SolarWinds
Company Details
Linkedin ID:
solarwinds
Website:
Employees number:
2,599
Number of followers:
277,770
NAICS:
5112
Industry Type:
Homepage:
solarwinds.com
IP Addresses:
0
Company ID:
SOL_1212343
Scan Status:
In-progress
SolarWinds Company CyberSecurity Posture
solarwinds.com
Making IT look easy.
SolarWinds A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
SolarWinds Risk Score (AI oriented)Between 600 and 649
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SolarWinds Global Score (TPRM)XXXX
SolarWinds
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SolarWinds Company CyberSecurity News & History
Past Incidents
17
Attack Types
4
SolarWinds
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The SolarWinds cyber attack, attributed to Russian state-sponsored actors, represents one of the most significant and sophisticated cybersecurity breaches against the global IT supply chain. The attack involved the compromise of the SolarWinds Orion software update mechanism, which was then used to deploy a malicious update to as many as 18,000 SolarWinds customers. This breach allowed the attackers to conduct espionage and potentially disrupt network operations across numerous U.S. federal agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations. The severity of this incident lies not only in the scale and depth of the intrusion but also in the stealth and sophistication with which the attackers operated, going undetected for several months. The SolarWinds breach underscores the high level of vulnerability in global IT supply chains and the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity vigilance and defense measures.
SolarWinds
Breach
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: SolarWinds faced a significant cybersecurity incident involving the exploitation of its Orion software, leading to the compromise of numerous corporate systems. This breach had far-reaching implications, attracting the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which resulted in legal allegations against the firm and its CISO for providing misleading statements post-incident. The event has raised concerns among security executives about the legal ramifications of their response actions in the wake of cybersecurity breaches.
SolarWinds
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The SolarWinds cyber attack, identified in December 2020, stands as one of the most significant and widespread cybersecurity breaches involving a supply chain attack vector. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) operatives executed this meticulously planned operation, subtly compromising the software development process of SolarWinds' Orion Platform. By inserting a malicious code into the software updates, the attackers managed to infiltrate the networks of approximately 18,000 SolarWinds customers, including U.S. federal agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and numerous private sector organizations globally. The severity of this breach lies not only in the scale and high-profile nature of the targeted entities but also in the potential access gained to sensitive information and the compromise of national security interests. The attackers demonstrated advanced capabilities, staying undetected for months while accessing sensitive data. This incident highlighted the vulnerabilities in the supply chain and the significant impact such breaches can have on national security, corporate governance, and consumer trust.
SolarWinds
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: In a highly sophisticated and targeted cyber espionage campaign, SolarWinds, a leading provider of IT management software, became the victim of a massive cyberattack disclosed in December 2020. This attack was orchestrated by allegedly state-sponsored hackers who managed to compromise the company's Orion software by inserting a malicious code into its updates. This backdoor, known as Sunburst, allowed the attackers unprecedented access to the networks of thousands of SolarWinds' clients, including top government agencies in the United States and numerous Fortune 500 companies. The breach's scale and the sensitivity of the data potentially accessed put at risk not only the financial assets and reputation of SolarWinds and its clients but also posed a significant threat to national security. The attackers demonstrated deep technical sophistication, enabling them to stay undetected for several months while conducting espionage and potentially extracting sensitive information.
SolarWinds
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: The **SolarWinds cyberespionage attack (Sunburst)**, uncovered in **2020**, was a **sophisticated Russian state-sponsored cyberattack** that compromised the company’s **Orion software updates**, allowing hackers to infiltrate at least **nine U.S. federal agencies** (including the Treasury, Justice, and Energy Departments) and **hundreds of private companies**. The breach enabled long-term undetected access, exfiltration of sensitive government and corporate data, and potential espionage operations. The attack exploited a **supply-chain vulnerability**, embedding malicious code in legitimate software updates distributed to SolarWinds’ customers. While the full extent of data theft remains partially classified, the incident posed a **severe national security risk**, disrupted trust in critical infrastructure, and triggered regulatory scrutiny. The SEC initially sued SolarWinds and its CISO for **alleged failures in disclosure and security practices**, though the case was later dropped. The attack’s scale and targeting of **government entities** highlighted its potential to undermine geopolitical stability and economic security.
SolarWinds
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the economy of geographical region
Description: The **SolarWinds cyberattack (2020)**, attributed to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), involved hackers injecting malicious code into the company’s **Orion network monitoring software**, which was then distributed to **~18,000 customers**, including **U.S. government agencies (Treasury, Commerce, NTIA), military branches (U.S. Army), and critical infrastructure (Operation Warp Speed for COVID-19 vaccines)**. While only **~100 entities were directly compromised**, the breach enabled **long-term espionage**, granting attackers **remote access to sensitive systems** for months. The fallout included: - **Massive reputational damage** (global media coverage, CNN/60 Minutes features). - **Operational disruption**: SolarWinds halted new feature development for **6 months**, diverting **400 engineers** to security overhauls. - **Financial losses**: **$26M class-action settlement (2022)**, **SEC lawsuit (2023)** against the company and CISO Tim Brown for alleged security misrepresentations, and **customer renewal rates dropping to ~80%** (later recovered to 98%). - **Geopolitical repercussions**: U.S. imposed **sanctions on Russia** and expelled diplomats. - **Health impact**: The CISO suffered a **stress-induced heart attack** post-attack, requiring surgery. The attack was a **supply-chain compromise**, using SolarWinds as a **vector to infiltrate high-value targets**, with implications for **national security** and **global cyber warfare norms**.
SolarWinds
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The **SolarWinds Orion breach** was a highly sophisticated **supply chain cyberattack** discovered in December 2020, attributed to state-sponsored hackers (likely Russian APT29/Cozy Bear). Attackers compromised SolarWinds’ software build system, injecting malicious code into legitimate updates for its **Orion IT monitoring platform**. These trojanized updates were distributed to **over 30,000 organizations globally**, including **U.S. government agencies (Treasury, Commerce, DHS, Pentagon), Fortune 500 companies, and critical infrastructure entities**. The breach granted attackers **unauthorized access to sensitive systems**, enabling **data exfiltration, espionage, and lateral movement** within victim networks. While the full scope remains partially undisclosed, confirmed impacts included **theft of classified emails, intellectual property, and national security-related data**. The attack exploited **trust in third-party software**, bypassing traditional defenses by leveraging SolarWinds’ signed updates. Remediation required **massive forensic investigations, system isolations, and patching**, with long-term reputational and operational damage. The incident prompted **global cybersecurity policy reforms**, including U.S. executive orders mandating **supply chain risk management (C-SCRM)** and zero-trust architectures.
SolarWinds
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The SolarWinds cyber attack, attributed to Russian state-sponsored actors, created a significant breach involving the Orion software platform. This attack compromised several US government agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations. By injecting malicious code into Orion's software updates, the attackers could perform espionage, data theft, and potentially disrupt operations. This sophisticated supply chain attack highlighted the vulnerabilities in the software development and distribution processes. The implications of the breach include the exposure of sensitive governmental communications, potential access to critical infrastructure systems, and the erosion of trust in a widely used IT management tool. The severity and impact of the attack underscore the challenges of securing complex IT ecosystems against state-sponsored cyber threats.
SolarWinds
Ransomware
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The SolarWinds cyberattack, discovered in December 2020, significantly impacted numerous organizations globally, including U.S. federal agencies and Fortune 500 companies. This sophisticated supply chain attack was orchestrated by inserting malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software updates. This breach allowed the threat actors, believed to be state-sponsored, to conduct espionage and exfiltrate data over several months unnoticed. The severity of this attack lies not only in its scale and the sensitivity of the data compromised but also in the profound breach of trust in a widely used network management tool. The attackers had access to sensitive communications, intellectual property, and potentially could have manipulated critical systems, highlighting the significant vulnerabilities in the software supply chain. This incident serves as a stark reminder of the need for stringent cybersecurity measures and rigorous vetting processes for software used within government and corporate environments.
SolarWinds
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with internal employee data leaks
Description: Several U.S. government agencies and large organizations were hit by cyberattacks due to a vulnerability in IT infrastructure provider – SolarWinds. Many government agencies and Fortune 500 companies use SolarWinds, which contributed to the severity of the attack. Organizations were forced to continue working with it despite knowing that a breach had occurred. The attack resulted from a weak password that an intern had used – “solarwinds123”. The attack affected thousands of SolarWinds’ clients, causing billions in damages.
SolarWinds
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with customers data leaks
Description: SolarWinds disclosed a **critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2025-26399)** in its **Web Help Desk (WHD) 12.8.7 and prior versions**, stemming from unsafe deserialization in the **AjaxProxy component**. This flaw, a **patch bypass** of two earlier vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-28986 and CVE-2024-28988), allows **unauthenticated attackers** to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. While no active exploitation has been reported yet, the original flaw (CVE-2024-28986) was previously **added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog** due to real-world attacks. The vulnerability affects **medium-to-large organizations** relying on WHD for IT support, workflow automation, and compliance. A hotfix has been released, requiring manual intervention (replacing JAR files and adding HikariCP.jar), but unpatched systems remain at risk of **full system compromise**, potentially enabling lateral movement within corporate networks. Given SolarWinds’ history with supply-chain attacks (e.g., the 2020 breach), this vulnerability poses a **high-risk vector for cybercriminals or state-sponsored actors** to infiltrate enterprise environments.
SolarWinds
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with customers data leaks
Description: SolarWinds faced a critical vulnerability in their Web Help Desk software, identified as CVE-2024-28989, which allowed attackers to decrypt stored credentials due to cryptographic weaknesses in the AES-GCM implementation. Though patched in version 12.8.5, the flaw was critical because it stemmed from the use of predictable encryption keys and nonce reuse, potentially leading to the decryption of sensitive information such as database passwords and LDAP/SMTP authentication secrets. This vulnerability was addressed quickly by SolarWinds, but highlighted the importance of robust cryptographic practices.
SolarWinds
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The SolarWinds cyber attack, attributed to Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) operatives, represented a sophisticated and long-undetected espionage campaign that compromised the SolarWinds Orion software. This breach, one of the most consequential to date, allowed hackers to infiltrate the networks of thousands of SolarWinds customers, including U.S. government agencies and numerous private sector organizations. The attackers exploited the supply chain vulnerability to insert malicious code into the company's software system. The breach was significant not just for the scale and sensitivity of the information accessed but also for the depth of access the attackers achieved into the networks of critical infrastructure entities, leading to concerns over national security and the integrity of critical IT infrastructure. The attackers' ability to remain undetected for months underscored the sophisticated nature of the operation and the challenge of defending against state-sponsored cyber espionage.
SolarWinds
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack that could bring to a war
Description: The SolarWinds cyberattack, attributed to Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) APT group, represents one of the most significant and sophisticated cybersecurity breaches. This campaign exploited the SolarWinds Orion software, through which the attackers inserted malicious code into the software's updates sent to thousands of customers. The breach enabled extensive surveillance and data exfiltration capabilities, impacting numerous high-profile organizations globally, including US government agencies and major corporations. The attackers gained access to sensitive information, including national security data, intellectual property, and enterprise secrets. The severity of the attack lies in its scope, the level of access obtained, and the duration of unnoticed activities, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in the supply chain security and the challenges in defending against state-sponsored cyber operations.
SolarWinds
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The SolarWinds cyberattack, discovered in December 2020, was a highly sophisticated and targeted espionage operation. It compromised the software development process of SolarWinds, a major US company that provides software for monitoring and managing network infrastructure. The attackers managed to insert a malicious code into SolarWinds' Orion software updates, allowing them to potentially access the networks of thousands of SolarWinds' customers, including numerous US government agencies and Fortune 500 companies. This led to a significant breach of sensitive information and put national security at risk. The attack is notable for its scale, sophistication, and the high profile of the targeted entities. It highlighted the vulnerability of supply chain attacks and raised serious concerns about cybersecurity practices and national defense. The repercussions of the attack are far-reaching, prompting a reevaluation of cybersecurity policies and measures across the private and public sectors.
N-able
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack with significant impact with customers data leaks
Description: CISA issued urgent warnings about two critical vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-8875 and CVE-2025-8876) in **N-able N-Central**, a widely used remote monitoring and management (RMM) software. The flaws—an **insecure deserialization** vulnerability enabling arbitrary command execution and a **command injection** vulnerability due to improper input sanitization—are actively exploited by threat actors. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, execute malicious code, modify system configurations, or deploy payloads across enterprise networks. While no direct ransomware link is confirmed, the combined risks pose severe threats to data integrity, system control, and network security. CISA mandated patches or discontinuation of use by **August 20, 2025**, with N-able releasing version **2025.3.1** to address the issues. Failure to remediate could lead to large-scale breaches, lateral movement within networks, and potential operational disruptions for organizations relying on N-Central for IT management.
N-able
Vulnerability
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: The article highlights critical vulnerabilities in **N-able’s N-central**, an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) tool used by MSPs (Managed Service Providers) to oversee thousands of SMB (Small and Midsize Business) environments. Two severe flaws—**CVE-2025-8876 (command injection via unsanitized user input)** and **CVE-2025-8875 (insecure deserialization leading to arbitrary command execution)**—pose a high risk of exploitation. Over **780 vulnerable N-central servers remain exposed globally**, with concentrations in North America (415) and Europe (239), while Shodan reports over **3,000 exposed instances**. Exploitation could grant attackers **full control over MSP systems**, enabling lateral movement into client networks, data exfiltration, or deployment of ransomware across interconnected SMBs. Given N-central’s role in managing IT infrastructure for thousands of businesses, a successful attack could **disrupt operations, compromise sensitive data, or trigger cascading breaches** across supply chains. The historical context—N-able’s origins as SolarWinds’ MSP division (spun off post-2021)—adds weight to the risk, as threat actors may leverage familiarity with legacy systems for targeted campaigns. The exposure of **unpatched, internet-facing servers** amplifies the likelihood of mass exploitation, potentially leading to **widespread outages, financial fraud, or operational paralysis** for dependent organizations.
SolarWinds Company Scoring based on AI Models
Cyber Incidents Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
A.I Risk Score Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
Underwriter Stats for SolarWinds
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Average (This Year)
SolarWinds has 132.56% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs All-Companies Average (This Year)
SolarWinds has 56.25% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident Types SolarWinds vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
SolarWinds reported 1 incidents this year: 0 cyber attacks, 0 ransomware, 0 vulnerabilities, 1 data breaches, compared to industry peers with at least 1 incident.
Incident History — SolarWinds (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SolarWinds cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
SolarWinds Company Subsidiaries
Making IT look easy.
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SolarWinds CyberSecurity News
November 27, 2025 08:03 AM
SEC ends lawsuit against SolarWinds and its security chief after years of fallout from 2020 hack
SEC drops SolarWinds lawsuit: case against company and CISO ends after massive Russia-linked hack.
November 25, 2025 04:48 PM
The SEC Backs Down in Landmark Cybersecurity Enforcement Case Against SolarWinds and Its CISO
Last week, the SEC agreed to voluntarily dismiss its high-profile case against SolarWinds Corporation (“SolarWinds” or the “Company”) and...
November 24, 2025 10:41 PM
SEC dismisses SolarWinds case tied to 2020 cyberattack
The dismissal of charges against SolarWinds for alleged cybersecurity lapses related to a 2020 Russian cyberattack in 2020 are the latest in...
November 24, 2025 10:03 PM
SEC Dismisses Remainder of SolarWinds Case
by: Hunton Andrews Kurth's Privacy and Cybersecurity, Hunton Andrews Kurth - Privacy and Information Security Law Blog-Hunton Andrews Kurth.
November 24, 2025 07:53 PM
The SolarWinds dismissal: a reprieve, not a pardon
Here's why CISOs shouldn't think they are off the hook following the SEC's dismissal of the SolarWinds case.
November 24, 2025 05:43 PM
SEC Backs Off SolarWinds: End of an Era for Cyber Disclosure Fights
In a stunning reversal, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on November 20, 2025, voluntarily dismissed its high-profile civil fraud...
November 24, 2025 03:28 PM
SEC drops SolarWinds lawsuit
The case that threatened to make CISOs responsible for security failures has been scrapped – but execs shouldn't rest too easily.
November 24, 2025 06:03 AM
SEC to Drop Controversial SolarWinds Cyberattack Lawsuit
The US Securities and Exchange Commission will drop its landmark lawsuit against SolarWinds Corp. that accused the company of covering up...
November 23, 2025 01:55 PM
Cybersecurity News Weekly Newsletter – Fortinet, Chrome 0-Day Flaws, Cloudflare Outage and Salesforce...
Welcome to this week's edition of the Cybersecurity News Weekly Newsletter, where we analyze the critical incidents defining the current...
Frequently Asked Questions
Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
SolarWinds CyberSecurity History Information
Official Website of SolarWinds
The official website of SolarWinds is http://www.solarwinds.com.
SolarWinds’s AI-Generated Cybersecurity Score
According to Rankiteo, SolarWinds’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 600, reflecting their Poor security posture.
How many security badges does SolarWinds’ have ?
According to Rankiteo, SolarWinds currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
Does SolarWinds have SOC 2 Type 1 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, SolarWinds is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
Does SolarWinds have SOC 2 Type 2 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, SolarWinds does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
Does SolarWinds comply with GDPR ?
According to Rankiteo, SolarWinds is not listed as GDPR compliant.
Does SolarWinds have PCI DSS certification ?
According to Rankiteo, SolarWinds does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
Does SolarWinds comply with HIPAA ?
According to Rankiteo, SolarWinds is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
Does SolarWinds have ISO 27001 certification ?
According to Rankiteo,SolarWinds is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Industry Classification of SolarWinds
SolarWinds operates primarily in the Software Development industry.
Number of Employees at SolarWinds
SolarWinds employs approximately 2,599 people worldwide.
Subsidiaries Owned by SolarWinds
SolarWinds presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
SolarWinds’s LinkedIn Followers
SolarWinds’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 277,770 followers.
NAICS Classification of SolarWinds
SolarWinds is classified under the NAICS code 5112, which corresponds to Software Publishers.
SolarWinds’s Presence on Crunchbase
No, SolarWinds does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
SolarWinds’s Presence on LinkedIn
Yes, SolarWinds maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/solarwinds.
Cybersecurity Incidents Involving SolarWinds
As of December 01, 2025, Rankiteo reports that SolarWinds has experienced 17 cybersecurity incidents.
Number of Peer and Competitor Companies
SolarWinds has an estimated 26,916 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
What types of cybersecurity incidents have occurred at SolarWinds ?
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack, Vulnerability, Ransomware and Breach.
What was the total financial impact of these incidents on SolarWinds ?
Total Financial Loss: The total financial loss from these incidents is estimated to be $26 million.
How does SolarWinds detect and respond to cybersecurity incidents ?
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an remediation measures with patched in version 12.8.5, and containment measures with apply n-able patch (version 2025.3.1) immediately, containment measures with discontinue use of n-central if patches are unavailable, and remediation measures with follow cisa’s binding operational directive (bod) 22-01 for cloud services, remediation measures with update all affected n-central deployments by august 20, 2025, and communication strategy with cisa advisory issued (added to known exploited vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-08-13), communication strategy with urgent notification to organizations using n-central, and enhanced monitoring with monitor for signs of exploitation (e.g., unauthorized commands, lateral movement), and third party assistance with shadowserver foundation (vulnerability tracking), third party assistance with uk government (collaboration), and and third party assistance with trend micro zero day initiative (zdi), and containment measures with hotfix release (manual patching required), and remediation measures with stop web help desk service, remediation measures with backup and delete `c3p0.jar`, remediation measures with backup `whd-core.jar`, `whd-web.jar`, `whd-persistence.jar`, remediation measures with replace with hotfix-supplied jars (`whd-core.jar`, `whd-web.jar`, `whd-persistence.jar`), remediation measures with add `hikaricp.jar`, remediation measures with restart web help desk, and recovery measures with hotfix application via solarwinds customer portal, and communication strategy with security bulletin published, communication strategy with upgrade instructions provided, and third party assistance with moody’s supply chain catalyst (cyber risk ratings), third party assistance with external cyber risk assessments, and containment measures with restricting vendor access to sensitive data, containment measures with reviewing mission-critical data sharing, containment measures with using secure platforms for file exchange, and remediation measures with implementing cybersecurity supply chain risk management (c-scrm) practices, remediation measures with reducing supplier list to essentials, remediation measures with setting strict data-sharing policies, and recovery measures with holding extra inventory to mitigate disruptions, recovery measures with enhancing supply chain resilience, and enhanced monitoring with monitoring high-risk vendors with access to sensitive data, and incident response plan activated with yes (immediate crisis mode), and third party assistance with mandiant (initial notification), third party assistance with crowdstrike (investigation), third party assistance with kpmg (forensic/response), third party assistance with dla piper (legal), and law enforcement notified with yes (u.s. government agencies involved), and containment measures with isolation of orion build environment, containment measures with switch to proton email/signal, containment measures with in-person crisis coordination, and remediation measures with 6-month focus on security over new features, remediation measures with transparency initiatives (sharing threat actor ttps), and recovery measures with engineering team reprioritized to security, recovery measures with customer communication campaigns, and communication strategy with media appearances (cnn, 60 minutes), communication strategy with direct verbal communication with affected entities, communication strategy with stock market notification pre-opening, and enhanced monitoring with likely (implied by security focus), and and third party assistance with cybersecurity firms (e.g., fireeye, crowdstrike), third party assistance with federal agencies (cisa, fbi), and and containment measures with isolation of compromised solarwinds orion instances, containment measures with network segmentation, containment measures with revocation of compromised credentials, and remediation measures with software patches, remediation measures with forensic analysis, remediation measures with enhanced monitoring, and recovery measures with rebuilding trusted environments, recovery measures with customer notifications, recovery measures with regulatory reporting, and communication strategy with public disclosures, communication strategy with customer advisories, communication strategy with coordination with federal agencies, and and .
Incident Details
Can you provide details on each incident ?
Title: SolarWinds Cyberattack
Description: Several U.S. government agencies and large organizations were hit by cyberattacks due to a vulnerability in IT infrastructure provider – SolarWinds.
Type: Cyberattack
Attack Vector: Vulnerability in IT infrastructure
Vulnerability Exploited: Weak password ('solarwinds123')
Title: SolarWinds Cyberattack
Description: The SolarWinds cyberattack, discovered in December 2020, significantly impacted numerous organizations globally, including U.S. federal agencies and Fortune 500 companies. This sophisticated supply chain attack was orchestrated by inserting malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software updates. This breach allowed the threat actors, believed to be state-sponsored, to conduct espionage and exfiltrate data over several months unnoticed. The severity of this attack lies not only in its scale and the sensitivity of the data compromised but also in the profound breach of trust in a widely used network management tool. The attackers had access to sensitive communications, intellectual property, and potentially could have manipulated critical systems, highlighting the significant vulnerabilities in the software supply chain. This incident serves as a stark reminder of the need for stringent cybersecurity measures and rigorous vetting processes for software used within government and corporate environments.
Date Detected: December 2020
Type: Supply Chain Attack
Attack Vector: Malicious Code in Software Updates
Vulnerability Exploited: Trust in Software Supply Chain
Threat Actor: State-Sponsored Actors
Motivation: Espionage
Title: SolarWinds Cyberattack
Description: The SolarWinds cyberattack, discovered in December 2020, was a highly sophisticated and targeted espionage operation. It compromised the software development process of SolarWinds, a major US company that provides software for monitoring and managing network infrastructure. The attackers managed to insert a malicious code into SolarWinds' Orion software updates, allowing them to potentially access the networks of thousands of SolarWinds' customers, including numerous US government agencies and Fortune 500 companies. This led to a significant breach of sensitive information and put national security at risk. The attack is notable for its scale, sophistication, and the high profile of the targeted entities. It highlighted the vulnerability of supply chain attacks and raised serious concerns about cybersecurity practices and national defense. The repercussions of the attack are far-reaching, prompting a reevaluation of cybersecurity policies and measures across the private and public sectors.
Date Detected: December 2020
Type: Espionage
Attack Vector: Supply Chain Attack
Vulnerability Exploited: Insertion of malicious code into software updates
Motivation: Espionage
Title: SolarWinds Cyberattack
Description: The SolarWinds cyberattack, attributed to Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) APT group, represents one of the most significant and sophisticated cybersecurity breaches. This campaign exploited the SolarWinds Orion software, through which the attackers inserted malicious code into the software's updates sent to thousands of customers. The breach enabled extensive surveillance and data exfiltration capabilities, impacting numerous high-profile organizations globally, including US government agencies and major corporations. The attackers gained access to sensitive information, including national security data, intellectual property, and enterprise secrets. The severity of the attack lies in its scope, the level of access obtained, and the duration of unnoticed activities, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in the supply chain security and the challenges in defending against state-sponsored cyber operations.
Type: Supply Chain Attack
Attack Vector: Malicious Software Update
Vulnerability Exploited: SolarWinds Orion Software
Threat Actor: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) APT group
Motivation: EspionageData Exfiltration
Title: SolarWinds Cyber Attack
Description: The SolarWinds cyber attack, attributed to Russian state-sponsored actors, created a significant breach involving the Orion software platform. This attack compromised several US government agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations. By injecting malicious code into Orion's software updates, the attackers could perform espionage, data theft, and potentially disrupt operations. This sophisticated supply chain attack highlighted the vulnerabilities in the software development and distribution processes. The implications of the breach include the exposure of sensitive governmental communications, potential access to critical infrastructure systems, and the erosion of trust in a widely used IT management tool. The severity and impact of the attack underscore the challenges of securing complex IT ecosystems against state-sponsored cyber threats.
Type: Supply Chain Attack
Attack Vector: Malicious Code Injection
Vulnerability Exploited: Software Development and Distribution Processes
Threat Actor: Russian state-sponsored actors
Motivation: EspionageData TheftPotential Operational Disruption
Title: SolarWinds Cyber Espionage Campaign
Description: In a highly sophisticated and targeted cyber espionage campaign, SolarWinds, a leading provider of IT management software, became the victim of a massive cyberattack disclosed in December 2020. This attack was orchestrated by allegedly state-sponsored hackers who managed to compromise the company's Orion software by inserting a malicious code into its updates. This backdoor, known as Sunburst, allowed the attackers unprecedented access to the networks of thousands of SolarWinds' clients, including top government agencies in the United States and numerous Fortune 500 companies. The breach's scale and the sensitivity of the data potentially accessed put at risk not only the financial assets and reputation of SolarWinds and its clients but also posed a significant threat to national security. The attackers demonstrated deep technical sophistication, enabling them to stay undetected for several months while conducting espionage and potentially extracting sensitive information.
Date Publicly Disclosed: December 2020
Type: Cyber Espionage
Attack Vector: Supply Chain Attack
Vulnerability Exploited: Compromised Software Update (Orion Software)
Threat Actor: Allegedly State-Sponsored Hackers
Motivation: Espionage
Title: SolarWinds Cyber Attack
Description: The SolarWinds cyber attack, attributed to Russian state-sponsored actors, represents one of the most significant and sophisticated cybersecurity breaches against the global IT supply chain. The attack involved the compromise of the SolarWinds Orion software update mechanism, which was then used to deploy a malicious update to as many as 18,000 SolarWinds customers. This breach allowed the attackers to conduct espionage and potentially disrupt network operations across numerous U.S. federal agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations. The severity of this incident lies not only in the scale and depth of the intrusion but also in the stealth and sophistication with which the attackers operated, going undetected for several months. The SolarWinds breach underscores the high level of vulnerability in global IT supply chains and the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity vigilance and defense measures.
Type: Cyber Espionage
Attack Vector: Supply Chain Compromise
Vulnerability Exploited: Malicious Software Update
Threat Actor: Russian State-Sponsored Actors
Motivation: EspionagePotential Disruption
Title: SolarWinds Cyber Attack
Description: The SolarWinds cyber attack, identified in December 2020, stands as one of the most significant and widespread cybersecurity breaches involving a supply chain attack vector. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) operatives executed this meticulously planned operation, subtly compromising the software development process of SolarWinds' Orion Platform. By inserting a malicious code into the software updates, the attackers managed to infiltrate the networks of approximately 18,000 SolarWinds customers, including U.S. federal agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and numerous private sector organizations globally. The severity of this breach lies not only in the scale and high-profile nature of the targeted entities but also in the potential access gained to sensitive information and the compromise of national security interests. The attackers demonstrated advanced capabilities, staying undetected for months while accessing sensitive data. This incident highlighted the vulnerabilities in the supply chain and the significant impact such breaches can have on national security, corporate governance, and consumer trust.
Date Detected: December 2020
Type: Supply Chain Attack
Attack Vector: Malicious Code Insertion in Software Updates
Vulnerability Exploited: Software Development Process
Threat Actor: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
Motivation: Access to Sensitive Information and Compromise of National Security Interests
Title: SolarWinds Cyber Attack
Description: The SolarWinds cyber attack, attributed to Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) operatives, represented a sophisticated and long-undetected espionage campaign that compromised the SolarWinds Orion software. This breach, one of the most consequential to date, allowed hackers to infiltrate the networks of thousands of SolarWinds customers, including U.S. government agencies and numerous private sector organizations. The attackers exploited the supply chain vulnerability to insert malicious code into the company's software system. The breach was significant not just for the scale and sensitivity of the information accessed but also for the depth of access the attackers achieved into the networks of critical infrastructure entities, leading to concerns over national security and the integrity of critical IT infrastructure. The attackers' ability to remain undetected for months underscored the sophisticated nature of the operation and the challenge of defending against state-sponsored cyber espionage.
Type: Espionage
Attack Vector: Supply Chain
Vulnerability Exploited: Software supply chain vulnerability
Threat Actor: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
Motivation: Espionage
Title: SolarWinds Orion Software Breach
Description: SolarWinds faced a significant cybersecurity incident involving the exploitation of its Orion software, leading to the compromise of numerous corporate systems. This breach had far-reaching implications, attracting the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which resulted in legal allegations against the firm and its CISO for providing misleading statements post-incident. The event has raised concerns among security executives about the legal ramifications of their response actions in the wake of cybersecurity breaches.
Type: Software Exploitation
Attack Vector: Supply Chain Attack
Vulnerability Exploited: Orion Software Vulnerability
Title: SolarWinds Web Help Desk Vulnerability
Description: SolarWinds faced a critical vulnerability in their Web Help Desk software, identified as CVE-2024-28989, which allowed attackers to decrypt stored credentials due to cryptographic weaknesses in the AES-GCM implementation. Though patched in version 12.8.5, the flaw was critical because it stemmed from the use of predictable encryption keys and nonce reuse, potentially leading to the decryption of sensitive information such as database passwords and LDAP/SMTP authentication secrets. This vulnerability was addressed quickly by SolarWinds, but highlighted the importance of robust cryptographic practices.
Type: Vulnerability Exploit
Attack Vector: Cryptographic Weakness
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2024-28989
Title: Critical Vulnerabilities in N-able N-Central RMM Software Actively Exploited (CVE-2025-8875 & CVE-2025-8876)
Description: CISA has issued urgent warnings regarding two critical security vulnerabilities in N-able N-Central remote monitoring and management (RMM) software that threat actors are actively exploiting. The vulnerabilities, CVE-2025-8875 (insecure deserialization) and CVE-2025-8876 (command injection), pose significant risks to organizations using this widely-deployed IT management platform. Both flaws allow for remote code execution, unauthorized access, and potential system control by attackers. CISA has set a deadline of August 20, 2025, for mandatory fixes, with N-able releasing version 2025.3.1 to address these issues.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2025-08-13
Type: Vulnerability Exploitation
Attack Vector: NetworkUser-Controlled Input (Deserialization)Improper Input Sanitization (Command Injection)
Title: Vulnerabilities in N-able N-central Servers Expose Thousands of MSPs and SMBs
Description: According to statistics from the Shadowserver Foundation, there are over 780 vulnerable N-central servers exposed to the internet, with the majority located in North America (415) and Europe (239). Shodan shows over 3,000 results for N-central. The product, developed by N-able (a spin-off from SolarWinds in 2021), is used by MSPs to manage thousands of small and midsize businesses (SMBs). Two critical vulnerabilities were identified: a command injection flaw via improper sanitization of user input (CVE-2025-8876) and an insecure deserialization vulnerability leading to command execution (CVE-2025-8875). These vulnerabilities pose a significant risk as N-central is widely used by MSPs and Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software providers, making them prime targets for cyberattacks.
Type: Vulnerability Exposure
Attack Vector: Command Injection (CVE-2025-8876)Insecure Deserialization (CVE-2025-8875)
Vulnerability Exploited: CVE-2025-8876 (Command Injection via Improper Input Sanitization)CVE-2025-8875 (Insecure Deserialization Leading to Command Execution)
Title: Critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability in SolarWinds Web Help Desk (CVE-2025-26399)
Description: SolarWinds has released a hotfix for a critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-26399) in Web Help Desk (WHD) that allows unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE). The flaw is a patch bypass of two prior vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-28988 and CVE-2024-28986) and stems from unsafe deserialization in the AjaxProxy component. Successful exploitation permits attackers to execute commands on the host machine. The issue affects WHD version 12.8.7 and earlier. SolarWinds has provided a hotfix via its Customer Portal, requiring manual file replacements and a service restart. CISA previously added the original flaw (CVE-2024-28986) to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog in August 2024.
Type: Vulnerability
Attack Vector: NetworkUnauthenticated AccessDeserialization
Vulnerability Exploited: Primary: CVE-2025-26399, CVE-2024-28988CVE-2024-28986Component: AjaxProxy (unsafe deserialization), 12.8.712.8.3 and all prior versions
Title: Supply Chain Cyber Risk and Vendor-Related Breaches
Description: The cyber incident description highlights the growing threat of supply chain cyberattacks, with 67% of firms reporting an increase in cyberattacks over the past year. Among these, 40% were vendor-related breaches within supply chains. High-profile incidents like the SolarWinds Orion breach, which compromised over 30,000 organizations globally via malicious software updates, underscore the severity. Vulnerabilities often arise in supplier systems, third-party infrastructure, and procured products/services, leading to data theft, IP loss, service disruption, and customer dissatisfaction. Many organizations lack the expertise to manage these risks effectively, emphasizing the need for stronger cybersecurity supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) practices.
Type: supply chain attack
Attack Vector: malicious software updatessupplier system vulnerabilitiesthird-party infrastructure weaknessesprocured product/service exploits
Vulnerability Exploited: poor cyber defenses in supplier systemslimited transparency in global supply chainsinconsistent security standards across geographiesunmonitored vendor access to sensitive data
Motivation: financial gainintellectual property theftservice disruptiondata exfiltration
Title: SolarWinds Supply Chain Cyberattack (SUNBURST)
Description: The SolarWinds cyberattack, attributed to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), involved the compromise of SolarWinds' Orion software build environment. Malicious code was inserted into legitimate software updates (SUNBURST backdoor), which were then distributed to SolarWinds' customers, including U.S. government agencies (e.g., Treasury, Commerce, NTIA) and private companies. The attack enabled remote access to affected systems, facilitating espionage. SolarWinds was notified on December 12, 2020, by Mandiant, revealing that ~18,000 customers had downloaded the tainted update, though only ~100 were ultimately compromised. The incident led to significant operational disruptions, financial losses, legal repercussions (including a $26M class-action settlement and SEC lawsuit), and severe stress on SolarWinds' leadership, including CISO Tim Brown, who suffered a heart attack during the aftermath.
Date Detected: 2020-12-12
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2020-12-13
Type: Supply Chain Attack
Attack Vector: Compromised Software UpdateBuild Environment InfiltrationTrojanized Orion Software (SUNBURST malware)
Vulnerability Exploited: Supply Chain WeaknessInsecure Build ProcessLack of Code Integrity Checks
Threat Actor: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) / APT29 / Cozy Bear
Motivation: EspionageIntelligence GatheringNation-State Operations
Title: SolarWinds Sunburst Cyberespionage Campaign (2020)
Description: The SolarWinds cyberespionage incident, attributed to Russian threat actors, involved a supply-chain attack via the SolarWinds Orion software. The attack, dubbed 'Sunburst,' compromised at least nine federal agencies and hundreds of companies beginning in 2019. The SEC initially pursued legal action against SolarWinds and its CISO, Tim Brown, for alleged inadequate disclosure of the breach and misleading security assertions. The case was dropped in 2024 without explanation, resolving a contentious legal battle that raised concerns among cybersecurity executives about the 'chilling effect' of regulatory actions on breach disclosures.
Date Detected: 2020-12
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2020-12-13
Type: cyberespionage
Attack Vector: compromised software update (SolarWinds Orion)backdoor (Sunburst malware)
Vulnerability Exploited: Supply-chain compromise via trojanized SolarWinds Orion software updates
Threat Actor: Russian state-sponsored actors (alleged)APT29 (Cozy Bear)
Motivation: espionageintelligence gathering
What are the most common types of attacks the company has faced ?
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Vulnerability.
How does the company identify the attack vectors used in incidents ?
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Malicious Code in Software Updates, Software updates, SolarWinds Orion Software, Compromised Software Update, Malicious Code in Software Updates, Exploiting CVE-2025-8875 (deserialization) or CVE-2025-8876 (command injection) in N-CentralPotential phishing or credential theft to access N-Central interfaces, malicious software updates (e.g., SolarWinds Orion)vendor systems with weak cyber defenses, SolarWinds Orion build environment and Compromised SolarWinds Orion software build system (2019).
Impact of the Incidents
What was the impact of each incident ?
Incident : Cyberattack SOL22751222
Financial Loss: Billions in damages
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL802050124
Data Compromised: Sensitive communications, Intellectual property
Systems Affected: Critical Systems
Incident : Espionage SOL327050424
Systems Affected: Network infrastructure monitoring software
Brand Reputation Impact: Significant
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL708050624
Data Compromised: National security data, Intellectual property, Enterprise secrets
Systems Affected: SolarWinds Orion Software
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL802050624
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of trust in a widely used IT management tool
Incident : Cyber Espionage SOL501050624
Data Compromised: Sensitive Information
Systems Affected: Orion SoftwareNetworks of Clients
Brand Reputation Impact: Significant
Incident : Cyber Espionage SOL102050724
Systems Affected: Numerous U.S. federal agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL201050824
Data Compromised: Sensitive Information
Systems Affected: 18,000 SolarWinds Customers
Incident : Espionage SOL1016050824
Systems Affected: U.S. government agenciesprivate sector organizations
Incident : Software Exploitation SOL527030325
Systems Affected: Corporate Systems
Brand Reputation Impact: High
Legal Liabilities: Legal allegations by the Securities and Exchange Commission
Incident : Vulnerability Exploit SOL409031225
Data Compromised: Database passwords, Ldap/smtp authentication secrets
Systems Affected: Web Help Desk software
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Systems Affected: N-able N-Central RMM deployments (versions prior to 2025.3.1)Managed systems connected to vulnerable N-Central instances
Operational Impact: Potential loss of control over managed IT systemsRisk of lateral movement within enterprise networksPossible deployment of malicious payloads (e.g., ransomware)
Brand Reputation Impact: Reputational damage for N-able due to critical vulnerabilitiesPotential loss of trust in N-Central among MSPs and enterprises
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Systems Affected: 780+ vulnerable N-central servers (3,000+ total exposed per Shodan)
Operational Impact: High risk to MSPs and thousands of SMBs due to potential exploitation of N-central vulnerabilities
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential reputational damage to N-able and affected MSPs if vulnerabilities are exploited
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Systems Affected: SolarWinds Web Help Desk (WHD)
Operational Impact: Potential unauthorized command execution on host machinesRisk of workflow disruption in IT support systems
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential reputational damage due to recurring vulnerabilities in SolarWinds products
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Data Compromised: Sensitive corporate information, Designs, Contracts, Intellectual property
Systems Affected: confidential company systemsvendor systems with access to sensitive data
Downtime: ['short-term disruption to deliveries', 'operational delays']
Operational Impact: service disruptionsupply chain ripple effectscustomer dissatisfaction
Brand Reputation Impact: loss of trust due to data breachesdamage from service disruptions
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Financial Loss: $26M (class-action settlement) + undisclosed legal/operational costs
Data Compromised: Network access credentials, Internal communications, Potential government/enterprise data
Systems Affected: SolarWinds Orion PlatformCustomer IT Environments (100+ agencies/companies)
Downtime: 6 months (new feature development halted)
Operational Impact: Shift to security-focused engineeringUse of Proton Email/Signal for communicationsIn-person crisis management due to compromised email
Conversion Rate Impact: Customer renewal rate dropped to ~80% (recovered to >98% later)
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe reputational damageLoss of trust in supply chain securityMedia scrutiny (CNN, 60 Minutes, major newspapers)
Legal Liabilities: SEC lawsuit (2023) against SolarWinds and CISO Tim BrownClass-action settlement ($26M, 2022)Potential fines from regulatory violations
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Data Compromised: Government agency data, Corporate intellectual property, Email communications
Systems Affected: SolarWinds Orion softwarefederal agency networks (at least 9)hundreds of private-sector companies
Operational Impact: compromised network integritylong-term forensic investigationsregulatory scrutiny
Brand Reputation Impact: significant reputational damageloss of customer trustlegal and regulatory challenges
Legal Liabilities: SEC lawsuit (later dropped)potential shareholder litigationregulatory investigations
What is the average financial loss per incident ?
Average Financial Loss: The average financial loss per incident is $1.53 million.
What types of data are most commonly compromised in incidents ?
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Sensitive Communications, Intellectual Property, , Sensitive information, National Security Data, Intellectual Property, Enterprise Secrets, , Sensitive Information, Database Passwords, Ldap/Smtp Authentication Secrets, , Sensitive Corporate Information, Designs, Contracts, Intellectual Property, , Network Access, System Credentials, Potential Government/Enterprise Data, , Government Communications, Corporate Emails, Intellectual Property, Network Access Credentials and .
Which entities were affected by each incident ?
Incident : Cyberattack SOL22751222
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: IT infrastructure provider
Industry: Technology
Customers Affected: Thousands of clients
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL802050124
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Company
Industry: Technology
Location: Global
Incident : Espionage SOL327050424
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Company
Industry: Technology
Location: United States
Size: Large
Customers Affected: Numerous US government agencies, Fortune 500 companies
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL708050624
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: Technology
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Thousands of customers
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL708050624
Entity Name: US Government Agencies
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Public Sector
Location: United States
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL708050624
Entity Name: Major Corporations
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: Various
Location: Global
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL802050624
Entity Type: Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure Entities, Private Sector Organizations
Location: United States
Incident : Cyber Espionage SOL501050624
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: IT Management Software
Customers Affected: Top Government Agencies, Fortune 500 Companies
Incident : Cyber Espionage SOL102050724
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: IT Software Company
Industry: Technology
Size: Large
Customers Affected: 18,000
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL201050824
Entity Name: SolarWinds Customers
Entity Type: U.S. Federal Agencies, Critical Infrastructure Entities, Private Sector Organizations
Location: Global
Customers Affected: 18,000
Incident : Espionage SOL1016050824
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Company
Industry: Software
Customers Affected: U.S. government agencies, numerous private sector organizations
Incident : Software Exploitation SOL527030325
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Corporation
Industry: Technology
Incident : Vulnerability Exploit SOL409031225
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Software Company
Industry: Technology
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Entity Name: N-able Technologies
Entity Type: Software Vendor
Industry: IT Management / Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM)
Location: Ottawa, Canada (HQ)
Customers Affected: Organizations using N-able N-Central (exact number unspecified)
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Entity Type: Managed Service Providers (MSPs)
Industry: IT Services
Location: Global
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Entity Type: Enterprises
Industry: Multiple (any using N-Central for IT management)
Location: Global
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Entity Name: N-able
Entity Type: Software Developer (MSP/RMM Solutions)
Industry: Technology (IT Management)
Location: Global (HQ in USA)
Customers Affected: Thousands of MSPs and SMBs using N-central
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Entity Name: Managed Service Providers (MSPs) using N-central
Entity Type: Service Providers
Industry: IT Services
Location: North AmericaEuropeGlobal
Customers Affected: Thousands of SMBs managed via N-central
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Entity Name: Small and Midsize Businesses (SMBs)
Entity Type: End Customers
Industry: Multiple Industries
Location: Global
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Software Vendor
Industry: IT Management & Monitoring
Location: USA
Size: Large
Customers Affected: Medium-to-large organizations using Web Help Desk (WHD) 12.8.7 or earlier
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Entity Name: SolarWinds (example high-profile case)
Entity Type: software provider
Industry: technology
Location: global (30,000+ organizations affected)
Customers Affected: 30,000+ organizations
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Entity Name: Unspecified firms (67% reporting increased attacks)
Entity Type: various industries, supply chain-dependent businesses
Location: global
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: Software Company
Industry: IT/Network Management
Location: Austin, Texas, USA
Size: ~400 engineers (mentioned in response team)
Customers Affected: 18,000 downloaded tainted update; ~100 agencies/companies compromised
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Entity Name: U.S. Treasury Department
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Sector/Finance
Location: USA
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Entity Name: U.S. Department of Commerce (NTIA)
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Public Sector/Telecommunications
Location: USA
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Entity Name: Operation Warp Speed (COVID-19 Vaccine Program)
Entity Type: Government Initiative
Industry: Healthcare
Location: USA
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Entity Name: Thousands of private companies/public institutions (global)
Location: Global
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Entity Name: SolarWinds
Entity Type: private company
Industry: IT management software
Location: Austin, Texas, USA
Size: publicly traded (NYSE: SWI)
Customers Affected: hundreds (including federal agencies and Fortune 500 companies)
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Entity Name: U.S. Federal Agencies
Entity Type: government
Industry: public sector
Location: United States
Response to the Incidents
What measures were taken in response to each incident ?
Incident : Vulnerability Exploit SOL409031225
Remediation Measures: Patched in version 12.8.5
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Containment Measures: Apply N-able patch (version 2025.3.1) immediatelyDiscontinue use of N-Central if patches are unavailable
Remediation Measures: Follow CISA’s Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01 for cloud servicesUpdate all affected N-Central deployments by August 20, 2025
Communication Strategy: CISA advisory issued (added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-08-13)Urgent notification to organizations using N-Central
Enhanced Monitoring: Monitor for signs of exploitation (e.g., unauthorized commands, lateral movement)
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Third Party Assistance: Shadowserver Foundation (Vulnerability Tracking), Uk Government (Collaboration).
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Third Party Assistance: Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (Zdi).
Containment Measures: Hotfix release (manual patching required)
Remediation Measures: Stop Web Help Desk serviceBackup and delete `c3p0.jar`Backup `whd-core.jar`, `whd-web.jar`, `whd-persistence.jar`Replace with hotfix-supplied JARs (`whd-core.jar`, `whd-web.jar`, `whd-persistence.jar`)Add `HikariCP.jar`Restart Web Help Desk
Recovery Measures: Hotfix application via SolarWinds Customer Portal
Communication Strategy: Security bulletin publishedUpgrade instructions provided
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Third Party Assistance: Moody’S Supply Chain Catalyst (Cyber Risk Ratings), External Cyber Risk Assessments.
Containment Measures: restricting vendor access to sensitive datareviewing mission-critical data sharingusing secure platforms for file exchange
Remediation Measures: implementing cybersecurity supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) practicesreducing supplier list to essentialssetting strict data-sharing policies
Recovery Measures: holding extra inventory to mitigate disruptionsenhancing supply chain resilience
Enhanced Monitoring: monitoring high-risk vendors with access to sensitive data
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (immediate crisis mode)
Third Party Assistance: Mandiant (Initial Notification), Crowdstrike (Investigation), Kpmg (Forensic/Response), Dla Piper (Legal).
Law Enforcement Notified: Yes (U.S. government agencies involved)
Containment Measures: Isolation of Orion build environmentSwitch to Proton Email/SignalIn-person crisis coordination
Remediation Measures: 6-month focus on security over new featuresTransparency initiatives (sharing threat actor TTPs)
Recovery Measures: Engineering team reprioritized to securityCustomer communication campaigns
Communication Strategy: Media appearances (CNN, 60 Minutes)Direct verbal communication with affected entitiesStock market notification pre-opening
Enhanced Monitoring: Likely (implied by security focus)
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Third Party Assistance: Cybersecurity Firms (E.G., Fireeye, Crowdstrike), Federal Agencies (Cisa, Fbi).
Containment Measures: isolation of compromised SolarWinds Orion instancesnetwork segmentationrevocation of compromised credentials
Remediation Measures: software patchesforensic analysisenhanced monitoring
Recovery Measures: rebuilding trusted environmentscustomer notificationsregulatory reporting
Communication Strategy: public disclosurescustomer advisoriescoordination with federal agencies
Network Segmentation: True
What is the company's incident response plan?
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Yes (immediate crisis mode), .
How does the company involve third-party assistance in incident response ?
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through Shadowserver Foundation (Vulnerability Tracking), UK Government (Collaboration), , Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), , Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst (cyber risk ratings), external cyber risk assessments, , Mandiant (initial notification), CrowdStrike (investigation), KPMG (forensic/response), DLA Piper (legal), , cybersecurity firms (e.g., FireEye, CrowdStrike), federal agencies (CISA, FBI), .
Data Breach Information
What type of data was compromised in each breach ?
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL802050124
Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive communications, Intellectual property
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
Incident : Espionage SOL327050424
Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive information
Sensitivity of Data: High
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL708050624
Type of Data Compromised: National security data, Intellectual property, Enterprise secrets
Sensitivity of Data: High
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL201050824
Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive Information
Incident : Vulnerability Exploit SOL409031225
Type of Data Compromised: Database passwords, Ldap/smtp authentication secrets
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive corporate information, Designs, Contracts, Intellectual property
Sensitivity of Data: high (mission-critical and confidential)
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Type of Data Compromised: Network access, System credentials, Potential government/enterprise data
Sensitivity of Data: High (government/commercial secrets)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (espionage-focused)
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Type of Data Compromised: Government communications, Corporate emails, Intellectual property, Network access credentials
Sensitivity of Data: high (classified government data)high (corporate secrets)
What measures does the company take to prevent data exfiltration ?
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Patched in version 12.8.5, Follow CISA’s Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01 for cloud services, Update all affected N-Central deployments by August 20, 2025, , Stop Web Help Desk service, Backup and delete `c3p0.jar`, Backup `whd-core.jar`, `whd-web.jar`, `whd-persistence.jar`, Replace with hotfix-supplied JARs (`whd-core.jar`, `whd-web.jar`, `whd-persistence.jar`), Add `HikariCP.jar`, Restart Web Help Desk, , implementing cybersecurity supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) practices, reducing supplier list to essentials, setting strict data-sharing policies, , 6-month focus on security over new features, Transparency initiatives (sharing threat actor TTPs), , software patches, forensic analysis, enhanced monitoring, .
How does the company handle incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) ?
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by apply n-able patch (version 2025.3.1) immediately, discontinue use of n-central if patches are unavailable, , hotfix release (manual patching required), , restricting vendor access to sensitive data, reviewing mission-critical data sharing, using secure platforms for file exchange, , isolation of orion build environment, switch to proton email/signal, in-person crisis coordination, , isolation of compromised solarwinds orion instances, network segmentation, revocation of compromised credentials and .
Ransomware Information
Was ransomware involved in any of the incidents ?
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Data Exfiltration: Yes (but not ransomware-related)
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Data Exfiltration: True
How does the company recover data encrypted by ransomware ?
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Hotfix application via SolarWinds Customer Portal, , holding extra inventory to mitigate disruptions, enhancing supply chain resilience, , Engineering team reprioritized to security, Customer communication campaigns, , rebuilding trusted environments, customer notifications, regulatory reporting, .
Regulatory Compliance
Were there any regulatory violations and fines imposed for each incident ?
Incident : Software Exploitation SOL527030325
Legal Actions: Legal allegations by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Regulatory Notifications: CISA Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01 compliance required
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Regulatory Notifications: U.S. CISA added original flaw (CVE-2024-28986) to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog (August 2024)
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Regulatory Notifications: U.S. General Services Administration mandates for C-SCRM practices in federal agencies
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Regulations Violated: Potential securities laws (SEC lawsuit), Cybersecurity disclosure requirements,
Fines Imposed: $26M (class-action settlement); SEC lawsuit pending
Legal Actions: SEC lawsuit (2023) against SolarWinds and CISO, Class-action lawsuit (settled 2022),
Regulatory Notifications: Stock market notification (pre-opening)U.S. government briefings
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Regulations Violated: SEC disclosure rules (alleged), potential violations of federal cybersecurity standards,
Legal Actions: SEC lawsuit (2022–2024, later dropped), potential class-action lawsuits,
Regulatory Notifications: mandatory disclosures to federal agenciescustomer notifications
How does the company ensure compliance with regulatory requirements ?
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Legal allegations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, , SEC lawsuit (2023) against SolarWinds and CISO, Class-action lawsuit (settled 2022), , SEC lawsuit (2022–2024, later dropped), potential class-action lawsuits, .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What lessons were learned from each incident ?
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL802050124
Lessons Learned: The need for stringent cybersecurity measures and rigorous vetting processes for software used within government and corporate environments.
Incident : Espionage SOL327050424
Lessons Learned: Reevaluation of cybersecurity policies and measures across the private and public sectors
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL708050624
Lessons Learned: Critical vulnerabilities in the supply chain security and the challenges in defending against state-sponsored cyber operations.
Incident : Cyber Espionage SOL102050724
Lessons Learned: High level of vulnerability in global IT supply chains and the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity vigilance and defense measures.
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL201050824
Lessons Learned: Highlighted vulnerabilities in the supply chain and the significant impact such breaches can have on national security, corporate governance, and consumer trust.
Incident : Software Exploitation SOL527030325
Lessons Learned: Concerns among security executives about the legal ramifications of their response actions in the wake of cybersecurity breaches.
Incident : Vulnerability Exploit SOL409031225
Lessons Learned: Highlighted the importance of robust cryptographic practices.
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Lessons Learned: Critical importance of patching RMM software promptly due to high-value target status for attackers, Deserialization and command injection vulnerabilities in IT management tools can enable broad network compromise, Proactive monitoring for CISA KEV catalog updates is essential for timely remediation
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Lessons Learned: Recurring patch bypasses highlight the need for robust vulnerability management and secure coding practices., Manual hotfix processes may delay remediation for organizations lacking dedicated IT resources., Proactive coordination with third-party researchers (e.g., ZDI) can accelerate vulnerability disclosure and patching.
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Lessons Learned: Supply chain cyber risks are a top-tier threat, requiring proactive management., Vendor-related breaches are increasingly common, accounting for 40% of incidents., Limited transparency and inconsistent security standards in global supply chains exacerbate risks., Organizations often lack expertise to manage cyber risks effectively, highlighting the need for training and resources., Restricting vendor access and securing data-sharing platforms are critical mitigation steps., Cyber risk assessments and tools like Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst can provide actionable insights.
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Lessons Learned: Importance of verbal communication during crises (stakeholders prefer direct dialogue over written updates), Need for psychiatric support for staff during high-stress incidents, Transparency in disclosing threat actor tactics/techniques (TTPs), Supply chain security requires rigorous code integrity checks, Proactive health monitoring for leadership under extreme stress
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Lessons Learned: Supply-chain attacks require heightened third-party risk management., Transparency in breach disclosures is critical but must balance legal and operational risks., Collaboration with federal agencies is essential for large-scale incident response., Regulatory actions (e.g., SEC lawsuits) can have unintended 'chilling effects' on cybersecurity disclosures.
What recommendations were made to prevent future incidents ?
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Recommendations: Immediately update N-able N-Central to version 2025.3.1 or later, Discontinue use of N-Central if patches cannot be applied, Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement risks, Enhance input validation and logging for RMM tools, Monitor for unusual activity in managed systems (e.g., unexpected commands, new user accounts), Review and harden deserialization processes in custom applicationsImmediately update N-able N-Central to version 2025.3.1 or later, Discontinue use of N-Central if patches cannot be applied, Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement risks, Enhance input validation and logging for RMM tools, Monitor for unusual activity in managed systems (e.g., unexpected commands, new user accounts), Review and harden deserialization processes in custom applicationsImmediately update N-able N-Central to version 2025.3.1 or later, Discontinue use of N-Central if patches cannot be applied, Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement risks, Enhance input validation and logging for RMM tools, Monitor for unusual activity in managed systems (e.g., unexpected commands, new user accounts), Review and harden deserialization processes in custom applicationsImmediately update N-able N-Central to version 2025.3.1 or later, Discontinue use of N-Central if patches cannot be applied, Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement risks, Enhance input validation and logging for RMM tools, Monitor for unusual activity in managed systems (e.g., unexpected commands, new user accounts), Review and harden deserialization processes in custom applicationsImmediately update N-able N-Central to version 2025.3.1 or later, Discontinue use of N-Central if patches cannot be applied, Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement risks, Enhance input validation and logging for RMM tools, Monitor for unusual activity in managed systems (e.g., unexpected commands, new user accounts), Review and harden deserialization processes in custom applicationsImmediately update N-able N-Central to version 2025.3.1 or later, Discontinue use of N-Central if patches cannot be applied, Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement risks, Enhance input validation and logging for RMM tools, Monitor for unusual activity in managed systems (e.g., unexpected commands, new user accounts), Review and harden deserialization processes in custom applications
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Recommendations: Patch N-central servers immediately to mitigate CVE-2025-8876 and CVE-2025-8875., MSPs should audit and secure their RMM tools to prevent supply-chain attacks., Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of N-central servers., Monitor for unusual activity on N-central instances, especially command execution attempts.Patch N-central servers immediately to mitigate CVE-2025-8876 and CVE-2025-8875., MSPs should audit and secure their RMM tools to prevent supply-chain attacks., Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of N-central servers., Monitor for unusual activity on N-central instances, especially command execution attempts.Patch N-central servers immediately to mitigate CVE-2025-8876 and CVE-2025-8875., MSPs should audit and secure their RMM tools to prevent supply-chain attacks., Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of N-central servers., Monitor for unusual activity on N-central instances, especially command execution attempts.Patch N-central servers immediately to mitigate CVE-2025-8876 and CVE-2025-8875., MSPs should audit and secure their RMM tools to prevent supply-chain attacks., Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of N-central servers., Monitor for unusual activity on N-central instances, especially command execution attempts.
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Recommendations: Apply the SolarWinds hotfix for CVE-2025-26399 immediately., Monitor systems for signs of exploitation (e.g., unauthorized command execution)., Review and harden deserialization practices in custom applications., Prioritize patching for internet-facing SolarWinds WHD instances., Consider network segmentation to limit exposure of help desk systems.Apply the SolarWinds hotfix for CVE-2025-26399 immediately., Monitor systems for signs of exploitation (e.g., unauthorized command execution)., Review and harden deserialization practices in custom applications., Prioritize patching for internet-facing SolarWinds WHD instances., Consider network segmentation to limit exposure of help desk systems.Apply the SolarWinds hotfix for CVE-2025-26399 immediately., Monitor systems for signs of exploitation (e.g., unauthorized command execution)., Review and harden deserialization practices in custom applications., Prioritize patching for internet-facing SolarWinds WHD instances., Consider network segmentation to limit exposure of help desk systems.Apply the SolarWinds hotfix for CVE-2025-26399 immediately., Monitor systems for signs of exploitation (e.g., unauthorized command execution)., Review and harden deserialization practices in custom applications., Prioritize patching for internet-facing SolarWinds WHD instances., Consider network segmentation to limit exposure of help desk systems.Apply the SolarWinds hotfix for CVE-2025-26399 immediately., Monitor systems for signs of exploitation (e.g., unauthorized command execution)., Review and harden deserialization practices in custom applications., Prioritize patching for internet-facing SolarWinds WHD instances., Consider network segmentation to limit exposure of help desk systems.
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Recommendations: Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only.Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only.Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only.Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only.Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only.Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only.Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only.Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only.
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Recommendations: Implement secure build environments with code signing/integrity verification, Develop playbooks for supply chain compromise scenarios, Engage third-party cybersecurity firms preemptively for incident response, Prioritize mental health support for incident response teams, Enhance customer communication strategies for transparencyImplement secure build environments with code signing/integrity verification, Develop playbooks for supply chain compromise scenarios, Engage third-party cybersecurity firms preemptively for incident response, Prioritize mental health support for incident response teams, Enhance customer communication strategies for transparencyImplement secure build environments with code signing/integrity verification, Develop playbooks for supply chain compromise scenarios, Engage third-party cybersecurity firms preemptively for incident response, Prioritize mental health support for incident response teams, Enhance customer communication strategies for transparencyImplement secure build environments with code signing/integrity verification, Develop playbooks for supply chain compromise scenarios, Engage third-party cybersecurity firms preemptively for incident response, Prioritize mental health support for incident response teams, Enhance customer communication strategies for transparencyImplement secure build environments with code signing/integrity verification, Develop playbooks for supply chain compromise scenarios, Engage third-party cybersecurity firms preemptively for incident response, Prioritize mental health support for incident response teams, Enhance customer communication strategies for transparency
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Recommendations: Implement zero-trust architectures to limit lateral movement in supply-chain attacks., Enhance software integrity checks (e.g., code signing, build environment security)., Develop clearer guidelines for public-private collaboration during nation-state cyber incidents., Reevaluate SEC disclosure rules to avoid discouraging proactive breach reporting.Implement zero-trust architectures to limit lateral movement in supply-chain attacks., Enhance software integrity checks (e.g., code signing, build environment security)., Develop clearer guidelines for public-private collaboration during nation-state cyber incidents., Reevaluate SEC disclosure rules to avoid discouraging proactive breach reporting.Implement zero-trust architectures to limit lateral movement in supply-chain attacks., Enhance software integrity checks (e.g., code signing, build environment security)., Develop clearer guidelines for public-private collaboration during nation-state cyber incidents., Reevaluate SEC disclosure rules to avoid discouraging proactive breach reporting.Implement zero-trust architectures to limit lateral movement in supply-chain attacks., Enhance software integrity checks (e.g., code signing, build environment security)., Develop clearer guidelines for public-private collaboration during nation-state cyber incidents., Reevaluate SEC disclosure rules to avoid discouraging proactive breach reporting.
What are the key lessons learned from past incidents ?
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are The need for stringent cybersecurity measures and rigorous vetting processes for software used within government and corporate environments.Reevaluation of cybersecurity policies and measures across the private and public sectorsCritical vulnerabilities in the supply chain security and the challenges in defending against state-sponsored cyber operations.High level of vulnerability in global IT supply chains and the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity vigilance and defense measures.Highlighted vulnerabilities in the supply chain and the significant impact such breaches can have on national security, corporate governance, and consumer trust.Concerns among security executives about the legal ramifications of their response actions in the wake of cybersecurity breaches.Highlighted the importance of robust cryptographic practices.Critical importance of patching RMM software promptly due to high-value target status for attackers,Deserialization and command injection vulnerabilities in IT management tools can enable broad network compromise,Proactive monitoring for CISA KEV catalog updates is essential for timely remediationRecurring patch bypasses highlight the need for robust vulnerability management and secure coding practices.,Manual hotfix processes may delay remediation for organizations lacking dedicated IT resources.,Proactive coordination with third-party researchers (e.g., ZDI) can accelerate vulnerability disclosure and patching.Supply chain cyber risks are a top-tier threat, requiring proactive management.,Vendor-related breaches are increasingly common, accounting for 40% of incidents.,Limited transparency and inconsistent security standards in global supply chains exacerbate risks.,Organizations often lack expertise to manage cyber risks effectively, highlighting the need for training and resources.,Restricting vendor access and securing data-sharing platforms are critical mitigation steps.,Cyber risk assessments and tools like Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst can provide actionable insights.Importance of verbal communication during crises (stakeholders prefer direct dialogue over written updates),Need for psychiatric support for staff during high-stress incidents,Transparency in disclosing threat actor tactics/techniques (TTPs),Supply chain security requires rigorous code integrity checks,Proactive health monitoring for leadership under extreme stressSupply-chain attacks require heightened third-party risk management.,Transparency in breach disclosures is critical but must balance legal and operational risks.,Collaboration with federal agencies is essential for large-scale incident response.,Regulatory actions (e.g., SEC lawsuits) can have unintended 'chilling effects' on cybersecurity disclosures.
What recommendations has the company implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Implement secure build environments with code signing/integrity verification, Prioritize mental health support for incident response teams, Enhance customer communication strategies for transparency, Engage third-party cybersecurity firms preemptively for incident response and Develop playbooks for supply chain compromise scenarios.
References
Where can I find more information about each incident ?
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Source: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
URL: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Source: N-able Security Advisory
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Source: CISA Binding Operational Directive 22-01
URL: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/bod-22-01
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Source: Shadowserver Foundation
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Source: Shodan Internet Device Search Engine
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Source: N-able (Product Vendor)
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Source: SolarWinds Security Bulletin
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Source: Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (ZDI)
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Source: U.S. CISA KEV Catalog (CVE-2024-28986)
URL: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Source: SolarWinds WHD Upgrade Instructions
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Source: Hiscox Research
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Source: Moody’s
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Source: U.S. General Services Administration
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Source: RegTech Analyst (FinTech Global)
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Source: The Guardian
URL: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/nov/17/solarwinds-hack-russia-cyber-attack-tim-brown
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Source: CNN/60 Minutes (interviews with Tim Brown)
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Source: SEC Lawsuit Filing (2023)
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Source: The Washington Post
URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/16/sec-drops-solarwinds-case-russian-hack/
Date Accessed: 2024-05-16
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Source: CISA Advisory on Sunburst
URL: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/aa20-352a
Date Accessed: 2020-12-17
Where can stakeholders find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities CatalogUrl: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog, and Source: N-able Security Advisory, and Source: CISA Binding Operational Directive 22-01Url: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/bod-22-01, and Source: Shadowserver Foundation, and Source: Shodan Internet Device Search Engine, and Source: N-able (Product Vendor), and Source: SolarWinds Security Bulletin, and Source: Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), and Source: U.S. CISA KEV Catalog (CVE-2024-28986)Url: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog, and Source: SolarWinds WHD Upgrade Instructions, and Source: Hiscox Research, and Source: Moody’s, and Source: U.S. General Services Administration, and Source: RegTech Analyst (FinTech Global)Url: https://regtechanalyst.com, and Source: The GuardianUrl: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/nov/17/solarwinds-hack-russia-cyber-attack-tim-brown, and Source: CNN/60 Minutes (interviews with Tim Brown), and Source: SEC Lawsuit Filing (2023), and Source: The Washington PostUrl: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/16/sec-drops-solarwinds-case-russian-hack/Date Accessed: 2024-05-16, and Source: SolarWinds Press ReleaseUrl: https://www.solarwinds.com/company/newsroom/press-releases/solarwinds-welcomes-sec-decision-to-drop-caseDate Accessed: 2024-05-16, and Source: CISA Advisory on SunburstUrl: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/aa20-352aDate Accessed: 2020-12-17.
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the investigation for each incident ?
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Investigation Status: Ongoing (active exploitation confirmed; full scope of attacks unknown)
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Investigation Status: Ongoing (Vulnerabilities identified; exposure tracking active)
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Investigation Status: Ongoing (no public reports of exploitation as of disclosure)
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Investigation Status: Ongoing (SEC settlement pending approval as of July 2024; U.S. government shutdown causing delays)
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Investigation Status: closed (SEC case dropped; forensic investigations concluded)
How does the company communicate the status of incident investigations to stakeholders ?
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Cisa Advisory Issued (Added To Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog On 2025-08-13), Urgent Notification To Organizations Using N-Central, Security Bulletin Published, Upgrade Instructions Provided, Media Appearances (Cnn, 60 Minutes), Direct Verbal Communication With Affected Entities, Stock Market Notification Pre-Opening, Public Disclosures, Customer Advisories and Coordination With Federal Agencies.
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
Were there any advisories issued to stakeholders or customers for each incident ?
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Stakeholder Advisories: Cisa Urges Immediate Action For All N-Central Users, N-Able Recommends Patching Or Discontinuing Use.
Customer Advisories: Organizations using N-Central should assume they are at risk if unpatchedMSPs must notify clients of potential exposure via vulnerable RMM tools
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Stakeholder Advisories: Solarwinds Customers Advised To Apply Hotfix Via Customer Portal.
Customer Advisories: Security bulletin issued with remediation steps
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Stakeholder Advisories: Direct Briefings To U.S. Army, Operation Warp Speed, And Global Enterprises.
Customer Advisories: Public disclosures via mediaProton Email/Signal communicationsTransparency reports on threat actor TTPs
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Stakeholder Advisories: Federal Agencies (Cisa, Fbi), Affected Corporate Customers, Investors.
Customer Advisories: Public disclosures (2020–2021)direct notifications to impacted organizations
What advisories does the company provide to stakeholders and customers following an incident ?
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Cisa Urges Immediate Action For All N-Central Users, N-Able Recommends Patching Or Discontinuing Use, Organizations Using N-Central Should Assume They Are At Risk If Unpatched, Msps Must Notify Clients Of Potential Exposure Via Vulnerable Rmm Tools, , Solarwinds Customers Advised To Apply Hotfix Via Customer Portal, Security Bulletin Issued With Remediation Steps, , Direct Briefings To U.S. Army, Operation Warp Speed, And Global Enterprises, Public Disclosures Via Media, Proton Email/Signal Communications, Transparency Reports On Threat Actor Ttps, , Federal Agencies (Cisa, Fbi), Affected Corporate Customers, Investors, Public Disclosures (2020–2021), Direct Notifications To Impacted Organizations and .
Initial Access Broker
How did the initial access broker gain entry for each incident ?
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL802050124
Entry Point: Malicious Code in Software Updates
Incident : Espionage SOL327050424
Entry Point: Software updates
High Value Targets: Us Government Agencies, Fortune 500 Companies,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Us Government Agencies, Fortune 500 Companies,
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL708050624
Entry Point: SolarWinds Orion Software
High Value Targets: Us Government Agencies, Major Corporations,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Us Government Agencies, Major Corporations,
Incident : Cyber Espionage SOL501050624
Entry Point: Compromised Software Update
Backdoors Established: Sunburst
High Value Targets: Top Government Agencies, Fortune 500 Companies,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Top Government Agencies, Fortune 500 Companies,
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL201050824
Entry Point: Malicious Code in Software Updates
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Entry Point: Exploiting Cve-2025-8875 (Deserialization) Or Cve-2025-8876 (Command Injection) In N-Central, Potential Phishing Or Credential Theft To Access N-Central Interfaces,
High Value Targets: Managed Service Providers (Msps), Enterprise It Environments Using N-Central,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Managed Service Providers (Msps), Enterprise It Environments Using N-Central,
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
High Value Targets: MSPs and RMM software (e.g., N-central)
Data Sold on Dark Web: MSPs and RMM software (e.g., N-central)
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Entry Point: Malicious Software Updates (E.G., Solarwinds Orion), Vendor Systems With Weak Cyber Defenses,
High Value Targets: Sensitive Corporate Data, Intellectual Property, Confidential Systems,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Sensitive Corporate Data, Intellectual Property, Confidential Systems,
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Entry Point: SolarWinds Orion build environment
Reconnaissance Period: Unknown (likely extensive, given nation-state actor)
Backdoors Established: SUNBURST malware in Orion updates
High Value Targets: U.S. Government Agencies (Treasury, Commerce), Covid-19 Vaccine Research (Operation Warp Speed),
Data Sold on Dark Web: U.S. Government Agencies (Treasury, Commerce), Covid-19 Vaccine Research (Operation Warp Speed),
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Entry Point: Compromised SolarWinds Orion software build system (2019)
Reconnaissance Period: months to years (prior to 2020 detection)
Backdoors Established: ['Sunburst malware (trojanized Orion updates)']
High Value Targets: U.S. Treasury, Commerce, State, Energy, And Dhs Networks, Private-Sector Intellectual Property,
Data Sold on Dark Web: U.S. Treasury, Commerce, State, Energy, And Dhs Networks, Private-Sector Intellectual Property,
Post-Incident Analysis
What were the root causes and corrective actions taken for each incident ?
Incident : Cyberattack SOL22751222
Root Causes: Weak password
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL802050124
Root Causes: Trust in Software Supply Chain
Incident : Espionage SOL327050424
Root Causes: Insertion of malicious code into software updates
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL708050624
Root Causes: Vulnerabilities in supply chain security
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL201050824
Root Causes: Compromised Software Development Process
Incident : Vulnerability Exploit SOL409031225
Root Causes: Use of predictable encryption keys and nonce reuse
Corrective Actions: Patched in version 12.8.5
Incident : Vulnerability Exploitation SOL310081425
Root Causes: Insecure Deserialization In N-Central’S Object Handling, Insufficient Input Sanitization In Command Processing, Lack Of Validation For User-Controlled Serialized Data,
Corrective Actions: N-Able Released Patched Version (2025.3.1) With Secure Deserialization And Input Validation, Cisa Enforced Mandatory Remediation Timeline (August 20, 2025),
Incident : Vulnerability Exposure SOL816082325
Root Causes: Improper Input Sanitization Leading To Command Injection (Cve-2025-8876)., Insecure Deserialization Enabling Command Execution (Cve-2025-8875)., Widespread Exposure Of N-Central Servers To The Internet (780+ Vulnerable Ips).,
Incident : Vulnerability SOL5792457092325
Root Causes: Insecure Deserialization In Ajaxproxy Component, Inadequate Patching For Prior Vulnerabilities (Cve-2024-28988, Cve-2024-28986), Lack Of Input Validation For Serialized Data,
Corrective Actions: Hotfix Release With Updated Jar Files (Including `Hikaricp.Jar` Replacement For `C3P0.Jar`), Enhanced Secure Coding Guidelines For Deserialization, Collaboration With Zdi For Vulnerability Reporting,
Incident : supply chain attack SOL4033240100225
Root Causes: Poor Cyber Defenses In Supplier Systems., Limited Transparency And Oversight In Complex Global Supply Chains., Inconsistent Security Standards Across Geographies And Vendors., Gaps In Vendor Management (E.G., Hr/It Vs. Procurement Oversight)., Over-Sharing Of Sensitive Data With Non-Essential Suppliers.,
Corrective Actions: Implement C-Scrm Practices As Mandated By Regulators (E.G., U.S. Gsa)., Conduct Regular Cyber Risk Assessments For Suppliers., Restrict Vendor Access To Sensitive Data And Systems., Use Secure Platforms For All Mission-Critical Data Exchanges., Enhance Monitoring Of High-Risk Suppliers., Integrate Cyber Risk Ratings (E.G., Moody’S) Into Supplier Management Processes., Build Resilience Through Traditional Mitigants (E.G., Inventory Buffers).,
Incident : Supply Chain Attack SOL4602046101925
Root Causes: Insecure Software Build Pipeline, Lack Of Code Integrity Verification, Supply Chain As A Vector For Nation-State Attacks, Underestimation Of Third-Party Risk In Software Distribution,
Corrective Actions: 6-Month Security Overhaul, Enhanced Build Environment Protections, Customer Transparency Initiatives, Legal/Regulatory Compliance Reviews,
Incident : cyberespionage SOL5303053112125
Root Causes: Insufficient Supply-Chain Security Controls (E.G., Build Environment Protection)., Delayed Detection Due To Sophisticated Malware (Sunburst) Evading Traditional Defenses., Over-Reliance On Perimeter Security Without Zero-Trust Principles.,
Corrective Actions: Solarwinds Implemented 'Secure By Design' Initiatives (E.G., Hardened Build Pipelines)., Federal Agencies Adopted New Supply-Chain Risk Management Frameworks (E.G., Eo 14028)., Enhanced Public-Private Threat Intelligence Sharing (E.G., Cisa'S Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative).,
What is the company's process for conducting post-incident analysis ?
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Monitor For Signs Of Exploitation (E.G., Unauthorized Commands, Lateral Movement), , Shadowserver Foundation (Vulnerability Tracking), Uk Government (Collaboration), , Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (Zdi), , Moody’S Supply Chain Catalyst (Cyber Risk Ratings), External Cyber Risk Assessments, , Monitoring High-Risk Vendors With Access To Sensitive Data, , Mandiant (Initial Notification), Crowdstrike (Investigation), Kpmg (Forensic/Response), Dla Piper (Legal), , Likely (implied by security focus), Cybersecurity Firms (E.G., Fireeye, Crowdstrike), Federal Agencies (Cisa, Fbi), , .
What corrective actions has the company taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Patched in version 12.8.5, N-Able Released Patched Version (2025.3.1) With Secure Deserialization And Input Validation, Cisa Enforced Mandatory Remediation Timeline (August 20, 2025), , Hotfix Release With Updated Jar Files (Including `Hikaricp.Jar` Replacement For `C3P0.Jar`), Enhanced Secure Coding Guidelines For Deserialization, Collaboration With Zdi For Vulnerability Reporting, , Implement C-Scrm Practices As Mandated By Regulators (E.G., U.S. Gsa)., Conduct Regular Cyber Risk Assessments For Suppliers., Restrict Vendor Access To Sensitive Data And Systems., Use Secure Platforms For All Mission-Critical Data Exchanges., Enhance Monitoring Of High-Risk Suppliers., Integrate Cyber Risk Ratings (E.G., Moody’S) Into Supplier Management Processes., Build Resilience Through Traditional Mitigants (E.G., Inventory Buffers)., , 6-Month Security Overhaul, Enhanced Build Environment Protections, Customer Transparency Initiatives, Legal/Regulatory Compliance Reviews, , Solarwinds Implemented 'Secure By Design' Initiatives (E.G., Hardened Build Pipelines)., Federal Agencies Adopted New Supply-Chain Risk Management Frameworks (E.G., Eo 14028)., Enhanced Public-Private Threat Intelligence Sharing (E.G., Cisa'S Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative)., .
Additional Questions
General Information
Who was the attacking group in the last incident ?
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an State-Sponsored Actors, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) APT group, Russian state-sponsored actors, Allegedly State-Sponsored Hackers, Russian State-Sponsored Actors, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) / APT29 / Cozy Bear and Russian state-sponsored actors (alleged)APT29 (Cozy Bear).
Incident Details
What was the most recent incident detected ?
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on December 2020.
What was the most recent incident publicly disclosed ?
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2020-12-13.
Impact of the Incidents
What was the most significant data compromised in an incident ?
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were Sensitive Communications, Intellectual Property, , National Security Data, Intellectual Property, Enterprise Secrets, , Sensitive Information, Sensitive Information, database passwords, LDAP/SMTP authentication secrets, , sensitive corporate information, designs, contracts, intellectual property, , Network Access Credentials, Internal Communications, Potential Government/Enterprise Data, , government agency data, corporate intellectual property, email communications and .
What was the most significant system affected in an incident ?
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident was Critical Systems and Network infrastructure monitoring software and and Orion SoftwareNetworks of Clients and and and U.S. government agenciesprivate sector organizations and Corporate Systems and and N-able N-Central RMM deployments (versions prior to 2025.3.1)Managed systems connected to vulnerable N-Central instances and and SolarWinds Web Help Desk (WHD) and confidential company systemsvendor systems with access to sensitive data and SolarWinds Orion PlatformCustomer IT Environments (100+ agencies/companies) and SolarWinds Orion softwarefederal agency networks (at least 9)hundreds of private-sector companies.
Response to the Incidents
What third-party assistance was involved in the most recent incident ?
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was shadowserver foundation (vulnerability tracking), uk government (collaboration), , trend micro zero day initiative (zdi), , moody’s supply chain catalyst (cyber risk ratings), external cyber risk assessments, , mandiant (initial notification), crowdstrike (investigation), kpmg (forensic/response), dla piper (legal), , cybersecurity firms (e.g., fireeye, crowdstrike), federal agencies (cisa, fbi), .
What containment measures were taken in the most recent incident ?
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were Apply N-able patch (version 2025.3.1) immediatelyDiscontinue use of N-Central if patches are unavailable, Hotfix release (manual patching required), restricting vendor access to sensitive datareviewing mission-critical data sharingusing secure platforms for file exchange, Isolation of Orion build environmentSwitch to Proton Email/SignalIn-person crisis coordination and isolation of compromised SolarWinds Orion instancesnetwork segmentationrevocation of compromised credentials.
Data Breach Information
What was the most sensitive data compromised in a breach ?
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Sensitive Communications, contracts, Sensitive Information, Network Access Credentials, Enterprise Secrets, intellectual property, Internal Communications, Intellectual Property, sensitive corporate information, designs, database passwords, corporate intellectual property, LDAP/SMTP authentication secrets, Potential Government/Enterprise Data, email communications, government agency data and National Security Data.
Regulatory Compliance
What was the highest fine imposed for a regulatory violation ?
Highest Fine Imposed: The highest fine imposed for a regulatory violation was $26M (class-action settlement); SEC lawsuit pending.
What was the most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation ?
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Legal allegations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, , SEC lawsuit (2023) against SolarWinds and CISO, Class-action lawsuit (settled 2022), , SEC lawsuit (2022–2024, later dropped), potential class-action lawsuits, .
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What was the most significant lesson learned from past incidents ?
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Regulatory actions (e.g., SEC lawsuits) can have unintended 'chilling effects' on cybersecurity disclosures.
What was the most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Identify and classify suppliers with access to sensitive data, reducing the list to essentials only., Prioritize patching for internet-facing SolarWinds WHD instances., Discontinue use of N-Central if patches cannot be applied, Patch N-central servers immediately to mitigate CVE-2025-8876 and CVE-2025-8875., Review and harden deserialization processes in custom applications, Develop and implement a robust Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) strategy., Prioritize mental health support for incident response teams, Set strict policies on data sharing and use secure platforms for exchanging sensitive files., Monitor high-risk vendors (e.g., those with access to sensitive data) more closely, potentially involving IT/security teams rather than just HR/procurement., Enhance software integrity checks (e.g., code signing, build environment security)., Implement zero-trust architectures to limit lateral movement in supply-chain attacks., Monitor systems for signs of exploitation (e.g., unauthorized command execution)., Develop clearer guidelines for public-private collaboration during nation-state cyber incidents., Leverage cyber risk rating tools (e.g., Moody’s Supply Chain Catalyst) to align policies with supplier risk profiles., Implement secure build environments with code signing/integrity verification, Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement risks, Consider network segmentation to limit exposure of help desk systems., Engage third-party cybersecurity firms preemptively for incident response, Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of N-central servers., Conduct external cyber risk assessments to categorize suppliers and assign safeguards., Prioritize access control, restricting information sharing to mission-critical data only., Monitor for unusual activity in managed systems (e.g., unexpected commands, new user accounts), Enhance customer communication strategies for transparency, Apply the SolarWinds hotfix for CVE-2025-26399 immediately., MSPs should audit and secure their RMM tools to prevent supply-chain attacks., Reevaluate SEC disclosure rules to avoid discouraging proactive breach reporting., Review and harden deserialization practices in custom applications., Develop playbooks for supply chain compromise scenarios, Enhance input validation and logging for RMM tools, Enhance supply chain resilience by anticipating disruptions (e.g., holding extra inventory)., Monitor for unusual activity on N-central instances, especially command execution attempts. and Immediately update N-able N-Central to version 2025.3.1 or later.
References
What is the most recent source of information about an incident ?
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are U.S. CISA KEV Catalog (CVE-2024-28986), RegTech Analyst (FinTech Global), Shadowserver Foundation, U.S. General Services Administration, The Washington Post, SolarWinds Security Bulletin, N-able Security Advisory, CNN/60 Minutes (interviews with Tim Brown), CISA Binding Operational Directive 22-01, Shodan Internet Device Search Engine, Hiscox Research, Moody’s, SolarWinds Press Release, SolarWinds WHD Upgrade Instructions, The Guardian, CISA Advisory on Sunburst, SEC Lawsuit Filing (2023), N-able (Product Vendor), CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog and Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (ZDI).
What is the most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog, https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/bod-22-01, https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog, https://regtechanalyst.com, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/nov/17/solarwinds-hack-russia-cyber-attack-tim-brown, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/16/sec-drops-solarwinds-case-russian-hack/, https://www.solarwinds.com/company/newsroom/press-releases/solarwinds-welcomes-sec-decision-to-drop-case, https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/aa20-352a .
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the most recent investigation ?
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing (active exploitation confirmed; full scope of attacks unknown).
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
What was the most recent stakeholder advisory issued ?
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was CISA urges immediate action for all N-Central users, N-able recommends patching or discontinuing use, SolarWinds customers advised to apply hotfix via Customer Portal, Direct briefings to U.S. Army, Operation Warp Speed, and global enterprises, Federal agencies (CISA, FBI), affected corporate customers, investors, .
What was the most recent customer advisory issued ?
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued were an Organizations using N-Central should assume they are at risk if unpatchedMSPs must notify clients of potential exposure via vulnerable RMM tools, Security bulletin issued with remediation steps, Public disclosures via mediaProton Email/Signal communicationsTransparency reports on threat actor TTPs and Public disclosures (2020–2021)direct notifications to impacted organizations.
Initial Access Broker
What was the most recent entry point used by an initial access broker ?
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an SolarWinds Orion build environment, Software updates, Malicious Code in Software Updates, Compromised Software Update, SolarWinds Orion Software and Compromised SolarWinds Orion software build system (2019).
What was the most recent reconnaissance period for an incident ?
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was Unknown (likely extensive, given nation-state actor), months to years (prior to 2020 detection).
Post-Incident Analysis
What was the most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Weak password, Trust in Software Supply Chain, Insertion of malicious code into software updates, Vulnerabilities in supply chain security, Compromised Software Development Process, Use of predictable encryption keys and nonce reuse, Insecure deserialization in N-Central’s object handlingInsufficient input sanitization in command processingLack of validation for user-controlled serialized data, Improper input sanitization leading to command injection (CVE-2025-8876).Insecure deserialization enabling command execution (CVE-2025-8875).Widespread exposure of N-central servers to the internet (780+ vulnerable IPs)., Insecure deserialization in AjaxProxy componentInadequate patching for prior vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-28988, CVE-2024-28986)Lack of input validation for serialized data, Poor cyber defenses in supplier systems.Limited transparency and oversight in complex global supply chains.Inconsistent security standards across geographies and vendors.Gaps in vendor management (e.g., HR/IT vs. procurement oversight).Over-sharing of sensitive data with non-essential suppliers., Insecure software build pipelineLack of code integrity verificationSupply chain as a vector for nation-state attacksUnderestimation of third-party risk in software distribution, Insufficient supply-chain security controls (e.g., build environment protection).Delayed detection due to sophisticated malware (Sunburst) evading traditional defenses.Over-reliance on perimeter security without zero-trust principles..
What was the most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Patched in version 12.8.5, N-able released patched version (2025.3.1) with secure deserialization and input validationCISA enforced mandatory remediation timeline (August 20, 2025), Hotfix release with updated JAR files (including `HikariCP.jar` replacement for `c3p0.jar`)Enhanced secure coding guidelines for deserializationCollaboration with ZDI for vulnerability reporting, Implement C-SCRM practices as mandated by regulators (e.g., U.S. GSA).Conduct regular cyber risk assessments for suppliers.Restrict vendor access to sensitive data and systems.Use secure platforms for all mission-critical data exchanges.Enhance monitoring of high-risk suppliers.Integrate cyber risk ratings (e.g., Moody’s) into supplier management processes.Build resilience through traditional mitigants (e.g., inventory buffers)., 6-month security overhaulEnhanced build environment protectionsCustomer transparency initiativesLegal/regulatory compliance reviews, SolarWinds implemented 'Secure by Design' initiatives (e.g., hardened build pipelines).Federal agencies adopted new supply-chain risk management frameworks (e.g., EO 14028).Enhanced public-private threat intelligence sharing (e.g., CISA's Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative)..
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Latest Global CVEs (Not Company-Specific)
Description
A weakness has been identified in codingWithElias School Management System up to f1ac334bfd89ae9067cc14dea12ec6ff3f078c01. Affected is an unknown function of the file /student-view.php of the component Edit Student Info Page. This manipulation of the argument First Name causes cross site scripting. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. Other parameters might be affected as well. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 3.3
Severity: LOW
AV:N/AC:L/Au:M/C:N/I:P/A:N
cvss3
Base: 2.4
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
cvss4
Base: 4.8
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
By providing a command-line argument starting with a semi-colon ; to an API endpoint created by the EnhancedCommandExecutor class of the HexStrike AI MCP server, the resultant composed command is executed directly in the context of the MCP server’s normal privilege; typically, this is root. There is no attempt to sanitize these arguments in the default configuration of this MCP server at the affected version (as of commit 2f3a5512 in September of 2025).
Risk Information
cvss3
Base: 9.1
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Description
A weakness has been identified in winston-dsouza Ecommerce-Website up to 87734c043269baac0b4cfe9664784462138b1b2e. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /includes/header_menu.php of the component GET Parameter Handler. Executing manipulation of the argument Error can lead to cross site scripting. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited. This product implements a rolling release for ongoing delivery, which means version information for affected or updated releases is unavailable. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 5.0
Severity: LOW
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
cvss3
Base: 4.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
cvss4
Base: 5.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
A security flaw has been discovered in Qualitor 8.20/8.24. Affected by this vulnerability is the function eval of the file /html/st/stdeslocamento/request/getResumo.php. Performing manipulation of the argument passageiros results in code injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
cvss3
Base: 7.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
cvss4
Base: 6.9
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
A vulnerability was identified in Scada-LTS up to 2.7.8.1. Affected is the function Common.getHomeDir of the file br/org/scadabr/vo/exporter/ZIPProjectManager.java of the component Project Import. Such manipulation leads to path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 6.5
Severity: LOW
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
cvss3
Base: 6.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
cvss4
Base: 5.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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Incident
Finding
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Digital Assets
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Network Security
Identify exposed access points, detect misconfigured SSL certificates, and uncover vulnerabilities across the network infrastructure.
SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)
Gain visibility into the software components used within an organization to detect vulnerabilities, manage risk, and ensure supply chain security.
CMDB (Configuration Management Database)
Monitor and manage all IT assets and their configurations to ensure accurate, real-time visibility across the company's technology environment.
Threat Intelligence
Leverage real-time insights on active threats, malware campaigns, and emerging vulnerabilities to proactively defend against evolving cyberattacks.
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