls For Remote Access Systems (Citrix)., Failure To Detect Lateral Movement In A Timely Manner., Potential Insider Threats Or Misconfigured Privileges Enabling Deep Access., Organizational Turmoil (E.G., Dismissals, Restructuring) Distracting From Cybersecurity Focus.,
Corrective Actions: Mandatory Network Segmentation And Least-Privilege Access Policies., Continuous Monitoring For Anomalous Activity, Especially In Remote Access Vectors., Review Of Personnel Practices To Align Dismissals With Evidence-Based Accountability., Transparency In Breach Communications To Maintain Public Trust.,
Incident : Data Breach FEM5362353100125
Root Causes: Lack Of Multifactor Authentication (Mfa) Across Fema Systems., Exploitation Of Vulnerable Citrix Remote Access Software., Inadequate Monitoring Of Network Access And Lateral Movement., It Leadership Failures In Cybersecurity Governance.,
Corrective Actions: Enforcement Of Mfa For All Fema Employees., Disconnection Of Compromised Citrix Tools., Termination Of Responsible It Personnel., Public Disclosure Of Cybersecurity Lapses To Drive Accountability.,
Incident : Data Breach FEM1802718100225
Root Causes: Unpatched Citrix Vulnerability, Inadequate Network Monitoring, Lateral Movement Controls Failure, Possible Insider Threats Or Misconfigurations,
Corrective Actions: Personnel Changes (24 It Employees Fired), Dhs Emergency Directive For Federal Agencies To Defend Against Similar Threats,
Incident : Data Exposure US-4641646100525
Root Causes: Overly Permissive Iam Policies ('Everyone' Access)., Lack Of Network Segmentation (Dhs)., Disabled Logging/Missing Alerts (No Detection Of Unauthorized Access)., Human Error In Access Configuration (Hsin-Intel)., Plain-Text Storage Of Credentials (2025 Breach)., Complex Cloud Architectures Without Adequate Governance., Shadow It/Unmonitored Accounts (Potential Factor)., Inadequate Policy-As-Code Enforcement.,
Corrective Actions: Revised Iam Policies With Least-Privilege Principles., Implemented Network Segmentation For Hsin Platforms., Enabled Centralized Logging And Monitoring (Dhs)., Mandated Encryption For Sensitive Data (Post-2025 Breach)., Conducted Staff Training On Secure Cloud Configurations., Deployed Automated Misconfiguration Detection Tools., Established Regular Audits For Public-Facing Resources.,
Incident : Data Breach FEM1533215100625
Root Causes: Failure To Patch Citrixbleed Vulnerability Despite Prior Warnings., Misrepresentation Of Security Preparedness By Fema Staff., Lack Of Centralized It Monitoring To Detect The Breach Earlier.,
Corrective Actions: Termination Of Incompetent Staff (Ciso, Cio, And 22 Others)., Hiring Of New It Security Personnel., Enforcement Of Mfa And Password Resets., Potential Restructuring Of Fema'S Cybersecurity Governance.,
Incident : Policy/Regulatory Failure CIS0332103101125
Root Causes: Political Gridlock Preventing Timely Reauthorization Of Critical Cybersecurity Programs., Conflation Of Cisa 2015 (Law) With Cisa (Agency) By Key Senators (E.G., Rand Paul)., Over-Reliance On Short-Term Continuing Resolutions For Long-Term Cybersecurity Needs., Lack Of Clear Legislative Vehicles For Updating Cisa 2015'S Threat Definitions (E.G., Ai, Supply Chain)., Insufficient Contingency Planning For Cisa Operations During Government Shutdowns.,
Corrective Actions: Bipartisan Negotiation To Separate Cisa 2015 Reauthorization From Unrelated Political Disputes., Development Of A Dedicated Legislative Process For Cybersecurity Updates (E.G., 5-Year Review Cycles)., Expansion Of Cisa'S Shutdown-Exempt Staff To Maintain Core Functions., Public-Private Working Groups To Modernize Threat-Sharing Frameworks (E.G., Ai, Systemic Risks)., State/Local Cybersecurity Coalitions To Sustain Grant-Funded Initiatives During Federal Lapses.,
Incident : Operational Risk CIS1192211101425
Root Causes: Government Shutdown Leading To Furloughs And Layoffs At Cisa., Political Disputes Redirecting Agency Focus Away From Core Cybersecurity Missions., Budget Cuts Targeting Critical Divisions (E.G., Isd, Sed)., High Attrition Rate (1,000+ Employees Left In 2023)., Perceived Mission Creep (E.G., Misinformation Efforts) Distracting From Cybersecurity Priorities.,
Corrective Actions: Restoration Of Cisa'S Workforce And Budget To Pre-Cut Levels., Depoliticization Of Agency Operations To Refocus On Cybersecurity., Reinstatement Of Eliminated Subdivisions (E.G., Chemical Security)., Stronger Legislative Protections For Cybersecurity Agencies During Government Shutdowns., Increased Transparency In Communicating Risks To Stakeholders.,
Incident : Identity Theft Prevention Advisory USC3733737112525
Root Causes: Widespread Exposure Of Ssns In Data Breaches Enables Identity Theft., Lack Of Proactive Protections (E.G., Unlocked Ssns, Unfrozen Credit) Leaves Individuals Vulnerable., Social Engineering Tactics (E.G., Phishing) Trick Individuals Into Disclosing Ssns.,
Corrective Actions: Increase Public Awareness Of Ssn Locks And Credit Freezes., Simplify The Process For Locking/Unlocking Ssns (E.G., Extend E-Verify Lock Duration Beyond 1 Year)., Encourage Adoption Of Multi-Factor Authentication For Ssn-Related Services., Advocate For Reduced Reliance On Ssns As Universal Identifiers.,
Incident : social engineering US-5985259112625
Root Causes: Over-Reliance On Trust In Digital Communications, Lack Of Widespread Mfa Adoption, Public Exposure Of Personal/Professional Details (E.G., Linkedin, Government Directories), Limited Public Awareness Of Ai-Generated Scam Tactics, Delayed Reporting Of Suspicious Activity,
Corrective Actions: Fbi-Led Awareness Campaigns Targeting High-Risk Groups, Encouragement Of Mfa Adoption And Password Hygiene, Development Of Ai-Detection Tools For Voice/Video Calls, Policy Changes To Limit Public Exposure Of Official Contact Details, Enhanced Collaboration Between Government Agencies And Tech Platforms To Disrupt Scam Infrastructure,
What is the company's process for conducting post-incident analysis ?
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Brennan Center For Justice (Via Foia Disclosure), , Yes (focus on remote access vulnerabilities), Recommended As Corrective Action, , Cyber Threat Alliance (Information-Sharing Coordination), Internet Security Alliance (Advocacy For Policy Updates), , Identity Protection Services, Credit Monitoring Services, , Credit Monitoring, Dark Web Monitoring For Compromised Pii, , Recommendation For Individuals To Monitor Accounts, .
What corrective actions has the company taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Review and tighten data sharing practices., Improve Detection And Response Capabilities, Enhance Local Law Enforcement Training, Deploy Advanced Technologies To Mitigate Drone Threats, , Enforce Mfa For All Remote Access., Disable Unnecessary Rdp Exposure To The Internet., Restrict Powershell To Administrative Use Only., Deploy Endpoint Detection And Response (Edr) Tools To Monitor For Malicious Activity., Conduct Regular Audits Of High-Privilege Accounts., , Enforced Mfa For Fema Region 6., Disconnected Vulnerable Citrix Remote Access Tool., Terminated It Leadership Responsible For Security Failures., Public Disclosure To Raise Awareness Of Risks., , Mandatory Network Segmentation And Least-Privilege Access Policies., Continuous Monitoring For Anomalous Activity, Especially In Remote Access Vectors., Review Of Personnel Practices To Align Dismissals With Evidence-Based Accountability., Transparency In Breach Communications To Maintain Public Trust., , Enforcement Of Mfa For All Fema Employees., Disconnection Of Compromised Citrix Tools., Termination Of Responsible It Personnel., Public Disclosure Of Cybersecurity Lapses To Drive Accountability., , Personnel Changes (24 It Employees Fired), Dhs Emergency Directive For Federal Agencies To Defend Against Similar Threats, , Revised Iam Policies With Least-Privilege Principles., Implemented Network Segmentation For Hsin Platforms., Enabled Centralized Logging And Monitoring (Dhs)., Mandated Encryption For Sensitive Data (Post-2025 Breach)., Conducted Staff Training On Secure Cloud Configurations., Deployed Automated Misconfiguration Detection Tools., Established Regular Audits For Public-Facing Resources., , Termination Of Incompetent Staff (Ciso, Cio, And 22 Others)., Hiring Of New It Security Personnel., Enforcement Of Mfa And Password Resets., Potential Restructuring Of Fema'S Cybersecurity Governance., , Bipartisan Negotiation To Separate Cisa 2015 Reauthorization From Unrelated Political Disputes., Development Of A Dedicated Legislative Process For Cybersecurity Updates (E.G., 5-Year Review Cycles)., Expansion Of Cisa'S Shutdown-Exempt Staff To Maintain Core Functions., Public-Private Working Groups To Modernize Threat-Sharing Frameworks (E.G., Ai, Systemic Risks)., State/Local Cybersecurity Coalitions To Sustain Grant-Funded Initiatives During Federal Lapses., , Restoration Of Cisa'S Workforce And Budget To Pre-Cut Levels., Depoliticization Of Agency Operations To Refocus On Cybersecurity., Reinstatement Of Eliminated Subdivisions (E.G., Chemical Security)., Stronger Legislative Protections For Cybersecurity Agencies During Government Shutdowns., Increased Transparency In Communicating Risks To Stakeholders., , Increase Public Awareness Of Ssn Locks And Credit Freezes., Simplify The Process For Locking/Unlocking Ssns (E.G., Extend E-Verify Lock Duration Beyond 1 Year)., Encourage Adoption Of Multi-Factor Authentication For Ssn-Related Services., Advocate For Reduced Reliance On Ssns As Universal Identifiers., , Fbi-Led Awareness Campaigns Targeting High-Risk Groups, Encouragement Of Mfa Adoption And Password Hygiene, Development Of Ai-Detection Tools For Voice/Video Calls, Policy Changes To Limit Public Exposure Of Official Contact Details, Enhanced Collaboration Between Government Agencies And Tech Platforms To Disrupt Scam Infrastructure, .
Additional Questions
General Information
What was the amount of the last ransom demanded ?
Last Ransom Demanded: The amount of the last ransom demanded was True.
Who was the attacking group in the last incident ?
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Hacker, Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation's Project 2025, Political ClimateTrump Administration, Political Leadership Changes, Extremists, Violent Extremists, Beijing, Unnamed Ransomware Gang, BianLian ransomware group, Unauthorized Government WorkersPrivate Sector EmployeesForeign Nationals, Unknown (suspected advanced hacker group), Unidentified (possibly advanced hacking group), Nation-State ActorsCybercriminalsHacktivistsOpportunistic Hackers and Identity Thieves / Fraudsters.
Incident Details
What was the most recent incident detected ?
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2023-06-21.
What was the most recent incident publicly disclosed ?
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2023-10-01.
What was the most recent incident resolved ?
Most Recent Incident Resolved: The most recent incident resolved was on 2023-05-31.
Impact of the Incidents
What was the most significant data compromised in an incident ?
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were names, birthdates, nationalities, locations, , Addresses, Bank Account Information, Social Security Numbers, , 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees, Information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security, as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence, , Employee names, Social Security numbers, Dates of birth, Positions, Grades, Duty locations, , call logs, recordings, potential location information, , law enforcement leads and tips, reports on foreign hacking and disinformation campaigns, analysis of domestic protest movements (e.g., Stop Cop City protests in Atlanta), cybersecurity intelligence (39% of exposed products), media reports praising violent actions against police, , , Surveillance records of American citizens, Foreign hacking/disinformation campaigns, Law enforcement tips, Domestic protest examinations, Cybersecurity intelligence (39% of accessed products), , Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA & CBP), , FEMA Employee Data, CBP Employee Data, , Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA and CBP), , FEMA Employee Data, CBP Employee Data, , Sensitive Intelligence (DHS), 184M User Records (2025 Breach), Plain-Text Credentials (Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), Bank Accounts, Health Platforms, Government Portals, , Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss, but documents suggest exfiltration occurred), Social Security Numbers (SSNs), Potential personally identifiable information (PII) in breaches, , personal information, login credentials, contact lists, potentially sensitive government communications and .
What was the most significant system affected in an incident ?
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident were DHS OIG Case Management System and and Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) platform and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) PlatformHomeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Tool and FEMA Computer NetworkDHS Systems (partial)Citrix Remote Access Infrastructure and FEMA Region 6 ServersMicrosoft Active DirectoryCitrix Remote Desktop Software and FEMA Computer Network (regional: New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana)Citrix Remote Access Software and HSIN-Intel Platform (DHS)Unsecured Database (2025 Breach) and Citrix SystemFEMA Region 6 Servers (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas) and Critical Infrastructure (e.g., power grids, water treatment plants)Federal Cyber Defense SystemsThreat Intelligence Sharing Platforms.
Response to the Incidents
What third-party assistance was involved in the most recent incident ?
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was brennan center for justice (via foia disclosure), , cyber threat alliance (information-sharing coordination), internet security alliance (advocacy for policy updates), , identity protection services, credit monitoring services, .
What containment measures were taken in the most recent incident ?
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Improved detection and response capabilitiesLocal law enforcement trainingTechnology deployment, Repositioning CCTVTraining police to handle hazardous drones, auditing RDP usagedisabling command-line scriptingrestricting PowerShell, Disconnected Citrix Remote Access Tool (2023-07-16)Enforced Multifactor Authentication, Localization of Breach (mid-July 2025)Network SegmentationAccess Revocation, Disconnection of Citrix Remote Access Tool (2025-07-16)Enforcement of Multifactor Authentication (MFA), Initial efforts launched mid-July 2023Ongoing remediation as of September 5, 2023, Password resetsMulti-Factor Authentication (MFA) enforcement, SSN Lock via SSA or E-VerifyCredit Freeze via Credit BureausIRS Identity Protection PIN and public service announcement (PSA)awareness campaignreporting via IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center).
Data Breach Information
What was the most sensitive data compromised in a breach ?
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Domestic protest examinations, Positions, birthdates, Cybersecurity intelligence (39% of accessed products), FEMA Employee Data, Foreign hacking/disinformation campaigns, potential location information, Surveillance records of American citizens, reports on foreign hacking and disinformation campaigns, Potential personally identifiable information (PII) in breaches, nationalities, Social Security Numbers, recordings, Bank Account Information, Government Portals, potentially sensitive government communications, Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA and CBP), media reports praising violent actions against police, Bank Accounts, Dates of birth, Grades, 184M User Records (2025 Breach), analysis of domestic protest movements (e.g., Stop Cop City protests in Atlanta), Social Security Numbers (SSNs), login credentials, Law enforcement tips, Plain-Text Credentials (Apple, Google, Meta, etc.), Duty locations, names, Addresses, locations, Social Security numbers, Health Platforms, Unknown (FEMA initially denied data loss, but documents suggest exfiltration occurred), Federal Employee Identity Data (FEMA & CBP), call logs, Employee names, Sensitive Intelligence (DHS), personal information, 200GB of data, including records of 20,000 FBI workers and 9,000 DHS employees, contact lists, law enforcement leads and tips, CBP Employee Data, cybersecurity intelligence (39% of exposed products), Information about DHS security experts, programme analysts, IT, infosec, and security and as well as 100 individuals who hold the title of intelligence.
What was the number of records exposed in the most significant breach ?
Number of Records Exposed in Most Significant Breach: The number of records exposed in the most significant breach was 184.3M.
Ransomware Information
What was the highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident ?
Highest Ransom Demanded: The highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident was True.
Regulatory Compliance
What was the most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation ?
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Pending Extradition to the US, Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Leadership), , Personnel Dismissals (20 IT workers), Administrative Leave for Others, , Termination of 24 FEMA Employees (Including IT Executives), , Internal disciplinary actions (24 employees fired), .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What was the most significant lesson learned from past incidents ?
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Proactive communication from authorities can mitigate large-scale campaigns.
What was the most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities., Conduct a third-party audit of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity posture, focusing on remote access and privilege management., Train staff on **secure cloud deployment practices** (e.g., Infrastructure as Code templates)., Develop contingency plans for government shutdowns to minimize disruptions to cyber defense., Freeze credit with all three major bureaus (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion) to block unauthorized credit accounts., Audit and secure RDP access with MFA and network segmentation., Lock your SSN via SSA or E-Verify to prevent employment fraud., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Immediate patching of known critical vulnerabilities (e.g., CitrixBleed, PAN-OS)., Deploying sensors for drone detection, Incentivize sharing of single-point-of-failure data to address systemic risks., Implement zero-trust architecture for intelligence-sharing platforms., Restore and increase funding for CISA to address workforce shortages and operational gaps., Enforce MFA and password policies across all systems., Restrict PowerShell and command-line scripting to limit attacker lateral movement., Implement zero-trust architecture to limit lateral movement., Improve detection and response capabilities, Clarify distinctions between CISA (the agency) and CISA 2015 (the law) to address political misconceptions., Implement strong authentication practices across all critical systems., Mandate MFA for all remote access and privileged accounts., Implement centralized IT monitoring to detect anomalies., Enable **centralized logging and monitoring** with context-aware alerts., Encrypt **data at rest and in transit** (avoid plain-text storage)., Reevaluate employee termination policies post-breach, Regularly update and patch remote management software., Establish a unified communication protocol for breach disclosures to avoid conflicting narratives., Obtain an IRS Identity Protection PIN to prevent tax fraud., Establish clearer incident response protocols for credential-based breaches., Pass a 10-year reauthorization of CISA 2015 with retroactive protections to Oct. 1, 2023., Investigate the dismissals of FEMA IT leaders to ensure accountability is evidence-based., Enhance local law enforcement training, Conduct independent review of DHS/FEMA cybersecurity protocols, Prioritize retention of key divisions like ISD and SED to maintain critical infrastructure protection., Address **shadow IT** with discovery tools and governance policies., Prioritize **human-centric security** (training, process improvements) alongside technical controls., Foster a culture of accountability and transparency in cybersecurity practices., Implement mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access systems., Provide cybersecurity training for IT executives and staff., Modernize the definition of 'cyber-threat indicators' to include supply chain and AI-related threats., Enhance collaboration with cybersecurity firms to proactively detect and mitigate advanced threats., Avoid politicizing CISA's mission to ensure bipartisan support for cybersecurity., Regular security audits to validate compliance and preparedness., Restore full funding for CISA to avoid operational gaps during shutdowns., Use identity protection or credit monitoring services for ongoing alerts., Public transparency reports for breaches impacting national security data., Implement strict data sharing policies and procedures to prevent oversharing of sensitive information., Monitor for unusual data exfiltration patterns., Use **automated policy-as-code tools** (e.g., Terraform, Open Policy Agent) to prevent drift., Enhance logging and anomaly detection for unauthorized access attempts., Enhance transparency in public communications about incidents, Establish bipartisan task forces to depoliticize cybersecurity legislation., Share SSNs only when absolutely necessary and never in response to unsolicited requests., Conduct **regular audits** of public-facing storage (buckets, databases, APIs)., Mandate MFA across all government systems and applications., Enhance public awareness of the risks posed by CISA's reduced capacity., Deploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats, Segment networks to **limit lateral movement** in case of breaches., Implement **least-privilege access** and **just-in-time permissions** for IAM roles., Educate employees on phishing risks to prevent credential theft., Training police on handling hazardous drones, Reauthorize the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program for 10 years, with provisions for AI-system support., Regularly review financial accounts and credit reports for suspicious activity., Enhance incident response protocols for timely detection and containment., Repositioning CCTV cameras, Enforce **multi-factor authentication (MFA)** on all admin accounts., Conduct regular audits of third-party software vulnerabilities. and Conduct regular access reviews and privilege audits..
References
What is the most recent source of information about an incident ?
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are SOCRadar (Ensar Seker, CISO), US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Statement by Secretary Kristi Noem, NextGov/FCW, Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, FBI Warning on BianLian Extortion Tactics, Brennan Center for Justice (FOIA Obtained DHS Memo), Sen. Gary Peters (D-MI) statements, Jeremiah Fowler (Cybersecurity Researcher), DHS Public Statement (Secretary Kristi Noem), CNN, CISA Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot (RVWP) Program, AFP, Nextgov/FCW, DHS Memo, Motherboard, ACSC Alert on BianLian Threat, DHS internal memo (obtained via FOIA), CrowdStrike - Common Cloud Misconfigurations, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Advisory on CitrixBleed, Bloomberg News, SentinelOne - Cloud Misconfiguration Prevention, House Homeland Security Committee, CISA Advisory on BianLian Ransomware, Social Security Administration (SSA), Nextgov, Cyber Threat Alliance (Michael Daniel), FBI Public Service Announcement (PSA), IRS Identity Protection PIN, WIRED, DHS Emergency Directive (post-breach), Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (Brennan Center for Justice), DHS Public Statement (August 29, 2023), Internal FEMA Document (reviewed by CNN), CNET, E-Verify (USCIS), Avast Decryption Tool Release (2023), DHS Public Statement (2023-08-29), AFP/Getty Images (FEMA HQ photo), Politico, ClearanceJobs, SecPod - Top 10 Cloud Misconfigurations, Wiz Academy - Top 11 Cloud Security Vulnerabilities and Internet Security Alliance (Larry Clinton).
What is the most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware, https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/fema-headquarters-is-pictured-in-washington-dc-on-february-news-photo/1238567890, https://www.bloomberg.com, https://www.nextgov.com, https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-data-hub-exposed-sensitive-intel-unauthorized-users/, https://www.wiz.io/academy/top-cloud-vulnerabilities, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/common-cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.secpod.com/blog/top-cloud-misconfigurations/, https://www.cnet.com, https://www.ssa.gov, https://www.e-verify.gov, https://www.irs.gov/identity-theft-fraud-scams/get-an-identity-protection-pin, https://www.ic3.gov .
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the most recent investigation ?
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
What was the most recent stakeholder advisory issued ?
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was CISA, FBI, ACSC, DHS Secretary’s Public Statement, Media Briefings, Internal FEMA Staff Updates, DHS Working Group Reports, Internal FEMA staff updates, DHS Task Force findings, FOIA Memo (DHS), Media Statements, Sen. Peters' warnings to reporters about national security risks., Cyber Threat Alliance and Internet Security Alliance statements on information-sharing impacts., House Homeland Security Committee Republican aide comments on CR extensions., House Democratic staffer remarks on state/local grant program success., Cybersecurity experts warn of increased risks due to CISA's reduced capacity., Private sector partners advised to bolster independent defenses amid government instability., General public advisory on SSN locking and credit freezing., Employers using E-Verify may encounter locked SSNs during hiring processes., FBI PSA warning senior officials and their contacts, recommendations for public vigilance, .
What was the most recent customer advisory issued ?
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued were an None (DHS)Recommended Password Resets for 184M Affected Users (2025 Breach), Individuals should weigh the inconvenience of locking/unlocking SSNs against the risk of identity theft.Credit freezes do not affect existing credit accounts but require planning for new credit applications.IRS IP PINs must be renewed annually. and General public alert via mediadirect outreach to potential high-value targets.
Initial Access Broker
What was the most recent entry point used by an initial access broker ?
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an Citrix Remote Access Software, Citrix Remote Access Software (via government contractor), Citrix Systems Inc.’s Remote Desktop Software (Compromised Credentials), Email Account, RDP credentials (phishing or purchased from IABs) and Citrix System (via stolen credentials).
What was the most recent reconnaissance period for an incident ?
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was Unknown (likely weeks prior to mid-July 2025), Unknown (breach lasted 'several weeks' in summer 2023).
Post-Incident Analysis
What was the most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Oversharing of data with a private contractor., Lack of adequate detection and response capabilities for drone threats, misconfiguration of HSIN-Intel access controls (set to 'everyone')inadequate access review processes, Weak or stolen RDP credentialsLack of MFA on critical access pointsUnrestricted use of PowerShell for scriptingInsufficient monitoring for data exfiltration, Programming error leading to misconfigured access controls.Inadequate segmentation of sensitive intelligence products.Lack of real-time monitoring for unauthorized access patterns., Lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) for remote access.Compromised credentials in Citrix remote desktop software.Inadequate monitoring of lateral movement within the network.Failure to segment high-value systems (e.g., Active Directory)., Inadequate security controls for remote access systems (Citrix).Failure to detect lateral movement in a timely manner.Potential insider threats or misconfigured privileges enabling deep access.Organizational turmoil (e.g., dismissals, restructuring) distracting from cybersecurity focus., Lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) across FEMA systems.Exploitation of vulnerable Citrix remote access software.Inadequate monitoring of network access and lateral movement.IT leadership failures in cybersecurity governance., Unpatched Citrix vulnerabilityInadequate network monitoringLateral movement controls failurePossible insider threats or misconfigurations, Overly permissive IAM policies ('everyone' access).Lack of network segmentation (DHS).Disabled logging/missing alerts (no detection of unauthorized access).Human error in access configuration (HSIN-Intel).Plain-text storage of credentials (2025 Breach).Complex cloud architectures without adequate governance.Shadow IT/unmonitored accounts (potential factor).Inadequate policy-as-code enforcement., Failure to patch CitrixBleed vulnerability despite prior warnings.Misrepresentation of security preparedness by FEMA staff.Lack of centralized IT monitoring to detect the breach earlier., Political gridlock preventing timely reauthorization of critical cybersecurity programs.Conflation of CISA 2015 (law) with CISA (agency) by key senators (e.g., Rand Paul).Over-reliance on short-term Continuing Resolutions for long-term cybersecurity needs.Lack of clear legislative vehicles for updating CISA 2015's threat definitions (e.g., AI, supply chain).Insufficient contingency planning for CISA operations during government shutdowns., Government shutdown leading to furloughs and layoffs at CISA.Political disputes redirecting agency focus away from core cybersecurity missions.Budget cuts targeting critical divisions (e.g., ISD, SED).High attrition rate (1,000+ employees left in 2023).Perceived mission creep (e.g., misinformation efforts) distracting from cybersecurity priorities., Widespread exposure of SSNs in data breaches enables identity theft.Lack of proactive protections (e.g., unlocked SSNs, unfrozen credit) leaves individuals vulnerable.Social engineering tactics (e.g., phishing) trick individuals into disclosing SSNs., Over-reliance on trust in digital communicationsLack of widespread MFA adoptionPublic exposure of personal/professional details (e.g., LinkedIn, government directories)Limited public awareness of AI-generated scam tacticsDelayed reporting of suspicious activity.
What was the most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Review and tighten data sharing practices., Improve detection and response capabilitiesEnhance local law enforcement trainingDeploy advanced technologies to mitigate drone threats, Enforce MFA for all remote access.Disable unnecessary RDP exposure to the internet.Restrict PowerShell to administrative use only.Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to monitor for malicious activity.Conduct regular audits of high-privilege accounts., Enforced MFA for FEMA Region 6.Disconnected vulnerable Citrix remote access tool.Terminated IT leadership responsible for security failures.Public disclosure to raise awareness of risks., Mandatory network segmentation and least-privilege access policies.Continuous monitoring for anomalous activity, especially in remote access vectors.Review of personnel practices to align dismissals with evidence-based accountability.Transparency in breach communications to maintain public trust., Enforcement of MFA for all FEMA employees.Disconnection of compromised Citrix tools.Termination of responsible IT personnel.Public disclosure of cybersecurity lapses to drive accountability., Personnel changes (24 IT employees fired)DHS emergency directive for federal agencies to defend against similar threats, Revised IAM policies with least-privilege principles.Implemented network segmentation for HSIN platforms.Enabled centralized logging and monitoring (DHS).Mandated encryption for sensitive data (post-2025 Breach).Conducted staff training on secure cloud configurations.Deployed automated misconfiguration detection tools.Established regular audits for public-facing resources., Termination of incompetent staff (CISO, CIO, and 22 others).Hiring of new IT security personnel.Enforcement of MFA and password resets.Potential restructuring of FEMA's cybersecurity governance., Bipartisan negotiation to separate CISA 2015 reauthorization from unrelated political disputes.Development of a dedicated legislative process for cybersecurity updates (e.g., 5-year review cycles).Expansion of CISA's shutdown-exempt staff to maintain core functions.Public-private working groups to modernize threat-sharing frameworks (e.g., AI, systemic risks).State/local cybersecurity coalitions to sustain grant-funded initiatives during federal lapses., Restoration of CISA's workforce and budget to pre-cut levels.Depoliticization of agency operations to refocus on cybersecurity.Reinstatement of eliminated subdivisions (e.g., Chemical Security).Stronger legislative protections for cybersecurity agencies during government shutdowns.Increased transparency in communicating risks to stakeholders., Increase public awareness of SSN locks and credit freezes.Simplify the process for locking/unlocking SSNs (e.g., extend E-Verify lock duration beyond 1 year).Encourage adoption of multi-factor authentication for SSN-related services.Advocate for reduced reliance on SSNs as universal identifiers., FBI-led awareness campaigns targeting high-risk groupsEncouragement of MFA adoption and password hygieneDevelopment of AI-detection tools for voice/video callsPolicy changes to limit public exposure of official contact detailsEnhanced collaboration between government agencies and tech platforms to disrupt scam infrastructure.
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Latest Global CVEs (Not Company-Specific)
Description
Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to versions 19.2.16, 20.3.14, and 21.0.1, there is a XSRF token leakage via protocol-relative URLs in angular HTTP clients. The vulnerability is a Credential Leak by App Logic that leads to the unauthorized disclosure of the Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF) token to an attacker-controlled domain. Angular's HttpClient has a built-in XSRF protection mechanism that works by checking if a request URL starts with a protocol (http:// or https://) to determine if it is cross-origin. If the URL starts with protocol-relative URL (//), it is incorrectly treated as a same-origin request, and the XSRF token is automatically added to the X-XSRF-TOKEN header. This issue has been patched in versions 19.2.16, 20.3.14, and 21.0.1. A workaround for this issue involves avoiding using protocol-relative URLs (URLs starting with //) in HttpClient requests. All backend communication URLs should be hardcoded as relative paths (starting with a single /) or fully qualified, trusted absolute URLs.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 7.7
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
References
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/0276479e7d0e280e0f8d26fa567d3b7aa97a516f
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/05fe6686a97fa0bcd3cf157805b3612033f975bc
- https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/3240d856d942727372a705252f7c8c115394a41e
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/19.2.16
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/20.3.14
- https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/21.0.1
- https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37
Description
Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. An Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and below enables remote, unauthenticated attackers to craft deep ASN.1 structures that trigger unbounded recursive parsing. This leads to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) via stack exhaustion when parsing untrusted DER inputs. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.2.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 8.7
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. An Integer Overflow vulnerability in node-forge versions 1.3.1 and below enables remote, unauthenticated attackers to craft ASN.1 structures containing OIDs with oversized arcs. These arcs may be decoded as smaller, trusted OIDs due to 32-bit bitwise truncation, enabling the bypass of downstream OID-based security decisions. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.2.
Risk Information
cvss4
Base: 6.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
Suricata is a network IDS, IPS and NSM engine developed by the OISF (Open Information Security Foundation) and the Suricata community. Prior to versions 7.0.13 and 8.0.2, working with large buffers in Lua scripts can lead to a stack overflow. Users of Lua rules and output scripts may be affected when working with large buffers. This includes a rule passing a large buffer to a Lua script. This issue has been patched in versions 7.0.13 and 8.0.2. A workaround for this issue involves disabling Lua rules and output scripts, or making sure limits, such as stream.depth.reassembly and HTTP response body limits (response-body-limit), are set to less than half the stack size.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description
Suricata is a network IDS, IPS and NSM engine developed by the OISF (Open Information Security Foundation) and the Suricata community. In versions from 8.0.0 to before 8.0.2, a NULL dereference can occur when the entropy keyword is used in conjunction with base64_data. This issue has been patched in version 8.0.2. A workaround involves disabling rules that use entropy in conjunction with base64_data.
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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RapidWhat Do We Measure ?
Incident
Finding
Grade
Digital Assets
Every week, Rankiteo analyzes billions of signals to give organizations a sharper, faster view of emerging risks. With deeper, more actionable intelligence at their fingertips, security teams can outpace threat actors, respond instantly to Zero-Day attacks, and dramatically shrink their risk exposure window.
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Network Security
Identify exposed access points, detect misconfigured SSL certificates, and uncover vulnerabilities across the network infrastructure.
SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)
Gain visibility into the software components used within an organization to detect vulnerabilities, manage risk, and ensure supply chain security.
CMDB (Configuration Management Database)
Monitor and manage all IT assets and their configurations to ensure accurate, real-time visibility across the company's technology environment.
Threat Intelligence
Leverage real-time insights on active threats, malware campaigns, and emerging vulnerabilities to proactively defend against evolving cyberattacks.
Rankiteo is a unified scoring and risk platform that analyzes billions of signals weekly to help organizations gain faster, more actionable insights into emerging threats. Empowering teams to outpace adversaries and reduce exposure.
