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Analyze » SentinelOne » GOOSEN1789503965

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GOOSEN1789503965)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-21
Company Score Before Incident773 / 1000
Company Score After Incident752 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERGOOSEN1789503965
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORPhishing (Malicious Browser Extension)
DATA EXPOSEDCredentials, session tokens, cookies, localStorage,...
INCIDENT DATE30/04/2025
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of SentinelOne's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts SentinelOne Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the SentinelOne breach identified under incident ID GOOSEN1789503965.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of SentinelOne's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/sentinelone, the number of followers: 407815, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 3164 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 773 and after the incident was 752 with a difference of -21 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on SentinelOne and their customers.

On 01 May 2025, 12 Brazilian Banks disclosed Malware Campaign issues under the banner "Brazilian Banking Malware 'KREMLIN' Leverages Blockchain for Stealthy Operations".

Cybersecurity researchers at Elastic Security Labs uncovered a previously undocumented Brazilian banking malware campaign (REF9334) deploying the KREMLIN toolkit.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting User endpoints (Windows systems with Google Chrome/Microsoft Edge), and exposing Credentials, session tokens, cookies, localStorage, sessionStorage, tab history, personally identifiable information (PII), with nearly 1,515+ infected systems records at risk.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Temporary disruption of C2 infrastructure by registering canary domain, and began remediation that includes Removal of malicious browser extension, system cleanup, credential resets.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Use of blockchain (Ethereum smart contracts) for C2 infrastructure evasion; abuse of legitimate binaries (SentinelOne) for DLL sideloading; bypass of Chromium’s Secure Preferences via developer mode manipulation, and recommending next steps like Monitor for unauthorized browser extensions, Implement strict browser security policies (disable developer mode for non-admin users) and Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to detect DLL sideloading.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing (T1566) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including phishing lures impersonating 12 Brazilian banks, and tricking victims into installing a malicious browser extension and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating javaScript file disguised as a banking document, invoice, or corporate file, manually executed by the victim. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified JavaScript (T1059.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating javaScript loaders, custom C++ installers, and malicious browser extensions, User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious JavaScript file manually executed by the victim, and Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating establishes persistence via a scheduled task. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Browser Extensions (T1176) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious browser extension (AVSync System Inc.) installed on Chrome/Edge and Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating establishes persistence via a scheduled task. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating bypassing Chromium’s integrity mechanisms by manipulating Secure Preferences. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating sideloads an unsigned DLL (SentinelAgentCore.dll) via legitimate SentinelOne binary, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious extension named AVSync System Inc. to appear legitimate, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating enabling Chrome’s developer mode to bypass Secure Preferences protection, Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating malware terminates if sandbox or VM environment detected, Reflective Code Loading (T1620) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating dLL sideloading via legitimate SentinelOne binary, and Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating regenerating HMACs and App-Bound encrypted hashes to evade detection. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvests and exfiltrates cookies, sessionStorage, localStorage, Credentials from Web Browsers: Browser Password Stores (T1555.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating steals credentials via malicious browser extension, and Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates localStorage and sessionStorage data. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Local Account (T1087.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating scans for hard-coded process names and hardware properties, Process Discovery (T1057) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating scans for hard-coded process names to evade analysis, System Information Discovery (T1082) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating verifies hardware properties (e.g., ≥2 CPUs and >3GB RAM), and Application Window Discovery (T1010) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating tab enumeration and domain tracking via malicious extension. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Screen Capture (T1113) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating screenshot capture of active tabs via malicious extension, Data from Information Repositories: Confluence (T1213.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating hTML source extraction from active tabs, and Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvests cookies, sessionStorage, localStorage, tab history. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver (T1102.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating uses Ethereum smart contracts as dead drop resolvers for C2 endpoints, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates data to C2 server (luizestrelhashapr.online such as 443), and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating retrieves payload locations from Ethereum smart contract. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates cookies, session tokens, and tab history to C2 server and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating dynamic C2 updates via Ethereum smart contracts. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating potential unauthorized access to banking accounts. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing (90%)
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Execution
JavaScript (80%)
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (70%)
Persistence
Browser Extensions (90%)
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (70%)
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (60%)
Defense Evasion
Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (80%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (80%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (70%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (60%)
Reflective Code Loading (70%)
Obfuscated Files or Information (70%)
Credential Access
Steal Web Session Cookie (90%)
Credentials from Web Browsers: Browser Password Stores (80%)
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (70%)
Discovery
Account Discovery: Local Account (60%)
Process Discovery (70%)
System Information Discovery (70%)
Application Window Discovery (80%)
Collection
Screen Capture (80%)
Data from Information Repositories: Confluence (50%)
Data from Local System (90%)
Command and Control
Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver (90%)
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (60%)
Impact
Defacement: Internal Defacement (50%)

Sources & References