Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » State of Maryland » STA1777335883

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (STA1777335883)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-68
Company Score Before Incident778 / 1000
Company Score After Incident710 / 1000
Company LinkView State of Maryland Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERSTA1777335883
Type of Cyber IncidentBreach
ATTACK VECTORNA
DATA EXPOSEDPublicly accessible property records
INCIDENT DATE13/04/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of State of Maryland's Breach and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts State of Maryland Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the State of Maryland breach identified under incident ID STA1777335883.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of State of Maryland's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/state-of-maryland, the number of followers: 71240, the industry type: Government Administration and the number of employees: 10351 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 778 and after the incident was 710 with a difference of -68 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on State of Maryland and their customers.

On 14 April 2024, Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT) disclosed Cybersecurity Incident issues under the banner "Maryland’s Property Ownership Database Cybersecurity Incident".

Maryland’s State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT) restored its property ownership database on Monday, April 29, following a nearly two-week outage caused by a cybersecurity incident.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Property ownership database, and exposing Publicly accessible property records.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Website taken offline, servers analyzed, and began remediation that includes Affected servers analyzed and remediated, while recovery efforts such as Final testing conducted, website reopened continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public advisories issued, residents directed to county-level offices.

The case underscores how Ongoing, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Residents directed to county-level real property assessment offices for record requests.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including suspicious activity on their servers, and website...allows users to search property ownership details and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating publicly accessible property records already available through the website. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating suspicious activity on their servers. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating website taken offline to prevent further exposure. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating temporarily disabling the site to prevent further exposure. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating only publicly accessible property records already available through the website were accessed. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate confidence (60%), with evidence including suspicious activity on their servers, and publicly accessible property records...were accessed. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation (T1499.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including website taken offline on April 14, and nearly two-week outage. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (70%)
External Remote Services (60%)
Execution
Exploitation for Client Execution (50%)
Persistence
External Remote Services (50%)
Defense Evasion
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (80%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (60%)
Impact
Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation (80%)

Sources & References