Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (THE1765842884)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of The Japan Times's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts The Japan Times Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the The Japan Times breach identified under incident ID THE1765842884.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of The Japan Times's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-japan-times, the number of followers: 94715, the industry type: Newspaper Publishing and the number of employees: 207 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 755 and after the incident was 595 with a difference of -160 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on The Japan Times and their customers.
On 30 October 2023, Askul Corporation disclosed Ransomware issues under the banner "RansomHouse Ransomware Attack on Askul Corporation".
Japanese e-commerce giant Askul Corporation confirmed that RansomHouse hackers stole around 740,000 customer records in a ransomware attack in October.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Multiple servers, backup files wiped, IT systems, and exposing 740,000 customer records, with nearly 740,000 records at risk.
In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Physically disconnected infected networks, Cut communications between data centers and logistics centers and Isolated affected devices, and began remediation that includes Updated EDR signatures, Applied MFA to all key systems and Reset passwords for all administrator accounts, while recovery efforts such as Working to fully restore systems continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through Notified affected customers and partners individually; informed Personal Information Protection Commission.
The case underscores how Concluded, teams are taking away lessons such as Lack of MFA on outsourced partner accounts can lead to initial access; multiple ransomware variants may evade updated EDR signatures; backup files should be secured to prevent wiping, and recommending next steps like Enforce MFA on all administrator accounts, including outsourced partners, Enhance EDR capabilities to detect evasive ransomware variants and Secure backup files to prevent wiping, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Affected customers and partners notified individually.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploited compromised credentials from an outsourced partner’s administrator account and Trusted Relationship (T1199) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating attackers exploited credentials from an outsourced partner’s account lacking MFA. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating deployed multiple ransomware variants, some evading updated EDR signatures. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used compromised administrator account to maintain access. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating moved laterally across servers to escalate privileges. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating disabled EDR and other security tools and Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware variants evaded updated EDR signatures. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Brute Force: Password Guessing (T1110.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating compromised credentials from an outsourced partner’s account (implied) and Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating exploited credentials from an outsourced partner’s administrator account. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating conducted network reconnaissance and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating moved laterally across servers (implied discovery). Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating moved laterally across servers and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used compromised credentials to move laterally. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stole 740,000 customer records including PII. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating ransomHouse released stolen data in two subsequent leaks. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deployed ransomware to encrypt systems and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating wiped backup files to hinder recovery. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- The Japan Times Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/the-japan-times/incident/THE1765842884
- The Japan Times CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/the-japan-times
- The Japan Times Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/the1765842884-the-japan-times-ransomware-november-2025/
- The Japan Times CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/the-japan-times/history
- The Japan Times CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/askul-confirms-theft-of-740k-customer-records-in-ransomhouse-attack/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf