Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SYM1783607031)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Symantec's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Symantec Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Symantec breach identified under incident ID SYM1783607031.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Symantec's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/symantec, the number of followers: 443760, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 12974 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 677 and after the incident was 537 with a difference of -140 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Symantec and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "GodDamn Ransomware Attack with Kernel-Level Evasion Tactics", has drawn attention.
A recent ransomware campaign attributed to the GodDamn strain, a rebrand of the Hyadina ransomware family, demonstrated refined tactics including kernel-level defense subversion and systematic credential harvesting.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting At least 10 hosts, and exposing True.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating anyDesk deployed from Music folder indicating manual installation by operator with prior access and Remote Access Software (T1219) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating anyDesk configured for unattended access, suppressing consent prompts. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating powerShell installer accelerated deployment across at least 10 hosts and System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating psExec commands routed through psexesvc.exe, services.exe, and wininit.exe. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating anyDesk persistence via registered services to survive reboots. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stolen accounts used for lateral movement via PsExec and Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating psExec executed via services.exe and wininit.exe. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating poisonX driver terminated security processes and removed user-mode hooks, Indicator Removal: Timestomp (T1070.006) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating kernel-level defense subversion to evade detection, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating poisonX signed under Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher, and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating disabled Defender real-time monitoring. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating mimikatz used for credential harvesting, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating nirSoft WebBrowserPassView, ChromePass, PasswordFox targeted browsers, Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager (T1555.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating nirSoft tools targeted cached domain credentials, and Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating nirSoft tools may capture credentials via input methods. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Network Configuration Discovery (T1016) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating ipconfig used for basic reconnaissance, Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating netscan used for host discovery, Account Discovery: Local Account (T1087.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating credential harvesting via NirSoft tools implies account discovery, and Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating cached domain credentials targeted via NirSoft tools. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating psExec used to mount administrative shares, Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating psExec facilitated lateral movement across 10+ hosts, Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stolen accounts used for lateral movement via PsExec, and Remote Access Software (T1219) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating anyDesk installed on additional hosts for remote access. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating godDamn ransomware encrypted files with .God8Damn or victim-specific extension. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Symantec Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/symantec/incident/SYM1783607031
- Symantec CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/symantec
- Symantec Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/sym1783607031-symantec-ransomware-may-2026/
- Symantec CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/symantec/history
- Symantec CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/goddamn-ransomware-attack/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf