Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MICPAC1770804753)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Pacific Coast Producers's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Pacific Coast Producers Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Pacific Coast Producers breach identified under incident ID MICPAC1770804753.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Pacific Coast Producers's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/pacific-coast-producers, the number of followers: 5010, the industry type: Food and Beverage Manufacturing and the number of employees: 539 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 750 and after the incident was 728 with a difference of -22 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Pacific Coast Producers and their customers.
On 25 December 2025, a cybersecurity incident called "TeamPCP Large-Scale Cloud Exploitation Campaign Targeting Misconfigured Infrastructure" came to light.
A threat group tracked as TeamPCP (also known as PCPcat, ShellForce, and DeadCatx3) has orchestrated a widespread cloud exploitation campaign, converting vulnerable cloud infrastructure into a self-propagating cybercrime platform.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Hundreds of compromised servers, and exposing 2.3 million job applicant records (names, birthdates, employment histories, contact details), with nearly 2.3 million records at risk.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Defensive measures include restricting public access to management APIs, enforcing authentication, preventing privileged containers, and monitoring for unauthorized DaemonSets and job submissions, and recommending next steps like Restrict public access to management APIs, Enforce authentication and Prevent privileged containers.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exposed Docker APIs, Kubernetes clusters, Ray dashboards, Redis servers, External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating publicly accessible management interfaces for initial access, and Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating react2Shell (CVE-2025-29927) vulnerabilities in Next.js applications. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Container Administration Command (T1609) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating attacker-controlled containers deployed on exposed Docker APIs, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating proxy.sh script deploys tunneling tools, scanners, and persistence, and Deploy Container (T1610) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious containers on exposed Docker and Ray APIs. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Escape to Host (T1611) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating daemonSets that mount host filesystems for lateral movement and Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating react.py exploits React2Shell to extract environment variables. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Escape to Host (T1611) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating privileged DaemonSets mount host filesystems and Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid (T1548.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating harvests credentials from compromised containers. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating xMRig obfuscated with double base64 encoding and Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window (T1564.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating tunneling tools (FRPS, gost) deployed for C2 relays. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating react.py extracts cloud credentials, SSH keys, Git tokens and Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API (T1552.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating environment variables harvested from compromised containers. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Cloud Account (T1087.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating kube.py enumerates cluster resources and credentials and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating pcpcat.py scans CIDR ranges from public cloud providers. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating sSH keys extracted for lateral movement and Escape to Host (T1611) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating daemonSets spread laterally via host filesystem mounts. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Cloud Storage (T1530) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 2.3 million job applicant records stolen from recruitment platform and Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating environment variables, cloud credentials, SSH keys extracted. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating tunneling tools (FRPS, gost) deployed for C2 relays and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious containers deployed via exposed APIs. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltrated to attacker-controlled servers and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating 2.3 million job applicant records leaked. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating compromised servers repurposed for cryptomining (XMRig) and Account Access Removal (T1531) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating credential harvesting may lead to account lockouts. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Pacific Coast Producers Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/pacific-coast-producers/incident/MICPAC1770804753
- Pacific Coast Producers CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/pacific-coast-producers
- Pacific Coast Producers Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/micpac1770804753-microsoft-azure-teampcp-cyber-attack-december-2025/
- Pacific Coast Producers CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/pacific-coast-producers/history
- Pacific Coast Producers CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://cyberpress.org/teampcp-automates-cloud-exploits/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf