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Analyze » Revil » REV1775449802

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (REV1775449802)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-293
Company Score Before Incident750 / 1000
Company Score After Incident457 / 1000
Company LinkView Revil Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERREV1775449802
Type of Cyber IncidentRansomware
ATTACK VECTORRansomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Double Extortion
DATA EXPOSEDStolen data used for double...
INCIDENT DATE31/12/2017
STATUSOngoing (Shchukin remains in Russia)

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Revil's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Revil Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Revil breach identified under incident ID REV1775449802.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Revil's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/revilcit, the number of followers: 94, the industry type: IT Services and IT Consulting and the number of employees: 3 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 750 and after the incident was 457 with a difference of -293 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Revil and their customers.

Kaseya recently reported "Russian Cybercriminal Behind GandCrab and REvil Ransomware Operations Identified", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

German authorities have unmasked 31-year-old Russian national Daniil Maksimovich Shchukin as the mastermind behind two of the most notorious ransomware groups: GandCrab and REvil.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting 1,500+ businesses and government entities (Kaseya attack), and exposing Stolen data used for double extortion, plus an estimated financial loss of €35 million (economic damage), €2 million extorted from German victims.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like FBI released free decryption key (REvil).

The case underscores how Ongoing (Shchukin remains in Russia).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model used to breach corporate networks and Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating kaseya attack disrupted 1,500+ businesses via managed IT services. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware encryption and double extortion tactics deployed and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating raaS affiliates likely used scripting for lateral movement. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating raaS model implies affiliates gained valid account access. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating high-revenue targets ($100M+) suggest privilege escalation. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains (GandCrab, REvil) used encryption to evade detection and Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating no direct digital footprint linking Shchukin to aliases. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating raaS affiliates likely dumped credentials for lateral movement. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating targeted high-revenue organizations ($100M+) implies reconnaissance. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating raaS model implies lateral movement within corporate networks. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating double extortion tactic involved stealing sensitive data. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware operations required C2 for encryption/extortion. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating double extortion tactic involved public release of stolen data. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains (GandCrab, REvil) encrypted systems for extortion and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware operations disrupted 1,500+ businesses (Kaseya attack). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (50%)
Exploit Public-Facing Application (60%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (50%)
Persistence
Valid Accounts (70%)
Privilege Escalation
Valid Accounts (70%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (80%)
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (60%)
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping (70%)
Discovery
System Information Discovery (70%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (100%)
Inhibit System Recovery (80%)

Sources & References