United States Army Reserve Company CyberSecurity Posture
http://www.usar.army.mil/
The U.S. Army Reserve's mission, under Title 10 of the U.S. code, is to provide trained and ready Soldiers and units with the critical combat service support and combat support capabilities necessary to support nation strategy during peacetime, contingencies and war. The Army Reserve is a key element in The Army multi-component unit force, training with Active and National Guard units to ensure all three components work as a fully integrated team. If you're looking for news about the U.S. Army Reserve, visit https://www.usar.army.mil/ For information about U.S. Army Reserve career opportunities visit https://www.goarmy.com/reserve.html
Company Details
united-states-army-reserve
25,424
93,453
92811
http://www.usar.army.mil/
0
UNI_7312289
In-progress
USAR Risk Score (AI oriented)Between 750 and 799
USAR Global Score (TPRM)XXXX
Description: The FBI and Department of Defense (DoD) revealed that **Salt Typhoon**, a Chinese state-sponsored hacker group linked to the Ministry of State Security and People’s Liberation Army, conducted a **long-term cyber-espionage campaign** against a US state National Guard network. The group **breached the network and remained undetected for nearly a year**, exfiltrating **sensitive military and law enforcement data**. The attack involved **compromising backbone routers and networking equipment** via known vulnerabilities, altering access controls, creating privileged accounts, and enabling remote management for **persistent, long-term access**. The primary objective was **surveillance and intelligence gathering** rather than financial gain, targeting **telecom carriers, government organizations, military infrastructure, and healthcare sectors**. The scale of the campaign was **far broader than initially assessed**, with at least **60 organizations across 80 countries** affected. The FBI warned that the indiscriminate targeting of private communications poses a **severe threat to national security**, urging immediate collaboration with global partners to counter the activity. The DoD confirmed the group’s ability to **move laterally across networks**, leveraging trusted connections to pivot into other systems, further amplifying the risk of **data exfiltration and operational disruption** in critical infrastructure.
United States Army Reserve has 16.28% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
United States Army Reserve has 56.25% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
United States Army Reserve reported 1 incidents this year: 1 cyber attacks, 0 ransomware, 0 vulnerabilities, 0 data breaches, compared to industry peers with at least 1 incident.
USAR cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
The U.S. Army Reserve's mission, under Title 10 of the U.S. code, is to provide trained and ready Soldiers and units with the critical combat service support and combat support capabilities necessary to support nation strategy during peacetime, contingencies and war. The Army Reserve is a key element in The Army multi-component unit force, training with Active and National Guard units to ensure all three components work as a fully integrated team. If you're looking for news about the U.S. Army Reserve, visit https://www.usar.army.mil/ For information about U.S. Army Reserve career opportunities visit https://www.goarmy.com/reserve.html
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Chief technology officers (CTOs) from companies, including Palantir, Meta, and OpenAI, are taking part-time roles in the US Army Reserve.
Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
The official website of United States Army Reserve is http://www.usar.army.mil/.
According to Rankiteo, United States Army Reserve’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 763, reflecting their Fair security posture.
According to Rankiteo, United States Army Reserve currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
According to Rankiteo, United States Army Reserve is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
According to Rankiteo, United States Army Reserve does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
According to Rankiteo, United States Army Reserve is not listed as GDPR compliant.
According to Rankiteo, United States Army Reserve does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
According to Rankiteo, United States Army Reserve is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
According to Rankiteo,United States Army Reserve is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
United States Army Reserve operates primarily in the Armed Forces industry.
United States Army Reserve employs approximately 25,424 people worldwide.
United States Army Reserve presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
United States Army Reserve’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 93,453 followers.
United States Army Reserve is classified under the NAICS code 92811, which corresponds to National Security.
No, United States Army Reserve does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
Yes, United States Army Reserve maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/united-states-army-reserve.
As of November 27, 2025, Rankiteo reports that United States Army Reserve has experienced 1 cybersecurity incidents.
United States Army Reserve has an estimated 779 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack.
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an incident response plan activated with fbi cyber division, incident response plan activated with cisa (cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency), and law enforcement notified with fbi (local field offices), law enforcement notified with dod (department of defense), and containment measures with joint cybersecurity advisory (fbi/cisa) with detection/mitigation guidance, containment measures with guidance from late 2024 for improved visibility, and remediation measures with identify and patch vulnerable networking equipment, remediation measures with audit access control lists (acls) on routers, remediation measures with remove unauthorized privileged accounts, remediation measures with disable unnecessary remote management interfaces, and communication strategy with public advisory via fbi/cisa, communication strategy with encouragement for victims to report to local fbi offices, and network segmentation with recommended as a mitigation strategy, and enhanced monitoring with recommended for early detection of malicious activity..
Title: Global Cyber Espionage Campaign by Salt Typhoon (Chinese State-Sponsored Hackers)
Description: The FBI has issued a security advisory warning that the Salt Typhoon hacker group (linked to Chinese state-sponsored entities) is escalating global attacks. The group targets telecommunications providers (including backbone, PE, and CE routers), government organizations, military infrastructure, and healthcare entities. They exploit known vulnerabilities in networking equipment to gain persistent access, modify routers, and exfiltrate sensitive data for espionage purposes. At least 60 organizations across 80 countries have been affected, with long-term compromises (e.g., a US National Guard network breached for nearly a year). The campaign focuses on surveillance and spying rather than financial gain.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-10-01T00:00:00Z
Type: Cyber Espionage
Attack Vector: Exploitation of known vulnerabilities in networking equipmentCompromised trusted devices/connectionsModification of router access control lists (ACLs)Creation of privileged accountsEnablement of remote management interfacesLateral movement via pivoting
Vulnerability Exploited: Known vulnerabilities in backbone routersProvider Edge (PE) routersCustomer Edge (CE) routers
Threat Actor: Name: Salt Typhoon, Aliases: ['APT41', 'Winnti Group (subgroup)', 'PRC-affiliated actors'], Affiliation: ['Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS)', 'People’s Liberation Army (PLA)', 'Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology', 'Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology', 'Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology'], Origin: China.
Motivation: State-sponsored espionageSurveillanceIntelligence gatheringMilitary/law enforcement data exfiltration
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Cyber Attack.
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (routers)Compromised trusted devices.
Data Compromised: Sensitive military data, Law enforcement data, Telecommunications metadata, Potentially healthcare data
Systems Affected: Backbone routers of major telecommunications providersProvider Edge (PE) routersCustomer Edge (CE) routersUS National Guard networks (unnamed state)Healthcare organization networks (indirectly)
Operational Impact: Long-term persistent access (up to 1 year in some cases)Lateral movement across networks
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential erosion of trust in telecommunications providersConcerns over national security implications
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Military Data, Law Enforcement Data, Telecommunications Traffic, Potentially Healthcare Data and .
Entity Name: Unnamed US State National Guard
Entity Type: Government/Military
Industry: Defense
Location: United States
Entity Name: Multiple Telecommunications Providers (60+ organizations)
Entity Type: Private/Public
Industry: Telecommunications
Location: Global (80 countries)
Size: ['Large enterprises', 'Critical infrastructure providers']
Entity Name: Healthcare Organizations (potentially impacted)
Entity Type: Private/Public
Industry: Healthcare
Location: United States (and possibly global)
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['FBI Cyber Division', 'CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency)']
Law Enforcement Notified: FBI (local field offices), DoD (Department of Defense),
Containment Measures: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (FBI/CISA) with detection/mitigation guidanceGuidance from late 2024 for improved visibility
Remediation Measures: Identify and patch vulnerable networking equipmentAudit access control lists (ACLs) on routersRemove unauthorized privileged accountsDisable unnecessary remote management interfaces
Communication Strategy: Public advisory via FBI/CISAEncouragement for victims to report to local FBI offices
Network Segmentation: ['Recommended as a mitigation strategy']
Enhanced Monitoring: Recommended for early detection of malicious activity
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as FBI Cyber Division, CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency), .
Type of Data Compromised: Military data, Law enforcement data, Telecommunications traffic, Potentially healthcare data
Sensitivity of Data: High (national security implications)Confidential (military/law enforcement)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed in US National Guard caseLikely in other telecom targets
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Identify and patch vulnerable networking equipment, Audit access control lists (ACLs) on routers, Remove unauthorized privileged accounts, Disable unnecessary remote management interfaces, .
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by joint cybersecurity advisory (fbi/cisa) with detection/mitigation guidance, guidance from late 2024 for improved visibility and .
Regulatory Notifications: FBI/CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory
Lessons Learned: State-sponsored APT groups like Salt Typhoon prioritize stealth and persistence over financial gain., Telecommunications infrastructure is a high-value target for espionage due to its role in global communications., Compromised networking equipment can serve as a pivot point for lateral movement into other critical sectors (e.g., military, healthcare)., Long-term compromises (e.g., nearly a year in the National Guard case) highlight the need for continuous monitoring and anomaly detection.
Recommendations: Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks.Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks.Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks.Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks.Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks.Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks.Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks.Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks.
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are State-sponsored APT groups like Salt Typhoon prioritize stealth and persistence over financial gain.,Telecommunications infrastructure is a high-value target for espionage due to its role in global communications.,Compromised networking equipment can serve as a pivot point for lateral movement into other critical sectors (e.g., military, healthcare).,Long-term compromises (e.g., nearly a year in the National Guard case) highlight the need for continuous monitoring and anomaly detection.
Source: FBI/CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (2024)
Date Accessed: 2024-10-01
Source: Department of Defense (DoD) Report on National Guard Breach
Date Accessed: 2024-07-01
Source: ITPro Article: 'Salt Typhoon attacks worse than previously thought'
URL: https://www.itpro.com/security/fbi-warns-salt-typhoon-hackers-are-ramping-up-attacks-globally
Date Accessed: 2024-10-01
Source: American Hospital Association (AHA) Statement by John Riggi
Date Accessed: 2024-10-01
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: FBI/CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (2024)Date Accessed: 2024-10-01, and Source: Department of Defense (DoD) Report on National Guard BreachDate Accessed: 2024-07-01, and Source: ITPro Article: 'Salt Typhoon attacks worse than previously thought'Url: https://www.itpro.com/security/fbi-warns-salt-typhoon-hackers-are-ramping-up-attacks-globallyDate Accessed: 2024-10-01, and Source: American Hospital Association (AHA) Statement by John RiggiDate Accessed: 2024-10-01.
Investigation Status: Ongoing (FBI/CISA/DoD leading investigations; victims encouraged to report)
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Public Advisory Via Fbi/Cisa and Encouragement For Victims To Report To Local Fbi Offices.
Stakeholder Advisories: Fbi Urges Telecom Providers To Review Router Configurations And Audit Privileged Accounts., Dod Advises Military And Defense Contractors To Monitor For Salt Typhoon Iocs., Aha Recommends Healthcare Organizations Take Aggressive Action To Detect And Remediate Potential Compromises..
Customer Advisories: Organizations using telecommunications services from affected providers should inquire about mitigation measures.Healthcare entities should verify third-party network security postures.
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Fbi Urges Telecom Providers To Review Router Configurations And Audit Privileged Accounts., Dod Advises Military And Defense Contractors To Monitor For Salt Typhoon Iocs., Aha Recommends Healthcare Organizations Take Aggressive Action To Detect And Remediate Potential Compromises., Organizations Using Telecommunications Services From Affected Providers Should Inquire About Mitigation Measures., Healthcare Entities Should Verify Third-Party Network Security Postures. and .
Entry Point: Known Vulnerabilities In Networking Equipment (Routers), Compromised Trusted Devices,
Reconnaissance Period: ['Extended (group active since at least 2019)', 'Long-term dwell time (e.g., ~1 year in National Guard case)']
Backdoors Established: ['Modified router ACLs', 'Privileged accounts', 'Remote management interfaces']
High Value Targets: Telecommunications Backbone Infrastructure, Government/Military Networks, Healthcare Systems (Indirectly),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Telecommunications Backbone Infrastructure, Government/Military Networks, Healthcare Systems (Indirectly),
Root Causes: Unpatched Vulnerabilities In Critical Networking Equipment, Insufficient Monitoring Of Router Configurations And Acl Changes, Lack Of Segmentation Between Telecommunications And Other Critical Infrastructure Networks, Delayed Detection Due To Stealthy, Long-Term Persistence Tactics,
Corrective Actions: Mandatory Patching Timelines For Networking Equipment In Critical Infrastructure, Enhanced Logging And Anomaly Detection For Router Configurations, Cross-Sector Collaboration To Share Threat Intelligence On Apt Groups Like Salt Typhoon, Regular Audits Of Privileged Accounts And Remote Access Capabilities,
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Recommended For Early Detection Of Malicious Activity, .
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Mandatory Patching Timelines For Networking Equipment In Critical Infrastructure, Enhanced Logging And Anomaly Detection For Router Configurations, Cross-Sector Collaboration To Share Threat Intelligence On Apt Groups Like Salt Typhoon, Regular Audits Of Privileged Accounts And Remote Access Capabilities, .
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Name: Salt TyphoonAliases: APT41, Aliases: Winnti Group (subgroup), Aliases: PRC-affiliated actors, Affiliation: Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), Affiliation: People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Affiliation: Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology, Affiliation: Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology, Affiliation: Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology and Origin: China.
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2024-10-01T00:00:00Z.
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were Sensitive military data, Law enforcement data, Telecommunications metadata, Potentially healthcare data and .
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident was Backbone routers of major telecommunications providersProvider Edge (PE) routersCustomer Edge (CE) routersUS National Guard networks (unnamed state)Healthcare organization networks (indirectly).
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident was Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (FBI/CISA) with detection/mitigation guidanceGuidance from late 2024 for improved visibility.
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Law enforcement data, Potentially healthcare data, Telecommunications metadata and Sensitive military data.
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Long-term compromises (e.g., nearly a year in the National Guard case) highlight the need for continuous monitoring and anomaly detection.
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Monitor for unusual privileged account creation or modifications to router configurations., Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement., Audit and harden access control lists (ACLs) on critical infrastructure devices., Healthcare organizations should aggressively scan for indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to Salt Typhoon., Report suspected compromises to the FBI or local law enforcement promptly., Patch known vulnerabilities in networking equipment (especially routers) immediately., Disable remote management interfaces unless absolutely necessary. and Collaborate with telecommunications providers to detect and mitigate supply chain risks..
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are ITPro Article: 'Salt Typhoon attacks worse than previously thought', FBI/CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (2024), Department of Defense (DoD) Report on National Guard Breach and American Hospital Association (AHA) Statement by John Riggi.
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.itpro.com/security/fbi-warns-salt-typhoon-hackers-are-ramping-up-attacks-globally .
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing (FBI/CISA/DoD leading investigations; victims encouraged to report).
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was FBI urges telecom providers to review router configurations and audit privileged accounts., DoD advises military and defense contractors to monitor for Salt Typhoon IoCs., AHA recommends healthcare organizations take aggressive action to detect and remediate potential compromises., .
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued was an Organizations using telecommunications services from affected providers should inquire about mitigation measures.Healthcare entities should verify third-party network security postures.
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was Extended (group active since at least 2019)Long-term dwell time (e.g., ~1 year in National Guard case).
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