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Analyze » RELX » RELLEX1772562253

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (RELLEX1772562253)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-50
Company Score Before Incident816 / 1000
Company Score After Incident766 / 1000
Company LinkView RELX Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERRELLEX1772562253
Type of Cyber IncidentBreach
ATTACK VECTORExploitation of unpatched vulnerability (React2Shell)
DATA EXPOSED2.04 GB of structured data
INCIDENT DATE02/03/2026
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of RELX's Breach and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts RELX Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the RELX breach identified under incident ID RELLEX1772562253.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of RELX's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/relx-group, the number of followers: 107690, the industry type: Technology, Information and Media and the number of employees: 2681 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 816 and after the incident was 766 with a difference of -50 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on RELX and their customers.

On 03 March 2026, LexisNexis Legal & Professional (RELX Group) disclosed Data Breach issues under the banner "FulcrumSec Claims Breach of LexisNexis, Exposing 2GB of Sensitive Legal Data".

On March 3, 2026, the threat actor FulcrumSec publicly took responsibility for a breach of LexisNexis Legal & Professional, a division of RELX Group, alleging the theft of 2.04 GB of structured data from the company’s AWS cloud infrastructure.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting AWS cloud infrastructure, Production Redshift data warehouse and 17 VPC databases, and exposing 2.04 GB of structured data, with nearly 3.9 million database records, 400,000 cloud user profiles records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

Overall, the incident is a reminder of why proactive monitoring and strong governance matter.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploited the React2Shell vulnerability in an unpatched React frontend application. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating react2Shell vulnerability in React frontend application exploited. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating lawfirmsStoreECSTaskRole ECS task container had broad permissions. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating eCS task container had access to all AWS Secrets Manager entries and Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating over-permissive ECS task role exploited for broad access. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used compromised ECS task role to evade detection and Subvert Trust Controls (T1553) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating rDS master password set to Lexis1234. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Cloud Instance Metadata API (T1552.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating eCS task container had access to AWS Secrets Manager, Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating single task role accessed all AWS Secrets Manager entries, and Password Cracking (T1110.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating 45 employee password hashes exposed. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 400,000 cloud user profiles (names, emails, phone numbers) exposed and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating complete VPC infrastructure map exposed. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 3.9 million database records, 2.04 GB of data stolen from AWS and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating production Redshift data warehouse and 17 VPC databases accessed. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 2.04 GB of structured data stolen by FulcrumSec and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltrated from AWS cloud infrastructure. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of data destruction, but high-volume exfiltration and Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating potential for data manipulation given broad access to databases. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
Execution
Exploitation for Client Execution (80%)
Persistence
Valid Accounts (70%)
Privilege Escalation
Valid Accounts (80%)
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (70%)
Defense Evasion
Valid Accounts (80%)
Subvert Trust Controls (60%)
Credential Access
Cloud Instance Metadata API (90%)
Valid Accounts (80%)
Password Cracking (70%)
Discovery
Account Discovery (80%)
Network Service Discovery (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Data from Information Repositories (90%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (80%)
Transfer Data to Cloud Account (60%)
Impact
Data Destruction (30%)
Stored Data Manipulation (40%)