Comparison Overview
Scania Japan

Scania Japan
4-4-20, Shiba,, Minato-Ku, 108-0014, JP
Last Update: 13/03/2026
Scania is a global manufacturer of heavy trucks, buses, and engines headquartered in Södertälje, Sweden. With more than130 years of history, we now employ around 60,000 people across more than 100 countries, engaged in research and development, production, sales, and af...

Continental
Continental-Plaza 1, Hannover, Lower Saxony, DE, 30175
Last Update: 20/09/2026
Continental is a leading tire manufacturer and industry specialist that develops and produces safe and convenient solutions for automotive manufacturers as well as industrial and end customers worldwide. Founded in 1871, the company generated sales of €19.7 billion in 2...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Scania Japan







Continental






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Scania Japan in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Continental has 0.99% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Scania Japan (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Scania Japan cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Continental (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Continental cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Scania Japan

Continental
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.