Comparison Overview
PULL&BEAR

PULL&BEAR
Polígono Industrial Río do Pozo, NARÓN, A CORUÑA, ES, 15578
Last Update: 30/03/2026
Pull&Bear was founded in 1991 with a clear international vocation and the intention to sell clothes to young people committed to their environment who live in the community and interact together. Young people who choose to dress casually, rejecting stereotypes and wanti...

Under Armour
101 Performance Dr, Baltimore, 21230, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Our Belief: WE USE THE POWER OF SPORTS TO EXPAND EVERY PLAYING FIELD. Our Obsession: WE ARE OBSESSED WITH ATHLETES WHO STRIVE FOR MORE – IN SPORTS, IN LIFE, AND IN THE WORLD. Our Mission: TO INSPIRE ATHLETES WITH INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN SOLUTIONS THEY CAN’T LI...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

PULL&BEAR







Under Armour






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Apparel and Fashion Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PULL&BEAR in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Apparel and Fashion Industry Avg (This Year)
Under Armour has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - PULL&BEAR (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PULL&BEAR cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Under Armour (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Under Armour cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

PULL&BEAR

Under Armour
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.