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Analyze » UnimedAR » KOPCOMUNI1783607495

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (KOPCOMUNI1783607495)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-142
Company Score Before Incident759 / 1000
Company Score After Incident617 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERKOPCOMUNI1783607495
Type of Cyber IncidentRansomware
ATTACK VECTORNA
DATA EXPOSED579,565 records breached in confirmed...
INCIDENT DATE06/07/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of UnimedAR's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts UnimedAR Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the UnimedAR breach identified under incident ID KOPCOMUNI1783607495.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of UnimedAR's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/unimed, the number of followers: 114, the industry type: Individual and Family Services and the number of employees: 18 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 759 and after the incident was 617 with a difference of -142 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on UnimedAR and their customers.

On 01 January 2026, Unimed disclosed Ransomware issues under the banner "Ransomware Attacks on Healthcare Surge in H1 2026".

The first half of 2026 saw a sharp rise in ransomware attacks targeting the healthcare sector, averaging 2.3 incidents per day, a 14% increase from the second half of 2025.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing 579,565 records breached in confirmed attacks, with nearly 579,565 records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The data underscores a new normal of persistent ransomware threats in healthcare, with attackers increasingly targeting both providers and supporting businesses.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating sharp rise in ransomware attacks targeting the healthcare sector, External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating healthcare providers and businesses targeted, including tech firms, and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating common vector for ransomware in healthcare (implied). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains (Qilin, LockBit, etc.) require execution and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating common ransomware execution method (implied). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating healthcare systems often rely on domain accounts (implied) and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often establishes persistence (implied). Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups exploit vulnerabilities for escalation (implied) and Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating compromised accounts used for lateral movement (implied). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains (e.g., LockBit) use obfuscation, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware disables security tools (implied), and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often deletes logs (implied). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating common in ransomware attacks (implied) and Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating healthcare systems store credentials in browsers (implied). Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups map domain accounts (implied) and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware scans for sensitive files (e.g., medical records). Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating common in healthcare ransomware (implied) and Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware spreads via SMB (implied). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 579,565 records breached in confirmed attacks and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating healthcare systems store data on shared drives (implied). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups use C2 over HTTP/HTTPS (implied) and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware downloads additional tools (implied). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration confirmed in ransomware attacks and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups use cloud storage (implied). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating data encryption confirmed in ransomware attacks, Service Stop (T1489) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware disrupts healthcare services (implied), and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware deletes backups (implied). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (60%)
External Remote Services (50%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (40%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (70%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (50%)
Persistence
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (60%)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (50%)
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (60%)
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (70%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (80%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (70%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (60%)
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (70%)
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (60%)
Discovery
Account Discovery: Domain Account (70%)
File and Directory Discovery (80%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (70%)
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (60%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Data from Network Shared Drive (80%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (60%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (100%)
Service Stop (80%)
Inhibit System Recovery (70%)