Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ERIDEFJOHROLVID1772180734)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Rolls-Royce's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Rolls-Royce Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Rolls-Royce breach identified under incident ID ERIDEFJOHROLVID1772180734.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Rolls-Royce's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/rolls-royce, the number of followers: 1834160, the industry type: Industrial Machinery Manufacturing and the number of employees: 31122 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 822 and after the incident was 788 with a difference of -34 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Rolls-Royce and their customers.
Rolls-Royce recently reported "Credential-Stuffing Attacks Target Corporate SSO Systems via Infostealer-Mined Logins", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.
A surge in credential-stuffing attacks is targeting corporate Single Sign-On (SSO) systems, with recent campaigns focusing on F5 BIG-IP devices.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting F5 BIG-IP devices, ADFS and OWA, and exposing Browser-saved logins, corporate SSO credentials, with nearly 70 unique email-password pairs (54 matched Infostealer logs) records at risk.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing (as per Defused Cyber’s analysis), teams are taking away lessons such as The campaign underscores the shift from exploiting vulnerabilities to abusing legitimate authentication, highlighting the growing threat of identity-based attacks. Organizations must enforce strong MFA, monitor for credential leaks, and secure network edge devices to prevent such attacks, and recommending next steps like Enforce strong multi-factor authentication (MFA) across all corporate systems, Monitor for credential leaks and Infostealer infections on employee devices and Secure network edge devices (e.g., firewalls, VPNs) and close unnecessary open ports.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including 77% (54 credentials) matched data from Infostealer infections, and threat actors repurposed stolen credentials to bypass defenses, Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exposed network edge devices (e.g., Fortinet FortiGate-60E with open ports 541/tcp, 10443/tcp), and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating targeting corporate portals such as ADFS, OWA, and STS. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer infections malware like RedLine, Raccoon, and Vidar that harvests browser-saved logins and Brute Force: Credential Stuffing (T1110.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including credential-stuffing attacks targeting corporate SSO systems, and 70 unique email-password pairs used in the attacks. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious Link (T1204.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating employees’ devices are compromised by Infostealers (implied phishing/malicious links). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating valid credentials to access corporate systems like F5 BIG-IP. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie (T1550.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating bypassing traditional security measures via legitimate logins and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating attackers use valid credentials to bypass defenses. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating access to corporate systems like F5 BIG-IP, ADFS, OWA (implied RDP/remote access). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating infostealers exfiltrate stored credentials from compromised employee devices. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating infostealers harvest browser-saved logins (implied exfiltration) and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating stolen logs are sold on underground forums (implied cloud/remote storage). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious authentication attempts from a Japanese IP (219.75.254.166) and Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating self-signed SSL certificate on Fortinet FortiGate-60E. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Rolls-Royce Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/rolls-royce/incident/ERIDEFJOHROLVID1772180734
- Rolls-Royce CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/rolls-royce
- Rolls-Royce Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/eridefjohrolvid1772180734-rolls-royce-ericsson-johnson-johnson-optage-inc-turkey-ministry-of-trade-cyber-attack-february-2026/
- Rolls-Royce CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/rolls-royce/history
- Rolls-Royce CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/massive-brute-force-attacks/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf