Suzu Labs A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
18/05/2026
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for Suzu Labs in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Suzu Labs in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Suzu Labs in 2026.
IT System Custom Software Development
Latest updates, reports, and threat intel affecting the global network.
Hackers are using AI to automate phishing, malware development, and cyberattacks at unprecedented speed and scale, according to new...
Earlier this month, the White House unveiled “President Trump's Cyber Strategy for America,” which outlined the administration's priorities...
US national cyber strategy focuses on stronger defenses, countering threats, fostering innovation.
A data breach has leaked sensitive medical records of over 15 million French citizens after hackers breached a centralized health...
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added a high-severity VMware Aria Operations bug on its Known Exploited...
Information included Social Security, driver's license and voter records dating to the 1990s.
An ongoing malicious campaign run by a threat actor Cisco Talos calls UAT-10027 has been targeting the U.S. education and healthcare sectors...
By exploiting one Cisco SD-WAN controller, attackers can push policy changes to every corner of the enterprise.
A new study from ETH Zurich is causing some serious re-evaluation of the use of cloud-based password managers, as the researchers found an...
An incomplete patch for CVE-2026-18556 allows for authentication bypass and account takeover in N-central Versions through 2026.3.1
The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp parsed inbound WAMP RPC frames in parse_rpc_msg() (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c) using a hand-rolled helper, extract_string_field(), that copied the message's uid and action fields with strncpy(out_buf, token + 1, outlen - 1) and then scanned the result with strchr(out_buf, '"'). Because strncpy does not NUL-terminate the destination when the source is at least outlen - 1 (127) bytes long, the subsequent strchr reads past the 128-byte destination buffer into adjacent stack memory; if a " byte is found beyond the buffer, a one-byte out-of-bounds NUL write also occurs. A related defect in extract_payload() runs strchr/strrchr over the receive buffer, which may not be NUL-terminated when a maximal-length frame fills it. The parsed bytes come directly from the OCPP central-system server over a websocket: the reader thread fills recv_buf via websocket_recv_msg() and calls parse_rpc_msg() on each inbound DATA frame (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c). A malicious or compromised central server, or an on-path attacker (OCPP is commonly deployed over plain ws://), can send an RPC frame whose uid or action field is 127+ bytes with no closing quote, triggering the out-of-bounds access. The primary impact is a remotely triggerable denial of service: the unbounded scan can fault on an unmapped page, and the stray NUL write can corrupt adjacent stack state. The over-read data is not reflected to the peer, so disclosure is limited. The feature is EXPERIMENTAL and must be explicitly enabled (CONFIG_OCPP). The fix replaces the manual parser with the bounds-respecting json_mixed_arr_parse() and copies the extracted uid with an explicitly NUL-terminated buffer, eliminating both over-reads.
A vulnerability in huggingface/transformers versions <=5.8.0.dev0 allows an attacker to perform arbitrary file writes via path traversal. The issue resides in the `save_pretrained()` methods of `PreTrainedTokenizerBase` and `ProcessorMixin`, where keys from the `chat_template` dictionary are used directly as filenames without proper validation. An attacker can exploit this by publishing a malicious Hugging Face Hub repository with a crafted `tokenizer_config.json` file. When a victim downloads and saves the tokenizer or processor, the attacker-controlled keys can escape the intended save directory, enabling arbitrary file writes with attacker-controlled content. This vulnerability affects multiple processors inheriting from `ProcessorMixin`, including Idefics, Florence, Gemma, Phi, and Qwen-VL.
PyAthena prior to 3.35.4 contains a sql injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary SQL by exploiting improper quote-escaping in DefaultParameterFormatter.format(), which routes DELETE and CTAS statements to the _escape_hive function that backslash-escapes single quotes rather than doubling them. Because Athena and Trino do not treat backslashes as escape characters inside string literals, attacker-supplied input such as a single quote followed by SQL syntax causes the parser to terminate the string literal prematurely, enabling data exfiltration via UNION SELECT, execution of destructive statements, and attacker-controlled CTAS destination and content.
Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh subnet key management leaks one PSA Crypto key slot on every subnet-key teardown. In subsys/bluetooth/mesh/subnet.c, net_keys_create() imports the Private Beacon Key into a PSA key slot under CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS (enabled by default), but subnet_keys_destroy() guarded the matching psa_destroy_key() with CONFIG_BT_MESH_V1d1. That Kconfig symbol was removed when explicit Mesh 1.0.1 support was dropped, so the destroy branch became permanently dead code and the import is never balanced by a destroy. The imbalanced teardown is reached every time subnet keys are destroyed: deleting a subnet (Config Server NetKey Delete), completing a Key Refresh Procedure (which retires the old key set), and resetting/re-provisioning the node. The over-the-air triggers are processed only under the node's device key, so they are exercisable by the provisioner or network administrator that owns the node, reachable over the Bluetooth Mesh network. With the default CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT of 16, repeated add/delete or key-refresh cycles exhaust the shared PSA key-slot pool after roughly a dozen rounds. Once exhausted, bt_mesh_private_beacon_key() and thus subnet creation fail: the node can no longer add subnets or complete key refresh, and other PSA crypto consumers on the device may be starved, until the device is rebooted. The fix aligns the destroy guard with the import guard (CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS) so each slot is freed.
curl -i -X GET 'https://api.rankiteo.com/underwriter-getcompany-history?
linkedin_id=axa' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
Every week, Rankiteo analyzes billions of signals to give organizations a sharper, faster view of emerging risks. With deeper, more actionable intelligence at their fingertips, security teams can outpace threat actors, respond instantly to Zero-Day attacks, and dramatically shrink their risk exposure window.
Rankiteo is a unified scoring and risk platform that analyzes billions of signals weekly to help organizations gain faster, more actionable insights into emerging threats. Empowering teams to outpace adversaries and reduce exposure.