SBNADS A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
29/03/2026
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for Sparkasse Bad Neustadt a. d. Saale in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Sparkasse Bad Neustadt a. d. Saale in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Sparkasse Bad Neustadt a. d. Saale in 2026.
Banking
Access Bank Plc is a full service commercial Bank operating through a network of over 600 branches and service outlets located in major centres across Nigeria, Sub Saharan Africa and the United Kingdom. Listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 1998, the Bank serves its various markets through 5 business segments: Institutional, Commercial, Retail Banking, Transaction Services and Financial Markets. The Bank has over 800,000 shareholders including several Nigerian and International Institutional Investors and has enjoyed what is arguably Africa’s most successful banking growth trajectory in the last ten years ranking amongst Africa’s top 15 banks by total assets and capital. As part of its continued growth strategy, Access Bank is focused on mainstreaming sustainable business practices into its operations. The Bank strives to deliver sustainable economic growth that is profitable, environmentally responsible and socially relevant. RC : 125384 Your privacy matters to us. We’re committed to protecting your personal information and being transparent about how we use it. Read up our privacy policy on our website or via: https://www.accessbankplc.com/privacy-policy
We're here to keep you updated on AIB Group news, financial services industry insights, expert business reports and all the latest AIB career opportunities. We are one of Ireland’s major retail banks serving personal, business and corporate customers. We offer a range of banking products and services such as mortgages, savings and business banking. We have a customer centric view, always putting the customer first and supporting our customers at every stage. We have over 2.3m million customers using our multifaceted service. We provide our customers with a diverse range of contact channels; through our branches, commercial centres and our direct channels, such as AIB internet and telephone banking, self-service banking and our award-winning mobile banking app. AIB has a presence in Northern Ireland through its community-based full service bank, AIB NI, and in Britain where AIB GB serves its target audience of SMEs, owner-managed businesses and professional firms. EBS is also now part of the AIB Group and offers mortgage and deposit products and services from its own branch network. This is a public channel so never post your personal or account details. AIB provides banking related services in Ireland and all AIB content is intended for use in Ireland. Information is correct at time of posting and may be subject to change. No comments made by any employee, agent or contractor of AIB or any user should be construed as financial, investment or other specialist advice or as recommendations. AIB is not liable for any comments/postings on this channel. AIB Social Media Terms of Use and Privacy Statement apply https://aib.ie/social/social-media-privacy AIB and AIB Group are registered business names of Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. Registered Office
Somos el banco peruano que desde hace más de 130 años viene liderando el sistema financiero a nivel nacional. A lo largo de todo este tiempo hemos contribuido con el desarrollo económico de nuestro país, transformando planes en realidad. Todo esto es posible gracias al equipo de profesionales de primer nivel que forman parte de nuestro equipo y que se caracterizan por su pasión por metas y resultados y capacidad de innovar y buscar siempre ser los mejores. Nuestra diversidad de negocios y áreas nos permite ofrecer múltiples experiencias de trabajo, en muchas especialidades que requieren diferentes competencias y habilidades. Por ello, estamos en permanente búsqueda de profesionales talentosos y dispuestos a afrontar nuevos retos, con capacidad para innovar y con ganas de desafiarse en grande para impactar en grande. ¡Únete al Equipo BCP!
Porque el mundo que nos rodea se actualiza constantemente, porque tu decides hacer tu vida más simple: para entretenerte, para compartir con tu familia o para moverte por la ciudad. En Bci evolucionamos junto a ti, en este mundo donde todo se transforma una y otra vez, con soluciones que harán tu vida más simple. Te invitamos a vivir positivamente este gran cambio para que sigamos evolucionando juntos. Únete a nuestro equipo en www.trabajaenbci.cl y #SeamosDiferentes
Founded in 1908, Bank of Communications Co., Ltd. ("the Bank") is one of the oldest banks in China as well as one of the note-issuing banks in modern China. The Bank was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in June 2005 and on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May 2007. The Bank currently has 182 domestic branches, comprising 30 provincial branches, 7 branches directly managed by the Head Office and 145 managed by provinces. It has also established 2,701 banking outlets in 202 cities and 144 counties nationwide. In addition, the Bank has set up 12 overseas institutions, comprising branches in Hong Kong, New York, San Francisco, Tokyo, Singapore, Seoul, Frankfurt, Sydney, Macau, Ho Chi Minh City, Taipei and Bank of Communications (UK) Co., Ltd. According to the "Top 1000 World Banks 2012" published by the British magazine "The Banker", the Bank was ranked number 30 in terms of its Tier 1 Capital, moving 5 positions forward as compared with the prior year, and was among the top 50 for the fourth consecutive year. The Bank is one of the major financial services providers in China. The Bank's business scope includes commercial banking, securities services, trust services, financial leasing, fund management, insurance and offshore financial services. Its wholly-owned subsidiaries include BOCOM International Holdings Company Limited, China BOCOM Insurance Co., Ltd and Bank of Communications Finance Leasing Co., Ltd. Subsidiaries controlled by the Bank include Bank of Communications Schroder Fund Management Co., Ltd, Bank of Communications International Trust Co., Ltd, BoCommLife Insurance Company Limited, Dayi Bocomm Xingmin Rural Bank, Zhejiang Anji BOCOM Rural Bank Ltd, Xinjiang Shihezi BOCOM Rural Bank and Qingdao Laoshan BOCOM Rural Bank. In addition, the Bank is the largest shareholder of Jiangsu Changshu Rural Commercial Bank Co., Ltd.
Bank Mandiri was established on 2 October 1998, as part of the bank restructuring program of the Government of Indonesia. In July 1999, four state-owned banks - Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Dagang Negara, Bank Exim and Bapindo - were amalgamated into Bank Mandiri. The history of these four banks can be traced back to over 140 years, and together they had contributed to the beginning of the Indonesian banking sector. We are continuously seeking mutually beneficial business opportunities that create synergies, building alliances and strengthening our supporting businesses with and through our subsidiaries, notably Bank Syariah Mandiri in Islamic banking, PT. Bank Mandiri Taspen in banking, Mandiri Europe in international banking, AXA Mandiri Financial Services in insurance, Mandiri Sekuritas in investment banking, Mandiri Capital Indonesia in venture capital, Mandiri Tunas Finance in multi-finance, Mandiri Utama Finance in multi-finance, and Mandiri International Remittance in remittance. With various subsidiaries that support our businesses, we have further strengthened our position as a prominent financial holdings institution in Indonesia.
Equitas Small Finance Bank is an active member of the communities where we live and work, and a strong philanthropic partner enabling individuals, families, businesses, and entire communities in their financial aspirations with seamless banking services. We take the responsibility to be good neighbours, and are committed to our legacy of giving back to our communities. We aim at changing the way banking is imagined delivered and experienced – with Fairness & Transparency being the key drivers.
Commerzbank is the leading bank for the German Mittelstand and a strong partner for around 24,000 corporate client groups. In addition, it supports private and small-business customers in Germany with more than €400 billion assets under management. The Bank’s two Business Segments – Private and Small-Business Customers and Corporate Clients – offer a comprehensive portfolio of financial services. Commerzbank transacts approximately 30% of Germany’s foreign trade and is present internationally in more than 40 countries in the corporate clients’ business. The Bank focusses on the German Mittelstand, large corporates, and institutional clients. As part of its international business, Commerzbank supports clients with a business relationship to Germany, Austria, or Switzerland and companies operating in selected future-oriented industries. In the Private and Small-Business Customers segment, the Bank is at the side of its customers with its brands Commerzbank and comdirect: online and mobile, in the advisory centre, and personally in its branches. Its Polish subsidiary mBank S.A. is an innovative digital bank that serves approximately 5.7 million private and corporate customers, predominantly in Poland, as well as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
At KeyBank we’ve made a promise to our clients that they will always have a champion in us. To deliver on our promise, we’re committed to building a team of engaged employees who do the right thing for our clients and shareholders, and help them achieve financial wellness each and every day. Headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio, KeyCorp is one of the nation’s largest financial services companies. Key Companies provide investment management, retail and commercial banking, consumer finance and investment banking products to individuals and companies throughout the United States and, for certain businesses, internationally. Follow along for business and industry insights, expert advice and more resources to help you achieve your financial goals. KeyCorp is an Equal Opportunity Employer committed to sustaining an inclusive culture. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability or veteran status. KeyBank is Member FDIC. Equal Housing Lender. Credit applications are subject to credit approval.
Latest updates, reports, and threat intel affecting the global network.
tls_opt_dtls_peer_connection_id_value_get() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_tls.c, which handles getsockopt(SOL_TLS, TLS_DTLS_PEER_CID_VALUE), passed the caller-supplied optval directly to mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() without verifying the buffer was at least MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX (default 32) bytes. mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() copies the peer-negotiated DTLS Connection ID (length 1..MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) into that buffer without a destination-size parameter, so a caller-supplied optlen smaller than the CID causes a write of up to 31 bytes past the buffer end. In CONFIG_USERSPACE builds the getsockopt syscall verifier (z_vrfy_zsock_getsockopt) bounce-buffers the user's optval into a kernel allocation of exactly optlen bytes (k_usermode_alloc_from_copy -> z_thread_malloc), so an unprivileged user thread that passes a small optlen on a connected DTLS socket with Connection ID enabled induces a kernel-heap buffer overflow, with the overflowing content being the remote peer's CID. The defect requires CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID, an established DTLS session with a negotiated peer CID, and (for the kernel-crossing case) CONFIG_USERSPACE. Introduced when the TLS_DTLS_CID option was added (v3.5.0). The fix rejects callers whose optlen is below MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX with -EINVAL.
react18-use is a React 19 use hook shim. Between 2026-05-19 01:07:01 and 2026-05-19 15:20:43, the default branch contained malicious commits 7b79148d1495a2505f9277da295a98cf176f4496 through 7b79148d1495a2505f9277da295a98cf176f4496 that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-19 01:07:01 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity since 2026-05-19 01:07:01, and clean local clones.
The UpdateHub management subsystem (subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c) drives every update operation through a single file-scope ctx structure that holds the CoAP block context, payload buffer, status code, socket, and a one-element poll-fd array fds[1]. Access to ctx was not serialized, and prepare_fds() wrote ctx.fds[ctx.nfds] and incremented ctx.nfds with no bounds check. Two independent paths mutate ctx concurrently: the background autohandler running on the system workqueue, and user-triggered operations reached through the updatehub run shell command, direct API calls, or — since the operations are exposed as syscalls — userspace threads. When a second flow enters prepare_fds() while ctx.nfds is already 1, the write lands one element past the array; by struct layout it overlaps the adjacent ctx.sock/ctx.nfds members. More broadly, the unsynchronized sharing lets two flows interleave connection setup and teardown, double-closing a socket descriptor or scribbling the shared buffers. The result is corruption of the update subsystem's internal state and denial of service of the firmware-update path; the out-of-bounds write is contained within the ctx structure and there is no demonstrated path to memory outside it or to code execution. Triggering requires a local actor able to invoke update operations (or, with CONFIG_USERSPACE, an unprivileged userspace thread) and to win a timing race against the background handler; remote peers cannot control the race timing. The fix serializes the entry points with a mutex and adds a bounds check to prepare_fds().
The UpdateHub over-the-air update client's start_coap_client() in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c leaks the CoAP/DTLS socket descriptor on its connection-setup failure paths. The shared error: cleanup gated socket closing on a ret > 0 flag, but ret was set to -1 immediately after the socket was created, so when zsock_setsockopt() (DTLS) or zsock_connect() subsequently failed the gate was false and cleanup_connection() was never called. The open descriptor in the global ctx.sock was then overwritten by the next attempt, permanently leaking it from the socket / net_context pool until reboot. The failing setup path is reached every time the OTA client tries to contact the UpdateHub server and the connection cannot be established — driven automatically by the periodic autohandler() poll (and on demand via the updatehub_probe()/updatehub_update() API or the updatehub run shell command). The DTLS handshake/connect outcome is influenceable by a network or on-path attacker who drops, resets, or otherwise disrupts traffic to the server, and also fails naturally whenever the server is unreachable. Each failed attempt permanently leaks one descriptor; once the shared socket pool is exhausted, networking degrades device-wide until the device is rebooted, a denial-of-service condition. Severity is low because the leak rate is bounded by the configured OTA poll interval (default once per 24 hours), the effect is gradual and recovered by reboot, and only builds with the UpdateHub client enabled are affected. There is no memory-corruption, information-disclosure, or authentication impact.
Certain web interface components in affected TP-Link Aginet devices do not validate and sanitize user-supplied input properly before passing it to system-level command execution functions. An authenticated adjacent attacker may inject specially crafted input to execute arbitrary operation system commands with elevated privileges. Successful exploitation may allow execution of arbitrary system commands, potentially leading to full device compromise.
curl -i -X GET 'https://api.rankiteo.com/underwriter-getcompany-history?
linkedin_id=axa' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
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