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Analyze » TP-Link » TP-1775679846

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (TP-1775679846)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-3
Company Score Before Incident770 / 1000
Company Score After Incident767 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERTP-1775679846
Type of Cyber IncidentVulnerability
ATTACK VECTORExploitation of SOHO routers (DHCP/DNS manipulation)
DATA EXPOSEDPasswords and authentication tokens from...
INCIDENT DATE31/12/2023
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of TP-Link's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts TP-Link Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the TP-Link breach identified under incident ID TP-1775679846.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of TP-Link's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/tp-link-corporation, the number of followers: 61740, the industry type: Computers and Electronics Manufacturing and the number of employees: 8511 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 770 and after the incident was 767 with a difference of -3 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on TP-Link and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Russian APT28 Exploits SOHO Routers in Large-Scale Credential Harvesting Campaign", has drawn attention.

The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) issued an advisory warning that Russian state-backed hacking group APT28 (also known as Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, and Sofacy) has been actively compromising small office and home office (SOHO) routers since early 2024.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting SOHO routers (TP-Link WR841N, Archer, WDR, WR series; MikroTik routers), and exposing Passwords and authentication tokens from web and email services.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Firmware updates, restricted management interfaces, multi-factor authentication.

The case underscores how Ongoing, and recommending next steps like Firmware updates, restricted management interfaces, multi-factor authentication, monitoring for unauthorized DNS changes.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exploitation of SOHO routers (DHCP/DNS manipulation), and cVE-2023-50224, an unauthenticated flaw allowing credential theft. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Pre-OS Boot: ROMMONkit (T1542.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating rewrite the router’s DHCP DNS settings, replacing primary DNS with malicious IP and Server Software Component: Transport Agent (T1505.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating deploys malicious DNS resolvers on virtual private servers (VPS). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Poisoning (T1557.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating redirect network traffic through attacker-controlled servers (AitM infrastructure), Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating traffic rerouted to adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) infrastructure for credential theft, and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating theft of passwords and authentication tokens from web and email services. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating targeted domains (e.g., Outlook, Office 365, Microsoft authentication services). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms (T1568.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating malicious DNS resolvers on VPS redirect traffic to attacker-controlled servers and Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating redirect network traffic through attacker-controlled servers. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration such as Yes (redirected to attacker-controlled servers). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating alters compromised routers to direct traffic to malicious DNS while preserving original as fallback and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials (passwords, authentication tokens) may enable further access. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
Persistence
Pre-OS Boot: ROMMONkit (70%)
Server Software Component: Transport Agent (60%)
Credential Access
Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Poisoning (90%)
Adversary-in-the-Middle (90%)
Steal Application Access Token (80%)
Collection
Data from Information Repositories (80%)
Command and Control
Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms (60%)
Proxy: External Proxy (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Defense Evasion
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (70%)
Valid Accounts (50%)