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Analyze » Squid HTTP Proxy project » SQU1782148033

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SQU1782148033)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-1
Company Score Before Incident781 / 1000
Company Score After Incident780 / 1000
Company LinkView Squid HTTP Proxy project Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERSQU1782148033
Type of Cyber IncidentVulnerability
ATTACK VECTORFTP parser exploitation
DATA EXPOSEDauthentication credentials, session tokens, API...
INCIDENT DATE31/03/2026
STATUSResolved

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Squid HTTP Proxy project's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Squid HTTP Proxy project Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Squid HTTP Proxy project breach identified under incident ID SQU1782148033.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Squid HTTP Proxy project's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/squid-http-proxy-project, the number of followers: 0, the industry type: IT Services and IT Consulting and the number of employees: 1 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 781 and after the incident was 780 with a difference of -1 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Squid HTTP Proxy project and their customers.

Squid Proxy recently reported "Squid Proxy Vulnerability 'Squidbleed' Exposes Sensitive Data Since 1997", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Security researchers at Calif.io have uncovered a critical memory leak vulnerability in Squid Proxy, dubbed Squidbleed (CVE-2026-47729), which has persisted in the software since 1997.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Squid Proxy versions prior to 7.6 and 8, and exposing authentication credentials, session tokens, API keys.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Disabling FTP support if unused, and began remediation that includes Patch integrated into Squid version 8 (April 2026) and backported to version 7.6 (June 2026).

The case underscores how Resolved, and recommending next steps like Disable FTP support if unused, upgrade to patched versions (7.6 or 8), avoid transmitting sensitive data over unencrypted HTTP.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating critical memory leak vulnerability in Squid Proxy (CVE-2026-47729). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exposing sensitive data from prior HTTP requests in shared proxy environments and OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating harvest authentication credentials, session tokens, and API keys. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating read beyond memory buffer boundaries in Squid’s FTP parser. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating attacker controlling an FTP server could silently harvest data and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (T1048) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating fTP parser exploitation as attack vector. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating exposing sensitive data from prior HTTP requests in shared environments. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
Credential Access
Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (70%)
OS Credential Dumping (80%)
Collection
Data from Local System (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (70%)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (60%)
Discovery
Account Discovery (60%)

Sources & References