Comparison Overview
Telefónica Germany

Telefónica Germany
Georg-Brauchle-Ring 50, München, 80992, DE
Last Update: 12/03/2026
We are Telefónica. Our vision is the OnLife Telco. We enable people to use the achievements of digitalisation at any time and in any place. We support our customers in their lives and are developing innovative products and services for this purpose. In so doing, we are ...

Safaricom PLC
Waiyaki Way, Westlands, Nairobi, Nairobi, KE, P.O. Box 66827, 00800, Nairobi
Last Update: 19/05/2026
Safaricom is the leading provider of converged communication solutions in Kenya. In addition to providing a broad range of first-class products and services for Telephony, Broadband Internet and Financial services, Safaricom seeks to uplift the welfare of Kenyans throug...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Telefónica Germany







Safaricom PLC






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Telefónica Germany in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Safaricom PLC in 2026.
Incident History - Telefónica Germany (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Telefónica Germany cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Safaricom PLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Safaricom PLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Telefónica Germany

Safaricom PLC
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.