Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SURSIGULT1774535812)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Ultraview AI's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Ultraview AI Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Ultraview AI breach identified under incident ID SURSIGULT1774535812.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Ultraview AI's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ultraviewai, the number of followers: 1785, the industry type: Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing and the number of employees: 13 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 744 and after the incident was 731 with a difference of -13 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Ultraview AI and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Silver Fox APT Targets Chinese-Speaking Users with Stealthy AtlasCross RAT Campaign", has drawn attention.
A Chinese-nexus advanced persistent threat (APT) group, tracked as Silver Fox (also known as Void Arachne and SwimSnake), is conducting a sophisticated campaign targeting Chinese-speaking users and professionals.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Enterprise networks and Windows systems, and exposing Potential data harvesting via WeChat DLL injection and RDP session hijacking.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The campaign demonstrates Silver Fox’s evolution from driver-based process termination to network-level disruption, highlighting the need for enhanced monitoring of in-memory malware and non-standard API resolution techniques, and recommending next steps like Monitor for non-standard processes loading System.Management.Automation.dll, Check for scheduled tasks under \Microsoft\Windows\AppID\ and Block or investigate typosquatted domains (e.g., www-surfshark[.]com, signal-signal[.]com).
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating typosquatted domains impersonating trusted brands like Surfshark, Signal, and Zoom and Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating victims are lured into downloading a ZIP archive containing a triple-nested Setup Factory installer. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating zIP archive containing a triple-nested Setup Factory installer and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating custom PowerShell execution engine (PowerChell) integrated in AtlasCross RAT. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating scheduled tasks under \Microsoft\Windows\AppID\ and Event Triggered Execution: Application Shimming (T1546.011) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating trojanized Autodesk component (Schools.exe) deployed alongside legitimate decoy applications. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection (T1055.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dLL injection into WeChat (Wxfun.dll) for data harvesting and Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating reflective loader for AtlasCross RAT to execute in memory. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads (T1027.009) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating triple-nested Setup Factory installer, trojanized Autodesk component, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection (T1055.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating atlasCross RAT loaded entirely in memory using a reflective loader, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating disables AMSI, ETW, CLM, and ScriptBlock logging; terminates Chinese security tools, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating legitimate decoy applications like UltraViewer to avoid suspicion, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating pEB walking and ROR13 hashing to dynamically resolve APIs, and Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stolen Extended Validation (EV) code-signing certificates to bypass security checks. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating rDP session hijacking via tscon.exe and OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating potential data harvesting via WeChat DLL injection. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating atlasCross RAT likely performs system reconnaissance and Process Discovery (T1057) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating terminates TCP connections used by Chinese security tools. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dLL injection into WeChat (Wxfun.dll) for data harvesting and Screen Capture (T1113) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating potential RDP session hijacking via tscon.exe. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating retrieves second-stage shellcode payload from C2 server over raw TCP, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating chaCha20 encryption and hardware-generated random keys for C2 communications, and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating retrieves second-stage shellcode payload from C2 server. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating atlasCross RAT communicates with C2 using ChaCha20 encryption and Automated Exfiltration (T1020) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating potential data harvesting via WeChat DLL injection. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation (T1499.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating terminates TCP connections used by Chinese security tools (360 Total Security, Huorong) and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating disables critical security mechanisms (AMSI, ETW, CLM, ScriptBlock logging). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Ultraview AI Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/ultraviewai/incident/SURSIGULT1774535812
- Ultraview AI CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/ultraviewai
- Ultraview AI Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/sursigult1774535812-signal-surfshark-ultraviewer-cyber-attack-november-2025/
- Ultraview AI CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/ultraviewai/history
- Ultraview AI CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://cybersecuritynews.com/silver-fox-abuses-stolen-ev-certificates/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf