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Analyze » Oracle » ORAMIC1775551007

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ORAMIC1775551007)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-47
Company Score Before Incident800 / 1000
Company Score After Incident753 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERORAMIC1775551007
Type of Cyber IncidentRansomware
ATTACK VECTORZero-day Exploits, N-day Exploits, Internet-facing Systems
DATA EXPOSEDTrue
INCIDENT DATE31/12/2022
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Oracle's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Oracle Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Oracle breach identified under incident ID ORAMIC1775551007.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Oracle's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/oracle, the number of followers: 11005980, the industry type: IT Services and IT Consulting and the number of employees: 197447 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 800 and after the incident was 753 with a difference of -47 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Oracle and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Storm-1175: China-Based Threat Actor Exploits Zero-Days and N-Days in High-Speed Ransomware Attacks", has drawn attention.

A China-linked threat actor, tracked as Storm-1175, has been identified as the force behind a surge of high-velocity ransomware attacks, leveraging a mix of zero-day and N-day vulnerabilities to breach internet-facing systems.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows and Linux, and exposing True.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

Overall, the incident is a reminder of why proactive monitoring and strong governance matter.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating leveraging a mix of zero-day and N-day vulnerabilities to breach internet-facing systems and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating gaining initial access through recently disclosed flaws before patches are widely deployed. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) like PowerShell for lateral movement, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating lOLBins like PsExec for lateral movement, and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating pDQ Deployer for payload delivery, including Medusa ransomware. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create Account: Local Account (T1136.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating persistence is established through new user accounts, Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating web shells for persistence, and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools for persistence. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating chained multiple exploits (e.g., OWASSRF) for post-compromise activity. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating security defenses are disrupted via antivirus exclusions, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall (T1562.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating firewall manipulation to disrupt security defenses, Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating credential theft for defense evasion, and System Binary Proxy Execution (T1218) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating lOLBins like PowerShell, PsExec for lateral movement. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating credential dumping via Mimikatz and Impacket and Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating credential theft for persistence and lateral movement. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating lateral movement and persistence via new user accounts and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration using Bandizip and Rclone. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating lOLBins like PsExec and Impacket for lateral movement and Remote Services: Windows Remote Management (T1021.006) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating abuse of RMM tools for lateral movement. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration using Bandizip and Rclone. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Remote Access Software (T1219) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating abuse of RMM tools (e.g., AnyDesk, Atera, ConnectWise ScreenConnect) and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating pDQ Deployer for payload delivery. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration using Bandizip and Rclone and Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating blend malicious traffic with legitimate encrypted communications. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating deploying Medusa ransomware within 24 hours in some cases and Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware attack threatening the organizations existence. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
External Remote Services (80%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (80%)
User Execution: Malicious File (70%)
Persistence
Create Account: Local Account (80%)
Server Software Component: Web Shell (90%)
External Remote Services (80%)
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (80%)
Defense Evasion
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (90%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall (80%)
Valid Accounts (80%)
System Binary Proxy Execution (70%)
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping (90%)
Credentials from Password Stores (70%)
Discovery
Account Discovery (70%)
File and Directory Discovery (60%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (80%)
Remote Services: Windows Remote Management (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Command and Control
Remote Access Software (90%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service (70%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (90%)
Data Destruction (60%)

Sources & References