Comparison Overview
Safaricom PLC

Safaricom PLC
Waiyaki Way, Westlands, Nairobi, P.O. Box 66827, 00800, Nairobi , KE
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Safaricom is the leading provider of converged communication solutions in Kenya. In addition to providing a broad range of first-class products and services for Telephony, Broadband Internet and Financial services, Safaricom seeks to uplift the welfare of Kenyans throug...

Jio
Reliance Corporate Park, Navi Mumbai, 400701, IN
Last Update: 08/09/2026
Make a new start. A start that will build beautiful relationships, shape millions of ideas. Enable a new way to live, learn, work and play. At Jio, we build products and services of the future to empower billions of Indians make their dreams a reality. Jio is about YO...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Safaricom PLC







Jio






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
Safaricom PLC has 47.09% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Jio in 2026.
Incident History - Safaricom PLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Safaricom PLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Jio (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Jio cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Safaricom PLC

Jio
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A flaw has been found in OpenClaw up to 2026.9.5. Affected is the function createCanvasHostHandler of the file extensions/canvas/src/host/server.ts of the component Canvas Host Route. Executing a manipulation can lead to denial of service. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. Fix suggestion's "streaming/size-limit" was never shipped - latest 2026.9.5 still buffers the whole file via readFile() (src/canvas/serve.runtime.ts:17,114), unlike the sibling WS path which caps at 64KB. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure.
A security vulnerability has been detected in DLR-RM stable-baselines3 up to 2.9.0. This affects the function PPO.load/load_replay_buffer/VecNormalize.load of the file save_util.py. Such manipulation leads to deserialization. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. In v2.9.0 the PyTorch tensor load path is hardened (weights_only=True), but that hardening was later reverted on master via PR #1913 "Hotfix: revert loading with weights_only=True" [blocked] to fix PyTorch 1.13 compat - so even the one "safe" path is inconsistent across versions. #2281 was closed as a duplicate of #1831 since both are unsafe pickle deserialization - but #1831's fix (PR #41) only gated the Hugging Face Hub loader in the separate huggingface_sb3 package. This finding covers the core stable_baselines3 load APIs (PPO.load, load_replay_buffer, VecNormalize.load), which have no safe mode or gate and remained exploitable in v2.9.0 until the outstanding hardening (PR #2264) ships.
A vulnerability was detected in dmlc dgl up to 2.1.0. This impacts the function load_info/_read_torch_data of the file utils.py. Performing a manipulation of the argument path results in deserialization. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in piskvorky gensim up to 4.4.0. The impacted element is the function Load of the file gensim/utils.py of the component Model Loader. This manipulation of the argument fname causes deserialization. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. Maintainer closed #3663 same-day with no comment, PR, or fix; repo's last push (2025-11-01) predates the report, so the unsafe pickle.load in SaveLoad.load remains unguarded at develop HEAD.
A security flaw has been discovered in JusticeRage Manalyze 1.0.0. The affected element is the function PE::_parse_debug of the file manape/pe.cpp of the component PE Parser. The manipulation of the argument misc.Length results in integer underflow. The attack may be performed from remote. The patch is identified as 3e299685759f4f767088871de58c5d07f98ee382. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue.