Comparison Overview
The Singapore Public Service
The Singapore Public Service
Singapore, SG
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The Singapore Public Service works with the elected Government and Singaporeans to forge a common vision of Singapore’s future and bring it into reality. We take pride in living out our values of integrity, service and excellence. Follow us for stories on how our pu...
US Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W., Washington, 20548, US
Last Update: 30/03/2026
For more information about GAO, please visit www.gao.gov. General Information The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. Often called the "congressional watchdog," GAO investigates how the federal go...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
The Singapore Public Service
US Government Accountability Office
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for The Singapore Public Service in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
US Government Accountability Office has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - The Singapore Public Service (X = Date, Y = Severity)
The Singapore Public Service cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - US Government Accountability Office (X = Date, Y = Severity)
US Government Accountability Office cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
The Singapore Public Service
US Government Accountability Office
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.