Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SOC1778869612)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Socket's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Socket Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Socket breach identified under incident ID SOC1778869612.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Socket's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/socketinc, the number of followers: 8706, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 84 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 750 and after the incident was 733 with a difference of -17 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Socket and their customers.
node-ipc npm package users recently reported "Malicious npm Supply Chain Attack Targets node-ipc with Credential-Stealing Malware", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.
A new supply chain attack has compromised the widely used *node-ipc* npm package, injecting credential-stealing malware into three recent versions: *9.1.6*, *9.2.3*, and *12.0.1*.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Node.js applications using node-ipc versions 9.1.6, 9.2.3, or 12.0.1, and exposing Cloud credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes/Docker/Helm/Terraform credentials, npm/GitHub/GitLab/Git CLI tokens, .env files, database credentials, shell histories, CI/CD secrets, macOS Keychain/Linux keyring files, Firefox profile data, Microsoft Teams local storage.
In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Removal of affected node-ipc versions, credential rotation, lockfile and npm cache audits, and began remediation that includes Rotate exposed credentials, audit dependencies, monitor for unauthorized access, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public advisories to developers.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Need for stricter maintainer account security, dependency audits, and monitoring of open-source supply chains, and recommending next steps like Remove affected node-ipc versions, Rotate all exposed credentials and Audit lockfiles and npm caches, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Developers and organizations using node-ipc.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including malicious npm Supply Chain Attack Targets *node-ipc*, and compromised the widely used *node-ipc* npm package. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious code embedded in the package’s CommonJS entrypoint (*node-ipc.cjs*), which executes automatically upon application load. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating harvests sensitive data such as Cloud credentials, SSH keys, .env files, database credentials, macOS Keychain/Linux keyring files, Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sSH keys and configs, Kubernetes/Docker/Helm/Terraform credentials, and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating npm, GitHub, GitLab, and Git CLI tokens compromised. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating harvests sensitive data from infected systems, including shell histories, CI/CD secrets, Firefox profile data and Data Staged: Local Data Staging (T1074.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating data is transmitted to a fake Azure-themed domain, deletes temporary archives post-exfiltration. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates it via DNS TXT queries to evade detection, transmitted to sh.azurestaticprovider.net such as 443 and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating relayed to *bt.node.js* using query prefixes like *xh*, *xd*, and *xf*. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating heavily obfuscated malware fingerprints infected systems, Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromise of an inactive maintainer’s account (*atiertant*), and Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes (T1564.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating avoids scanning *.git* and *node_modules* directories, skips files larger than 4 MiB. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Socket Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/socketinc/incident/SOC1778869612
- Socket CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/socketinc
- Socket Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/soc1778869612-node-ipc-cyber-attack-march-2022/
- Socket CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/socketinc/history
- Socket CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/popular-node-ipc-npm-package-compromised-to-steal-credentials/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf