Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SEN1769647301)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of SendGrid's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts SendGrid Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the SendGrid breach identified under incident ID SEN1769647301.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of SendGrid's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/sendgrid, the number of followers: 20135, the industry type: Information Technology & Services and the number of employees: 41 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 753 and after the incident was 734 with a difference of -19 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on SendGrid and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "TA584 Initial Access Broker Expands Operations with Tsundere Bot and XWorm in Ransomware-Linked Campaigns", has drawn attention.
A prolific initial access broker (IAB) tracked as TA584 has escalated its activity, deploying the Tsundere Bot malware alongside the XWorm remote access trojan (RAT) to compromise networks likely as a precursor to ransomware attacks.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting compromised networks and infected hosts, and exposing system information and potential personally identifiable information (PII).
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how ongoing (monitored since 2020).
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing (T1566) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating phishing emails sent via compromised, aged accounts using SendGrid, Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating each target receives a unique URL with geofencing, IP filtering, and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromised, aged accounts using SendGrid and Amazon SES. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating clickFix prompt instructing them to execute a PowerShell command and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating obfuscated script that loads XWorm or Tsundere Bot into memory. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating obfuscated script that loads XWorm or Tsundere Bot into memory, Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms (T1568.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating blockchain-based C2 retrieval using Ethereum blockchain, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs (T1070.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating tsundere Bot and XWorm capabilities suggest log tampering, and Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating malware-as-a-service threat with potential signed components. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating powerShell command fetches an obfuscated script, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating webSocket communication to evade traditional network monitoring, and Fallback Channels (T1008) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hardcoded fallback C2 address if blockchain retrieval fails. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating compromised aged accounts used for phishing campaigns. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating tsundere Bot collects system information and System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery (T1614.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating geofencing aborts execution if system locale matches CIS languages. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating tsundere Bot collects system information and potential PII. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating tsundere Bot and XWorm capabilities include data exfiltration and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating malware-as-a-service with potential cloud-based exfiltration. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating tsundere Bot can turn infected hosts into SOCKS proxies and Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating infected hosts can be turned into SOCKS proxies. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating tsundere Bot infections could lead to ransomware deployment. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- SendGrid Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/sendgrid/incident/SEN1769647301
- SendGrid CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/sendgrid
- SendGrid Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/sen1769647301-sendgrid-cyber-attack-october-2025/
- SendGrid CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/sendgrid/history
- SendGrid CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/initial-access-hackers-switch-to-tsundere-bot-for-ransomware-attacks/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf